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Abstract
This thesis covers the issue of Jerusalem in the Arab-Israeli conflict since the British
occupation of the city in 1917. The main argument is that, contrary to assertions that
the Jerusalem question is, and always has been, non-negotiable, the parties to the
conflict have defined and redefined their positions regarding the city on different
occasions. The construction of nation-states and national identities has been the
primary reason for the changes in the definitions. By drawing on the theory of
conflict resolution and the literature on nationalism, the thesis validates the core
argument by close scrutiny of the positions held by the parties to the conflict.
The thesis comprises an Introduction, five chapters and a Conclusion. The
Introduction discusses the theory behind the centrality of defining conflict as a
method of conflict resolution. It also mentions some key concepts and ideas of the
construction of nationalism and national identity.
Chapter One, "Jerusalem and the Palestinian Politics of State", describes how
the Palestinian leaders did not reject the idea of an international regime in Jerusalem
during the pre-1948 era, even thought they insisted on establishing sovereignty over
the whole of Palestine. After the 1948 war, however, they demanded that sovereignty
include Jerusalem, and so rejected the internationalisation of the city. The chapter
argues that Jerusalem did not play a vital role in the Palestinian political movement
between 1948 and the 1980s. It was revived mostly as part of the programme to build
a Palestinian state.
Chapter Two, "Israel and Jerusalem: the Zionist Movement and the Jewish
State", argues that Zionist thought at the beginning of the twentieth century did not
assign to Jerusalem a special status in the plan to construct a Jewish state. Until 1967
both Zionist and Israeli leaders accepted a Jewish state without East Jerusalem. Even
after that date, there were figures who did not reject a compromise on the city.
Chapter Three, "Jordan and Jerusalem: Second Capital or Arab Solidarity",
explains that Jordan did not object to the internationalisation of Jerusalem during the
pre-1948 period. The state's priority at the time was to annex areas allocated to the
Arabs according to the Partition Plan proposed by the United Nations. Later,
however, Jordan reached an understanding with Israel to partition the city, which led
to the rejection of internationalisation. For a long time Jordan has regarded East
Jerusalem as a sacred part of its territory, although recently it has had to recognise
the right of Palestinian sovereignty over that sector of the city.
Chapter Four, "The Arab Muslim Jerusalem", explains that while Jerusalem
is of vital importance according to public opinion, for the city enhances the feeling of
a common Arab and Muslim identity, it is treated by Muslim and Arab regimes as
part of their foreign policy. They have domestic problems that have greater priority.
Chapter Five, "Jerusalem in the International Sphere", concludes that the
concern of the international community about the Jerusalem question is based on its
importance in the political settlement and stability of the Middle East, rather than on
its religious significance.
The Conclusion outlines the general context on which a redefinition of the
positions of the parties to the conflict could be based, with a view to reaching a
political settlement. The thesis in general is a critical review of the assumptions and
generalisations made about Jerusalem, with the aim of providing a deeper
understanding of the whole situation, which could help in finding a peaceful solution.
in
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Introduction
In 1993 a congregation of Palestinians at al-Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem made
the following statement:
Jerusalem has been an Arab Muslim city ever since the Arabs established
the city of Yabus [Jerusalem] 5000 years ago. This is a fact that is not open
to argument or compromise.1
The Israeli Prime Minister, Yitzhak Shamir, addressed his right-wing party -
the Likud - at the Central Committee on 5 July 1989 as follows:
Jerusalem is the eternal capital of our nation and our country. It is engraved
in the Bible, on which the exiled in Babylon vowed: If 1 forget thee, O
Jerusalem, let my right hand lose its cunning! Let my tongue cleave to the
roof ofmy mouth, if I do not remember you, if I do not set Jerusalem above
my highest joy!2
These quotations are examples of the perception that Jerusalem is the subject
of a deep conflict, and that in addition to the contemporary legal and political
realities, the historic and religious claims form an essential part of it. The examples
show how the conflict affects the followers of the three monotheist religions -
Judaism, Christianity and Islam - and its potentially serious consequences. Thus,
every room in every home in Jerusalem, every shop, road, shrine, as well as the birth
rate, the infrastructure, in fact, every nook and cranny of the city has been seen as
part of the daily confrontation.
Under these circumstances it is not surprising that Jerusalem has been
classified as a non-negotiable issue, and that the postponement of an acceptable
solution has, on different occasions, been the bypass that has enabled the signing of
peace accords in the region. This was true of the Egyptian accords with Israel in
1979 and the Palestinian and Jordanian accords with Israel in 1993 and 1994.
In the view of many observers, the collapse of the negotiations between the
Palestinians and the Israelis in 2000, which resulted in tension throughout the region,
if not the world, was due to Jerusalem.
' "Statement of the Popular Gathering in al-Aqsa Mosque, 21 June 1993", Documents on
Jerusalem (Jerusalem: PASSIA, 1996), p.54.
2 "Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir's Speech to the Likud Central Committee, Tel Aviv, 5
July 1989", ibid., p. 113.
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Nevertheless, any final settlement in the Middle East must include a solution
to the problem of Jerusalem. This means that the conflict needs to be reconsidered as
to whether or not it is negotiable. If it is not negotiable, then why are there dozens of
proposals to resolve it? And what is preventing these proposals from producing any
results?
The view of the conflict as being beyond a resolution is based on the
acceptance that religious and historical constraints prohibit any change in the posi¬
tions of the parties to the conflict. Therefore, perhaps the right way to deal with the
Jerusalem issue is to begin by questioning the authenticity of this view, and whether
or not it reflects reality.
This thesis argues that it is not true that the parties to the conflict over
Jerusalem hold rigid and uncompromising positions. Instead it argues that the parties
to the conflict have defined and redefined their positions regarding the city on
different occasions. Moreover, they have been ready to make, and have made,
compromises and concessions regarding Jerusalem and will be able to do so again
under certain conditions.
It is important to re-examine the various religious and historical claims to
Jerusalem, which form part of the parties' positions; not in the sense of investigating
or rejecting them, but in finding out how they have been portrayed politically by the
different parties to the conflict.
Before tackling the political settlement of Jerusalem, it is important to
answer questions such as: Does the religious significance of Jerusalem really mean
that the parties to the conflict have no choice but to adopt such political positions?
Did the same significance create the same claims in the 1960s? If not, why is it doing
so now?
Although there is no doubt that the inherited religious and historical
significance of Jerusalem is unique, politicians, however, have ascribed to it varying
interpretations to serve their own particular political agendas. Jerusalem itself and
attitudes towards it have been continually defined and redefined.
Thus the argument of conflict definition and redefinition will form the
assumption of this thesis. It has been derived from the reading of the conflict
resolution theories and literature. This thesis builds on this notion by using the
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understanding of conflict dynamics according to "conflict definition and
redefinition" along with the conflict resolution literature to validate the argument of
the thesis that Jerusalem has been treated in varying ways by the parties to the
conflict. In addition, I shall refer to the literature of nationalism and the construction
of national identity, where the definition of the city has been formed in the context of
a larger transformation in the Middle East, that is, the implementation of the nation-
state scheme.
Therefore, this thesis will study the positions held by the parties to the
conflict between 1917 and 2001. The choice of this fairly long period is for two main
reasons; the first being that 1917 was the year of the British occupation of Jerusalem
and the British promise to establish a Jewish national home in Palestine (the Balfour
Declaration). So this year, for the purposes of the study, can be seen as the beginning
of the present conflict. The roots of the present positions can be traced back to the
many circumstances and positions at that time. Moreover, to perceive the changeable
nature of the definitions of the conflict over Jerusalem, it is necessary to make a
comparison of the various positions held during this period. Secondly, the construc¬
tion of the nation-state scheme and development of national identities in the Middle
East were greatly accelerated in the year following the First World War.
0.1 Theoretical Underpinning: Conflict Definition and Redefinition
The notion of conflict definition has not been given much coverage in theoretical
works on conflict, and has been treated only perfunctorily * Among the works which
I began developing this idea of conflict definition and redefinition in the 1990s as a means
of analysing conflicts so as to understand the Arab-Israeli conflict in general, rather than
Jerusalem alone. In particular, my aim was to discover how changes were made to the
definition of the parties to the conflict, and how these changes resulted in a different
understanding of the conflict, its development and possible solutions. My initial purpose was
to understand how and why the conflict between Israel and the Arab parties had been defined
in different ways, and the parties to the conflict given different identities, such as
Palestinians, Arabs, Muslims, Jews, Israelis, Zionists, the West, colonialist and imperialist
powers. I sought to understand how giving different identities to the parties to the conflict
could produce a different understanding of the conflict's past, present and future, and how
decision-making was influenced by these changes. However, the complexity of the issue of
Jerusalem seemed to offer a richer and more focused case study to examine and develop this
idea of conflict definition and redefinition as a method of studying conflicts. This was
especially true where the terminology was changed in defining the issue of the conflict - in
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could make a major contribution to the understanding of conflict by explaining
conflict definition and redefinition, is that of Hugh Miall, Oliver Ramsbotham &
Tom Woodhouse: Contemporary Conflict Resolution: The Prevention, Management
and Transformation ofDeadly Conflicts, first published in 1999.
However, the concept of "conflict redefinition" as applied in this thesis has two
major differences from that of "conflict transformation":
1. Conflict "definition" and "redefinition" indicate a phenomenon broader than that
of conflict "transformation". Transformation means a change in the conflict
itself, whereas "redefinition" refers to what politicians or the parties to the
conflict understand or assert, whether it is real or not. As John Burton expresses
it: "The conflict that is to be solved is the conflict as perceived by those involved,
their interpretations of behaviour and events are part of the reality".3
2. Miall, Ramsbotham & Woodhouse concentrate on the importance and factors of
conflict transformations in the context of "ending violent conflicts". They build
on the fact that conflict is a dynamic phenomenon and conclude that conflict
resolution requires "a series of necessary transformations in the elements which
would otherwise sustain ongoing violence and war".4 In other words, they
confine the importance of what they call conflict transformation to conflict
resolution, whereas transformation can also happen in other contexts such as
escalation. The idea behind using the concept of conflict redefinition is that it
expresses the dual direction of conflict administration. Politicians and parties
define and redefine conflicts in ways to achieve goals that could be conflict
resolution or conflict escalation.
3. However, before elaborating on the functions of conflict definition and
redefinition, it should be pointed out that the definition of certain conflicts
consists of the definition of certain elements, that is, the cause and type of the
conflict, and the parties concerned.
Jerusalem's case - as religious, territorial, national, etc., which is a another important aspect
of conflict definition and redefinition.
3 John W. Burton, Global Conflict, The Domestic Sources ofInternational Crisis (Brighton,
UK: Wheatsheaf Books, 1984), p. 135.
4
Hugh Miall, Oliver Ramsbotham & Tom Woodhouse, Contemporary Conflict Resolution,
The Prevention ofDeadly Conflicts (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2001), p.156.
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0.1.1 Defining the Causes of Conflict
The definition of a conflict cause can be formed in different ways, each designed to
serve a particular function.
First, it is always necessary to distinguish between what are no more than
triggers and the underlying long-term causes, which are the actual engine of the
conflict.5 A famous example of this is the First World War, triggered by the assassi¬
nation of Archduke Franz Ferdinand, heir to the throne of the Austro-Hungarian
Empire, in 1914, although there were other, deeper, causes that could be interpreted
in various ways: ideologically, economically, psychologically, national interests, etc.
Triggers usually have an emotional and symbolic value which justifies the
eruption of a confrontation or war, but which is not sufficient in itself to support the
continuation and the general goals of hostilities, these being based on older and
stronger reasons and controversies.
Jerusalem has been described on many occasions as a trigger. According to
an analysis of the various clashes between Palestinians and Jews which have erupted
in Jerusalem, the city is a trigger rather than the underlying or exclusive reason for
the conflict. The Jewish-Muslim dispute over the Wailing Wall of al-Aqsa Mosque
in Jerusalem in the late 1920s - as explained in Chapter One - was seen as the
trigger, not the real cause, of the widespread confrontations in Palestine at that time.
The same can be said of the visit by Ariel Sharon, then the right-wing opposition
leader, to al-Aqsa Mosque in October 2000. In both cases the broader context of
confrontation between the Israelis and Palestinians was the real engine of conflict,
which included territorial, nationalist and economic dimensions. Thus it is normal to
hear commentators say that Ariel Sharon's visit was only a trigger, whereas the
Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza and the failure of the negotiations
were the real reasons for the Palestinian Intifada, or that the Palestinians launched
these confrontations, thereby exploiting the visit to improve their position at the
negotiations. There is also the view that Ariel Sharon made the visit with the aim of
seeking a confrontation, which would serve his personal interest in the election and
his political agenda of destroying the peace process.
5 On the immediate and general causes of conflict, see: Amos Yoder, World Politics and the
Causes ofWar since 1914 (New York, Lanham; London: University Press of America Inc.,
1986), p.23.
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However, the differences in the definitions of the causes of conflict are more
marked than those between the trigger and the underlying longstanding reasons. The
description of the motives, results and meanings of a conflict needs to be included,
whether they are religious, economic, political or territorial. The definition or rede¬
finition of a conflict according to one of these descriptions can serve particular
functions such as the following:
1. Some definitions justify the actions of the political leadership or one of the
parties to the conflict. For instance, portraying the cause of a protest inside a
country or against a country as rebellion or terrorism could be used to justify a
violent reaction and thus avoid recognising other complaints and assertions as
reasons for the conflict.6
2. Definitions could be chosen to convince domestic public opinion or external
powers to support or even take part in a confrontation. Religion, nationalism,
history and security are usually invoked to promote support. An example from
the 1990s is the Kosovo war in Yugoslavia. Although the Serbs and the
Albanians of Kosovo asserted on various occasions that their aspirations were
based on nationalism rather than religion, both groups benefited from and
invoked religious claims and identities to gain support: the Serbs from Orthodox
Christian countries and Kosovo's Albanians from the Muslim world. In the case
of Palestine, the highlighting of the Jewish or Islamic significance of Jerusalem
has been a common theme in Israeli and Palestinian discourse. Here, the aim has
been to gain support from Jews or Muslims all over the world, which could be
channelled to serve the establishment of a Zionist secular state or a Palestinian
nationalist state.
3. The issue is defined as having a national, religious and historic basis, and
members of the elite or leadership declare that they are its "guardians" and must
therefore defend it from the "enemy". This is a common method of gaining
legitimacy to continue in power, or of winning support over other rival parties. It
can even be used to justify economic and political failure or corruption by stating
6
Burton, Global, p. 132.
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that it is the result of a national matter of top priority which has consumed the
*7
country's resources and governmental efforts.
4. In some cases there are substantial changes in the cause of the conflict, such as
the decline or increase in the importance of the resources of a disputed territory,
owing to the discovery of new resources or the depletion of those currently being
exploited.
5. A change in the parties' abilities and the balance of power, for national or
international reasons, could persuade the leadership to aim for peace or
escalation. This could result in the emphasis or suppression of those definitions
with sensitive emotional connotations.
This thesis gives examples illustrating how the cause of the Jerusalem
question was defined in different ways according to the context so as to achieve a
particular aim, such as internal unity, the eradication of domestic rivalry, an increase
in support, the promotion of ideological claims and policies, or a solution to the
challenge of an international situation.
0.1.2 Defining the Types of Conflict
Another basic element in the definition of a conflict is the classification of its type.
This is based on different aspects of the conflict according to its size, place and
length, etc.8
For the purposes of this research, I shall concentrate on the range and
intensity as the basis of classification, namely, the division of conflicts into zero-sum
and non-zero-sum. This classification is derived from Game Theory, a branch of
mathematics which has been applied to politics with increasing frequency since the
1940s.9
7
Mary Kaldor, The Politics ofNew War (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 1999), pp.78, 81, 84.
8 For the classification of the types of conflict, see Kenneth E. Boulding, Conflict and
Defense: A General Theory (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1962), pp.41-44; Theodore A.
Couloumbis & James H. Wolfe, Introduction to International Relations: Power and Justice
(Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall International, 1990), p. 161; E.F. Penrose, The
Revolution in International Relations: A Study in the Changing Nature and Balance of
Power (London: Frank Cass, 1965), p. 127.
9
Boulding, Conflict and Defense, p.41.
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The term "zero-sum conflict" has been used to describe a situation where the
gain by one party is equal to the loss by the other party.10 In other words, a zero-sum
conflict has no room for a settlement or co-operation. Usually "nationality, language,
territorial homelands and culture are not easily bargained over. They create zero-sum
conflicts."11
Non-zero-sum games offer scope for co-operation among the players in some
positions, or when the parties realise that taking a particular position to avoid playing
19
the game is an advantage to both sides.
Transition from zero-sum to non-zero-sum is possible, for example, where it
is imposed by variables. In Game Theory literature there is a known probability
called the Prisoners' Dilemma, where, under certain circumstances, prisoners cannot
avoid co-operating with one another to deal with a particular situation or to face a
common challenge.13 Thus a zero-sum conflict could be redefined as a non-zero-sum
conflict.
However, it is important to note that Game Theory depends largely on taking
into account the elements of the conflict and the factors affecting it, so as to search
for the possibility of a compromise. It must be borne in mind that the parties to the
conflict cannot ignore reality and portray the conflict as being beyond a compromise
- or zero-sum - in order to justify certain actions or to avoid a compromise.
Jerusalem has been defined or portrayed, especially during the last three
decades of the twentieth century, as a zero-sum conflict where no solution nor
compromise is possible. However, by taking a long-term view of the conflict since its
early stages in the 1920s, and by a deeper examination of the political positions of
the parties concerned, this thesis will show that these parties have expressed non-
zero-sum views regarding Jerusalem on many occasions, and that they have been
ready to make, and indeed have made, concessions to reach a settlement, and that the
definition of the type of conflict over Jerusalem has been open to change.
10
Ibid, p.44.
11 John McGarry & Brendan O'Leary, The Politics ofEthnic Conflict Regulation (London:
Routledge, 1993), p.16.
12
Boulding, Conflict and Defense, p.44.
13 Morton A. Kaplan, New Approaches to International Relations (New York: St Martin's
Press, 1968), p.513.
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0.1.3 Defining the Parties to the Conflict
Here again the definition of the parties to a conflict is subject to variation according
to the context. It is commonly accepted that the parties have different identities:
national, religious, ethnic and ideological. Choosing a particular identity will have
several consequences. The conflict between Israel and its opponents has been defined
in many ways, such as Israeli-Palestinian, Jewish-Islamic, Arab-Israeli, or a
Western imperialist or colonialist issue.
Clearly, each definition has its own meanings and consequences. The conflict
can be broadened and intensified, or narrowed and minimised, according to the
definition. Jerusalem in particular, and to a greater degree, has been given over¬
lapping definitions of the parties to the conflict over the city. The conflict and
solution in a Palestinian-Israeli framework would be different from those of an
Islamic-Christian-Jewish framework, for the demands of each party, the balance of
power, and the political positions in general would vary according to which
definition was adopted.
Miall et al. define what they call "actor transformation" as "a change of
leadership, a change in the constituency of leaders or adoption of new goals, values
or beliefs" which could "lead to redefine directions, abandon or modify cherished
goals or adopt radically different perspectives".14
The strengthening of a political ideology or power inside one of the parties
concerned could lead to a redefinition in its view of the identity or range of all the
parties to the conflict. For instance, the growth in Palestinian patriotism and left-
wing secularism in the late 1960s led to a decrease in the concentration on
Jerusalem's significance as a Muslim cause. On the other hand, the growth in
Islamism in the Middle East since the 1980s has accompanied an increase in the
Palestinian leadership's concentration on Jerusalem as an Arab and Muslim issue.
However, the main context in which the positions of the parties to the conflict
have been defined and redefined has been the establishment of the nation-state and
the development of a national identity.
14
Miall, Ramsbotham & Woodhouse, Contemporary, p. 157.
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0.2 The Nation-State Scheme in the Middle East
The victory of Britain and France over the Ottomans in the First World War and the
Franco-British occupation of large areas of the former territories of the Ottoman
Empire opened the door to the establishment of a new regional political order. The
Sykes-Picot agreement of 1916, which was to divide the Middle East between
Britain and France, was an important aspect of the scheme and implied the creation
of new separate entities in the region. Although these entities were individual states,
they were under British and French Mandates.
There were different meanings and functions attached to the implementation
of the scheme. Among the most remarkable was that these states would be expected
to express the interests of their own people living inside the newly drawn borders but
they were not to be part of a larger Arab and Muslim entity or movement. According
to many observers this was the method of "divide and rule".
If this scheme were to succeed, then causes such as Palestine or Jerusalem
would not be seen as Arab or Muslim issues. The definition of the parties to the
conflict over Jerusalem would then be Arab Palestinians versus Jews, and the object of
the conflict could be incompatible ethnic claims, subject to a compromise supported by
the British government.
National identity and interests would replace or have priority over Arab and
Islamic identities and concerns, for example. Under this scheme Palestine would be
expected to be considered an external question by the populations of the region.
However, the implementation of the scheme was not only a matter of
declaring the establishment of new states, but also that of a lengthy construction,
especially the development of national identities to match the states. Moreover, the
legitimacy of these states and their ruling regimes still had to be promoted among the
peoples concerned.
To understand the construction of the nation-state in the Middle East and the
analysis of a question such as Jerusalem in this context, it is necessary to explain
some key concepts that will be used in the argument in the following chapters.
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0.2.1 The Nation-State and Nationalism
The nation-state in general is a phenomenon connected with "nationalism", the
concept of which, according to many scholars, can be traced back to the second half
of the eighteenth century. It described the new shape of the states in Europe, such as
that of France after the French Revolution, which aimed to establish a state
representing not a single class or a city, but a whole population. The nation-state was
seen as a state representing what was then believed to be a people of a particular
race, language, ethnicity, etc.15
The association between the establishment of state and nationalism was
always crucial and has been described as follows:
I defined nationalism as a political movement having two characteristics: (1)
individual members give their primary loyalty to their own ethnic or national
community, this loyalty supersedes their loyalty to other groups, e.g. those
based on common kinship or political ideology; and (2) these ethnic or
national communities desire their own independent state.15
According to this definition, the peoples of the newly established states in the
Middle East are supposed to give priority to the domestic issues of the new states,
not only over their narrow kinship and local loyalties but also over those of Islam and
the Arab world. However, according to the same definition and to many others of a
similar nature, there is the assumption that loyalty is an expression of an already
developed national or ethnic identity, in the sense that nationalism or identity
precedes the establishment of a state. This logic was the reason why the term
"nation-state" was applied to these entities. However, the term was inapplicable to
the Arab and Islamic world, where the people of the new states did not have
particular identities associated with these borders which could distinguish them from
neighbouring states. Certainly, there were relative differences in the situation of these
countries with newly drawn frontiers, where some of them once formed an
administrative or political unit, whose inhabitants asserted a connection with a
15 Hass Kohan, The Idea ofNationalism, A Study in its Origin and Background (New York:
Macmillan, 1946), p.3. See also, Ernest Renan, "What is a Nation?", lecture given in Paris on
11 March 1882, in Goff Eley & Ronald Grigor Suny (eds), Becoming National (A Reader)
(New York, & Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1996), p.42.
16 Michael Brown (ed.), Theories of War and Peace: An International Security Reader
(Cambridge, Mass. & London: MIT Press, 1998), p.258.
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particular pre- or post-Islamic era or event. Some of these countries had natural
resources and material bases qualifying them as states, whereas others did not.
However, the separate nation-state identity in the Western sense was still far from
existing in most, if not all, of these countries.
This issue raises two points that have already been discussed in the literature
on nationalism: (1) Is nationalism a natural development? and (2) What is the ante¬
cedence between nation construction and state building?
0.2.1.2 Nation Construction
Hass Kohan wrote in the 1940s: "[Nationalism is not a natural phenomenon, not a
product of 'eternal' or 'natural' laws; it is a product of the growth of social and
intellectual factors at a certain stage of history."17 By the end of the twentieth
century, scholars studying the development of nations and their identity indicated
clearly that identity and nationalism were constructed by the elite. Mary Kaldor, in
analysing the role of the elite, uses phrases such as "identity politics" to mean
"movement which mobilises around ethnic, racial or religious identity for the
purpose of claiming state power"1 , which some members of the elite implement in
their own interests. She describes the construction of identity as follows:
Identity politics tend to be fragmentative, backward-looking and exclusive.
Political grouping based on exclusive identity tends to be a movement of
nostalgia, based on the reconstruction of a heroic past, the memory of in¬
justice, real or imagined, and famous battles, won or lost. They acquire
meaning through insecurity, the rough rekindled fear of historic enemies, or
through a sense of being threatened by those with different labels.19
Kaldor's analysis is based on her reading of the 1990s Balkan experience, and
concentrates on the elite's self-interest in constructing a sense of nationalism.
However, the role played by the elite in other cases goes beyond this. There are the
ideologists and intellectuals who seek to exploit nationalism to the advantage of their
own circle. There is also an external factor, namely, the role played by colonial
powers to establish nations and identities to serve particular political functions. The
Arab world in the years following the First World War is an example.
17
Kohan, The Idea, p.6.
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According to this view, although nation construction in the eighteenth century
was largely the result of natural development, being an intellectual solution seeking
the group's well being, it became less independent and more firmly manipulated to
serve the agendas of domestic or external powers.
Benedict Anderson, in his famous book, Imagined Communities, describes
"nation-ness" as well as "nationalism" as "cultural artefacts":
The creating of these artefacts towards the end of the eighteenth century was
the spontaneous distillation for a complex "crossing" of discrete historical
forces; but that once created they became "modular", capable of being
transplanted, with varying degrees of self-consciousness, to a great variety
of social terrains, to merge and be merged with a correspondingly wide
variety of political and ideological constellations.20
It is possible to see examples in the twentieth century of what Anderson calls
"nation-building" policies that include "both a genuine, popular nationalism
enthusiasm and systematic, even Machiavellian, instilling of nationalist ideology".
The instruments used to construct nationalism. As explained in several new works on
the subject, included the media, literature, the educational system, administrative
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regulations, and the creation of national symbols.
Thus it can be said that nations and states could develop or be constructed in
ways that varied from one set of circumstances to another and from one era to
another. The nation and nationalism are largely phenomena that in the twentieth
century came to be constructed by certain external and domestic powers. This
explains how, in the Middle East for example, states could be established before the
development of their nations.
0.2.1.3 Nation-State Building
The establishment of states before the development of their nations is a phenomenon
of the post-colonial era. It has been the result of the colonial powers having drawn
the borders of these states with the collaboration of the elites or the intellectuals
20 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of
Nationalism (London & New York: Verso, 1991), p.4.
21
Ibid., p. 114. See also, David McCorne, The Sociology of Nationalism: Tomorrow's
Ancestors (London & New York: Routledge, 1998), p.52.
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trying to imitate European nationalism and use it to achieve independence and
progress.22
In the twentieth century, politicians and scholars argued that states establish
nations, not the other way round. A Polish politician, Marshall Pilsudki, said: "It is
the state which makes the nation, not the nation which makes the state."23 This shape
of the relationship between states and nations made some scholars suggest using the
phrase "state-nation" instead of "nation-state".24
Roger Owen discusses the establishment of nation-states by colonial powers
in the Middle East, describing the common procedure of creating new administrative
and political centres; a capital city, a legal system, a flag and internationally
9 S
recognised frontiers.
In other words, in the Middle East and elsewhere during the twentieth
century, states were first declared and then there began a lengthy process of
constructing their identities and nationalism.
The construction of these states and identities has been met with reluctance by
large sections of the Arab world, on the grounds that the scheme divides Arab and
Muslim nations that are already in existence. The scheme has provoked continual
debates and controversies regarding the future of Arab-Arab relations as well as the
role that each state is allowed - or required - to play in the affairs of the other states.
The question of Palestine and Jerusalem has been at the centre of these debates and
controversies.
0.3 Jerusalem and the Nation-state Scheme
Jerusalem has not been a passive element in the construction of nation-states. The
redefinition of the region's identities and states under the nation-state scheme has
22
For examples of Middle Eastern intellectuals who tried to imitate European nationalism in
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, see Najlb 'Azurl, Yaqazat al-Umma
al- 'Arabiyya [The Awakening of the Arab Nation], 2nd edn, English trans. Ahmad Abu
Melhim (Beirut: The Arab Institution of Studies and Publishing, 1998), p. 18. See also,
Bernard Lewis, What Went Wrong? Western Impact and Middle Eastern Response (New
York: Oxford University Press, 2002), pp.58-63.
23
Quoted in McCorne, Sociology, p.86.
24 Ibid.
25
Roger Owen, State, Power and Politics in the Making of the Modern Middle East
(London: Routledge, 2000), p.l 1.
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influenced the cause of Jerusalem, yet at the same time Jerusalem has in turn
influenced the construction of nation-states in the Middle East. This is clarified in the
following points.
0.3.1 Jerusalem and the Nation-state in Palestine
The policy of the British Mandate in Palestine included tasks similar to those in other
mandated countries: the establishment of national and local governments and
political regimes, which would be under mandatory state control. Although in
Palestine it was not the indigenous inhabitants of the country who would form the
regime, but Jewish immigrants, the same process of constructing a nation and its
identity was followed.
As Roger Owen has observed, the need for a political centre - a capital city -
was essential in establishing the new political entities/states in the region. Because of
its symbolic importance compared with other cities in Palestine, Jerusalem was
chosen as the centre of the Mandate. At the same time, the majority of the Jewish
community in Palestine was living in the city, although most of its members were not
Zionist. Zionist leaders, however, established their intellectual and political institu¬
tions in Jerusalem, their choice being based on the claim that the city was theirs by
right according to Jewish history.
In addition, during the Ottoman era, Jerusalem was the religious, cultural and
administrative centre for other Palestinian cities and its notables had a status superior
to those elsewhere in Palestine. Thus it was Jerusalem which formed the centre of the
Palestinian national movement during the Mandate, and its notables were the Pales¬
tinian Arab leadership.
Jerusalem has remained central to the Palestinian and Jewish/Israeli rhetoric
as a national capital of the Jewish or the Palestinian state until the present day. As the
capital of Palestine and Israel and a symbol of national identity for both, Jerusalem
has played a positive role in developing the idea of the nation-state in the Middle
East. However, it should be remembered here that symbols used in this way are
constructed according to the presentation and interpretation required to enable them
to serve particular functions. This thesis will show that the religious and historic
significance of Jerusalem has been subjected to this process so as to serve as a
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national centre for the sought Jewish and Palestinian nations. From historical exami¬
nation it appears that the city has been vital in promoting and mobilising support for
the nation-state plan. Yet, at the same time, the two sides - the Jews and the
Palestinians - have been ready to make concessions regarding their status in the city
on various occasions, not only in exchange for establishing their nation-state, but
also to maintain their own interests and achieve gains elsewhere in that state.
0.3.2 Jerusalem and Arab-Muslim Identity
Besides its role as a national centre and symbol, Jerusalem has played another,
contradictory, role. The question of Palestine in general has been one of the pillars of
the argument against the nation-state, in particular that this scheme serves the
interests of foreign powers. Much of Palestine's emotional and symbolic status has
been derived from the existence of Jerusalem inside Palestine.
Palestine's geographical position and Jerusalem's religious significance were
used by Palestinian nationalists to gain Arab support for the Palestinians. At the same
time the geographical position has been a theme in the discourse of pan-Arab unity,
which rejects the Jewish state, insisting that it is an alien physical body installed to
prevent the possibility of unity between the Arab countries of Africa and Asia.
Jerusalem is also a vehicle of pan-Arab and pan-Islamic power, around which a
united Muslim and Arab movement and public opinion could be mobilised. In other
words, Jerusalem could be useful to both the Palestinian nationalist, and
Arab/Islamist nationalist movements.
0.3.3 Who is Responsible for the Jerusalem Issue?
One of the crucial questions regarding both Jerusalem and the construction of the
nation-state is who is responsible for the Jerusalem issue. Is it the international
community and the United Nations, or the Palestinians and the Israelis, or is it a
Muslim/Arab-Jewish regional issue?
Arab regimes fell under contradictory pressures: some demanded to maximise
their participation in the Jerusalem issue and others to minimise it. International
powers and the requirements of nation-state construction were the main pressures to
minimise participation. Public opinion and the pan-Arab and Islamic powers and
political organisations were demanding maximum participation.
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However, it is not possible to deal with the different Arab regimes as one
group under the same circumstances or in the same position, nor is it possible to see
the whole period of the conflict since 1917 from a single perspective.
During particular periods and under certain circumstances the states
controlled by the Mandate had very little freedom to make decisions, especially
before independence, or when treaties between them and Britain and France
restricted their mobility. However, even when new regimes, such as Egypt, Syria and
Iraq, came to power in the 1950s, other regimes such as Jordan and the Gulf states
still had to depend on the political and military protection and financial aid of the
leading world powers against their new radical neighbours. Moreover, the so-called
radical regimes had to act carefully regarding Israel, knowing that they were not
ready for confrontation with that state. In addition, much of their sources and energy
was wasted settling domestic and Arab internal disputes and confrontations, which
were mostly given higher priority than the question of Palestine. Nevertheless, pan-
Arab slogans were raised.
On the other hand, the influence of pan-Arab political parties in the various
states until the 1970s and the Islamic movement since then have persuaded domestic
public opinion to press their governments to take a greater interest in the Jerusalem
issue. The regimes in different contexts have been outbidding one another, each
attributing the responsibility for the defeat in Palestine to someone else, while
publicising its pride in being the real defender of the nation's interests. This kind of
competition has appeared in different contexts, such as the rivalry of some regimes
over the leadership of the Arab and Muslim world, or their attempts to enhance their
legitimacy and popular support by attacking other Arab regimes bearing the responsi¬
bility for Arab political and economic crises and defeat, or even in territorial and
economical controversies. All this discord turned Palestine and Jerusalem, because of
their importance in public opinion, into fertile objects of competition between these
regimes, making each of them careful in appearing to bear its responsibility for the
Palestinian issue.
As a result, the overlapping contradictory factors facing the Arab/Muslim
regimes made complete isolation and abstention from playing a role in the
Palestinian and Jerusalem question unthinkable At the same time, however, these
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regimes still wanted to avoid playing a direct role by defining issues such as
Palestine, or even Jerusalem, as their own national issue. This situation led to a
search for a halfway house.
The solution was the use of vocabulary such as "support" or "solidarity", thus
referring to a situation where one party helps another, without implying that the two
parties are united. Solidarity and support in the form of financial and rhetorical help,
and an increase in the armies' action in wars against Israel, were the halfway house
between isolation and direct participation. Offering financial and verbal help to the
Palestinians could contain angry public opinion, yet at the same time it would not put
these states in direct confrontation with Israel, and so it would reduce the pressure
from the international powers.
In short, Jerusalem was used and interpreted by the international, Jewish
Zionist, Palestinian, Arab and Muslim parties to serve particular and sometimes
contradictory functions. It was a pillar of the plan to establish a Jewish or Palestinian
nation-state, and an essential component of the pan-Arab and pan-Islamic discourse,
which rejected the nation-state. The debate over the definition of the parties to the
conflict in Jerusalem reflects the reactions to the question of nation-state construction
in the Middle East. The resolution of the Jerusalem issue and the achievement of a
political settlement seem to be closely connected with the future development of the
nation-state in the region. Meanwhile, the development of the Jerusalem issue itself
is expected to continue playing an influential rule in this area.
0.4 The Research Contribution and Sources
The aim of this research is to analyse the process of the political settlement of
Jerusalem, using conflict resolution theory as an analytical tool. The thesis develops
the notion of studying conflict definition and redefinition so as to understand conflict
and its development more fully. Jerusalem is therefore viewed not only in the
framework of the peace process in the Middle East, but also in the general political
transformation of the region. In addition, some commonly held assumptions and
arguments in the discussion of the Jerusalem question are examined. By producing a
clearer understanding of the situation, it is hoped that this study will contribute to
reaching a solution to the conflict.
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Although the settlement of the Jerusalem question has been examined in
several studies, the focus has been largely on providing the historical documentation
for the process rather than a detailed political analysis. Most of these studies have
covered only short periods, dealing with occasions when there have been political
negotiations or discussions on Jerusalem in progress. Therefore, on the whole, they
have not observed the dynamics of the development of the Jerusalem question, nor
the changeable nature of the positions of the parties concerned. In other words, by
basing their findings on the period following the June 1967 War, many studies have
assumed that any change in the positions of the parties to the conflict is impossible.
In addition, the limited period covered by these studies and the restriction of the
research to the Palestinian-Israeli aspect have made it difficult to see the Jerusalem
question in the general context of Middle Eastern politics.
However, it is important to note that the recent focus on Jerusalem in the
Palestinian-Israeli negotiations has stimulated a number of studies of the political
settlement of the city, resulting in the publication of several books since the second
half of the 1990s. Michael Dumper, who has written and lectured extensively on
Jerusalem for a long time, has produced the following two books on the topic: The
Politics of Jerusalem Since 1967, published in 1997, and The Politics of Sacred
Space: The Old City of Jerusalem in the Middle East Conflict, published in 2002.
Both books provide important observations and data, some of which have been
collected by the author directly from the field, and which may be unavailable from
other sources. The focus is on the development of the situation inside Jerusalem,
especially the city's demography, sectarianism, infrastructure, holy places, services,
property ownership and economy. These topics form most of the first book and only
the last of the eight chapters is devoted to the political settlement. In this chapter,
"Jerusalem and the International Community", all the positions taken by the United
States, the United Kingdom, the European Union, Jordan, the PLO, and the Arab
states since 1967 are discussed. The second book adopts a similar pattern but concen¬
trates on Old Jerusalem (the walled city).
In 1996 Roger Friedland and Richard Hecht published their lengthy detailed
work To Rule Jerusalem. The book, which covers a long period beginning in the
nineteenth century, makes two important contributions to the literature on Jerusalem.
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Firstly, it touches on the question of Jerusalem and the transformation of the national
identity of both the Israelis and the Palestinians, though it does not take the
discussion beyond these two parties. Secondly, it provides a field observation of life
in the city. This was the result of interviews with numerous Palestinian and Israeli
figures living in Jerusalem, with special attention given to the position of the city in
the internal Jewish-Jewish, Palestinian-Palestinian, and Palestinian-Jordanian
controversies. However, the negotiations on Jerusalem between the conflicting
parties and the political and religious position of the city in the Middle East are given
relatively little space.
In 2001, Menachem Klein published his book Jerusalem, the Contested City,
a translation of his Hebrew text Doves Over Jerusalem. It covers the period from
1967 until the final negotiations on Jerusalem in 2000. The book focuses on East
Jerusalem, which was occupied by Israel in 1967. It examines the demographic and
administrative situation inside this sector of the city, the positions of the Palestinians
and the Israelis at the negotiations, and the internal conflicts between both parties
over the issue of Jerusalem. Readers are given inside data on the discussions and
positions of the Israeli side during the negotiations on Jerusalem, especially the
Egyptian-Israeli rounds of the late 1970s. It concentrates on the Palestinian-Israeli
aspect of the issue, with little attention given to the wider regional and international
contexts. Thus the chapter on the Arab League and the Organisation of the Islamic
Conference is very general, and examines only on the Jordanian-Palestinian disputes
inside these two institutions.
Also in 2001, Bernard Wasserstein published his book Divided Jerusalem:
The Struggle for the Holy City. This work has a promising prologue, which calls for
the review of several commonly held assumptions regarding the links between the
parties to the conflict - Jews, Muslims, and Christians - and indicates how these
assumptions have been developed to serve certain political aims. The book as a
whole provides a comprehensive political history of the city of Jerusalem since the
seventeenth century, written in what could be described as an interesting and
academically concrete style. However, the historical chronology has no connection
with the ideas of the prologue on the constructed political implications for the
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religious dimension of Jerusalem, or what it calls "the Heavenly City", remaining in
the circle of general history.
These studies were important sources for this thesis, especially the data
collected in Jerusalem and elsewhere. The research also benefited from secondary
sources which covered some issues connected directly or indirectly with Jerusalem.
Among these works, two examine the development of Palestinian identity. Rashld
Khalidi, in Palestinian Identity (1997), concentrates on Jerusalem's role in this area.
Muhammad Muslih's The Origin of Palestinian Nationalism was a most useful
source of information about events in Palestinian life in the early 1920s. Additional
detail was provided by Y. Porath in The Palestinian-Arab Nationalist Movement,
Volumes 1 (1974) and 2 (1977), covering 1918-1929 and 1929-1939 respectively, as
well as biographies of Amln al-Husayni, the Palestinian leader of the 1920s to the
1940s: Philip Mattar, The Mufti of Jerusalem (1988); and Zvi Elpeleg, The Grand
Mufti (1993). There is a shared significance among these secondary sources in that
much of their material is not currently available, such as interviews with individuals
who are now deceased, or information from personal and family archives as in the
case ofRashld Khalidi and Muhammad Muslih.
Among the published Arabic sources from which I benefited, especially those
covering the pre-1948 period, was a biography of Amin al-Husaym by 'Isa KhalTl
Muhsin: Filastm wa Samahat al-Mufti al-Akbar [Palestine and His Eminence the
Grand Mufti] (1995). This biography is particularly important because it is based on
original documents and archives of Palestinian sources rarely used before. Some of
the material is no longer available, such as that of the Archives of the Arab Studies
Association in Jerusalem, located at Orient House in Jerusalem, which were confis-
cated by the Israeli authorities in 2001.
Although, for various reasons, it was not possible for me to visit Jerusalem
itself, I had access to several important primary sources. My interviews in Amman,
London and Oxford included personalities who had lived in Jerusalem and had
played direct and prominent roles in the city's affairs from the pre-1948 period until
the present day (see the Bibliography). I also had access to several official and
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unofficial archives. In addition to the Public Record Office in London, I collected
information from the Palestinian National Council Archive, the Jordanian Royal
Committee for Jerusalem Affairs, the Jerusalem Day Committee Information Centre,
the Arab Orthodox Society Files, and the files and minutes of the Jordanian
Parliament in the archive ofNew Jordan Studies Centre, all of which are in Amman,
as well as reports from non-governmental organisations and human rights institutions
in Jerusalem, and from the Palestinian Statistics Bureau in Ramallah.*
Published documents, especially the three volumes, Documents on Palestine,
Volumes 1 and 2, and Documents on Jerusalem, all published by the Palestinian
Academic Society for the Study of International Affairs in Jerusalem were important
sources of information.
Last but not least, the newspapers, both British and Arab, covering various
periods from the 1940s to the present day, were extremely useful in clarifying certain
points and revealing forgotten details.
0.5 Structure of the Thesis
This thesis is divided into five chapters, in addition to this Introduction and a
Conclusion. Each chapter examines the position and policies of one or more of the
parties to the conflict. The reason for dealing with each party separately is to enable a
comparison to be made of the positions of each party, and to understand the factors
influencing its decisions at different stages.
Chapters One and Two on the Palestinian and Israeli positions respectively
are longer than the other chapters for two reasons. Firstly, both parties play an active
role in the situation and are viewed by many others as being directly responsible for
it. Since both Palestinians and Israelis live in the city of Jerusalem, they have a much
closer interaction with the issue. Secondly, the two chapters include historical and
contextual data that provide the background to the remainder of the thesis.
Chapter One, "Jerusalem and the Palestinian Politics of State", shows that
Jerusalem could play a role in both constructing the Palestinian nation-state and
adding a wider Arab and Muslim dimension to the Palestinian conflict. However,
26 On the Archives confiscated from Orient House, see the Editorial, "The Looted Archives
ofOrient House", in Jerusalem Quarterly File, Issue 13, 2000.
The Bureau was also destroyed by the Israeli Army in April 2002.
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establishing a nation-state has been the priority in the Palestinians' policies. Thus,
while Jerusalem has been emphasised as the capital and symbol of this state, there
has also been a readiness to show flexibility regarding the city on various occasions
in exchange for advancing the possibility of establishing this state. Most of the time
the Palestinians have defended their right of making independent national decisions
without Arab intervention. Nevertheless, on certain occasions they have highlighted
the Arab and Muslim and even international Christian responsibility for Jerusalem,
pointing out that these parties have also been responsible for deciding the fate of the
city.
Chapter Two, "The Zionist Movement and the Jewish State", argues that the
Zionist leaders have been ready to make concessions over Jerusalem in exchange for
other gains. Moreover, the centrality of Jerusalem in the Zionist discourse regarding
the Jewish state developed at a late stage in the evolution of the Zionist movement.
The hard-line position on the city in recent years expresses the balance of power and
Israeli superiority against its adversaries, rather than religious and ideological prin¬
ciples.
Chapter Three, "Jordan and Jerusalem: Second Capital or Arab Solidarity?",
is devoted to Jordan, which ruled the East sector from 1948 to 1967, and still has a
role in administering the holy places and the waqf (religious endowments)
institutions in the city. The chapter shows how Jordanian discourse on Jerusalem has
been designed to assert the legitimacy of the regime as the city's defender, and to
justify the kingdom's union of the East and West Banks. While emphasising the role
of Jerusalem as the state treasure in creating Jordanian national pride and identity,
the Jordanian government has been careful not to allow the city to develop into a
centre of Palestinian national identity. The chapter also points out how for years
Jordan asserted that its sovereignty of Jerusalem was irreversible, although in the
1980s and 1990s it was forced to backtrack.
Chapter Four, "The Arab Muslim Jerusalem", describes how the Arab and
Muslim states have refused to become directly involved in the Jerusalem question.
They have insisted on solving the problem in the framework of the nation-state
policy, by supporting Palestinian national rights, though not partnering them at the
negotiations, or by using their military means. This kind of response shows that these
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states have given economic and political support mainly to contain and satisfy
domestic public opinion and in reaction to the rivalry among Arab regimes.
Chapter Five, "Jerusalem in the International Sphere", discusses the position
of the four major parties under the headings: "Great Britain and Europe", "The
United States of America", "The Vatican and the Churches" and "The United
Nations". The chapter examines the gradual change in the international view of
Jerusalem. The city's religious significance, namely that of Christianity, had been
used to justify political claims by various international powers in the Middle East
until the early twentieth century. Nowadays, Western powers concentrate on the
importance of Jerusalem in terms of a political settlement in the Middle East and its
influence on the relationships between the states of the region. This includes the
Vatican, which shows less determination to play a role in shaping the settlement of
the issue. Meanwhile, thanks to the United States, the United Nations has small role
in the Jerusalem question and now acts only as a mirror for international politics.
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Chapter One
Jerusalem and the Palestinian Politics of State
Introduction
By the end of the twentieth century, the slogan "the Palestinian State and its capital
Jerusalem" had become the embodiment of Palestinian national aspirations.
However, the Palestine intended by this slogan had not been imaginable until the
period following the 1948 war. The same thing could be said about Jerusalem. The
intended Palestine is around 22 per cent of the Palestine under the British Mandate,
or what is now known as the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The intended Jerusalem is
what is known as East Jerusalem, or the sector remaining under Arab control after
the 1948 war (see Map 2).
East Jerusalem is now the national capital sought by the Palestinians.
However, it had never previously been their national capital, so why should it be
seen in this light now?
For many in the Arab and Islamic world, as well as among the Palestinians, a
nation-state like that which the Palestinians are demanding is considered a symptom
of the disunity and weakness which serve the interests of foreign powers. The
Palestinians have developed a discourse in which they have defined Jerusalem as a
Muslim and Arab issue for which Muslims and Arabs should bear their responsibility
in handling, though asserting at the same time that the city would be part of the
Palestinian national state.
The nation-state in the Middle East was supposed to bring into being new
identities associated with the people inside the borders of these states, and to replace
other, older Arab and Muslim identities. Under this scheme, Palestine and Jerusalem
were expected to regarded as an external issue by these states. However, while the
Palestinian leadership seeks a nation-state of this pattern, it asserts that Jerusalem is
an Arab-Muslim and even a Christian issue.
In fact Jerusalem has played multiple roles. It has been the centre of not only
Palestinian nationalism, but also Arab-Muslim discourse. This has been mainly
connected with elite politics. The Palestinian leaderships have managed to benefit
from Jerusalem playing different and changeable roles.
In the same sense the Palestinian political position regarding a political settle¬
ment in Jerusalem has been changeable. Before 1948 the Palestinian leadership had
accepted the loss of control over the city even though it was playing a central role in
the Palestinian national movement, which had resulted in various confrontations
between the Palestinians and the Jews. It was able to accept an international presence
to guarantee freedom of worship and the safety of its Jewish community. This
position changed between 1948 and the mid-1970s, when the internationalisation of
the city was rejected by the Palestinian leadership. The new attitude was the result of
the zero-sum definition of the Arab-Israeli conflict, which denied the existence of a
Jewish state in Palestine. When the Palestinian position changed in the mid-1970s
and the definition of the conflict changed in turn from zero-sum, or based on the
question of existence, to non-zero-sum, that is, a territorial conflict open to
compromise, the position towards Jerusalem itself also changed.
The multiple roles of Jerusalem, and the Palestinian leadership's definition
and redefinition of its positions on the political settlement in Jerusalem will be
examined in this chapter in four chronological phases:
1. From the establishment of the British Mandate to the proclamation of Israel
(1920-1948).
2. From 1948 to the Israeli occupation of the rest of Palestine in 1967.
3. From 1967 to the Oslo Accords in 1993.
4. The final negotiations at Camp David and Taba, and the eruption of al-Aqsa
Intifada in September 2000.
1.1 Pre-1948 Jerusalem: The Politics of the Notables
The British entry into Jerusalem in 1917 as part of its victory over the Ottoman
Empire in the First World War formed a turning-point in the history of Palestine.
From that time Jerusalem began to play a larger political and social role under the
new British Mandate.
26
1.1.1 Jerusalem and the New Palestine
From the historical point of view, Palestine had never been a united, independent
political or administrative entity. In the late Ottoman era, the northern areas of Acre
and Nablus had belonged to the Ottoman province (vilayet) of Beirut, while the
centre and most of the south formed an autonomous district (sanjaq) of Jerusalem.'
However, the name Palestine had always existed and referred to an area that could
not be clearly defined, although it was concentrated mainly around Jerusalem. There
were many medieval and nineteenth-century writers who described Palestine as the
area that included the Palestinian territory under the British Mandate plus parts of the
present Jordan and Lebanon.
However, it should also be noted that the Ottoman sanjaq of Jerusalem,
which was established in 1874, had included around 81.4 per cent of what later
became British Mandate Palestine,3 that is, Jerusalem, Bethlehem, Hebron,
Beersheeba, Gaza and Jaffa. Moreover, owing to the religious significance of
Jerusalem, the sanjaq was distinguished by its direct communication with Istanbul
instead of through a larger unit, as was the case with other sanjaqs. 4
Consulates and vice-consulates of European countries began to be established
in Jerusalem, beginning with Britain in 1838 and followed during the rest of the
nineteenth century by France, Prussia, Sardinia, Spain and the United States.5
This status made Jerusalem the centre of the drawn borders of a separate
mandatory Palestine. On the other hand, the social structure of Jerusalem was crucial
1 'Azurl, Yaqazat, p. 18. See also, Yazid Sayigh, Armed Struggle and the Search for State:
The Palestinian National Movement 1949-1993 (Washington, DC: Institute for Palestine
Studies; Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), p.5.
2 For instance, 'Azurl, Yaqazat, pp.49-71. For medieval examples, see citations in Edward
W. Said, The Question ofPalestine (London, and Henley, Oxon: Routledge & Kegan Paul,
1979), p. 10; and Rashid Khalidi, Palestinian Identity: The Construction ofModern National
Consciousness (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997), pp.29-31.
3 Amln Mas'ud Abu Bakir, Mulkiyyat al-Aradi fi Mutasarrifiyyat al-Quds 1858-1918
[Landownership in Jerusalem 1858-1918] (Amman: 'Abd al-Hamld Shuman Institute,
1996), p.57.
4
Khalidi, Palestinian Identity, p. 152.
5 See C.E. Bosworth, "The Land of Palestine as Mirrored in Western Guide Books of the
Closing Ottoman Period", paper in The Book of the Third International Conference on Bilad
al-Sham: Palestine, 19-24 April 1980, vol. 2, Geography and Civilisation of Palestine
(Amman: University of Jordan; Irbid, Yarmuk University, 1984), p.5.
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in shaping the Palestinian political movement in the early years of the British
Mandate. This structure was a pure model for what Albert Hourani calls "the politics
of notables".6 This description referred to the members of "great families" resident in
cities of the Ottoman Empire, "who can play a certain political role as intermediaries
between government and people, and - within certain limits - as leaders of the urban
population".7 Such groups varied from one city to another and according to local
circumstances. However, there were three major groups of notables, established
mostly in the Arab countries, during the Ottoman era:
1. The traditional group of 'ulama' or Muslim scholars, whose role was vital to the
Ottoman government because "they alone could confer legitimacy on its acts".
They occupied the positions of mufti, naqlb, qadi, etc. (religious judges). Their
inherited status depended on their families, and also on their control of the
sources ofwaqf(religious endowment).
2. Local military leaders.
3. Secular notables (a 'yan, agas and amirs), whose power was rooted in certain
political or military traditions, or who controlled agricultural production,
o
collected land tax and conscripted men for the armed forces.
These groups, as Hourani explains, had a degree of autonomy, for they were
not fully dependent on the government or on the people. Their function was to
legitimise the central government and to administer, on its behalf, the areas where
they were resident. At the same time they represented their people and could
mobilise them when necessary to support or oppose the central government.9
Although Jerusalem was without a substantial commercial or agricultural
base, its religious status allowed the Ottoman government to provide it with a reli¬
gious officer, a qadi, who could appoint deputies in other towns and collect fees for
6 Albert Hourani, Philip S. Khoury & Mary C. Wilson (eds.), The Modern Middle East (A
Reader) (London: I.B. Tauris, 1993). See also Albert Hourani, "Ottoman Reform and the
Politics of Notables", reissue of a paper presented at a conference on The Beginning of
Modernisation in the Middle East (University of Chicago, 1966), pp.83-109.
7 Ibid., p. 89.
8
Ibid., pp. 90, 93 & 103. See also A.H. Hourani, "Introduction", in A.H. Hourani & S.M.
Stern (eds.), The Islamic City: A Colloquium (Oxford: Bruno Cassier; Philadelphia, Penn.:
University of Pennsylvania Press, 1970), p. 18.
9 Hourani & Stern, The Islamic City, p. 18.
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the 'ulama' of Jerusalem.10 This made the lulama' the most influential element at the
local level.
The power of these religious notables spread across Palestine for different
reasons. Firstly, they held religious authority in the other towns and cities. Secondly,
the power of the other traditional notables declined as a result of the Ottoman cen¬
tralisation policy (tanzimat) of 1860. This policy ended the power of the notables in
spheres such as taxation, justice and security.11 At the same time, new socio-
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economic powers appeared in Palestine as a result of the increase in external trade.
These powers, according to Muhammad Muslih, were newly rich families and
individuals, largely consisting of Palestinian and Lebanese Christians, Jews and
Europeans, who formed a rising middle class but because of their origins and ethnic
identity could not be the "Palestinian bourgeoisie".13 As a result, the notables of
Jerusalem had the power to be the notables of Palestine and the major political force
in the country when the British Mandate was established.
In his chapter "The Constitution of the Islamic City", Stern explains the role
usually played by the notables when a new government took power. He says that
when the authority of the government began to decline, the notables "stepped into the
breach and controlled the cities de facto". They would administer the city until the
ruling power regained its authority or a new ruler took over from it.14 Roger Owen
observes that "colonial" states in the Middle East tried to sustain the role of such
groups so as to benefit from them, and "to create an alliance, implicit or explicit"
with them.15
Jerusalem's religious and historical significance and its religious institutions
were transformed into a source of social, financial and political power for certain
families and notables controlling the holy places and the municipality in the city.
10 Baruch Kimmerling & Joel S. Migdal, Palestinians: The Making of People (Cambridge,
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1994), p.68.
11 Alexander Scholch, "The Decline of Local Power in Palestine after 1856: The Case of
'Akil Agha", paper in Third International Conference on Bilaad al-Sham. vol. 3, History of
Palestine (Amman: University of Jordan; Irbid: Yarmouk University, 1984), pp.114, 116.
12
Bosworth, "The Land ", p.4.
13 Muhammad Y. Muslih, The Origin of Palestinian Nationalism (New York: Colombia
University Press, 1988), pp. 9, 37 & 41.
14 Hourani & Stern (eds), The Islamic City, pp.34-35.
15
Owen, State, Power, p. 15.
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This subsequently made Jerusalem and its notables the centre of Palestinian political
life.
The British authority and the city's notables were the two major parties in
Palestine, and Palestine's political future, to a large extent, depended on relations
between them. Both sides co-operated to construct a new formula of "politics of the
notables". The reconstruction of this formula and its functioning centred largely on
Jerusalem, and passed through three main stages as described below.
1.1.2 The Notables at the Crossroads (1917-1921)
The British presence in Palestine caused the Palestinians to face several questions:
How should they deal with the British occupation? How should they respond to the
colonial plan to divide the Arab region into separate countries? And, of course, how
should the issue of Zionism be settled?
Meanwhile, the Jerusalem notables were making efforts to sustain their
power. To do so, it was important that Jerusalem preserved its role as a source of
power and as the base of the leadership. Between 1918 and 1921 the Palestinians
rebuilt their political structure on the Arab Executive Committee and the Supreme
Muslim Council. Both of these major institutions led the Palestinian national
movement until the mid-1930s. Both were based in Jerusalem and influenced by the
political structure and dynamics of the city.
1.1.2.1 The Arab Executive Committee
In 1918, the organisation of the Palestinian political movement was based on the
establishment of the Muslim-Christian Associations (MCA) in every district
throughout the country. Between 22 January and 10 February 1919 the MCA held a
Congress - later known as the First Palestinian-Arab Congress - which was attended
by 28 Palestinian notables representing various districts of Palestine.16
This united structure was attributed largely to Jerusalem's peculiar demo¬
graphy and history, for in several cities there were no Christian communities.
Jerusalem was the main mixed city and, more importantly, it also contained the
16 Subhi Ghusha, Shamsuna lan Taghlb [Our Sun will not Set], vol. 1 (Jerusalem: Markaz
al-Saraya li Khadmat al-Mujtama', 1994), p.261.
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Christian notables who lived alongside the Muslim notables and were part of the
administrative bodies such as the municipality. This framework had several
meanings in relation to the definition of the conflict. Firstly, it showed that it was not
a religious conflict, but one of indigenous inhabitants against outsiders. Secondly, it
was a sign of building a transcendent nationalist identity over the sectarian Muslim
and Christian identities.
The British authorities were aware of the establishment of the MCA and the
preparations to hold the Congress. Nevertheless, no objections were raised; on the
contrary, there were attempts to exploit the Congress. Britain's main aim at the time
was apparently to promote the creation of a separate Palestine. Therefore, Gabriel
Haddad, a Syrian official who was on good terms with the city's notables, was
invited to visit Jerusalem to convince the delegates at the Congress of the justice of
17the slogan "Palestine for the Palestinians". Britain hoped that the notables would
be the driving-force behind the creation of such a "nationalism" which accepted a
separate country as a national goal.
The Congress passed five resolutions:18
1. Palestine was considered to be part of an Arab Syria and had "never been sepa¬
rated from it at any time".
2. Rejection of a statement made in a speech by M. Pichon, France's Foreign Minis¬
ter, asserting that France "has rights in our country [Palestine], based on the
desire and hopes of the native population". The Congress dismissed this
assertion, saying that it had "no foundation".
3. The wish was expressed to keep Palestine allied with the independent Arab
Syrian government, bound by Arab unity and free from all foreign influence or
protection.
4. Based on President Wilson's principles of self-determination, the Congress
refused any promise or treaty regarding Palestine.
5. The Palestinian government would seek the assistance of its friend Great Britain
in the development of the country, on condition that this would not prejudice in
any way its independence and Arab unity.
17
Y. Porath, The Emergence of the Palestinian-Arab Nationalist Movement 1918-1929
(London: Frank Cass, 1974), p.80.
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This was the early Palestinian position, which was against the separation
scheme. However, this view was not shared by the Jerusalem notables. The city was
represented at the Congress by four delegates who actually formed the opposition
party. One was 'Arif Pasha al-Dajanl, who was the President of the Congress. He and
Y'aqub Farrajj, the representative of Jerusalem's Orthodox community, were
considered pro-British. When the Congress resolutions were declared, they
announced that they supported only the second resolution, opposing the French claim
to Syria,19 and issued a statement condemning the change in Palestine's name to
Southern Syria and affirmed that the government of Palestine must be fully
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autonomous in its home affairs, with only a cultural union with Syria.
The other two delegates from Jerusalem were considered pro-France: Shukri
al-Karml, the representative of the Roman Catholics, and 'Abd al-Hamld Abu
Ghowsh, the representative of the villages around Jerusalem. Both of them
announced that their signatures on the draft of the resolutions applied only to the
91
issue of Palestine's union with Syria.
As a result, Jerusalem's status as the centre of the leadership was threatened
by the position of its notables. For example, on 8 February 1919, the Congress
decided to elect Raghib al-Dajani from Jaffa as the replacement President. In
addition, the delegation from Nablus was entrusted with the Congress's documents
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and authorised to convene the coming Congress in its city.
In response, the members of Jerusalem's MCA held a meeting, where the
following decision was made:
On behalf of the public in general, we beg that a constitutional and internally
independent government be, by the free choice of the indigenous population,
established in Palestine. This government will enact all the necessary laws,
according to the wishes of its inhabitants, and be politically united with a
completely independent Arab Syria...23
This decision was a form of declaration by the young members of
Jerusalem's MCA that the position of the Association members was different from









that of its delegate. However, a compromise was soon reached to preserve
Jerusalem's political leadership. As a sign of its dissatisfaction and disappointment
with the Congress resolutions, Britain banned a Palestinian delegation from
participating in the Paris Peace Conference as representatives of the Palestinians.
This decision provoked mass demonstrations, and Amir Faysal in Syria, through
popular demonstrations, was declared as the Palestinian representative.24 On 11
March, and as an indicator, Jerusalem's MCA sent a copy of the Congress
resolutions to Faysal, authorising him to represent Palestine at the Peace Conference
on condition that Palestine was to enjoy full internal autonomy within the structure of
the union.25
The fact that the letter was sent by the Jerusalem leadership clearly cancelled
the resolution to elect a leadership from outside the city. The authorisation of Faysal
as the representative of the Palestinian problem was a halfway solution between the
choice of the Jerusalem notables and the rest of the Congress members. Porath
interprets the compromise as follows: "Apparently, the more extremist groups under¬
stood that without the Jerusalem leadership their appearance as the representative of
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Palestine would carry no weight."
However, it should be noted that the differences appearing inside Jerusalem,
as expressed in the declaration by the city's MCA, reflected the differences between
two powers. One was known by observers as the old notables, who dated from the
Ottoman era, and the other was the young activists, who also belonged to the same
class of notable families but supported the Syrian project under the leadership of
Faysal.
In 1919 and 1920 the young activists managed to mobilise the masses to
support the Syrian option. During April 1920 in particular, they took advantage of
the annual traditional religious season in Jerusalem, Mawsim al-Nabl Musa.* They
23 Ibid., p.85.
24 Robert John & Sami Hadawi, The Palestine Diary, vol. 1, 1914-1945 (Beirut: The




Mawsim al-Nabl Musa is an annual religious festival in Jerusalem, dating back to the
twelfth century. In the 1920s, however, it became a religious and Palestinian nationalist
celebration, in which political slogans and themes were expressed. It is considered a
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delivered political speeches promoting their ideas, which were followed by clashes
between Arabs and Jews. The British police arrested those responsible for the
violence in both groups. Among the accused were two young activists, Amln
- - 'y n
al-Husaynl and 'Arif al-'Arif, who fled to Damascus on 6 April.
It can be concluded from this that the Palestinian view was divided between
the old notables, who were in favour of an autonomous Palestine, and the young acti¬
vists, who supported the Arabist plan to establish the Syrian Arab state. Jerusalem
was to be the focal point of the first view and its leadership to be that of Palestine,
whereas the opposition was centred on Damascus.
The Syrian project received a severe blow from its symbol and leader, Amir
Faysal himself. On 3 January 1919, he secretly signed an agreement with Chaim
Weizmann, the representative of the Zionist Organisation, in which he accepted (1)
the separation of Palestine from the Arab state that was to be established; and (2) the
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Balfour Declaration. Faysal also agreed with the French government on 27
November 1919 that the Arab government would not resist France's occupation of
Lebanon and the coastal regions of Syria north of Alexandretta.29 When the news of
his agreements was published, there was widespread strong disapproval and
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condemnation among the Arab nationalists. The final phase in the Syrian project
was the occupation of Damascus by French troops on 25 July 1920, following which
Faysal left for London.31
These developments enhanced the power of the old notables in Jerusalem.
Therefore, when the Third Palestinian-Arab Congress was held in Haifa on 13
contribution to the development of a united Palestinian national identity, since it was an
annual meeting-point for delegations from various cities.
27 Muhsin Yusuf, "Intifadat al-'Am 1920 al-Filastlniyya fi Watha'iq Wizarat al-Kharijiyya
al-Baritaniyya" [The 1920 Palestinian Uprising in the British Foreign Office Documents],
Shu'un Filastiniyya, nos. 227 & 228 (February-March 1992), pp.6-7.
28 For the text of these agreements, see Walter Laqueur, The Israel-Arab Reader: A
Documentary History of the Middle East Conflict (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1969),
pp. 18-20, 22 & 23.
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(London: Hamish Hamilton, 1938), p.301.
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31 J.M.N. Jeffiries, Palestine: The Reality (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1939), p.328.
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December 1920,32 it requested the establishment of a native government like that of
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Iraq and Transjordan. The leadership of Jerusalem was recognised when the Con¬
gress elected members of the Arab Executive Committee, in which Musa. Kazim
al-Husaynl, the former mayor of Jerusalem, was voted in as President, and 'Arif
al-Dajanl from Jerusalem as Vice-President.34
The Executive Committee became the Palestinian political leadership. Its
political positions did not always match the wishes of the British government. For
instance, on 28 March 1921, the Committee submitted a report to the British
Secretary of the Colonies, Winston Churchill, "On the State of Palestine", which
summed up the view of the Third Palestinian-Arab Congress. The Report asked for:
1. The abolition of the principle of a Jewish National Homeland.
2. The creation of "a National Government" responsible to a parliament elected by
the Palestinian people resident in Palestine before the First World War.
3. A ban on Jewish immigration until such a government was formed.
4. The abolition of the plan to separate Palestine from her sister states.35
For the British government in Jerusalem there were signs that the Committee
had no intention of taking any practical steps regarding issues such as Arab unity.
For instance, Musa Kazim al-Husaynl was quoted as saying in 1921: "Now, after the
recent events in Damascus, we have effected a complete change in our plans here.
• 36Southern Syria no longer exists. We must defend Palestine" This simply meant that
the Palestinian leadership effectively accepted the separation scheme.
There were British predictions that those notables would adhere to the use of
peaceful political tools. One of the British Intelligence officers reported in January
1921: "I do not feel that there is much reason to fear the responsible members of the
discontented party; but the words and actions of the irresponsible members are apt to
32 In May 1920, the British authorities in Palestine prohibited the holding of the Second
Congress. Therefore, the Congress members issued a statement that the Congress had been
held (see Muslih, The Origin of, p.206).
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35 The text of the "Report on the State of Palestine" cited in English in Bayan Nuwayhidd
al-Hut (ed.), Min Awraq Akram Zu'aytir: Watha'iq al-Haraka al-Watanyya al-Filastmiyya
1918-1939 [The Papers of Akram Zu'aytir: The Documents of the Palestinian National
Movement 1918-1939] (Beirut: The Palestinian Studies Institution, 1979), pp. 64-72.
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be dangerous."37 In short, and as will be detailed later, the Committee and the
Mandate had found enough space in which to coexist.
1.1.2.2 The Muslim Religious Institutions
The British High Commissioner in Jerusalem seemed interested in co-operating with
the religious leaders and institutions in the city, believing that it could help him in his
task of administering the Mandate. Jerusalem, a holy city for the Muslim inhabitants
and a probable source of tension, emerged as a source of stability for the occupiers.
The political power of the Mufti of Jerusalem had grown under British rule
since the entry of the British troops into Jerusalem. The Mufti at that time was Kamil
al-Husayni. He assumed sole responsibility for the Central Waqf Committee for the
whole of Palestine. In addition, he was appointed Judge of the Shar'ya Court of
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Appeal in Jerusalem, and was granted the title ofGrand Mufti (al-Mufti al-Akbar).
The British attitude could be seen largely as a reward to Kamil for some of
his actions. Together with other religious leaders he organised a welcome for the
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British military leaders and visits to them when they entered Palestine. He
participated in the ceremony of laying the foundation stone of the Hebrew
University.40 In addition, he announced publicly that the population could rest
assured that the British government, as was its policy everywhere, would do nothing
to hinder the Muslims in the practice of their religion.41 By these actions, Kamil
eased the new rulers' task and normalised their presence as a non-Muslim power in
Palestine and Jerusalem.
When Kamil died in early 1921, the election for the new Mufti accelerated
what could be called the reproduction of the "politics of the notables" formula. The
37 Ibid.
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National Movement (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988), p.22.
39 This has been justified by the Arabs' expectations that the British troops would give them
their independence. See Muhsin Salih, "Juhud ba'd 'Ulama' Filastln fl Ri'ayat
al-Muqadasat al-Islamiyya fl al-Quds wa- Himayatuha 1918-1931" [The Efforts of Some of
Palestine's Scholars in Sustaining and Protecting the Islamic Shrines in Jerusalem 1918-
1931], Majallat Dirasat al-Quds al-Islamiyya, vol. 1, no. 1 (Winter 1997), p.21.
40 Bernard Wasserstein, Divided Jerusalem: The Struggle for the Holy City, 2nd edn.
(London: Profile Books, 2002), p.87.
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British High Commissioner, Herbert Samuel, had inherited the authority of the
Mutasarrif of Jerusalem, who, in accordance with Ottoman law, had to appoint the
Mufti from a list of three candidates chosen by a college of electors comprising the
city's 'ulama', imams (leaders of the prayers in the mosques), and Muslim represen¬
tatives of the regional councils and municipality.
When the election took place on 12 April 1921, there were four candidates,
among whom was Amin al-Husaynl, the younger brother of the deceased Mufti. He
was only 25 years old, and had spent two years in religious education in al-Azhar and
the Egyptian University (subsequently Cairo University). He did not complete his
studies because he enlisted in the Ottoman Army and participated in the First World
War - though not at the front. While in the army, he protested about Turkish
discrimination against Arabs. When Britain occupied Palestine, he worked with the
British Army. He was employed in Damascus as an assistant to Gabriel Haddad,
Director of the Department of Security and Assistant to the British military governor
of Jerusalem. There, he became involved with the nationalist groups centred on Amir
Faysal. He had just returned to Palestine after his flight a year earlier following
al-Nabl Musa clashes. Amin had benefited from a special pardon for himself and
'Arif al-'Arif, which had been granted by Herbert Samuel.42
Amin came fourth and last in the election. However, the candidate who won
the highest number of votes withdrew from the election as a result of British
pressure. This enabled Herbert Samuel to elect Amin al-Husaynl on 8 May 1921.43
Some observers interpret the British position as a response to the popular
demand to appoint Amin, or as the British High Commissioner's realisation of the
importance of the familial balance in Jerusalem. Therefore, he wished to please the
family of al-Husaynl.44 Samuel and Amin had met each other in early April. Norman
Bentwich, the legal secretary and a relative of Samuel, reported that Amin al-
Husaynl had declared at this meeting:
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his earnest desire to co-operate with the government and his belief in the
good intention of the government toward the Arabs. He gave an assurance
that the influence of his family and himself would be devoted to maintaining
tranquillity in Jerusalem.45
The role of the religious institutions of Jerusalem was further strengthened by
the British approval of the establishment of the Supreme Muslim Council (SMC) in
1921. This measure was the continuation of the British policy to minimise
Palestinian opposition to the Mandate by allowing the Arabs autonomy in their
religious affairs.46
The Council had the responsibility for many institutions, such as schools,
courts, orphanages, mosques, and the awqaf funds. The British High Commission did
not prevent Amln al-Husaynl from assuming greater power with his election to the
Council Presidency on 9 January 1922.47
As a result, by the beginning of 1922 the formula of the politics of the not¬
ables had been reconstructed in Palestine. The notables' strength was derived largely
from their traditional authority and from their religious and administrative positions
in Jerusalem. Nevertheless, although there was room for agreement between the
Mandate and the notables, there were also reasons for disagreement. In addition to
being a source of the notables' authority, Jerusalem was a trigger-point of conflict.
1.1.3 The Notables' Triangular Policy (1922-1937)
During the 1920s the Palestinian notables managed to preserve a balanced triangular
relationship. The first angle was the British Mandate and the notables' need for
friendly relations with Britain as the new ruler. The second angle was Zionism and
the resistance to the policy of a Jewish National Homeland. The third angle was that
of the Palestinians-Arabs-Muslims. This balance reflected the Palestinian position
regarding the reasons for conflict in Palestine at that time
44 'isa Khalll Muhsin, FHastin wa Samahat al-Mufti al-Akbar al-Hajj Muhammad Amm
al-Husaynl [Palestine and the Grand Mufti al-Hajj Muhammad Amln al-Husaynl] (1995),
pp.50 & 52; and Mattar, The Mufti, p.24.
45
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47 Muhsin, Filastln, pp.53-54.
38
1.1.3.1 The British Angle
Amin al-Husaynl was officially an employee who was appointed to his post by a
decision of the British Mandate. The Executive Committee was a body of traditional
leadership which existed before the British occupation and they enjoyed relative
freedom of action and organisation. In exchange for this, the British government
benefited from the policies of the notables in different ways.
1. The acceptance by this elite, like the acceptance by elites in the surrounding
countries, of the idea of a separate country.
2. The notables differentiated between the British and Jewish sides. In their rhetoric
they criticised the British Zionist policy, whereas their day-to-day policies
showed clear differences in dealing with each side. In this context Musa Kazim
al-Husaynl was reported to have told Isma'Il Sudql, the Egyptian politician of the
Watanl Party in 1921, before a meeting arranged with the Secretary of the
Colonies, Winston Churchill, that the Palestinians would ask for full indepen¬
dence. However, if this were not possible, their wish was that the real authority
should lie with the British and not with the Jews.48
1.1.3.2 The Zionist Angle
The policy of a Jewish National Homeland was the angle of dispute between the
British government and the notables. The notables rejected any existence of a Jewish
state. Therefore, the Palestinians rejected any political proposal that could lead to its
establishment.
Jerusalem was the focus of Jewish-Palestinian tension, and if the city was the
main source of the notables' power, it was also their main responsibility. There were
many Arab-Jewish disputes in the city. Instances of these confrontations began with
the clashes during the above-mentioned al-Nabi Musa season in 1920, followed by
disputes over the right to worship and the administration of the Wailing Wall in
1922, 1925, 1926, 1928 and 1929.
48 A.W. Kayyali, Palestine: A Modern History (London: Third World Centre for Research
and Publishing, n.d.), p.92.
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Nevertheless, the Palestinian leadership followed non-violent methods in
these disputes. They rejected religious definitions of the conflict and asserted on
different occasions that the Jews could live as citizens in a Palestinian state and that
before the Mandate they had enjoyed "all privileges and rights of citizenship".49 So
the Palestinian leaders continued to use peaceful political methods, which satisfied
the British government. In referring to the first eight years ofHajj Amln al-Husayni's
presidency of the SMC, Herbert Samuel wrote: "with the exception of a small affray
in Jerusalem in the following November, for a period of eight years no disturbance
occurred anywhere in Palestine."50 Even in the Wailing Wall clashes of 1929, and
despite historians, including some of Amin al-Husayni's supporters, holding him
responsible for mobilising the Arab side, there is evidence that he was still following
peaceful means.51
The dispute began in September 1928, when Jewish religious leaders brought
arks that were larger than usual, and mats to the Wall. They also installed a screen
that divided the area in front of the Wall. The Muslims considered this a violation of
the status quo, and an impediment to the free movement of the inhabitants of the
neighbouring Arab district. Although British police ordered the removal of the
screen, the Jewish worshippers refused to comply with the order and showed
resistance instead. This led to a confrontation between the police and the Jews,
resulting in some minor injuries. The event was widely publicised and provoked an
international Zionist campaign for the expropriation of the Wall (see Chapter Two).
The Wall was part of the Islamic waqf and Hajj Amln was the official
responsible for it. He tried to deal with the Zionist campaign by using peaceful
means. For instance, in October 1928 he formed a committee for the defence of
al-Buraq al-Sharif (the Islamic name for the Wailing Wall). The committee confined
itself to peaceful political methods: a publicity campaign in newspapers, pamphlets,
statements, messages, conferences and meetings.
49
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The Zionist campaign continued during 1929 and confrontations erupted in
September of that year. The following week, Hajj Amln told the High Commissioner
that he wished to renew co-operation with the government and to restore law and
order.53 A British officer described Amin's attitude as follows: "[He regarded] the
maintenance of order and co-operation with the government [as] his duty not only to
the government but also to God and the people as well as to his own conscience."5
The British police sources also reported in November 1929 that Amln had refused an
offer from Syrian leaders to establish guerrilla groups to start a resistance
campaign.55
1.1.3.3 The Palestinian-Arab-Muslim Angle
As Albert Hourani explains, the notables do not depend on one source of power, for
they try to create a balance between their relationships with the ruler and the ruled
and gain other sources of power.
The Palestinian leadership worked in the Arab and Muslim arenas to gain
political and financial support to face the Zionist movement. An early example of the
Palestinian style of addressing Arabs and Muslims was in 1922 on the occasion of
the League of Nations Assembly to legalise the Mandate in Palestine. Several
appeals and letters were issued for this purpose, the first appeal beginning with the
following Qur'anic verse:
Glorified [and Exalted] is He [Allah] [above all that evil they associate with
Him], Who took His slave [Muhammad] for a journey by night from
al-Masjid Haram [in Makkah] to al-Masjid al-Aqsa [in Jerusalem], the
neighbourhood whereofWe have blessed.56
The appeal was addressed to "the Muslim nation from their brothers of Bayt
al-Maqdis [Jerusalem] and the rest of Palestine". Another, similar appeal was ad¬
dressed to the "Egyptian nation", the "Iraqi nation", and "the Kings, Princes and
53




56 Surat al-Isra' (17:1) in Muhammad Taqi ud-Din al-Hilali & Muhammad Muhsin Khan
(trans), Translation of the Meaning of the Noble Qur'an in the English Language (Madinah
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Heads of the governments ofMuslims". It is noticeable that the appeals concentrated
on the Zionist issue and did not object to the British Mandate itself.
Jerusalem was the main theme in these appeals. The first paragraph stated:
"The Palestinian Muslims, who have guarded al-Aqsa Mosque and the Dome of the
Rock for 1,300 years, declare to the Muslim world that these holy places are in great
danger of horrible Zionist aggression."
The second paragraph indicates the common right to Jerusalem's holy places:
We, as faithful, careful guardians of what God entrusts us to preserve - the
third of the Harams and the first Qibla [direction of prayer] - commit
ourselves to defend it. ... our right to it is the same as that of the Egyptian,
the Hejazi, the Moroccan, the Persian, the Turk, the Afghan, the Indian, the
Javanese, and every Muslim on the earth, east or west
The appeals then detailed the Zionists' plans to establish their government in
Palestine and expel the Muslims. They concluded by asking the Muslims to protest
on the day of the League ofNations Assembly, which was to examine the "Mandate
text on Palestine, including the Balfour Declaration, the complete eradication of
Islam from Palestine and defeat of the Islamic Nation."57
These appeals were the start of a formula in which the Arab and Muslim
identity and significance of Jerusalem were highlighted, yet channelled to serve the
goal of establishing a separate independent Palestinian national state. Although there
were several Arab and Muslim countries occupied by that time, Jerusalem was the
reason why the Palestinians could ask for special support. The assertion of the
equality of the Muslims' rights in Jerusalem, which should have resulted in equal
responsibility, was not interpreted as expressing an aspiration for Islamic or Arab
unity; it was designed to help establish a separate national state, which would
certainly be an Arab-Muslim state.
1.1.4 The Collapse of the "Politics of Notables" Formula
The success of the notables formula in the 1920s could be attributed to a number of
auxiliary factors. The Zionist enterprise did not grow rapidly. For instance, Jewish
immigration declined sharply in 1927, and in 1928 immigration and emigration
57 The text of the appeals (Arabic) cited in Bayan al-Hut, Min Awraq, pp. 193-196.
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balanced each other. This was in addition to various difficulties faced by the Zionist
CO
movement during this period.
By the end of the 1920s, however, the formula had lost its momentum and
new factors led to the collapse of the notables' power:
1. If the British authorities had helped to reproduce the formula to sustain the power
of the notables in Jerusalem, they did not do the same in other districts. The
notables outside Jerusalem had already lost much of their power during the
Ottoman era. The remainder disappeared under British rule and this minimised
the notables' popular influence.59
2. New political and economic powers were emerging outside Jerusalem. Their
development was accelerated by the escalation of Zionist immigration and
colonisation at the beginning of the 1930s, by the poor state of the economy, and
by the Wailing Wall confrontations of 1929.
The new powers were the expression of popular dissatisfaction with the not¬
ables' policies, which were criticised for making a distinction between the British
Mandate and the Jewish side. 'Abd al-Hamld al-Sa'ih, the former Speaker of the
Palestinian National Council and one of the activists in the 1930s, writes:
During this period [the beginning of the 1930s] some of the nationalist
figures were demanding that al-Hajj Amln be stronger and tougher in
resisting the English. They had noticed that he was strong in resisting the
Zionists, but that he softened in the face of the English.60
This attitude led to the appearance of groups calling for different methods in
handling the Jewish question. There were, for example, the military groups, headed
by 'Izz al-Din al-Qassam. Al-Qassam was a Syrian scholar of religion who had been
active in northern Palestine since the mid-1920s in preparation for a revolution.61 In
fO
addition, there were many other independent local military groups.
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Al-Qassam criticised the SMC in particular for concentrating on the construc¬
tion of mosques, including the decoration of al-Aqsa Mosque as well as other
construction projects such as building a hotel in Jerusalem. He was quoted as saying:
"The jewels and decoration of the mosques must be changed into weapons. If you
lose your land, how will mural decorations help you?"63
In 1932 Hizb al-Istiqlal (the Independence Party) was established for the
same reasons. The founders of the party were pan-Arab intellectuals, mostly from
Nablus in northern Palestine, who opposed the moderate methods of the traditional
leadership.64
On other hand, by the end of the 1920s a new bourgeoisie had begun to
organise itself. On 14 November 1929, some businessmen arranged a congress in
Haifa, at which they condemned British discrimination against them in favour of
Jewish businessmen. Therefore, they decided to establish a company and a bank to
stimulate domestic agriculture, trade and industry. They also pledged not to sell land
to the Jews, and declared a boycott on trade with them. The Congress elected a
leadership consisting mainly of businessmen from the northern cities.65
In the face of the new situation, the notables of Jerusalem responded by re¬
organising themselves into their own political parties. For example, Amin al-Husaynl
established the Palestinian Arab Party.66 In the aftermath of the 1929 confrontations
he had tried to balance his relationship with the British authorities and the new
powers. He continually presented himself to the British authorities as the moderate
leader whose policies prevented the application of more radical ideas. Amin
heightened his rhetoric when addressing the Palestinians and tried to satisfy them by
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instilling fresh hope in them. He faced the calls for violent resistance by seeking
political and financial support from the Arab and Muslim worlds.
Nevertheless, Amln's plans did not succeed. The Arab regimes did not
respond positively (see Chapter Four), and the British Mandate acted against such
manoeuvres. For instance, in 1931 he organised the General Muslim Congress in
Jerusalem. Firstly, he failed to gain official Arab participation, and secondly, he had
to make numerous promises to the British High Commissioner before being granted
permission to hold the Congress. Among the promises was that the Congress would
not discuss other Arab countries. Speakers were not to make statements that could
provoke the Jewish side. These promises were not kept. After the Congress the High
Commissioner summoned the Mufti, who defended himself by asserting that he had
done his best to keep his promises. The British High Commissioner told Amln
al-Husaynl
that it was particularly desired that no allusion should be made to alleged
aspirations of the Jews over al-Aqsa Mosque ... [and] that the reference to
the Baraq, as being part of al-Aqsa Mosque, had been struck out of the
agenda.
According to the minutes of the meeting, the Mufti said that:
he had removed the phrase "Mosque of al-Aqsa" from the agenda [and that
during the discussion] there had been no incitement arising from this subject
and when some of the delegates proposed that they should go to the Wailing
Wall in a body and say prayers and be photographed there, he had with great
difficulty persuaded them not to do so and only one or two of them went
there individually.67
In its analysis of Amin's aims in holding the Congress, the British Police in
Jerusalem said: "Hajj Amin Husaynl seems to be giving less heed to local opposition
/:o
and depending more and more for his prestige on the Islamic world."
By 1933, nationalist elements, especially in the northern districts, were able
to initiate independent waves of political and armed resistance. The notables of
Jerusalem, namely Amln al-Husaynl and the Executive Committee, had to co-operate
with the new powers. Therefore, as a response to calls from different Palestinian
67 F0371/16009: Note of an interview between the Mufti and the High Commissioner on 17
December 1931.
68 F0371/16009: Report of the High Commissioner, Arthur Wauchop, to the Foreign Office
on the General Muslim Congress, December 1931.
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groups, the Committee led large demonstrations in Jerusalem on 13 October, and in
Jaffa on 23 October 1933. Fifty-three Arabs and seven British were killed, and
several Arab leaders were arrested. Musa Kazim al-Husaynl was injured in Jaffa and
died as a result on 26 March 1934.69 A few months before his death at the age of 83,
he had attended a meeting with the British High Commissioner to discuss the new
position of the Executive Committee. He summed up the situation and its
developments as follows:
I spent fifty years as an employee of the Ottoman state ... and I was
responsible for security, law and order. It is not easy for me to call today for
what you consider preaching for security, law and order. It is your
inequitable rule and clumsy policy that have forced me to sign the resolution
regarding demonstrations and strikes.70
In April 1936, in an all-out rebellion, a decision to hold a general strike was
made without consultation with the Mufti. The initiative had been taken mainly by
committees in the northern cities. Only a few days earlier, Amin al-Husayni himself
had assured the High Commissioner that no more rioting would occur.71 On 25 April
1936, as a result of popular pressure, he agreed to head the newly established Arab
High Committee (AHC) (al-Lajna al- 'Arabiyya al- 'Uliya), which was to succeed the
79 • _
Executive Committee. To sustain his position, Amin al-Husaym had to agree to
lead the escalating protest. He began to respond to the pressure by adopting tactics
• £. • 7Tsuch as the decision in May to promote the popular abstention from paying taxes.
During the summer he gave moral and material support to the armed rebels. In
addition, he instructed the imams in the mosques to concentrate on the Jewish danger
to Arab Palestine and the Muslim holy places.74
1.1.4.1 Peel Committee Report
In the aftermath of the 1936 rebellion, the Palestine Royal Commission (Peel
Commission) was established to seek a solution to the Palestinian question. The
Commission's report on 7 July 1937 recommended the termination of the Mandate
69 For details of these demonstrations, see Muhsin, Filastm, pp. 124,128 & 129.
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and the establishment of two states in Palestine: one Jewish, and the other Arab to be
united with Transjordan. Meanwhile, a new Mandate would be inaugurated for
Jerusalem and Bethlehem.75
Clearly the mainstream among the Palestinians would not accept this plan,
since it included the establishment of a Jewish state. The details of the Mandate for
Jerusalem and Bethlehem were not crucial since the principle of Jewish state itself
was unacceptable. The AHC gave its rejection in a letter dated 8 July and signed by
Amln al-Husaynl. The Committee demanded the cessation of Jewish immigration
and land sales to Jews. It also asked for the establishment of a national democratic
government, with a treaty safeguarding Britain's interests in Palestine and protecting
• • • lf\
all the legitimate rights of the Jews.
Even without this rejection, the "politics of notables" formula was already
losing its function. Under the "politics of notables" formula the notables of Jerusalem
benefited from the city's institutions and the social status that they gained from their
religious and administrative posts in the city to lead the Palestinians' national
movement into peaceful and moderate channels. In other words, they made the
religious significance of Jerusalem play into the hands of the Mandate. By the mid-
19305, however, new military, political and economic powers were rising in other
cities, particularly in the northern districts, which objected to the policies of
Jerusalem's notables. The notables of Jerusalem responded positively by co¬
operating with the new powers and started to support some of the resistance
activities. The resistance movement was supported by the institutions of Jerusalem
which the notables had the power to control under the Mandate. Moreover, Amin
al-Husayni's movements in the Muslim and Arab arena persuaded Britain that it
could lead to a wider Muslim or Arab anti-European movement.(see Chapter Five).
This meant that Jerusalem and its notables entered the counter-camp against
British policies. When Amln al-Husayni increased his participation in the resistance
movement, the Mandate government decided to arrest him on 17 July 1937, a
decision that meant abandoning the policy of the notables. Amin evaded arrest and
75
Report of the Palestine Royal Commission (Peel Commission), 7 July 1937. Cited in
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hid at home in al-Haram al-Shanf. Meanwhile, the British authorities declared the
AHC illegal and deported some of its leaders to the Seychelles. On 14 October Amln
77 • • • . « •
fled to the Lebanon. These events inaugurated a new phase in Palestinian politics
and witnessed the collapse of the British phase of the "politics of the notables".
1.1.5 The Revolutionary Notables (1937-1948)
Amln al-Husaynl, who had already been dismissed from a number of his posts, espe-
70 t
cially the Presidency of the SMC, brought together his associates from Lebanon to
reorganise themselves. His decision to face the British authorities enhanced his
70
popularity and transformed him into a Palestinians hero. From Lebanon he created
new sources of legitimacy, for on the Palestinian level his status in Jerusalem was not
enough to support his leadership. Therefore, he based his revolutionary legitimacy on
his leadership of the armed resistance inside Palestine. Meanwhile, on the level of the
Arab and Muslim countries, his position as Jerusalem's Mufti earned him acceptance
and popularity.
1.1.5.1 The 1939 White Paper
In November 1938 Britain decided to abolish the Partition Plan on the pretext that
on
"administrative and financial" difficulties made it "impracticable". While consider¬
ing the need to enhance its position in the region against the German and Italian
challenge, Britain began to seek a solution to satisfy the Arabs, although it refused to
— R1
deal with Amln al-Husayni. On 17 May 1939, a few months before the outbreak of
the Second World War, Britain published an initiative to solve the Palestinian
problem. It was called the 1939 White Paper. It described a plan that accepted most
of the Palestinian demands, especially the virtual cancellation of the Balfour
Declaration. An independent Palestinian state for both Arabs and Jews was to be
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established after ten years. In addition, Jewish immigration and land transfers to the
Jews were to be restricted.
The AHC rejected the plan, justifying this by (1) their lack of confidence in
British intentions, and (2) the condition that the plan would be implemented only
after a transition period of ten years and only with the co-operation of both the Arabs
and the Jews. Therefore, if the Jews refused to co-operate, the whole plan would be
cancelled. The committee asked that Palestine should be independent within the Arab
federal union.82
The reason for this refusal could have been the fact that the Palestinian
leadership was no longer dependent on the traditional familial and religious status in
Jerusalem. Amin al-Husaynl now had to calculate seriously the power of splinter
rebel groups. The rebels inside Palestine issued a declaration in which they rejected
the leadership of the Husaynis and other notables, and the Arab kings who ruled by
8^
British sufferance. They demanded total independence in an Arab Palestine.
In the following period Amin increased his participation in the Arab
countries' domestic affairs in his efforts to play the role of Arab and Muslim leader.
He also sought new international alliances, such as the Axis. He launched propa¬
ganda campaigns in the Arab and Muslim countries, the theme of which was the
84 —
threat of Jewish action against Jerusalem's holy places. Amin participated in an
attempted coup in Iraq in 1941.85 Then he presented himself to the Axis as a leader
8A
capable of enflaming a revolution against the French and British.
The Allies saw the manoeuvres of Amin as a dangerous exploitation of the
holy places to mobilise the Muslims. In this context an article in the Foreign Affairs
journal in 1941 analysed Amin's role as follows:
The ensuing trouble, which led to bloodshed in Jerusalem on Easter Sunday,
1920, was at first looked upon by the Mohammedan world as a local
Palestinian issue. It was Haj Amin al-Husayni, the Mufti of Jerusalem, who
made Islam conscious of the fact that it was not. It was he who persuaded
the more than 150,000,000 Mohammedans under British and French rule to
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serve notice on the home government that they would not have the support
of Islam in the war then in the offing if the Balfour Declaration was not
recalled.87
After the defeat of the Axis, Amln al-Husaynl and his associates attempted to
use the Arab League to oppose the UN plan for the partition of Palestine. However,
they failed. The Palestinian position had been explained at a conference held in
London in September 1946. It was attended by Arab states and a Palestinian delega¬
tion headed by Jamal al-Husaynl, the Vice-President of the AHC. The Palestinian
delegation made the following demands:
1. Palestine was to be an undivided state governed by all communities, with repre¬
sentatives popularly elected in their respective numerical proportion.
2. Jews who had a minimum of ten years' residency in the country were to be given
equal citizenship.
3. Jewish immigration and land transfers to Jews were to be permitted only with the
approval of the majority of the Arab members in the legislative assembly.
4. Regarding the holy places, the delegation made the following conditions:
The guarantees concerning the holy places would be alterable only with the
consent of the UN, and the safeguards provided for the Jewish community
would be alterable only with the consent of a majority of the Jewish members of
the legislative assembly.88
These demands were understandable, bearing in mind the reasons for and
definitions of the conflict. The existence of a Jewish state was the non-negotiable
issue, whereas Jerusalem could be under international auspices and the Jewish
presence in the city could be accepted with institutionally recognised guarantees.
In general, while Jerusalem in the pre-1948 era had been a trigger-point for
some clashes, it had also been a power base for the Palestinian leadership, which
managed to use its status and leadership to maintain understanding with the British
Mandate during the 1920s and part of the 1930s. Thus despite the general image of
87 Pierre Crabites, "Britain's Debt to King Farouk", Foreign Affairs, vol. 19, no.4 (July
1941), p.859.
88 Robert John & Sami Hadawi, The Palestine Diary, vol. 2, 1945-1948 (Beirut: The
Palestine Research Centre, 1970), p.96.
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Jerusalem as a city of confrontation, it played in those early years, in one way or
another, a role of pacification and containment.
On the other hand, while the Palestinians insisted on attaining their sovereign
independent state, there was flexibility regarding Jerusalem. The Palestinian leader¬
ship showed its readiness to accept an international presence to supervise the
freedom ofworship and the protection of the Jewish community in the city.
1.2 The Dismantling of Palestine: 1948-1967
The British Mandate was terminated on 15 May 1948 and the resulting Arab-Israeli
war ended with the partition of Palestine. Israel controlled nearly 78 per cent of the
area that had been under the Mandate. According to the records of the UN Relief and
Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees, the organisation was responsible in 1950
for nearly 726,000 refugees who had been expelled from the land that the Jews now
OQ
declared was their state, while nearly 150,000 remained inside it.
Jerusalem was partitioned. Israel occupied the larger, modern West sector,
and Jordan the East sector with its holy places. Amln al-Husaynl's attempt to
establish a Palestinian state was not successful. The Palestinian AHC organised a
congress in Gaza on 1 October 1948, at which it was decided to form an "All
Palestine Government" that would be the government of all Palestine "on its
mandatory borders'. The government would be headed by Ahmad Hilml, and the
PNC by Amin al-Husaynl. Jerusalem was declared as the capital, while Gaza was
chosen as a temporary centre. Although the Arab states, apart from Jordan,
recognised the Palestinian government, it did not have any role. 90 On one hand
Amman, which was controlling the West Bank, managed to create a union of the
East and West Bank of the River Jordan. Even some members of the All Palestine
Government recognised the union and held ministerial and other high-ranking posts
in the Jordanian government (see Chapter Three). On other hand, Egypt, who had a
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tense relationship with Amin al-Husayni, did not allow the government to act in
Gaza, which was controlled by Egyptian troops.91
This situation transformed the Jerusalem issue to a large extent into a
Jordanian-Israeli issue. Meanwhile, the Palestinians suffered political and social
fragmentation and lacked any representation. They did not rule any part of Palestine
and had no political institutions.
In the view of many Arab sources, it was this situation in the 1950s, not
Jerusalem itself, which created the environment for the evolution of the Palestinian
national identity. However, it seems that English sources on the subject, contributed
by Palestinians, Israelis and others, concentrate on Jerusalem, its elites, its history,
and its role as the focus of the conflict with Zionism from the late nineteenth century
until the 1930s, as the main accelerator of Palestinian nationalism.
The reasons for this phenomenon could be the writers' way of thinking and
the audience targeted in each case. The writers in English apply the general theory of
nationalism, in which the role of the elite, the history of the city and the use made of
it to construct identity and nationalism are examined. Therefore, Jerusalem has
appeared to be the main ingredient. In addition, such works, particularly those by
Palestinian authors, have tried to convince readers of the historical existence of
Palestine and the Palestinians as a response to the Israeli propaganda that has denied
these facts and therefore the right of the Palestinians to establish a state. Jerusalem
was always an important piece of evidence for the Palestinians' objective.
On the other hand, the readers targeted by the Arabic works were mostly the
Palestinians themselves. The authors were politicians promoting the aim of establi¬
shing an independent Palestinian entity without relying heavily on Arab political
parties or regimes as the means of liberation.
The demand for an independent Palestinian body has grown mostly in the
Gaza Strip and the refugee camps in Lebanon and other Arab countries of exile, and
less so in Jordan and Jerusalem. The following reasons for the growth of a Pales¬
tinian national identity have been frequently explained in the memoirs and bio¬
graphies of Palestinian leaders who rose to power in the 1960s:
91 Smith, Palestine and the Palestinians, pp.90-91.
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1. A political and legal vacuum resulted from the lack of recognised representative
institutions. Palestinians realised that their problem was either neglected, or
represented by Arab regimes with their own interests and strategies. Although
they were the victims, they were not recognised as one of the parties in the
conflict. Indeed, on many occasions they were denied the right to attend debates
Q9
on the problem.
2. The Palestinians generally believed that the Arab regimes were responsible for
the defeat of 1948, owing to either their weak performance or their particular and
secret agendas.93
3. The Palestinians were disappointed with post-war Arab politics, especially the
failure of Arab unity, and the resulting disputes and rivalries among the Arab
political parties and regimes.94
4. Palestinian activists suffered restrictions and punishment by Arab governments
when they attempted to establish political organisations and programmes of
action.95
5. The Palestinians suffered daily hardship in the refugee camps. There were the
problems of unemployment, food supplies, accommodation and education. In
addition, the refugees were now stateless, possessing neither passports nor
identity cards.96
In these circumstances Palestinian national groups emerged and demanded
independent action without any direct connection with the Arab regimes and political
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parties. A new organisation was established in the late 1950s and was to be known
later as the Palestinian National Liberation Movement, or Fath. Its founders were the
future prominent figures of Yasir 'Arafat, Khalll al-Wazir, Salah Khalaf, Khalid
al-Hassan and others from the refugee camps and the educated middle class.97
Jerusalem no longer seemed to be part of the scene. Its traditional leadership
lost its power in the face of increased rejection and popular opposition. Many new
Palestinian activities attributed the responsibility of defeat to it. Subhl Ghusha, who
was the leading Arab Nationalist activist in Jerusalem in the 1950s, expresses this
attitude as follows: "[those] 'rich families' threw away Palestine, and their policies
QO
were equivalent to treason."
However, Jerusalem returned to the centre of the Palestinian national stage
when the efforts to create an independent Palestinian entity entered a new phase in
1963 after the death ofAhmad Hilml, who had served as Palestine's representative in
the Arab League.99 Despite his minor role, the selection of a successor opened the
case of Palestinian representation.
By the end of the 1950s, the Arab regimes were also considering the
establishment of a Palestinian independent body for different reasons. Egypt, Iraq
and Syria, for instance, were hoping to contain the growth of independent Palestinian
activity and create a loyal institution to be used against other regimes.100
In September 1963 the Arab League appointed Ahmad al-Shuqayri, a lawyer
and politician from a notable family in Acre, as the new representative.101 During the
First Arab Summit in January 1964, al-Shuqayrl demanded the establishment of a
"Palestinian entity"*. King Husayn of Jordan opposed it because he considered it to
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be a threat to Jordanian sovereignty. As a result, the Summit issued a decision
approving the need "to organise the Palestinian people and enable them to play their
• • • 109
part in liberating their homeland and deciding their future."
Al-Shuqayri then asked Hazim Nusayba, the current Jordanian Foreign
Minister and a Jerusalemite, to arrange a meeting with the Jordanian Prime Minister,
Wasfi al-Tall. At the meeting in Nusayba's house, al-Shuqayri asserted that the
proposed entity was no threat to Jordan and that he would comply with Jordanian
conditions.103
On 28 May 1964 a congress was held in Jerusalem under the name of the
First Palestinian Congress, subsequently renamed the First Session of the Palestinian
National Council (PNC). The Council proclaimed the establishment of the
Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) and adopted a Palestinian National
Covenant104 (al-Mithaq al-Qawmt al-Filatini) and a Constitution to organise PLO
action.
Jerusalem was largely absent from the Council, and reference to it in the
Covenant was made indirectly in Article 15, which dealt with the holy places:
The liberation of Palestine, from a spiritual viewpoint, prepares for the Holy
Land an atmosphere of tranquillity and peace, in which all the Holy Places
will be safeguarded, and free worship and visit to all will be guaranteed,
without any discrimination of race, colour, tongue, or religion. For all this
the Palestinian people look forward to the support of all the spiritual forces
in the world.
The absence of Jerusalem could be attributed to several reasons:
1. Mentioning Jerusalem could provoke Jordan, which considered the city to be its
second capital.103 The Covenant aimed to reassure Arab neighbours that the PLO
would not lay claim to areas under the control of Arab states. Article 24 stated:
"This organisation does not exercise any regional sovereignty over the Western
102 'Abd al-Rahman, Munazzamat, p.70.
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Bank in the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, or the Gaza Strip or the Himma
Area."
The Covenant preserved the classical definition of the conflict, that is, the
existence of the Zionist state. Therefore, Israel was described as "illegal and false",
and any "coexistence" with it was rejected. This meant that no solution such as the
internationalisation or official partition of Jerusalem was acceptable.
The Covenant did not retain the classical Palestinian demand to have an
independent state similar to other Arab states, because this could provoke Arab
states, especially Jordan. The demand for national independence was replaced with a
clear concentration on Arab ideological terms. Therefore, the lack of a demand for a
state meant that Jerusalem was not mentioned in national political terms.
The religious currents were weak in the Council and so no religious jargon
was used. This meant that there were no traditional religious references to Jerusalem.
The holy places of Jerusalem were not under Israeli occupation.
However, there are those who deny the absence of Jerusalem from the
Council. Sallm Al-Za'nun, the Speaker of the PNC, argues that the question of
Jerusalem was addressed: firstly, by holding the Congress in that city, and secondly,
that the PLO Constitution stated: "Jerusalem is the centre of the PNC", and that the
Council should be assembled annually "in Jerusalem or Gaza, or any other place
according to the circumstances."106 In fact, the Constitution also states that Jerusalem
is the centre of the PLO Executive Committee.107
However, the tension in the Middle East was increasing and leading to the
June 1967 War, which created a completely new situation.
In general, in the period between 1948 and 1967, the Palestinians lacked
representative bodies that could express specific Palestinian political positions, thus
the efforts of Palestinian activists concentrated on finding such bodies. At the same
time the fact that the Old City of Jerusalem, which includes most of the holy places,
was not under Israeli occupation made the situation in West Jerusalem not so much
different from the "occupation" of other Palestinian cities such as Haifa and Jaffa.
106 Interview, Salim al-Za'nun. Amman, 2 October 2001.
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1.3 Redefinition of the Conflict: 1967- 2000
The June 1967 War ended in an Arab defeat and the Israeli occupation of the
territories of three Arab countries:
- Jordan lost the West Bank, including East Jerusalem.
Egypt lost the Palestinian Gaza Strip and the Sinai Peninsula.
Syria lost the Palestinian Himma and the Golan Heights.
This overwhelming and swift defeat accelerated the political and social
transformation of the Palestinians. In particular, it strengthened the calls for
increasing independent Palestinian action in the conflict.
The Palestinian discourse in general became more patriotic. The armed
resistance factions, which had begun military action against Israel a few days after
the war, proliferated and grew rapidly, becoming the strongest Palestinian political
power. In February 1969 Fath and other factions controlled the PLO, and Yasir
'Arafat, the current spokesman of Fath, was elected by the PNC as the PLO
Chairman.
The Fath Movement leadership had hesitated to head the PLO. They gave a
conditional acceptance after their meeting in Kuwait. Among the conditions was the
amendment of the Palestinian Covenant. In 1968, the Covenant was altered to
emphasise the independence of Palestinian action:
1. The name of the Covenant was changed from al-MIthaq al-Qawmi to al-MIthaq
al-Watanl. (Both names translate into English as the National Covenant.
However, in Arabic al-Qawmi refers to the Arab nation, whereas al-Watanl refers
to Palestinian patriotism.)
2. Fath also required the cancellation of the article that promised not to demand the
108
sovereignty of the West Bank, Gaza and al-Himma.
1.3.1 The Absence of Jerusalem from the Palestinian Discourse
The patriotic definition of the conflict, which replaced the Arab nationalist definition
was not enough to restore Jerusalem to the platform. The various sessions of the PNC
did not reflect any special concern for the city. At the Council's Fourth Session in
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July 1968 (the first following the war), Jerusalem was mentioned in one resolution.
This was an assertion of the Muslim countries' support for the Arabism of Jerusalem,
because of its religious significance for Muslims, as a result of their having been
entrusted for more than a thousand years with the guardianship of its holy places of
all the monotheistic religions.109 It should be noted that Jerusalem was mentioned
only in its Islamic dimension in the section of the resolution called "The Universal
Struggle for the Liberation from and Termination of Colonialism". There was no
reference to a Palestinian relationship with Jerusalem in national terms.
The Fifth Session in February 1969 demanded support for "our people's
resistance in the occupied territories, especially Gaza and Jerusalem, and called for
the establishment of special committees for this purpose."110 At other sessions either
only a passing reference was made to Jerusalem or there was not even any mention
of it at all, such as at the Ninth Session in 1971. Even ten days after the fire at
al-Aqsa Mosque on 21 August 1969, the only reference to the city at the PNC's Sixth
Session in Cairo between 1 and 6 September was in the international section, where
Muslims were thanked for expressing their anger at the crime of setting fire to
al-Aqsa Mosque.111
Apart from the PNC,112 any mention of Jerusalem was made only in passing
and was usually in an address to the international community and the Muslim world
and to serve certain functions such as giving evidence for the historical existence of
the Palestinians. For instance, 'Arafat in his first speech at the UN General Assembly
in 1974 said that the world
must know that Palestine was the cradle of the most ancient cultures and
civilisation. Its Arab people were engaged in farming and building,
spreading culture throughout the land for thousands of years, setting an
example in the practice of religious tolerance and freedom of worship,
acting as faithful guardians of the holy places of all religions. As a son of
108 Interview, Sallm al-Za'nun.
109 Nafi' al-Hassan, "al-Quds fl al-Haraka al-Watanyya al-Fliastlniyya" [Jerusalem in the
Palestinian National Movement], paper presented at the conference on Jerusalem, the Key of




112 On my visits to the Council's offices in Amman in September and October 2001, Council
researchers joined me in scanning the Council documents, and agreed that the Council had
not expressed any particular concern for Jerusalem in the 1960s and 1970s.
58
Jerusalem, I treasure for myself and my people beautiful memories and vivid
images of the religious brotherhood that was the hallmark of our Holy City
before it succumbed to catastrophe."3
Observers refer to the signing of the Camp David agreement in 1979 as the
point when Jerusalem again began to attract increasing attention in the PLO dis¬
course, as explained later.114
The interpretation of the city's absence from the Palestinian official discourse
could be the circumstances of the Palestinian political movement from 1967 to the
early 1980s. These circumstances can be summed up in the following points:
1. The Ideological Definition: The armed struggle had been dominated by secular
and leftist members who regarded the conflict over Palestine as a national issue
or as part of the struggle against imperialism. Meanwhile, the religious elements
played only a minor role in the resistance movement, thus the religious
significance of Jerusalem did not form an apparent part of these factions.
2. The National Goals: The armed factions that assumed the leadership of the PLO
in 1968 raised the goal of the full liberation of Palestine through armed struggle.
On the one hand these factions depended on this armed struggle as a source of
legitimacy, though not on the kind on which Jerusalem's notables of the pre-1948
era depended. In fact the armed struggle in the Palestinian discourse in the late
1960s was more than just a tool, it was on the level of ideology. Article 9 in the
new National Covenant115 asserted that armed struggle was "the only way to
liberate Palestine" and that it was "the overall strategy, not merely a tactical
phase". In this context, Jerusalem's traditional importance as a source of
legitimacy declined.
On the other hand, the stage after the liberation did not receive much atten¬
tion. For example, there was no room for discussing the shape or the capital of
the Palestinian state.
At the same time, the insistence on full liberation by an armed struggle was
an expression for rejecting any political settlement. This rejection reflected
113 The speech cited in Abdul Hadi (ed.), Documents on Palestine, vol. 1, pp. 226-234.
114 Interview, Subhl Ghusha,
115 The Palestinian National Covenant (1968), Arabic text, PNC Archive. Cited in Eng.
trans., Abdul Hadi (ed.), Documents on Palestine, vol. 2, pp.213-215.
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concerns that a settlement of this kind would re-create the pre-war situation and
that the PLO would be excluded from the negotiations.
The idea of a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza was regarded as
treachery. For instance, after the clashes of September 1970 in Jordan, 'Arafat
threatened an "insider" delegation that came to see him in Amman with the
suggestion of establishing an independent state: "If a head rises to demand this
metamorphic state, we will cut it off."116 A solution of this kind was seen as the
end of the resistance without liberating the rest of Palestine.
3. The PLO Action inside Jerusalem: In 1967 the armed factions had only a small
presence in the West Bank. For instance, in Jerusalem itself, Fath had only two or
three members when it launched its first military operation in 1965.117
The main Palestinian reaction in the territories in 1967 was the
establishment of the Higher Islamic Council (HIC) (al-Hay'a al-lslamiyya
al-'Uliya)* which was constituted largely of Jordanian officials and asserted ties
with Amman. (For details, see Chapter Three.)
The lack of power inside the West Bank encouraged the resistance to Israeli
policies in Jerusalem to concentrate on military operations, without making
serious plans to build a grassroots organisation. Palestinian propaganda was
• 118based on this kind of armed action. As a result the armed struggle was the
theme of the Palestinian discourse while issues such as Judaising Jerusalem and
the settlements was given relatively little attention.
1.3.2 Palestinian Steadfastness* in Jerusalem
The absence of Jerusalem from the PLO discourse, and the limited support inside the
West Bank and Gaza in the aftermath of the 1967 War did not prevent the gradual
116 al-Shu'aybl, Al-Kiyaniyya, p. 158.
117 Interview, Salim Al-Za'nun.
There are different translations used by writers for the name of this body, such as the
Supreme Muslim Council and the High Islamic Board.
118 Interview, Subhl Ghusha.
*
Steadfastness (sumud) is a description used to refer to the Palestinian rejection of the Israeli
occupation in the West Bank and Gaza including Jerusalem, and their attempts to build their
own national educational, economic, health, etc. institutions separately from the Israeli occu¬
pation.
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growth in the 1970s of a movement in these territories, centred in Jerusalem, suppor¬
ting the PLO and working to face the occupation policies.
On 15 August 1973, following a decision at the PNC session in January of
that year, activists inside Palestine, including journalists, lawyers, professors and
students, declared the establishment of the Palestinian National Front in the occupied
territories"9 as "an inseparable part of the Palestinian national movement represented
in the PLO."120 The Front acted until 1978, when it was replaced with the National
Guidance Committee, which continued activities until it was dissolved by an Israeli
decision in 1982.121
The two organisations were similar to the HIC and many Palestinian
institutions, such as the daily newspapers, and many NGOs, some of which had been
established between 1948 and 1967 were based in Jerusalem. The choice of
Jerusalem reflected, (1) the historical significance of the city as the centre of
Palestinian society, and (2) the effects of the Israeli annexation of East Jerusalem,
that is, its Palestinian occupants faced fewer restrictions than their fellow citizens in
the occupied territories that were subjected to military rule. However, the main
Palestinian political weight remained outside Palestine and concentrated on the
armed struggle.
The national institutions in Jerusalem managed to oppose Israeli annexation
policies on several levels by what they called sumud (steadfastness). Jerusalem's
inhabitants refused to apply for Israeli citizenship.122 In the same context, whereas 18
per cent of East Jerusalem Arabs participated in the Israeli municipal elections in
1969, only 10 per cent voted in 1973,123 and in the following years only 5-10 per
119 Jamal R. Nassar & Roger Heacock (eds), Intifada: Palestine at the Crossroads (New
York; Westport, Conn.; & London: PRAGER, 1990), p.58.
120 Samih K. Farsoun & Christina E. Zacharia, Palestine and the Palestinians (Boulder, Co.;
Oxford: Westview Press, 1997), p.222.
121 Alain Gresh, The PLO: The Struggle Within: Towards an Independent Palestinian State,
English trans. (London; Totowa, NJ: Zed Books, 1988). p.221.
122 B'TSELEM, A Policy of Discrimination: Land Expropriation and Building in East
jefusalem (Jerusalem: January 1997), p. 18.
123 Gresh, The PLO, p. 134.
124 Juli Till, Jerusalem: Its Political Significance in the Palestinian-Israeli Peace Talks
(London: GulfCentre for Strategic Studies, 1994), p. 18.
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From the demographic point of view, despite all the Israeli policies to limit
the proportion of Palestinians in Jerusalem, the Palestinians succeeded in preserving
their presence. There was a slight increase in their numbers across the city, the West
sector and the annexed East sector, as described in detail later (see Chapter Two).
The main reason for the increase was the natural growth rate of the population, which
was 3 per cent between 1967 and 1980, compared with 1.4—1.5 per cent in the West
Bank. However, the policy of steadfastness was also an important motive for
remaining in the city.125
1.3.3 Jerusalem and the Political Process
The October 1973 War, which was launched by Egypt and Syria against Israel,
clearly influenced the Palestinian position. This war was seen as a step by Egypt not
to liberate the Arab land by force, but to create a new balance of regional pressures
for launching a political process. The Twelfth Session of the PNC in Cairo on 8 June
1974 adopted what was to be known as the Phased Plan.126 The Council stated: "new
political circumstances ... have come into existence in the period between the
Council's last and present sessions." The resolutions embodied clear changes in
defining the conflict, for example:
1. Instead of insisting on the armed struggle as the only means of liberation, the
programme stated that the PLO's intention was to "employ all means", which
meant the possibility of considering a political settlement.
2. Instead of insisting on Israel's immediate and complete withdrawal, the Council
adopted the principle of establishing an "independent competent authority for the
people over every part of Palestinian territory that is liberated." This also meant
moving from the zero-sum view, at least in the short term, where the immediate
liberation and termination of Israel were no longer the only choice. Nevertheless,
the plan insisted on rejecting the UN Resolution 242 and any proposal implying
the official recognition of Israel's existence.
125 Sannr al-Zabin & Nabil al-Sahh, Al-Quds Mu'dilat al-Salam [Jerusalem: The Problem of
Peace] (Abu Dhabi: ECSSR, 1997), p.40.
126 For the text of the programme, see Abdul Hadi (ed.), Documents on Palestine, vol. 1,
pp.225—226.
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Four months later, the Arab Summit in Rabat on 28 October 1974 recognised
197
the PLO as "the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people". This
decision meant that Jordan could no longer negotiate on behalf of the Palestinians
and that the Palestinians were defined as the essential party in the conflict.
Two weeks later on 13 November a new and important step was achieved
when 'Arafat was invited to address the UN General Assembly, and on 22 November
the Assembly decided to grant the PLO observer status.128
Progress in the level of PLO representation in the Arab world and the UN
was still not complete, for the United States and Israel continued to withhold any
recognition of the organisation. In September 1975 Henry Kissinger, the US
Secretary of State, signed a secret memorandum, which was leaked in a few days to
the press. It was called the "Memorandum of agreement between the U.S. and Israel
concerning the reconvening of the Geneva conference", and included the following
statement:
The US will continue to adhere to its present policy with respect to the PLO,
whereby it will not recognise or negotiate with the PLO, so long as the PLO
does not recognise Israel's right to exist and does not accept Security
Council Resolutions 242 and 338.129
The PLO's efforts to engage in a political process were met with external and
internal difficulties. Some of the Arab regimes were exerting pressure to reach a
peaceful settlement. Others were doing their best to prevent such a settlement. For
instance, Iraq in 1973 and 1974, and Syria and Libya in the 1980s supported and
financed dissidents to find an alternative leadership of the PLO.130 Their main pretext
for this action was the political concessions given by the PLO.131
At a stormy meeting on 20 September 1977, the Palestinian leadership failed
to persuade the Palestinian Central Council (PCC) to declare its conditional
acceptance of UN Resolution 242. This prevented the Palestinian leadership from
127 For the text of the resolutions, see ibid., p.226.
128 Cobban, PLO, p.63.
'29 Cited in ibid., p.67.
130 gee Sayigh, Armed Struggle, pp.354-355, 377-378, & 573; and Cobban, PLO,
nn-72-71
131 Sayigh, Armed Struggle, pp. 354, 355, 567-573, 580-585; Samih Shabib, Munazzamat
fahrir al-Filastiniyya, wa Tafa'ulatuha fl al-BI'a al-Rasmiyya al-'Arabiyya: Duwal
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responding positively to US President Carter's attempts to start a peace process in the
Middle East.132 The failure to accept the UN resolutions and the American conditions
made PLO representation the main issue consuming political efforts to begin a
political process. Therefore, the main concerns of the Palestinians in dealing with the
peace proposals were the principles of self-determination and representation.
The main peace proposals put forward in the late 1970s and 1980s dealt with
Jerusalem in three ways:
1. Some proposals made no mention of the city but referred to the Israeli
withdrawal from the territories captured in 1967. This implied that Jerusalem was
included.133
2. In other proposals Jerusalem was put aside for negotiation, such as in the Reagan
Plan of 1982.
3. In the third type of proposals there was an explicit reference to Jerusalem. This
appeared mostly in the Arab proposals; such as the Saudi Prince Fahd's plan in
1981 and that of the Fez Summit in 1982, which stated that Israel's withdrawal
would include Jerusalem.134
The Palestinian position was actually in line with the first and third proposals.
The Palestinians considered Jerusalem part of the 1967 occupied territories to be
included in any Israeli withdrawal.
The Palestinian position towards the Egyptian-Israeli agreement at the Camp
David Accords of 17 September 1978 had a special place for Jerusalem. The agree¬
ment included an outline of a peace process in the Middle East. It stated that Israeli
forces would be withdrawn and redeployed in specified security locations. This was
to be done after the formation of a government elected by the inhabitants of these
areas. Negotiations for the final arrangement would begin no later than three years
al-Tawq, 1982-1987 [The PLO and its Interaction with the Official Arab Environment: The
Confrontation States, 1982-1987] (Nicosia: Sharq Press, 1988), pp.30 & 31.
132 Cobban, PLO, p.88.
133 This strategy appears in the line taken by the Soviet Union. See Abdul Hadi (ed.),
Documents on Palestine, vol. 1, p.287.
134 Fahd Plan, cited in Abdul Hadi (ed.), Documents on Palestine, vol. 1, pp.287-288; also
Fez Plan, cited in ibid., p.295.
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after this election.135 The fate of Jerusalem was not mentioned in the outline plan and
there was no indication that the city would be included in the coming negotiations.
The PLO Executive Committee issued a statement criticising the accords in
general and mentioning Jerusalem three times. The statement attacked the agreement,
describing it as a "conspiracy", "collusion", "capitulation" and an "imperial target".
The statement continued: "[it] neglects Jerusalem, which has always been a holy
symbol for our Arab nation and for all the Muslims and Christians in the world". The
agreement was also considered a "capitulation to the Zionist enemy position
regarding Jerusalem". The statement added that the accords were "deceiving the
people of Egypt and the soldier martyrs who fell for the cause of raising the Arab
flag on Jerusalem, Sinai, and Golan."136
When compared with the other views of the Palestinian leadership during that
period, its statement appears to have been a kind of propaganda that did not
accurately reflect the current Palestinian policy. Certainly, the ambiguity of the
agreements and the exclusion of the PLO's role were the main reasons for this
frustrated statement. However, the statement indicates two important points
regarding Jerusalem:
1. The Camp David Accords and the escalation of the Israeli government's settler
policy in the city alarmed the Palestinians and highlighted the complexity of the
137Jerusalem question.
2. The Palestinian statement clearly indicated the Palestinians' return to making use
of Jerusalem when addressing the Arab and Muslim worlds.
The Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982 and the consequent expulsion of the
PLO forces from that country increased the readiness of the Palestinian leadership to
engage in the peace process despite Syrian opposition. Thus the PLO leadership tried
to overcome the obstacles in President Reagan's Plan, issued on 1 September 1982,
whose aim was to "reconcile Israel's legitimate security concerns with the legitimate
rights of the Palestinians":138
135 For the text of the Accords, see ibid., pp.248-250.
136 The Executive Committee statement in Shu'un Filastiniyya, no. 84 (November 1978),
pp.227-229.
137 interview, Subhl Ghusha.
138 Reagan Plan, cited in Abdul Hadi (ed.), Documents on Palestine, vol. 1, pp.289-290.
65
1. The Plan referred to the Camp David Accords as the basis of the solution.
2. It included the statement: u[The US] will not support the establishment of an
independent Palestinian State."
3. Palestinian self-government would be linked with Jordan.
4. Jerusalem "must remain undivided, but its final status should be decided through
negotiations."
Despite these obstacles, the Palestinians in charge of diplomatic affairs
decided to deal with the Plan. They communicated secretly with Arab and European
officials. A secret explanatory memorandum covering self-government, borders,
settlements, and self-determination was sent to European states from the American
administration, and European officials passed a copy to the Palestinian leadership.139
The question of Jerusalem was tackled in this secret memorandum. The American
administration stated that it would not accept the Israeli annexation of Jerusalem, and
that it would accept the participation of the residents of Arab East Jerusalem in the
proposed election.140
According to Khalid al-Hassan, the Palestinian leadership was trying to
develop the Plan, especially with the aim of achieving the confederation of a
Palestinian state with Jordan. Nevertheless, the American attitude towards the role of
the PLO remained the main obstacle.141 Therefore, the formal view of the PNC in
February 1983 was to reject the Plan because it "does not respect the established
national right of return and self-determination, the setting up of the independent
Palestinian state, and also the PLO - the sole legitimate representative of the
Palestinian people..
Clearly, as far as the leadership was concerned, the PLO's priority was the
establishment of a Palestinian state. At the same time, however, it appeared that
Jerusalem would rapidly become a serious issue before any practical negotiations
could take place.
The Palestinian leadership then worked on a solution that could restore it to
its place at the negotiation table. This was when it signed the Jordanian-Palestinian
139 Khalid al-Hassan, "Qira'a Siyasiyya fl Mubadarat Righan" [A Political Reading of the
Reagan Initiative], Political Papers 10 (Amman: Daral-Jalll, 1985), p.24.
140 Ibid., pp.20 & 72.
141 Ibid., pp.30, 56 & 78.
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Joint Accord on 11 February 1985. The Introduction to the Accord declared that the
aim of the Jordanians and Palestinians was to achieve a peaceful and just settlement,
in which the Israeli occupation of the Arab territories, including Jerusalem, would be
terminated. The agreement stated that the PLO would participate in an international
conference as part of a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation. Finally, the aim of a
confederated state would be the means by which the Palestinians would practise their
right of self-determination.142
The Accord collapsed because some of the leading figures in the PLO and
Fath refused to co-operate with the Jordanian regime, and because doubts were
raised about the status of the Palestinians in the joint delegation.143
It can be concluded that between 1974 and the eruption of the Intifada in
1987 the Palestinian political movement was engaged in endeavours to gain world
recognition of the Palestinians as a people represented by the PLO and therefore
having the political right to establish their state. This formed a priority which
overshadowed any other issue, including Jerusalem.
1.3.4 The 1987 Intifada: The Turning-Point
On 8 December 1987 a mass protest erupted in the Gaza Strip and spread to the West
Bank. It was triggered by a traffic accident in Gaza, where an Israeli vehicle collided
with two cars carrying Palestinians. The fact that the Palestinians belonged to an
Islamic movement called Islamic Jihad strengthened the Palestinian conviction that
the accident was a deliberate act.144
The Intifada reflected and triggered a series of changes in the Palestinian
political position. Jerusalem witnessed events that it had not seen since 1967. Ten
days after the eruption of the Intifada, the confrontations in the city were considered
to be the most intensive since 1976, when Palestinians in the occupied territories
joined the protest against land appropriation in Galilee.145 The confrontations
142 The text of the Accords, cited in Abdul Hadi (ed.), Documents on Palestine, vol.1, p.299.
143 Khalid al-Hassan, "Filastmiyyat: Afaq al-'Amal bayn Dawratay al-Majlis al-Wapani
apSai' 'Ashra wa al-Thamina Ashra" [The Horizons of Palestinian Action between the
Seventeenth and Eighteenth Sessions of the PNC], Political Papers 9 (Amman: Dar
al-Karmil, 1987). pp.124, 129, 151&152.
>44 Sayigh, ArmedStruggle, p.607.
145 The Times (20 December 1987).
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between the Palestinian youths and the Israeli soldiers were similar to those in other
areas. The fact that the Israeli settlers circulated freely in the Arab quarter of the city
made it easier for the Palestinian youths to attack them with knives and other
weapons.146 In short, East Jerusalem resembled part of the occupied territories rather
than a part of Israel, as successive Israeli governments had tried to portray.
Nevertheless, this situation did not mean that Jerusalem played the leading
role in the Intifada. It was not the trigger, nor was it the assembly-point where large
groups of people from other cities gathered to organise joint protest marches as they
had done at the beginning of the twentieth century or even in the 1970s and 1980s,
despite Palestinian attempts to revive such roles. For instance, in the second month of
the Intifada, when the confrontations were losing their momentum,147 the United
National Leadership for the Intifada (which included the PLO's main factions), tried
to exploit the status of al-Aqsa Mosque to maintain the escalation of the protest. On
15 January 1988 a demonstration was launched from the Mosque after the weekly
Friday prayers.148 However, on subsequent Fridays the Israelis imposed a curfew on
the Old City of Jerusalem for the first time since 1967, and thus succeeded - more or
less - in containing the situation and preventing large-scale protests.149
The remarkable role played by Jerusalem was in the political arena. Leading
figures from the West Bank and Gaza began to act as the Intifada's political
spokespeople. They issued statements and held Press conferences to publish the
Intifada's demands from Jerusalem.150 This was an implicit assertion of Jerusalem as
the political centre inside Palestine.
The return of Jerusalem to the Palestinian discourse occurred because of the
shift in the PLO's political position and its acceptance of the two-states solution.
The Palestinian leadership decided to take further steps to meet the American
conditions, so it developed what was known as the Palestinian "peace offensive".
This offensive was actually strengthened in the aftermath of the Intifada. King
146 Roger Friedland & Richard Hecht, To Rule Jerusalem (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge
University Press, 1996), p.330.
147 The Times (3 January 1988).
148 The Times (16 January 1988).
149 The Times (23 & 30 January 1988).
150 For instance, at a Press conference on 14 January 1988, the demands by the Intifada
colnprised 14 points. See Abdul Hadi (ed.). Documents on Palestine, vol.1, pp.306-307.
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Husayn declared in August 1988 his historic decision to cut the legal and
administrative ties between Jordan and the West Bank (see Chapter Three). This
decision enhanced the status of the PLO as the representative of the Palestinians and
gave it more power to start a political process.
The Intifada had also become a vital card in the hands of the PLO, for it gave
a strong message that the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982 had backfired,
resulting in the shift in emphasis of the Palestinian resistance movement to the
occupied territories themselves and strengthening the PLO leadership there.
The Palestinian leadership capitalised on the new situation by forming a
political initiative based on the partition of Palestine, or the two-state solution. The
PNC held a session in Algiers between 12 and 15 November 1988, where it officially
accepted UN Resolutions 242 and 338. At the same time, it put forward the
Palestinian political programme, which included the declaration of an independent
Palestinian state according to the UN Partition Resolution 181. The declaration of
independence did not define the borders of the state although Jerusalem was
designated as its capital.151 In the first sentence of the declaration Palestine was
defined as "the land of three monotheistic faiths". The core paragraph stated: "The
PNC in the name of God, and in the name of the Palestinian Arab people, hereby
proclaims the establishment of the State of Palestine in our Palestinian territory with
its capital Holy Jerusalem (al-Quds al-Sharif)r
The restoration of Jerusalem to the Palestinian discourse, as will be
elaborated later, could be based on several factors:
1. Palestinian nationalism in search of a state needed a capital, and Jerusalem was
the undisputed capital.
2. The solution of creating a state on less than 22 per cent of the historical Palestine
needed emotional symbols that could compensate for the absence of the highly
emotional parts of Palestine, such as Haifa and Jaffa, which were now part of
Israel. Jerusalem was the city that could provide such compensation.
151 "Palestinian Declaration of Independence, 15 November 1988", in Abdul Hadi (ed.),
Documents on Palestine, vol. 2 (Jerusalem: PASSIA, 1997), pp.331-333.
69
3. The importance of Jerusalem for the Arab and Muslim worlds would help in
gaining support for the proclamation.
Subsequent to the PNC resolutions, and after hesitation and several assertions
from 'Arafat, upon Washington's demands that the PLO "renounce all forms of
individual, collective and state-sponsored terrorism", and that it recognise Israel's
right of existence,152 the Reagan administration declared that the PLO had met the
American conditions to begin a dialogue with the PLO.'53 However, the dialogue
was not the breakthrough desired by the Palestinians. Officially, it took place through
the American envoy Robert Pelletreau, who was also the US Ambassador in Tunisia,
and it remained at a general level without any real progress or practical action to set
in train an active political process. Then the Americans stopped the dialogue a few
months later when a small faction of the PLO carried out an unsuccessful military
attack on the Israeli coast in May 1990 and the PLO Chairman, Yasir 'Arafat,
refused to condemn their action.154 This was followed by the Iraqi invasion of
Kuwait, which suspended the peace process for nearly 18 months.
However, before moving to the post-GulfWar era, it is important to elaborate
on the political role of Jerusalem in the Palestinian discourse during that period.
'Arafat's speeches and statements seemed to be creating a formula that made use of
the collective Arab and Muslim identity to forge a national Palestinian identity. On
the one hand, he was repeating and highlighting the common Arab, Muslim and
Christian interest in Jerusalem. Yet, on the other hand, he regarded the common
interest as a support for the independent Palestinian national state that had
sovereignty over the city. For instance, in his speech at the Arab Summit in Baghdad
in May 1990, he called for the development of the relationship of the "surrounding
Muslim states" and "the development ofMuslim-Christian co-operation", and added,
"Jerusalem is the centre" of this development. Then he attacked the intention of the
American Congress in issuing a decision that recognised Jerusalem as the Israeli
capital: "This is an aggression against Arab dignity, against the international will, ...,
152 Mahmoud Abbas, Through Secret Channels (Reading, Berks, UK: Garnet, 1995), pp.32
& 33.
152 Abdul Hadi (ed.), Documents on Palestine, vol. 1, p.337.
154 Interview, 'Aflf Safyia, London, 9 November 2001.
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and against the status of Jerusalem, which is in the hearts ofmillions of Muslims and
Christians." Finally, he concluded:
[Jerusalem] is part of the occupied Palestinian land, and it is the capital of
the Palestinian state, and any alteration in its legal, religious, cultural and
historical status is an extreme violation of the international resolutions and
principles.155
1.3.5 Madrid Negotiations
The end of the 1991 Gulf War increased the urgency of settling the situation in the
Middle East. The Americans were building the New World Order and this required a
new regional order in the Middle East as well as in other parts of the world to sustain
the American interests (see Chapter Five). Meanwhile the Palestinians were suffering
intense isolation from the Arab regimes and international community as a
punishment for the PLO because of its support for Iraq in the war.
PLO representation formed the main obstacle to launching the peace process. In
addition, Israel rejected any representation of East Jerusalem. The PLO was in a
situation where it needed to show flexibility in its role:
1. Owing to its isolation, it was not in a position to manoeuvre for long.
2. More importantly, "inside delegation" virtually meant a delegation affiliated to
the PLO. Therefore between March and October 1991, inside delegations met
James Baker in Jerusalem several times. At these meetings the delegations made
it clear that the PLO authorised them to transmit its instructions.156
On the other hand, Jerusalem was allocated more space in the Palestinian
political discourse, and clearly there was a correlation between Jerusalem and the
Palestinian identity and national state.
During 1991 and the preparations for the international peace conference,
Jerusalem was given increased priority in the Palestinian discourse. The PNC held its
Twentieth Session, entitled "al-Quds al-Sharif and the Martyrs' Session", in Algeria
between 23 and 28 September 1991. In his speech at the meeting, 'Arafat mentioned
Jerusalem 16 times, and called for the restoration of Arab dignity "in the name of
155 'Arafat's Speech, Filastm al-Thawra (3 June 1990).
156 "PLO Political Department report to the PNC Session, Algeria 1991" (Amman: PNC
Office Archive).
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Jerusalem", declaring that the Israeli withdrawal was to include Jerusalem, which
would be the capital of the Palestinian state.157
This emphasis provoked those Palestinians who believed that the
repossession of Jerusalem did not justify concessions on their historical rights in the
rest of Palestine. Khalid al-Hassan addressed the Council as follows:
Can we find a formula to restore the Arabism of the West Bank and Gaza
Strip, including Jerusalem, without closing the file on the Palestinian
problem in the future? ... I am Khalid al-Hassan, a son ofHaifa. If I lose the
right - and subsequently my hope - to return to Haifa, then I do not need
you. [Following applause from Council members] ... by God, Haifa and
Jerusalem are equal to me, because all Palestine is holy.158
The PNC compiled a list of six principles for the Madrid Peace Conference,
four ofwhich included Jerusalem:
1. The UN resolutions, including 242 and 338, were to be the basis of the
conference, and the application of these resolutions were to include Jerusalem.
2. Jerusalem was an inseparable part of the occupied territories; therefore, what was
applicable to these territories was also applicable to Jerusalem.
3. The construction of settlements in the occupied territories, including Jerusalem,
should be halted.
4. The PLO had the right to form the Palestinian delegation from both inside and
outside the homeland, including Jerusalem.
5. The Arab position should be co-ordinated and unilateral solutions rejected.
6. There should be a guarantee that the successive phases of the solution would be
put into effect until a comprehensive settlement was reached.
Baker eventually managed to convince the Palestinians to be more flexible on
the procedures of forming the delegation, stating that the substantive talks would
create a solution closer to their wishes than to those of Israel. He also promised
Faysal al-Husaynl and Hanan 'Ashrawi, both holders of Jerusalem identity cards,
that although they would not be among the delegation members, he would maintain
contact and co-ordination with them.159
157 'Arafat's Speech, Algeria 1991 (Amman: PNC Office Archive).
158 Sa'id al-Hassan, Howl Ittifaq Ghazza-Arlha Awwalan, Wathai'q wa Dirasat.[The Gaza-
Jericho First Agreement: Documents and Studies], (Amman: Dar al-Shuruq, 1995), p.238.
159 Menachem Klein, Jerusalem, the Contested City (London: Hurst, 2001), p. 126.
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As a result the Palestinians agreed to attend the conference as part of a joint
Jordanian-Palestinian delegation consisting of 28 members. (Delegations from the
other states consisted of 14 members.) The negotiators who were entitled to sit at the
negotiating table were to be insiders, not known as PLO members, nor residents of
Jerusalem.160
However, the Palestinian mission included a steering delegation that was on
the same level as the Americans regarding "residence, security and communication",
although it was not permitted access to the conference hall. This delegation included
Palestinians from Jerusalem and the countries of exile.161 The insider Palestinians
also received an American letter of assurances on 18 October 1991, which included
the following statements:
The US understands how much importance Palestinians attach to the
question of East Jerusalem. Thus we want to assure you that nothing
Palestinians do in choosing their delegation members in this phase of the
process will affect their claim to East Jerusalem, or be prejudicial or
precedential to the outcome of negotiations. ...
It is also the US position that a Palestinian resident in Jordan with ties to a
prominent Jerusalem family would be eligible to join the Jordanian side of
the delegation.162
The letter added that it was the US position that Palestinians from East
Jerusalem should be able to vote in the elections for the interim autonomous
government. It should be noted here that the US did not support the Palestinians'
right to stand for election.
On the other hand, the letter stated that the US believed that Palestinians from
East Jerusalem and from outside the occupied territories should be able to participate
in the negotiations of the final status. The US also supported the right of the
Palestinians to bring any issue, including that of East Jerusalem, to the table.
It was clear that there was a Palestinian concession on the inclusion of
Jerusalem at the conference, through the acceptance of not representing Jerusalem in
the delegation, and having no guarantees regarding the solution in Jerusalem. This
was in contrast to the escalated style that characterised the Palestinian discourse on
160 Reb'I al-Madhun, "Sab'at Shuhur Mubahathat Qabla Madrid" [Seven Months of Talks
before Madrid] Shu'un Filastmiyya, nos. 223/224 (October/November 1992), pp. 137-139.
161 Ibid., p.138.
162 "US Letter of Assurances", Abdul Hadi (ed.), Documents on Palestine, vol., pp.8-10.
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Jerusalem at the time, and despite the centrality of Jerusalem in the discourse on the
independent state. The Palestinians chose flexibility and accepted compromises.
However, the negotiations increased the status of Jerusalem in Palestinian politics.
In the negotiation arena, despite the absence of Jerusalem's representatives at
the table, the city came under the spotlight in several ways. At the conference on 30
October 1991, the opening Palestinian speech, delivered by Haidar 'Abd al-Shafi, a
resident of Gaza and co-founder of the PLO in 1964,163 referred to Jerusalem as part
of Palestine's historical existence and described it as the "cradle of the world
religions". He said: "[Jerusalem] defines Palestinian existence, past, present and
future." He used the phrase that had become the theme in the Palestinian discourse,
when describing Jerusalem as the "capital of our homeland and future state" and
"Jerusalem, the heart of our homeland and the cradle of the soul, is shimmering
through the barriers of occupation and deceit."
Faysal al-Husaym was the President of the whole delegation, and 'Ashrawl
was its spokeswoman. Both of them attracted international media attention.
Moreover, diplomatic meetings and press conferences continued to be held in
Jerusalem, that is, from the delegation office at Orient House.
During the negotiations the Palestinians repeatedly asked for East Jerusalem
to be included in the interim arrangement. They argued that the final negotiations
would deal with Jerusalem as a unified city and that the Palestinians from the West
Bank, including Jerusalem and the Gaza Strip, as well as those people who had been
displaced and deported since 1967, should participate fully in the election of the
legislative assembly.164
Following its victory in the Israeli election of 1992 the Labour Party
officially accepted the direct participation of Faysal al-Husaynl in the negotiations.163
Nevertheless, disputes continued and the Palestinians did not accept the Labour
Party's offer that the Palestinians could vote but not stand as candidates for election.
On 1 July 1992 Faysal al-Husayni sent to the American side responses to an
163 The speech text cited in ibid., pp.21-25.
164 For Jerusalem in the Palestinian proposals, see Shu'un ftlastmiyya, nos. 229/230 (April
]992), p. 142; and Abdul Hadi (ed.), Documents on Palestine, vol. 2, pp.59-60, 73-77, 96,
133 &136.
165 JClein, Contested, p. 134.
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American draft of an Israeli-Palestinian joint declaration of principles.166. The
memorandum criticised the American draft's statement: "once negotiations on
permanent status begin, each side can raise whatever issue it wants including the
question of Jerusalem." The Palestinian memorandum replied that the US should
consider Israeli annexation and settlement in Jerusalem as prejudicial to the
implementation of Resolution 242. It also criticised the American position because
instead of considering Palestinian empowerment during the interim period, whether
territorially, functionally or personally, as a step towards the implementation of the
resolution, "the draft implies that this empowerment could be reserved by an Israeli
claim to sovereignty in the final status."167
The Palestinian response was according to the instructions of the PLO.168
This was different from the result of the secret negotiations that were taking place in
Oslo at the time, as is explained later. However, the Palestinian delegation delivered
to the American Secretary of State, Warren Christopher, on 5 August 1993, a
proposed plan for an interim period which accepted delaying "the final status of
Jerusalem" for the final status negotiations. Nevertheless the plan stated:
"[thejPalestinian Interim Autonomous Government will exercise its territorial
jurisdiction on the occupied Palestinian territories... including Jerusalem."169
Some of the negotiators submitted their resignation in protest against the
PLO's latest action. The plan was prepared in the PLO's head office in Tunis and
was sent to the delegation, which was reluctant to submit it, and considered it
capitulation to the American conditions. When the PLO leadership insisted on the
submission of the document, the delegation required written instructions from
'Arafat personally. They submitted the document only when they received these
written instructions. 'Arafat invited them to Tunisia and resolved the problem of the
resignations.170
However, the role of Jerusalem in Palestinian politics at this time was not
confined to the peace process. The Palestinian leadership transferred Jerusalem to the
166 "The US Draft", Abdul Hadi (ed.), Documents on Palestine, vol. 2, pp. 134-135.
167 "Memorandum from Faysal al-Husayni to Dennis Ross, US Department of State, 1 July
1993", Documents on Jerusalem, pp.55-56.
168 Filastm al-Thawra (18 July 1993).
mFilastm al-Thawra (15 August 1993).
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theme of its efforts to break the isolation from which it had been suffering since the
Gulf War. This attitude was based on the supposition that the Arab and Muslim
worlds could renounce their support for the Palestinian cause but not for Jerusalem.
The PLO asked for support against the escalation of the Israeli "Judaization"
policies. At first this request was only partly successful. For instance, in August 1991
the conference of the foreign ministers of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference
(OIC) declared "the Islamic nation's commitment to liberate al-Aqsa Mosque ...". 71
However, the OIC Summit in Dakar, Senegal, four months later saw a crisis between
'Arafat and the heads of the Arab Gulf states. Some of these states insisted on
omitting the word "jihad" from the Summit's final communique, although the word
had already been used at the Mecca 1981 Summit. This attitude caused 'Arafat to
speak at length twice in protest against the amendment, and when he failed to change
their minds, he withdrew from the Summit.172
'Arafat continued to move in different directions to revive the issue of
Jerusalem. He sent two letters to the head of al-Azhar Mosque in Cairo and the
Coptic Patriarch in Egypt on the occasion of an international Islamic-Christian
conference on Jerusalem to explain the Israeli attempts to exclude the city from the
peace process.173 Following the OIC Summit, the PLO also organised a seminar
under the title "Jerusalem: the Key to Peace".174
Attempts at the official level also continued. On 23 January 1992, less than
one month after the Dakar Summit, the 15 member states of the "Jerusalem
Committee" of the OIC concluded their first meeting since the Gulf War. 'Arafat
attended the meeting and asked for urgent help to restore the holy places in
Jerusalem and to deal with the Israeli policies in the city. His style of language on
this occasion was very similar to that of the Palestinian leadership when asking for
Arab and Muslim support in the 1920s. 'Arafat had brought with him a list of houses
in the city which needed urgent repairs to prevent collapse and to avoid their
occupants being forced into "moving outside the city, which means evacuating
170
Klein, Contested, pp. 136-137.
171 Filasttln al-Thawra (1 September 1991).
172 Filasttin al-Thawra (22 December 1991).
173 Filasttm al-Thawra (3 November 1991).
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Muslims, who are the guardians of al-Aqsa Mosque, from Jerusalem".175 He said,
"Jerusalem has not received a penny for 20 months."
The Committee passed resolutions that helped to remove the isolation of the
PLO. Nevertheless, it was theoretically confined to Jerusalem. So it decided to
contact the Christian religious leaders regarding Jerusalem. Asked the OIC members
to pay their contributions to the Jerusalem Fund.176
Jerusalem continued to play this active role in rebuilding the Palestinian-
Arab, Muslim and Christian relations. The imam of al-Aqsa Mosque visited Malaysia
in February 1992 and was received as a top official visitor. His visit was made during
a solidarity campaign in the Muslim countries of South-East Asia, apparently as a
means of raising funds for Palestine.177 These activities spread to the Arab countries,
including the Arab Gulf states, during 1992 and 1993. Exhibitions and conferences
were organised under titles such as "Jerusalem: Past and Present" (Qatar), 178 "The
Anniversary of al-Aqsa Mosque Fire (Cairo),179 and "The Mosques" (Mecca).180
Palestine in general was discussed through Jerusalem, and Jerusalem's religious
significance again became active in mobilising support for the Palestinian national
movement.
1.3.6 Oslo Accords
On 13 September 1993, Mahmud 'Abbas, on behalf of the PLO, and Shimon Peres,
on behalf of the Israeli government, signed at the White House in Washington a
"Declaration of Principles (DOP) on Interim Self-Government Arrangements". It
was agreed to establish a Palestinian Interim Self-Government Authority after an
Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and the district of Jericho in the West Bank.
To begin with, the Israelis were to withdraw from the populated areas before the eve
of the election for the Self-Government Authority Council.
174 The papers of the seminar are held in the Archives of the PNC office in Amman.
175 Compare these words with those used in the Palestinian letters to the Muslim nation in
1922. See pages 43-44.
176 Filastm al-Thawra (2 February 1992).
177 Filastm al-Thawra (23 February 1992).
178 Filastin al-Thawra (31 May 1992).
179 Fiiastm al-Thawra (21 June 1992).
180 filastm al-Thawra (21 March 1993)
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The elected Council would have responsibility for education and culture,
health, social welfare, direct taxation and tourism during an interim stage lasting five
years. This would lead to negotiations - scheduled for not later than the beginning of
the third year of the interim stage - on the final status agreement based on
Resolutions 242 and 338. Jerusalem, refugees, settlements, security arrangements,
• 181borders and other issues of common interests were shifted to the final negotiations.
Following the Declaration, Yasir 'Arafat and Yitzhak Rabin signed on 4 May
1994 an accord in Cairo regarding the "Gaza Strip and Jericho". From 10 May 1994
the PLO forces from exile began to enter the two areas. 'Arafat himself arrived in
Gaza on 12 July 1994.182
The accords and the establishment of the autonomous authority together
formed a radical redefinition of the conflict between the Palestinians and the Israelis:
1. The type of conflict was officially redefined. Each side - the Palestinians and the
Israelis - recognised the other, and each- at least officially - dismissed attempts
to solve the conflict by eliminating the national existence of the other. Their
acceptance of the partition as a solution transformed the conflict from a zero-sum
to a non-zero issue.
2. The cause of the conflict was amended from being that of national existence to
that of territory.
3. The accords were important in identifying the parties to the conflict. The fact that
they were signed bilaterally, not as part of a comprehensive or co-ordinated
Arab-Israeli agreement, emphasised the Palestinian problem as Palestinian-
Israeli, rather than giving it a general Arab/Muslim-Jewish definition. The
Palestinians found that they had the right to sign agreements - including
reference to Jerusalem - without being governed by an Arab decision of any
kind.
4. The Accords also meant the official renunciation of violence to resolve the
conflict.
181 The DOP text, Abbas, Secret Channels, p.225.
182 Sayigh, Armed Struggle, pp.658, 659.
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With regard to Jerusalem in particular, it is important to study the position of
the city at different stages: during the negotiations, and during the implementation
period, which was intended to include the final status negotiations beginning in 1996.
1.3.6.1 Jerusalem in the Oslo Negotiations
At the beginning of December 1992, Ahmad Qray', a PLO official, was in London to
supervise the multilateral Palestinian negotiations. He was the co-ordinator of the
negotiating committees and his role, like that of other PLO officials, was informal.
Since he had the telephone number of a relative of Yair Hirschfeld, an Israeli
academic with connections in the Israeli Labour government, Qray' asked the
Palestinian General Delegate in London, 'Afif Safyia, to help arrange a meeting.
This move had been suggested by the Palestinian negotiators, Hanan 'Ashrawi and
Faysal al-Husaym, whose intention was to help gain Israeli recognition of the PLO.
The meeting took place at the Ritz Hotel. Because it was the first face-to-face contact
between Qray' and the Israelis, he asked Safyia, who also attended, to keep it secret.
Safyia agreed, although he did not think that there was anything special about the
occasion, for it was similar to many other meetings.183
Qray' later asked the Terje Larsen, a Norwegian researcher who happened to
be in London at that time and, being in contact with Hirschfeld and Palestinian
officials, knew about the meeting, to help him organise further meetings in Norway.
These meetings began on 21 January 1993 and comprised 13 face-to-face rounds.
The Palestinians delegation consisted of Ahmad Qray', Hassan 'Asfur (Assistant to
Mahmud 'Abbas), and Mahir al-Kurd ('Arafat's economic adviser), the last being
replaced later with another member. The Israeli delegation began with two
academics, Yair Hirschfeld and Ron Pundak, who declared in the first four rounds
that they were not authorised by the Israeli government to negotiate. In the sixth
round on 21 May 1993, the General Director of the Israeli Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, Uri Savir, joined the delegation, and in the seventh round on 13 June, Joel




Abbas, Secret Channels, pp. 149 & 151.
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Jerusalem held a prominent place in these negotiations. Appendix 2 is a
comparison of the Palestinian and Israeli positions regarding the city. The Palestinian
positions can be summarised as follows:
1. The basis of the negotiations: In the first round the Palestinians demanded that
Jerusalem should be discussed by a multilateral committee, including the Arab
countries.
2. Authority: The Palestinians demanded that East Jerusalem should be considered
to be under Palestinian control during the interim period.
3. Election: Residents of Jerusalem should have the right to participate in the
election as both candidates and voters.
4. The text of the agreement: Jerusalem was to be included in the text of the
agreement.
As result of the negotiations, the Palestinians accepted the following:
1. Jerusalem was to be negotiated on a bilateral track.
2. Jerusalem was to be discussed at the final status negotiations. The city would not
be under Palestinian control during the interim period.
3. The Palestinian residents of East Jerusalem would have the right to participate in
the election as both candidates and voters according to a special future
agreement.
The secret meetings resolved several problems that had arisen in the public
negotiations. Firstly, the negotiators were not subjected to the pressure imposed by
the media and public opinion. Secondly, the PLO had direct access to the negotiating
table without the need to form a delegation consisting purely of insiders as was the
case in Madrid with the consequent concern about the representation of Jerusalem,
exiled Palestinians and refugees. All the representation formalities that had
consumed the peace efforts for 17 years were removed by these secret negotiations.
This led to a swift take-off in dealing with the actual subjects of dispute,
including Jerusalem. At first, the Palestinians held to their traditional view, which
considered East Jerusalem to be part of the 1967 occupied territories. Therefore, they
rejected any Israeli formula excluding reference to Jerusalem in the Declaration of
Principles. In April, however, the Palestinians agreed to delay the question of
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Jerusalem to the final status negotiations. This concession led to the other important
concession: that Jerusalem would not be included under the interim authority.
The Palestinians' new position has been analysed by various politicians and
researchers. Anls al-Qasim, member of the PNC, a prominent Palestinian lawyer in
exile, and a member of the Madrid steering committee, was one of those who thought
that the priority of the Palestinian leadership was to return to the occupied territories
and to be recognised as the representative of the Palestinian people, while
1 8S
"everything else was secondary".
Nevertheless, there have been other opinions. For instance, from an
examination of the minutes of the Oslo meetings (see Appendix 2), and the details of
'Arafat's meeting with the Norwegian mediator Terji Larsen (described in various
sources), it is clear that the Palestinian leadership's entry into the occupied territories
was not a sticking-point in the negotiations. Early in the third and fourth rounds,
before agreeing to find a solution to the question of Jerusalem, the Israelis had
willingly accepted the return of the Palestinian leaders.186
This is not to suggest that the Palestinian negotiators did not make
concessions on East Jerusalem. Their priority was to set the political process in
motion and then to develop it. This meant delaying discussion of some of the conflict
issues while achieving agreement over others, but without giving up those issues.
This is almost what Qray' told the Israeli delegation in Oslo: "We have accepted the
harsh conditions for the interim period with courage because there was the hope that
187
at the final stage we would deal with all the awkward and unresolved issues."
However, the postponement of Jerusalem highlighted an important
difference. On the one hand, the city could be used in the national discourse to
construct a national identity as part of a solution relying on an independent state and
the mobilisation of Arab and Muslim support. On the other hand, the PLO had to
recognise the reality of its political position. The concessions could be seen as an
acceptance to delay the discussion of the symbol and capital of the state in order to
185 Interview, Anis al-Qasim, Amman, 20 September 2001.
186 Abbas, Secret Channels, pp.134, 135 &139; Jane Corbine, Gaza First, The Secret Norway
Channel to Peace Between Israel and the PLO (London: Bloomsbury, 1994). p. 121.
187 Abbas, Secret Channels, p. 169.
81
achieve progress in creating this state, which reveals how much Jerusalem served the
state programme, rather than the other way round.
To gain a comprehensive understanding of the PLO position in Oslo, a
detailed examination of Jerusalem's status in the text of the Accords is necessary.
1.3.6.2 Jerusalem in the Texts of the Oslo Accords
In addition to the Oslo DOP, there was the Palestinian-Israeli interim agreement on
the West Bank and Gaza Strip - Oslo II - which was signed in Washington on 28
1 oo
September 1995, stating in detail the implementation of the Principles. In both
documents Jerusalem was briefly mentioned in three points:
1.3.6.2.1 The Election
According to the Oslo Accords elections are supposed to take place for the
Palestinian Authority Council. Regarding Jerusalem, the DOP stated: "Palestinian
residents of Jerusalem will have the right to participate in the election, according to
an agreement between the two sides." The Interim Agreement, dated 28 September
1995, stated that the Palestinian candidates in Jerusalem were to apply for a permit to
conduct their campaign from the Palestinian organisation responsible for the election.
This organisation should, in turn, apply for a permit from the Israeli side. The
11• • 189
agreement also designated six Post Offices as the city's polling stations.
1.3.6.2.2 The Situation during the Interim Period
The only document that addressed the question of Jerusalem during the interim
period was a letter dated 11 October 1993 from Shimon Peres to the Norwegian
Foreign Minister. It confirmed the following:
Palestinian institutions of East Jerusalem and the interests and well-being of
the Palestinians of East Jerusalem are of great importance and will be
preserved.
Therefore, all the Palestinian institutions of East Jerusalem, including the
economic, social, educational and cultural, and the holy Christian and
188 The text of Oslo II Agreement, Abdul Hadi, Documents on Palestine, vol. 2,
pp.246-256.
189 "Ittifaqiyyat Oslu: al-Ittifaqiyya al-Isra'lliyya al-Filastlniyya, hawl al-Daffa
al-Gharbiyya wa Qita' Ghazza [Oslo Accords: The Israeli-Palestinian Accords on the West
Bank and Gaza Strip] (Amman: Daral-Jalil, 1998), pp.143 &144.
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Muslim places, are performing an essential task for the Palestinian
population.
Needless to say, we will not hamper their activity, on the contrary, the
fulfilment of this important mission is to be encouraged.190
This text was written on the demand of the Palestinians, as a guarantee that
Israel would not exploit the interim period to create a new situation in the city.
Although the letter was not supposed to be publicised, it could have been helpful in
arousing Palestinian and Arab public opinion. On the other hand, though, it neither
mentioned the interim period nor contained any specific Israeli obligations.
Moreover, it did not make any connection between the West Bank or the Gaza Strip
and the city. Nor did it refer to any political institutions such as Orient House.
By restricting the reference to Jerusalem during the interim period in this
way, the Israelis could reasonably argue that the city was excluded from any other
agreement, for example, the release of detainees and prisoners resident in Jerusalem.
Moreover, Palestinian residents of the city could not work in Palestinian institutions
such as the police and security forces.191 Even texts stating "Neither side shall
initiate or take any step that will change the status of the West Bank and Gaza Strip
pending the outcome of the permanent status negotiations" could be seen as
inapplicable to Jerusalem.
It should also be remembered that during the negotiations the Israelis offered
to implement some measures favourable to the Palestinians, such as constructing a
certain number of housing units, or granting a particular status to Orient House, the
Palestinian political headquarters in Jerusalem.192 However, none of these offers was
mentioned in any text and no such agreement was made.
The negotiators themselves had their own view of the status of Jerusalem in
the agreements. Mahmud 'Abbas, the second man in the PLO and the person
responsible for the negotiations, evaluated it as follows:
It is known that a Knesset resolution annexed Jerusalem to Israel, but by
placing the issue on the agenda for the permanent status negotiations, the
Israelis admit that the issue is subject to debate; in other words, the
annexation of Jerusalem has now become null and void. But we must be
aware that issues require a great deal of effort, patience and a long time to
190 Abbas, Secret Channels, p.241.
191 Ittifaqiyyat Oslu, p.52.
192 Abbas, Secret Channels, pp.124 & 128.
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resolve. There will be a struggle ahead and there will be risks, but have there
been agreements reached without risk?193
However, the implementation of the agreements and the subsequent
negotiations are important indicators for judging the Palestinian decisions in the
negotiations.
1.3.6.3 The Implementation of the Oslo Accords: Jerusalem
Delaying Jerusalem for the final status negotiations did not stop the ball from rolling.
The continuous Israeli siege around Jerusalem and the escalation of the Israeli
annexation policies increased the urgency of organising a Palestinian counter-
strategy to save the Palestinian presence in the city. Nevertheless, Palestinian
activities continued under the general term of steadfastness (sum ud.), rather than
following a combined strategy. Jerusalem became the focal point of tension in
Palestinian-Israeli relations, and disputes erupted on political, demographic, cultural
and religious levels.
1.3.6.3.1 The closure
Since the GulfWar, Israel had prohibited Palestinians from the West Bank and Gaza
from entering Israeli territory (within the 1948 borders) or what was known as the
Green Line, to which Jerusalem was annexed since 1967.194 The Oslo Accords had
no points to ensure that Palestinians had free access to Jerusalem and its holy places.
The closure separated Jerusalem from the West Bank, which affected not
only the city but also the Palestinian national project of establishing an independent
state. In particular, the geographical link between the south and north of the West
Bank was broken.
Jerusalem began to lose its central role in the daily life of the Palestinians of
the West Bank. Many of them became unemployed and lost educational
opportunities. They lacked health services and had no access to the religious
Christian and Muslim places. Because Jerusalem is in the centre of the West Bank,
Palestinians needing to travel between the north and south were now restricted to the
193 Ibid., p. 221.
194 Abraham Ashkenasi (ed.), The Future ofJerusalem (Frankfurt-on-Main, Germany: Peter
Lang, 1999), p.37.
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routes outside Jerusalem - narrow and rugged roads through the hills skirting the city
- a detour that increased the journey time six or sevenfold compared with the direct
route.
Jerusalem itself suffered a decline in visitors, passing traffic, shoppers and
workers in the city. One of the effects of this situation was that investors moved out
of the city or opened branches elsewhere.195
1.3.6.3.2 The Demographic Structure
The resistance to changes in the demographic structure was conducted on two levels:
individual and collective. Individual resistance meant accepting poor housing
conditions to avoid leaving the city and losing one's identity card.* For instance,
Palestinian residents continued to live in small, overcrowded old houses owing to
Israeli restrictions on building new houses for Palestinians or on repairing old ones.
According to Israeli statistics, in 1996 the proportion of Jewish households in
Jerusalem having three or more occupants per room was 2.4 per cent, compared with
27.8 per cent of Palestinian households. The proportion of Jewish households having
two occupants per room was 13.5 per cent, compared with 61.5 per cent of
Palestinian households.196 In other cases Palestinians abandoned plans to go abroad
for study or employment, or even to live with their spouses or other relatives who
were not allowed to live in the city. If they had done so, their right of residence and
identity cards would be withdrawn according to Israeli law.197
Owing to the severe Israeli restrictions on building new houses, some
Palestinians built their homes at night and on Saturdays, when the municipal
inspectors were off duty. Faysal al-Husaynl was reported to have said: "The most
important Palestinian activity as this time is building, even without permission."198
The refusal to sell houses and land to Israelis was another common resistance
tactic. Except for a few cases, no land nor houses were sold to Israelis. Moreover, on
195 Ibid., p.58.
*
The Palestinians of East Jerusalem have special identity cards different to the West Bank
and Gaza and give them the ability to live in the city.
196 Dirasat Filastiniyya no. 32 (Autumn 1997), pp.144 & 145.
197 For examples see B'TSELEM "The Quiet Deportation Continues: Revocation of
Residency and Denial of Social Rights of East Jerusalem Palestinians" (Jerusalem: April
1997), pp.24-32.
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3 May 1997 the Palestinian Authority (PA) issued a decree forbidding the sale of any
land in Palestine to foreigners, and warning that anyone who sold land in this way or
assisted in its sale would be liable to punishment.199 This was clearly a firm decision
against the sale of land to Israelis. It was followed by the assassination of several
estate agents in ambiguous circumstances.200 Jerusalem's Mufti, Tkrima Sabri,
asserted that religious law imposed the death penalty for selling land to Israelis, and
that the bodies of those found guilty would not be purified before burial, nor would
they be buried in an Islamic cemetery.201 At the same time, there were many cases of
Palestinian families waging lengthy battles in the Israeli courts against the
confiscation of their property by the Israelis or its forced sale to them.202
The Israeli settlements were another major challenge for the Palestinians.
(See Chapter Two) An attempt to construct the Abu Ghunlm/Har Homa settlement to
house around 30,000 Jews south of Jerusalem provoked widespread demonstrations
and protest in various Palestinian cities. Although there was the expectation of a full-
scale uprising during these protests, the Palestinian leadership seemed to prefer using
international diplomatic efforts to tackle the matter. Nabll 'Amr, 'Arafat's adviser,
stated on Palestinian Radio: "The fruits of world support arrive gradually. Thanks to
such support we have come this far." 03 As a result, Palestinian protest and
international opposition were insufficient to prevent the construction of the
settlement.
1.3.6.3.3 The Holy Places
One of the direct results of the closure was the blocking of the Palestinians' access to
their Muslim and Christian holy places, something that had probably never happened
since the era of the Crusades. The increasing hostility aroused by the situation
erupted in September 1996, when the Likud government decided to open a tunnel
198 Nadav Shragi, Haaretz (5 June 2000).
199 Abdul Hadi, Documents on Palestine, vol. 2, p.353.
200 Ibid., p.356.
201 Ibid.
202 For six examples of testimonies made after the Oslo Accords by Palestinian residents of
East Jerusalem who were being pressured by the Israeli government or settlers to give up or
se|l their properties, see the report of B'TSELEM "A Policy of Discrimination: Land
Expropriation, Planning and Building in East Jerusalem" (Jerusalem: 1997), pp.92-96.
203 The Independent (21 March 1997).
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under al-Haram al-Shanf. The measure provoked an unprecedented wave of protests,
"The Tunnel Intifada" in which 37 Palestinians and 11 Israeli soldiers were killed
and 200 Palestinians and 55 Israeli soldiers wounded on the first day.204
The tunnel was seen as a trigger, or as the last straw in the accumulated
disappointment with the results of the peace process, especially after the Likud
Party's return to power following the assassination of Yitzhak Rabin. Marwan
Barghuthi, the head of Fath's High Committee in the West Bank, said during the
Intifada that closing the tunnel would not be enough to stop the armed clashes, and
that the Israeli government would have to implement the agreements, continue the
redeployment from the West Bank and release the prisoners.205
The direct results of the tunnel confrontations enhanced the status of Yasir
'Arafat and the PA. The Palestinian police forces had returned fire against Israeli
soldiers and defended the Palestinian protesters, which discredited the accusation that
the PA was a collaborator.206 The Intifada highlighted Jerusalem's return to its pre-
1948 position as a trigger in the conflict. The Intifada showed also how the city
could, once again, be a source of political power for the Palestinian leadership of
'Arafat.
1.3.6.3.4 The National Institutions in Jerusalem
The numerous plans and attempts to develop Palestinian strategy or large-scale
national organisations and institutions to encompass the Palestinian movement inside
Jerusalem had failed before the establishment of the PA. For instance, in October
1992 the Palestinian Central Council decided to revive the Palestinian Municipality
in the city.207
After the establishment of the Authority, a meeting of representatives of
syndicates, associations, and Islamic and Christian institutions was held on 6 June
1994 in Jerusalem. Faysal al-Husaynt was given the responsibility for establishing a
204 The Independent (27 September 1996).
205 The Independent (28 September 1996).
206 Farsoun & Zacharia, Palestine & the Palestinians, p. 289.
207 filastin al-Thawra (1 November 1992).
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central body for Jerusalem to challenge Israeli plans and to observe the negotiations
on the city.208
Such attempts were fruitless, or at least had only modest success. For
instance, the Arab Municipality Council was revived in 1995. Of the original sixteen
members of the elected Council when the 1967 war erupted, there were now only six
still living. One of those six, Amln Majaj, was asked to head the Council. However,
he died in 1998, and Zaki al-Ghul, another surviving member, was appointed as the
new mayor, along with twelve Council members.209 Like other members, al-Ghul
lived in Amman, regarded the move as symbolic, and believed that the revived
Council functioned in two ways: (1) paying the pensions of the surviving employees
of the pre-1967 municipality; and (2) providing a platform for the media activities
conducted by al-Ghul and the Council members!210
One of the main reasons for such a failure was the disagreement between the
Palestinian leaders, especially between the head of the PA, 'Arafat, and leaders in
Jerusalem, including Faysal al-Husaynl. Disputes between the two parties were
interpreted in different ways:
1. There was the asserted disagreement over the status of Jerusalem in the Oslo
negotiations, where the city's local leadership opposed the exclusion of
Jerusalem from the interim authority.211
2. There was also 'Arafat's insistence on holding the Jerusalem profile himself,
which limited the role of Faysal al-Husaynl, despite his being appointed in 1994
to take charge of the file for the PLO.212 This was a kind of remaining role for
Jerusalem as a source of legitimacy and leadership.213
208 Filastm al-Thawra (12 June 1994),
209 Klein, Contested, p. 197.
210 Interview, Zaki al-Ghul.
211 Sa'id al- Hassan, Hawl Ittifaq, pp.132 & 287.
212 Interview, As'ad 'Abd al-Rahman.
213 'Arafat has been claiming that he himself descended from al-Husaynl family, a claim that
sorne observers reject. See Aburish, Arafat, pp.8-12.
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However, the absence of a Palestinian central institution in Jerusalem became
more marked. As a result the role of Orient House was strengthened, for it served as
a kind ofPLO official arm in the city, with the Palestinian flag flying on its roof.*
Nevertheless, it is important to note that Orient House was owned by the
al-Husaynl family, and its status depended on the personality of Faysal al-
al-Husaynl himself, the son of 'Abd al-Qadir al-Husayni, who was the cousin of al-
Hajj Amln al-Husayni, and the leader of the Holy Jihad Volunteer Army in 1948.214
Faysal al-Husayni's personality gradually developed as much from his political
positions as from his notable origins.
However, this situation did not develop into a polarisation or leadership
rivalry, especially since the main personality in Jerusalem, Faysal al-Husayni,
showed no ambition for leadership outside the city. This relationship increased the
multiplicity of Palestinian arms in the city, making it more difficult to create a clear
and united strategy.
The closure of institutions created more problems for the NGOs. For instance,
the staff and clients, who benefited from their activity mostly from outside the city,
no longer had access to the offices. According to an estimate, 80 per cent of these
institutions had moved beyond the military checkpoints outside the municipality
boundaries, meanwhile retaining only skeleton offices and Post Office boxes in the
city.215 This is in addition to Israel's refusal and banishing of any presence by the PA
institutions and security forces in the city.216
*
Orient House is a palace built in 1897 as a residence for a notable of Jerusalem, Isma'Il
al-Husayni. It is situated one kilometre from the Old City, in a neighbourhood named after
one of Salah al-DIn's military leaders, al-Sheikh Jarrah, who defeated the Crusaders in the
twelfth century. Since its construction, the palace has hosted Jerusalem's official guests such
as the German Emperor in 1898 and other VIPs until the 1930s. After the 1948 war the
palace was used as the UNRWA centre before being converted into a hotel. In 1967 it
became a private residence. In 1983 Faysal al-Husayni rented part of the building for use as
the office of the Arab Studies Association which he had established. However, the Israeli
authorities closed it in 1988. It was then reopened in 1992 as the office for the negotiations
delegation. (See Al- Sharq al-Awsat, 25 April 1999.)
214 Friedland & Hecht, To Rule, p.433.
215 Mohammad Shtayyeh, (ed.), Scenarios on the Future of Jerusalem, (Al-Bireh: The
Palestinian Centre for Regional Studies, 1998),p. 199.
216 For details see Klein, Contested, pp. 191-192 & 249.
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1.4. The Final Negotiations
Officially the final status negotiations were begun in Taba in Egypt as scheduled in
May 1996.217 However, the meeting was merely ceremonial, for the negotiations had
to be postponed owing to an early Israeli election.
The new Prime Minister, Binyamin Netanyahu, revived Israel's old veto on:
Jerusalem, the Palestinian state, the refugees and the settlements. He insisted on new
negotiations regarding the implementation of the phases of the interim agreement not
yet implemented. Thus the Hebron Agreement, signed on 15 January 1997, rephased
• 918 •
the interim agreement. Then the implementation of the newly agreed phases was
also renegotiated for several months, during which Netanyahu suggested cancelling
the agreed interim phases and moving on to quick final negotiations.219 Finally, a
new implementation agreement was reached after a 9-day summit held between
Netanyahu and 'Arafat and attended by the American President Bill Clinton at Wye
Plantations in Washington on 23 October 1998. It included the statement that Israel
would carry out a three-phase withdrawal from 13 per cent of the West Bank. That
agreement was not implemented either. The Netanyahu government collapsed in
December and Israel again went to the polls in May 1999.
Yet another new agreement on implementing the Wye Plantations
Memorandum was signed in early September 1999 between Yasir 'Arafat and the
new Israeli Labour Prime Minister, Ehud Barak. The date of 13 February 2000 was
• • 220
appointed for reaching a "frame agreement" on the final negotiations.
Again, the latest new agreement was not implemented. Therefore, on 8 and 9
March Yasir 'Arafat and Ehud Barak met in Ramallah, and in Sharm al-Shlkh in
Egypt. They decided to include villages adjacent to Jerusalem in the coming
withdrawal, and to resume negotiations immediately on a frame agreement by May
in preparation for a final agreement in September.221 The agreement was not
implemented and a new summit had to be convened.
217 Farsoun & Zacharia, Palestine & the Palestinians, p.308.
218 Hebron Protocol, Abdul Hadi, Documents on Palestine, vol. 2, pp.317-321.
219 al-Quds al- 'ArabF(\4 October 1998).
220 The Guardian (3 September 1999).
221 al-Quds al- 'Arab7(9 & 10 March 2000).
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1.4.1 Camp David 2000.
The period covering the Camp David summit in July 2000 and the subsequent
negotiations until January 2001 will remain a remarkable chapter in the Palestinian-
Israeli negotiations as a whole and with regard to Jerusalem in particular. The
Palestinian position can be understood as much from the circumstances of the interim
period and the summit as from the negotiations themselves.
The Palestinians were reluctant to go to a summit in the US in July. They
realised that to begin final negotiations at that time was a radical change - at their
expense - in the agreed strategy of the peace process. The move to final negotiations
without implementing the interim agreement would clearly be a loss to the
Palestinians. They believed that they had made concessions and paid the price for the
agreements. Therefore, moving to final negotiations meant that they would pay the
price for the same goods yet again. Thus, the Palestinians tried to delay the final
negotiations until other agreed withdrawals had taken place or at least until they were
given an assurance by the Americans that they would take place, whatever the results
of the summit. The Palestinian interpretation of the interim agreement was that it
would give them control over 90 per cent of the West Bank and Gaza before the final
negotiations.222 At the time they had control over 65 per cent of Gaza plus scattered
areas equal to no more than 40 per cent of the West Bank. These areas were divided
into two categories. The larger area was designated as category B, where the PA had
only part control, and the remainder was category A, where the PA had "full
control".223 Moreover, in February 2000 the Palestinian Negotiation Department
declared that there were 32 points in the agreement, which the Israelis had not
implemented.224
The experience of the protracted negotiations over the interim period made
the Palestinians uneasy about reaching any general agreement. They insisted on
complete and fully documented agreements - with the necessary maps attached - at
any future meetings.
222 Report submitted by the Speaker of the PNC, to the PCC meeting (2-3 July in Gaza).
(Amman: PNC office archive).
223 Afif Safieh, "Diplomacy in the Middle East: The Art of Delaying the Inevitable", RUSI
Journal, vol. 164, no.4 (August 2001), p.29.
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Meanwhile, the final negotiations had been in session since March. Some
were public, others were secret, and they had taken place in Stockholm and various
parts ofWashington. The Israeli negotiators proposed a long phased final agreement.
However, the Palestinian negotiators emphasised between February and April that
they would not be "dragged" into phasing and fragmenting the solutions, and they
rejected any agreement that did not contain a solution for Jerusalem and the
refugees.225 Then Ehud Barak demanded the cancellation of the interim agreement
and the initiation of the final negotiations. Such an attitude provoked resentment
among the Palestinians, who felt that they had been negotiating for months in vain.
The Palestinians rejected the idea of a quick summit and presented the
American administration with two demands: (1) the implementation of the agreed
withdrawals; and (2) sufficient preparation for the summit.226 The Palestinian
leadership had suspicions as to why "the Americans and the Israelis are so sure that a
treble summit is able to reach a final deal"227, especially since Ehud Barak was
taking a hard line. The suspicions of the Palestinians increased when the American
Secretary of State, Madeleine Allbright, agreed with them on two weeks' preparation
for the summit. Then there was an unexpected telephone call from the American
President inviting them to a summit in one week.228 The Palestinians "had to go to
avoid being accused of spoiling the negotiations."229
Owing to overlapping factors, including the deficient peace process, the PA
was in a critical situation regarding its popular support. For instance, the results of a
poll conducted in March 2000 showed that 'Arafat's popularity in the West Bank and
Gaza was in decline: only 39 per cent supported his policies compared with 47 per
cent in February. In addition, 71 per cent believed that the Authority contained
224 Dirasat Filastuniyya, no.42 (Spring 2000), p.202.
225 For these statements, see Hassan 'Asfur in al-Quds al- 'Arab!(22 February 2000); Nabll
'Amr, al-Quds al-'Arabi (10 April 2000); and Ahmad Quray', al-Quds al-'Arabi(25 April
2000).
226Hussein Agha & Robert Malley, "Camp David: The Tragedy of Errors", The New York
Review ofBooks (9 August 2001).
227 Interview, Salim al-Za'nun.
228 ibid.
229 See the PLO Executive Committee Report to the PCC session 9-10 September 2000 in
Gaza. (Amman: PNC Office archives).
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corruption, and only 22 per cent believed that the Authority was democratic.230 This
situation certainly restricted the ability of the negotiators to make concessions.
Any negotiation on Jerusalem itself was now to be viewed completely
differently from before. The continual tension in the city and the increased
concentration on the city in the Palestinian, Arab and Muslim discourse was
developing it into an almost uncontrollable public opinion issue. The establishments
of the PA and the PLO in Jerusalem were, like the Israelis, creating and
institutionalising barriers to making concessions on the city. At the end of June, the
HIC in Jerusalem, which included members close to the PLO such as Tkrema Sabri
and Faysal al-Husaynl, issued afatwa forbidding any concession on Jerusalem.231
The negotiations began in complete isolation from the media and delegations
were limited to twelve members. The summit was divided into four committees:
security, borders, refugees and Jerusalem.232 There were no minutes nor
documentation; there were no written or specific offers or ideas, and discussion was
spread between formal and informal meetings.233
The common view held by American and Israeli politicians was that Israel
had made generous offers on various issues but that Yasir 'Arafat had rejected
them.234
The official Palestinian account of events was given in the PLO Executive
Committee Report submitted to the PNC in September. The Israelis' "view" of a
solution was that the Palestinians would be granted sovereignty of the villages
around Jerusalem. The quarters outside the Wall (of the Old City) would remain
under Israeli sovereignty and have a kind of autonomy, although they would be
responsible to the "Abu-DTs Municipality". The quarters inside the Wall were to be
divided: the Jewish and Armenian quarters were to be dealt with separately, while
the rest would be under a special system. According to the report, the "offer"
changed several times although the substance was the same. For instance, there was
230 al-Quds al- 'ArabT( 10 April 2000).
231 al-Quds al- 'Arabi(22 June 2000).
232 PLO Executive Committee Report, 2000.
233 Interviews: As'ad 'Abd al-Rahman, Salim al-Za'nun and 'Afif Safyia.
234 See the view of the American envoy, Dennis Ross, in the Jerusalem Post (22 June 2001);
and in The New York Review ofBooks (20 September 2001).
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an offer "to grant sovereignty to a Palestinian Presidency centre inside Jerusalem's
walls ... for example an embassy". "Sovereignty over al-Haram al-Sharif would be
Israeli, and the Palestinians would have only a custodianship role." The Palestinians'
access road would reach only al-Haram al-Sharif.235
Apart from this report, Palestinian sources said that the American and Israeli
ideas were presented in vague and ambiguous wording. For instance, it was proposed
to give the Palestinians "functional sovereignty" in Jerusalem. According to the
Palestinians, such sovereignty was only symbolic, for Israel would maintain its
control over the city. The same interpretation could be put on the Israeli proposal to
divide the sovereignty into two parts: the Palestinians would have control of
everything above the ground in al-Aqsa Mosque, and everything beneath the ground
would be under the control of the Israelis. A Palestinian official commented that such
"a trick would not convince a first-year Law student."
Ehud Barak tried to personalise the issue of al-Aqsa Mosque by offering
Yasir 'Arafat an office in the village of Abu-DIs, and allowing him to pray in
al-Aqsa Mosque every day. 'Arafat was provoked into replying that his office would
— • 237
be on his family's own land in the Maghribi (Moroccan) neighbourhood
(originally situated in the Western Wall Plaza and destroyed by the Israelis in 1967).
Jerusalem was main reason for rejecting the Israeli offer. The offer of 92-95
per cent of the West Bank excludes areas that were not defined as the West Bank.
The Israeli offer excluded four areas: the expanded East Jerusalem; the Latroun
Salient; the no-man's-land around the West Bank between the 1948 and 1967
borders, and the shores of the Dead Sea. This makes the Israeli offer no more than 95
per cent of 90 per cent which is closer to 85 per cent, since expanded Jerusalem alone
is around 8% of the West Bank.238
'Afif Safyia explained that Ehud Barak explored the possibility of returning
one out of every three neighbourhoods in occupied East Jerusalem, while
maintaining Israeli control of almost half of the Old City: the Jewish quarter, the
235 PLO Executive Committee Report, 2000.
236 Interview, Sallm al-Za'nun. For the proposals, see the Jerusalem Post (21 July &
4 August 2000).
237 al-Quds al- 'Arabl{26 July 2000).
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Armenian quarter, the Wailing Wall (50 metres) and/or the entire Western Wall (450
metres).239
The Palestinians according to the Executive Committee Report offered a
solution consisted of three points:
1. The partition of Jerusalem: "East Jerusalem would be returned to full Palestinian
sovereignty."
2. Israel would have "authority and not sovereignty" over the Jewish quarter.
3. Jerusalem would remain an open city and co-operation would be on a municipal
level.
However, other Palestinian officials mentioned further details. 'Arafat was
reported to have offered the Israelis full recognition of [West] Jerusalem as the
capital of Israel, in exchange for full Palestinian sovereignty over East Jerusalem. In
addition, the Jewish neighbourhood and the Western Wall in the Old City would be
under Israeli sovereignty.240 The Palestinian officials said that internationalisation
could also be accepted, although not for East Jerusalem nor al-Aqsa Mosque, but for
the whole city; the West and East sectors.241
When the summit ended on 25 July, a trilateral statement was issued,
pledging to continue the efforts to reach an agreement.242
Jerusalem was only one of the issues being disputed. The Palestinians also
rejected the Israeli suggestions for the withdrawal, the Israeli requirement to control
the airspace and monitor the arrivals and departures at the crossing-points, and the
proposed solutions to the refugee problem.243
Nevertheless, the reality of the Israeli and American proposals was that
Jerusalem had become a subject for formal negotiation. The Palestinians, for the first
time, had officially accepted that parts of the Old City would remain under Israeli
control. The media, which were prohibited access to the summit site, focused their
attention on Jerusalem. Palestinian negotiators accused the Israelis of arranging such
238 Safieh, "Diplomacy.", p.29.
239 Ibid.
240 Jerusalem Post (23 July 2000).
241 al-Ra'y (6 September 2000).
242 Jerusalem Post (26 July 2000).
243 The PLO Executive Committee Report, 2000.
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coverage to mislead public opinion by asserting that Jerusalem was the only obstacle
to reaching an agreement.244
By the end of the summit, the Jerusalem snowball was growing bigger and
moving faster. The city had become daily news, and the Arab-Israeli conflict seemed
to have been reduced to a dispute over Jerusalem. The post-summit Jerusalem was no
longer the pre-summit Jerusalem. The Arab and Muslim aspect of the conflict had
strengthened. And 'Arafat was welcomed back in Gaza as the hero who had refused
to make concessions on Jerusalem. 45
Clearly, a new definition of the Israeli-Arab conflict was taking shape.
During the summit 'Arafat, to escape pressure, declared that Jerusalem was an issue
not only for the Palestinians, but also for the Arabs and Muslims.246 According to
some stories, the American administrations tried to use this declaration to expedite
the summit by offering Arab backing for a solution. As'ad 'Abd al-Rahman related
the following story. During the summit Yasir 'Arafat had only restricted access to
the telephone, for the Americans controlled any communication between the summit
site and the world. When 'Arafat asserted the Arabs' right to participate in the
decision on Jerusalem, Madeleine Allbright declared that the Arab leaders were in
favour of compromise and offered 'Arafat a telephone line to contact some of them.
When 'Arafat telephoned the leaders, he began with the sentence "Your
Majesty/Your Excellency, they want me to sell Jerusalem", following which,
according to 'Abd al-Rahman, he continued the discussion. However, his opening
sentence had already directed the conversation against radical concessions, and
turned the Arab position into support for his refusal to make further concessions.247
Moreover, during the summit 'Arafat had warned the Americans that Ehud
Barak's handling of Jerusalem as an issue of religious division would "turn the
244 al-Quds al- 'Arabi (24 July 2000).
245 For details of the welcome, see al-Quds al- 'Arabi(26 July 2000) and the Jerusalem Post
(27 July 2000).
246 al-Quds al- 'Arabi (20 July 2000); Jerusalem Post (21 July 2000).
247 Interview, As'ad 'Abd al-Rahman.
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conflict from a political national issue into one of religion, and then neither he
• • • 948
himself nor the Israelis would have the ability to control the situation."
After the negotiations, 'Arafat toured several Muslim and Arab countries in
search of political and financial support, especially after American criticism that he
was not flexible enough and that his position could affect his relations with the
American administration, leading to a suspension of American financial aid.249
The heavy concentration on Jerusalem provoked some Palestinians into
issuing a warning that inflating the status of the city in that way was a conspiracy to
justify avoiding other problems such as the refugees and the borders.250
However, 'Arafat's efforts to mobilise official Arab support did not achieve
the success that he sought. Arab leaders continued to refuse to hold a summit.251 And
Only the Committee of Jerusalem of the (OIC) was invited to a special meeting in
Morocco at the end of August. The meeting issued a usual supportive statement for
the Palestinian national rights in Jerusalem. This was not what 'Arafat was aiming at,
he wanted an Arab and Muslim decision saying that Jerusalem is a Muslim and Arab
issue and its fate would be decided only by an Arab Muslim decision. (See Chapter
Four).
Nevertheless, 'Arafat's efforts did not fail completely. For instance, the
Egyptian President asserted on various occasions that no one in the Arab and Muslim
worlds could concede East Jerusalem and al-Aqsa Mosque.252 The new atmosphere
created by the dispute over Jerusalem enhanced fears of a possible explosion in the
region. President Mubarak, for instance, said that conceding Jerusalem could trigger
endless violence.253 There were also Israeli and American reports and analysis that
since May the possibility of a violent eruption had increased owing to the tension in
the territories.254 The popular moods showed how Jerusalem could be at a certain
248 As'ad 'Abd al-Rahman reported this story as he heard it from Mahmud 'Abbas and the
Chief negotiator Sa'ib 'Urayqat and at the joint Palestinian leadership meeting.
249 Faysal al-Husayni in the Herald Tribune (7 August 2000).
250 For instance, Sari Akram Zu'aytir, "Concentrating on Jerusalem: Ploy or Conspiracy?" in
al'Ra >(10 September 2000).
251 al-Quds al- 'ArabI'(2 August 2000).
252 Interview, As'ad 'Abd al-Rahman; and al-Hayat (\3 August 2000).
253 Jerusalem Post (25 Auguat 2000).
234 Interview, Dennis Ross, Jerusalem Post (22 June 2001).
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moment an uncontrollable public opinion issue, and out of the hands of the official
level.
During August and September the snowball continued to roll. Jews and
Palestinians in the city organised several rival activities. The Israeli municipality and
other organisations held rallies and celebrations to mark the fast of Tisha B'Av,
which were bigger than in previous years. The Palestinian Waqfand other institutions
organised several activities to highlight the anniversary of the fire at al-Aqsa Mosque
in 1969.255
The Israeli Income Tax Department escalated its raids on the city,
confiscating goods from shops and homes, including fruit, vegetables, domestic
electrical appliances, and so on. These raids made the Palestinian main roads in the
9
city, according to the Haaretz newspaper, appear "very much like a battlefield."
Ariel Sharon, the Likud Party leader, in such an atmosphere decided to visit
al-Haram al-Sharif on 28 September. His visit was seen as an unprecedented
provocation, for he was supported by a bodyguard in the form of a huge military
parade of several thousand soldiers. He had ignored the warnings by the Palestinian
Legislative Council, the Palestinian Ministry of Information, Fath, Hamas and other
organisations of the possible consequences.257
On the second day Israeli soldiers killed 5 and injured 90 of the
• — • • • 9 SX
demonstrators that had gathered in al-Haram al-Sharif to protest against the visit.
The visit and its fatal consequences triggered al-Aqsa Intifada, marking the
beginning of a new chapter in the Middle Eastern Arab-Israeli conflict.
The eruption of al-Aqsa Intifada was a strong reminder that Jerusalem was a
cause of the Palestinian national movement, and was a focal point in the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict. This fact was in addition to the political concentration on the
city at the Palestinian and Arab-Muslim levels.
Between October and December, efforts were directed at containing the
situation and resuming the negotiations. Although a number of meetings and
summits between the Israelis and Palestinians took place under American
255 Haaretz (28 August 2000).
256 Ibid.
257 al-Quds al- 'ArabT(28 April 2000).
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supervision, no effective results were achieved.259 In November, during the Intifada,
Barak and the American President discussed ways of amending the Camp David
proposals.260 In December Clinton suggested the following:
1. Israel would withdraw from 95 per cent of the West Bank and 100 per cent of the
Gaza Strip.
2. The refugees would be dealt with on the basis of compensation, with most of
them being settled outside Palestine.
3. Jerusalem was to be divided according to the principle of "Arab sections to the
Palestinians, Jewish sections to the Jews." The Palestinians would be granted the
Arab neighbourhoods of East Jerusalem and the Arab quarter of the Old City,
including the Temple Mount/al-Haram al-Sharlf. Israel would be granted the
Jewish neighbourhoods and part of the Armenian quarters of the Old City,
including the Western Wall.
4. The problem of the "Temple Mount" would be solved by giving the Palestinians
sovereignty above the ground and Israel sovereignty beneath it. Or an
international mechanism could be established to limit Palestinian sovereignty
under the area and prevent excavation of the holy sites declared to be Jewish.
5. A special administration would manage the Old City and so, there would be no
961
barriers or border checkpoints to control freedom ofmovement.
The Palestinians asked for explanations and refused to agree on the ideas in
general without details. On 2 January 'Arafat met Clinton in the White House, where
he asked for maps showing the Israeli withdrawal. The principle of granting the Arab
sections to the Arabs and the Jewish section to the Jews was not clear, because its
application could provoke a dispute over the identities and boundaries of the
sections. Clinton replied that he had no further details and that he expected an answer
immediately. According to SalTm al-Za'ntin, 'Arafat knew that the American
258 al-Hayat (30 September 2000).
259 al-Hayat (5, 10, 17, 18 &19 October 2000).
260 Haaretz (5 & 15 November 2000).
261 See Haaretz (24 & 28 December 2000).
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President was merely presenting the Israeli proposals, which was why he could not
give any explanation.262 This led to further negotiations in Taba the following month.
1.4.2 Taba 2001
Two weeks before the Israeli election for Prime Minister, bilateral negotiations
without American attendance began in Taba, Egypt. They lasted for six days,
finishing on 27 January. They were different from those at Camp David. The
negotiations did not concentrate on Jerusalem, but rather on the Israeli withdrawal
from the West Bank. The negotiations did not fail but were halted because of the
imminent Israeli election. The two sides declared at the end of the negotiations that
1. the "Taba talks were unprecedented in their positive atmosphere";
2. "circumstances and time constraints" were the reasons for bringing them to a
halt; and
3. both "sides took into account the ideas suggested by President Clinton together
with their respective qualifications and reservations."263
The talks were indeed unprecedented. According to the Palestinian
negotiators, the Israelis abandoned their demand for their personnel to monitor the
border checkpoints and airports.264 Both the Israelis and Palestinians presented maps
showing a suggested withdrawal from the West Bank, in which many settlements
would be removed. Meanwhile, no advancement had been made in the negotiations
on the Old City, both sides remaining largely in their previous positions. Outside the
Old City, however, the Palestinians had made concessions, including the acceptance
that settlements around Jerusalem would remain under Israeli sovereignty.
The end of the Taba talks brought to a halt the most serious and
comprehensive Palestinian-Israeli negotiations, which had continued from the Camp
David summit in July 2000 until the end of January 2001. The election of Ariel
Sharon in early February signalled the close of these negotiations. So the region had
to begin another discussion on how to bring the Palestinians and Israelis together
262 Interview, Sallm al-Za'nun.
263 Jerusalem Post (28 January 2001).
264 al-Quds al- 'ArabI(21/2% January 2001).
265 Al-Hctyat (31 January 2001).
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again for the next stage and whether negotiations should start before or after the
Intifada and confrontations were brought to an end.
The Palestinian rejection of the American-Israeli proposals in Camp David
could be interpreted in two ways: (1) the proposals did not satisfy the Palestinian
side; and (2) their experience of the interim agreement discouraged the Palestinians
from accepting any general proposal that was not complete in all its details.
However, there is a third reason that observers do not exclude, which is the personal
factor or 'Arafat's personal position. It was believed that 'Arafat "could pressure and
convince his party (Fath) to support further concessions on Jerusalem, whereas he
himself, while accepting the delay in discussing Jerusalem, refused to make further
concessions. This personal position could be interpreted in different ways as personal
ideological and religious belief or that 'Arafat knew that such concessions could
damage his political and religious status among the Palestinians and in the Arab and
Muslim worlds. He himself told one of his aides at an informal meeting at the
beginning of 2000 that he would never accept Barak's offer to pray in al-Aqsa
Mosque. According to 'Arafat himself he had personally decided in 1967 not to pray
in the Mosque until it was liberated. He had taken the decision because while he was
praying in the Mosque that year, a female Israeli soldier had entered the building and
behaved provocatively.266
1.5 Conclusion
1.5.1 From Camp David to Taba: The Current Political Position
The study of the Palestinian position on the issue of Jerusalem between the Camp
David summit in July 2000 and the end of the talks in Taba in January 2001 provides
an understanding of it at the present time and its possible direction in future
negotiations.
The Palestinians have still insisted on considering East Jerusalem as part of
the occupied territories and that it should be returned to Palestinian sovereignty like
the rest of the West Bank. They have also refused to make concessions except on the
Jewish quarter and the "Wailing" Wall.
266 Interview, As'ad 'Abd al-Rahman. (Yasir 'Arafat told 'Abd al-Rahman this story during
an aeroplane trip at the beginning of 2001.)
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It is interesting to note that the Palestinian refusal to recognise the Israeli's expansion
of the city's boundaries became an element of flexibility. The Palestinians have
defined East Jerusalem according to the boundaries fixed by Jordan between 1948
and 1967, comprising around 6.5 square kilometres. Therefore, the Israeli settlements
in the expanded Jerusalem have been considered part of the West Bank, and the
Palestinians accepted provisionally at the Camp David and Taba talks that this area
could be part of a compromise and land exchange.267
1.5.2 The Changing Definition of the Conflict
East Jerusalem in the geographical and political sense came into being only in the
aftermath of the 1948 war and was the result of political developments. The
Palestinian leadership confined its claims to it in recent years for political and legal
reasons. At the same time some Palestinians have disagreed with this view of
Jerusalem, insisting that the religious and historical definition did not divide the city
into West and East sectors. They have also rejected the two-state solution, for they
consider the whole of Palestine to be holy.
These differences of view summarise the changeable political definition of
the conflict with Israel. They indicate the two main positions held by the Palestinians
throughout the twentieth century. The first covered the period 1917 to 1974. During
this stage the official and mainstream attitude was to define the conflict as a zero-
sum issue, in which there was no room for conciliation or compromise. The subject
of the conflict was the existence of the Jewish state itself. Therefore, as far as
Jerusalem was concerned, there was no question of partition or conceding any
sovereignty to the Jewish state. Nevertheless, especially during the British Mandate,
the Palestinians did not oppose an international presence or guarantees in the city.
This meant that while the sovereign state of Palestine was not compromised, the
administration of Jerusalem could be placed under international control to guarantee
freedom of worship in a Palestinian state where Muslims, Christians and Jews could
live alongside one another as equal citizens.
When, in 1974, the PLO decided to follow the phased programme, in which
Palestinian authority would be established in any liberated part of Palestine, it
267 Ibid.
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entailed changing the definition of the conflict. It implied the acceptance of Israel's
existence and the abandonment of the zero-sum definition. Consequently, political
compromises and solutions began to be considered. East Jerusalem was now seen as
part of the 1967 occupied territories and therefore part of the possible Palestinian
state.
In November 1988 the PNC proclaimed the Palestinian state in exile and
designated Jerusalem as its capital. This proclamation, together with the pressure of
the Intifada and other international developments, initiated the political process
leading to the signing of the Oslo DOP in 1993, in which Jerusalem was designated
as part of the final negotiations. At Camp David in July 2000 and in Taba in January
2001 Jerusalem was discussed in the final status negotiations and neither side
declared that the city was a non-negotiable or zero-sum issue. Like any other dispute,
the conflict over Jerusalem has had a changeable definition subject to the wider
political context and the continuing management of the issue.
1.5.3 Arab-Muslim Jerusalem and the Capital of Palestine
It is important to note, however, how the Palestinian leadership, highlighted the
city's historical importance and holiness especially before 1948, in the early 1990s
and in the Camp David summit of 2000. The Palestinian leaders drew the attention of
Muslims to the holy places in Jerusalem by visits, campaigns and communication
with Arab and Muslim leaders until Palestine became an Arab-Muslim cause. But it
should also be noticed that such Arab and Muslim involvement was not in the
context of a solution that depended on building Islamic or Arab unity. The
Palestinian leadership managed to assert that support was needed to give the





The Zionist Movement and the Jewish State
Introduction
This chapter discusses the status of Jerusalem in Israeli politics and Zionist political
thought during the following stages:
1. The evolution of Jewish political nationalism, or Zionism from the end of the
nineteenth century up to the proclamation of the State of Israel in May 1948.
2. The construction of the State of Israel between 1948 and 1967, when the historic
holy places of Jerusalem were outside the Israeli borders.
3. The post-1967 years and the change in Israel's discourse regarding Jerusalem
after the Israeli occupation and annexation of the Eastern sector of the city and
the surrounding areas.
4. Jerusalem during the Middle East peace negotiations between 1991 and 2001.
Observers and scholars have suggested that there has been internal agreement
in Israel over the present and future status of Jerusalem, and that for the Jews the
conflict over the city has been a zero-sum issue on which no compromise was
possible. In Chapter Two it is suggested that this image does not reflect the actual
situation. Jerusalem was not central to Zionist thought for many years, and Zionist
leaders on many occasions have been ready to make concessions over the city in
exchange for the establishment and viability of the Jewish state. Moreover, ultra-
Orthodox Jewish groups do not have a clear or decisive opinion of Jewish
sovereignty in Jerusalem. The Israeli hard-line attitude towards the city in the post-
1967 era is part of the definition and redefinition of the conflict. This attitude has
produced a discourse that asserts an Israeli consensus on the whole of Jerusalem as a
zero-sum issue. In this chapter, the Israeli attitude is closely scrutinised to discover
whether this has been true of the conflict over Jerusalem at any stage.
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2.1 Jerusalem and Zionism: pre-1948
The second half of the nineteenth century was a transition in Jewish history in the
establishment of the Jewish political national movement or Zionism. It was mainly
the result of the hostility towards the Jews (or anti-Semitism as it was known) in
Europe during that period, which manifested itself as discrimination, massacres and
persecution.1
There were three points of view among the Jews on the means of
emancipation:
1. The assimilation of the Jews in their societies.
2. A return to the religious roots and salvation by migration to Palestine.
3. The Jewish political nationalist movement that worked to reconstruct the Jews as
a nation.
The first option failed, for no formula could be found to combine the Jews'
desire to integrate in the European communities and gain full citizenship without
• « **2
losing their inherited religious and cultural identity. Those Jews of the second and
third points of view collaborated to form the Jewish Nationalist Movement
(Zionism).
Among the most prominent intellectual figures that developed Jewish
political nationalism were Moses Hess, Leo Pinsker and Theodore Herzl, all of
whom were secular, basing their views on socialist or revolutionary theories.
In 1862 in France, Moses Hess wrote his book The Revival of Israel, which
was later retitled Rome and Jerusalem. This book followed Hess's long personal
history as a socialist close to Karl Marx and Engels. Three years earlier he had
considered religion to be the symptom of a pathological state ofmind, and the history
of religion a history of human error. He believed in the Jews as a race with a special
historical experience and therefore eligible to have their own nationalism. Moses
1 For details of the Jews' circumstances in Western Europe, see James Parkes, A History of
the Jewish People (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1962), p. 177. For Eastern Europe, see
Moshe Menuhin The Decadence ofJudaism in Our Time (Beirut: The Institute for Palestine
Studies, 1969), pp.58-60.
2 For the contradiction between self-preservation and assimilation, see Parkes, A History of
the Jewish, pp. 175-178.
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Hess saw the solution to the Jewish question in the recognition that "[e]ach and every
Jew, whether he wishes it or not, is automatically, by virtue of birth, bound in
solidarity with his entire nation.... Each has the solidarity and responsibility for the
rebirth of Israel."4
In this sense Hess regarded Jerusalem as the necessary historical component
in the construction of nationalism. In the Introduction to his book, Hess wrote: "It is
the thought of my nationality, which is inseparably connected with my ancestral
heritage, with the Holy Land and the Eternal City."5 Nevertheless, this did not mean
for him that the national rebirth had to take place in Jerusalem. He was referring to
the historical phase when Jews formed one group or what could be seen according to
19th century jargon as a nation. But he did not ask then for Jerusalem or any other
designated place to be chosen for this rebirth of Israel.
Another intellectual Zionist pioneer was Leo Pinsker, who published his book
Auto-Emancipation in Berlin in 1882. He also recommended the construction of
Jewish nationalism and a state, although he referred to Jewish history in these words:
"the road cannot seem too long to the wanderers of two thousand years."
Nevertheless, he did not select Jerusalem as the place of this nationalism and state,
for he wrote: "some preferred America, or even Spain ....But the majority, however,
preferred Palestine".6
The most famous pioneer, Theodor Herzl, published his book The Jewish
State in 1895, in which he described the Jewish state as a solution. He discussed
proposals for the location of the Jewish state, comparing between Argentina and
Palestine. His opinion was: "We shall take what is given to us, and what is selected
by Jewish public opinion."7
The works of such thinkers reveal that Jewish beliefs regarding the history of
Jerusalem did not mean for them that Jerusalem or Palestine had to be the site of the
Jewish state. Actually some contemporary Israeli scholars in reviewing such works
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Menuhin, Decadence, p.29.
7 Theodor Herzl, The Jewish State: An Attempt at a Modern Solution of the Jewish Question,
6th edn. (London: H. Pordes, 1972), p.30.
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say "Jerusalem in general and East Jerusalem in particular was not part of the Zionist
identity."8
However, there was also the religious trend among the Jewish activists, which
consisted of two major divisions:
1. The philanthropic practical trend, consisting of rich Jews, such as the English
Jew Moses Montefiore, who worked to help Jews wishing to live in the Holy
Land. These activities began in the first half of the nineteenth century - when the
Jews in Palestine numbered only nine thousand - although there were no clear
political implications.9
2. A new scholarly Jewish trend of plans with political implications regarding
Jerusalem and Palestine. It introduced a new interpretation of the classical Jewish
Zionism, in which the restoration of the Jewish Kingdom in "Eretz Yisrael"
would take place only with the arrival of the Messiah, and then the Jews would
return to Palestine.10 Religious scholars in the nineteenth century, influenced by
the circumstances of the Jews as well as powerful European nationalism, worked
to change this view. One of the early efforts was made by Judah Alakaly, who,
while confirming that the full occupation of the Promised Land must await the
coming of the Messiah, stated that human agency might begin the task.11
Intellectual secular thinkers and activists assembled with philanthropic and
religious groups at the First Zionist Congress in 1897. It was declared at the
Congress: "the aim of Zionism is to create for the Jewish people a home in Palestine
secured by public law." The means of achieving this home were the colonisation of
Palestine "by Jewish agricultural and industrial workers", and "by means of
appropriate institutions, local and international", and the "strengthening and fostering
.19
of Jewish national sentiment and consciousness". These resolutions united the
religious and secular Jews, and Palestine was designated as the location of the Jewish
home.
Interview, Menachem Klein, Oxford, 19 February 2002. See also Wasserstein, Divided,p.4.
9
Menuhin, Decadence, p.24.
10 Mark A. Tessler, A History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict (Bloomington &
Indianapolis, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 1994), pp.16, 17, 19.
'1
Parkes, History of the Jewish, p. 186.
12 The Basil Programme, Abdul Hadi (ed.), Documents on Palestine, vol.1, p. 14.
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Attitudes toward Jerusalem and the role of the city in the years following the
1897 Congress until the proclamation of Israel - which could be labelled the period
of the construction of Jewish Nationalism - are described below.
2.1.1 Jerusalem's Indigenous Jewish Society
The first point to be noted is that Jerusalem was not a place that would accept the
Zionist pioneers and their project. The city was not suitable for the colonisation with
farmers and factory-workers as hoped by the international Zionist movement. It was
not the ideal place to establish agricultural enterprise or factories.
In addition, the residents of Jerusalem, including the Jewish community, did
• • 1T
not welcome the Zionist movement. In 1914 there were 85,000 Jews in Palestine,
nearly 45,000 of them in Jerusalem.14 This community, however, consisted largely of
non-political religious Jews and refugees benefiting from philanthropic aid from rich
Jews, and many of them were against working on the production line. Attempts by
Jews such as Montefiore to put Jerusalem's Jewish population to work had already
failed. In the second half of the nineteenth century, he had established projects
around the Old City such as a windmill, workshops and agricultural settlements. All
these had failed because the city's inhabitants preferred to continue their dependence
on donations from abroad, and saw their task as the maintenance of Jerusalem's
sanctity.15 They also saw the Zionist enterprise as a threat to their lifestyle and their
coexistence with the other communities.16 There were also the Orthodox Jews who
still thought that the Jewish home should be God's work only after the arrival of the
Messiah.17 Moreover, the geographical definition of Jerusalem appeared
controversial among Jews. For instance, when Montefiore conceived his project to
expand beyond the Old City, he was also trying to resolve the Jews' housing problem
in the city by establishing a settlement called Mishkenot Sha'anaim. However, there
was extremely strong resistance to the project, especially by the Ashkenazi
(European Jewish) rabbis, who argued that living outside the Old City's walls was
13
Laqueur, History ofZionism, p.213.
14 Leonard Stein, Zionism (London: Ernest Benn, 1925), p.65.
15 Friedland & Hecht, To Rule, pp.54, 56.
16 See Laqueur, History ofZionism, p.213.
17
Tessler, Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, p.20.
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moving outside Jerusalem's sacred space. It was the Sephardis (Oriental Jews) who
18
accepted Montefiore's invitation and the Ashkenazis followed them only later.
2.1.2 Jerusalem as an Intellectual Centre
After the First World War, there were only around 55,000 Jews in Palestine. The
decline in their numbers was attributed to famine, disease and emigration during the
19
war.
The increased immigration after 1917, when Palestine was captured by the
British troops, provided the Zionists with the opportunity to strengthen the nationalist
trend among the new Jewish settlers. Between 1918 and 1924 nearly 40,000
immigrants entered Palestine. Although the classical Jewish philanthropic religious
societies of cities such as Hebron, Safed and Tiberias were weakened, intellectual
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immigrant Jews created a new identity for the Jewish community in Jerusalem.
If the agricultural colonies in the coastal plain of Palestine were the material
basis of the Jewish national home, Jerusalem was where the Zionist leaders worked
to construct the Jewish collective sentiment and to promote political and intellectual
consciousness. The intellectual, cultural and mythical infrastructure was concentrated
in Jerusalem. On 24 July 1918, an important step was taken to revive the Hebrew
language when the foundation stone of the Hebrew University was laid on Mount
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Scopus in Jerusalem. This was to be an academic centre producing the scholarly
works necessary to form the collective narrative of the history and future of the
Jewish nation. Jerusalem was the centre of most of the Jewish institutions, such as
the Jewish Agency, the Jewish National Fund and the Va'ad Leumi (National
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Council for Jews in Palestine). The instruments to generate the national myths were
laid in the city, mostly in the Western sector, the tombs of Zionist pioneers were also
23
there, and those pioneers provided the heroes necessary to the Jewish nation.
18 Friedland & Richard, To Rule, p.53.
19
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22 Edwin Samuel, "The Government of Israel and its Problems", The Middle East Journal,
vol. 3, no.l (January 1949), p.9.
23 Friedland & Hecht, To Rule, p.8.
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2.1.3 The Confrontations in Jerusalem
The development of the Zionist movement contained its own dynamics that helped to
turn Jerusalem into a symbol of Zionism. Confrontations and differences with others
are important motives for creating internal unity between groups, and thus produce or
strengthen nationalism. Clearly Jerusalem played an important role in this process.
Jerusalem's holy places in particular were the cause of frequent controversies
and confrontations between the Arab Palestinian and Jewish communities. The most
important holy place for the Jews in the city is the Western Wall.
Zionist politicians aimed to exploit this Wall politically. There were
attempts during the 1920s to purchase the Wall or to convince the British authorities
to confiscate it for the benefit of the Jews. Such a strategy by secular Zionists aimed,
as Colonel Frederick H. Kisch, the Head of the Political Department of the Zionist
Executive, said in 1926, "to break the Muslim sanctity of the whole property as a
Muslim Waqf.Three years later, he wrote: "the political effects would be very
great" if the wall were purchased and the Muslims were evacuated from the
immediate neighbourhood.24 Such attempts were part of the Zionist propaganda
regarding Jewish history and historical rights in Palestine, and reflected the need to
challenge the existence of the Arab population, for whom Jerusalem was also the
main centre.
Disputes over the Wall were exploited to encourage Jewish immigration into
Palestine. Many Jewish and Zionist newspapers both inside and outside Palestine
presented the clashes of 1929 as a continuation of the Russian pogroms of the 1880s
or in some cases even worse.25 Ironically, however, while the Russian pogrom
justified emigration from Russia and Eastern Europe, the asserted pogrom in
Jerusalem was used to encourage immigration into Palestine, where the claimed
pogrom was happening. Chaim Weizman, as President of the Zionist Organisation,
wrote in New Palestine, the official magazine of the American Zionist Organisation:
24
Mattar, The Mufti, p.40.
25 For examples of these newspapers, see ibid., p.36.
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"The only rational answer" to the dispute of 1929 over the Wall "is to pour Jews into
Palestine." He added, "We must reclaim [our] homeland [and] the wall."
It should be noted how Jerusalem and the Western Wall were exploited not
only in the conflict against the Palestinians but also in internal Jewish rivalry and in
gaining support for Zionism. A major confrontation was triggered on 15 August 1929
when the followers of the revisionist Vladimir Jabotinsky went in procession to the
Wailing Wall and held an anti-Arab demonstration. This power parade coincided
with the Sixteenth Zionist Congress in Zurich, where the radical Jabotinsky was
calling for the abandonment of any political solution that required Arab-Jewish co¬
operation until the Jews were in the majority in Palestine and could negotiate from a
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position of strength. This exploitation of the escalation of hostilities in Jerusalem to
influence the leadership, impose a hard-line attitude and score points in internal
rivalries was to continue in domestic Israeli politics during the following decades.
The exploitation of confrontation is a common strategy in the construction of
nationalism. Politicians usually connect confrontation with historical roots and
territories that encourage national grouping and the mobilisation of support. In this
sense, the definition of Jerusalem as the symbol of the Jewish nation and a focal
point of confrontation with the Palestinian Arabs was used to bring Jews together and
mobilise them as a nation.
2.1.4 Proposals for Political Settlement
If Jerusalem were vital in inspiring nationalism, the image was to change when the
Zionist leadership had to make a stand against a certain proposed political settlement
in Palestine.
In 1937 the British Royal Commission (Peel Commission) recommended a
Partition Plan in which Palestine would be divided into two states. Although the
Twentieth Zionist Congress in August of that year welcomed the principle of
establishing a Jewish state, it rejected the suggested borders. Two months later, the
Jewish Agency proposed a new map of the partition in which Jerusalem would be
26 Cited in ibid., p.38.
27 John & Hadawi, Palestine Diary, vol. I, p.205.
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divided between the Jewish state and the zone under the British Mandate. Mount
Scopus and the modern West sector outside the Old City would belong to the Jewish
state, while the Old City and the East sector would be part of the British Mandate. In
justification of the plan the Jewish Agency stated:
The need of a special regime for that part of the town cannot justify the
exclusion of the whole of Jerusalem from the Jewish State. It has been truly
said that Jewish Palestine without Jerusalem would be a body without a soul.
Jerusalem has throughout the ages been the spiritual centre of the Jews,
dispersed as they were over the face of the earth.... It is a symbol of Jewish
national life and practically synonymous in the mind of Jews in Palestine.
Throughout the ages, Jews have persisted, in spite of all obstacles, in
attempting to re-establish themselves in Jerusalem. In this latest phase of the
return to Zion, Jews have built the greater part of new Jerusalem outside the
city walls.29
The importance of such position is that:
1. Under the need of establishing the Jewish state the agency made a distinction
between religious significance and sovereignty. While emphasising greatly
religious historical ties between Jews and Jerusalem it accepted that the historical
parts of Jerusalem could be excluded from the Jewish state.
2. There was acceptance for the idea that "new" Jerusalem could be constructed and
Jews could accept it as their Jerusalem.
3. This position, forming the Zionist/ Israeli position until 1967, contradicts the
later insistence of Jerusalem as the unified eternal capital of Israel.
During the discussions of the UN plan for partition in 1947, the Zionist
leadership reserved a special slot for the status of Jerusalem. However, according to
Abba Hillel Silver, Chairman of the American Section of the Jewish Agency, the
discussion was to be confined to the "new Jewish city outside the [western] walls of
Jerusalem". He thought that the exclusion of this sector would hinder the
development of the Jewish state.30 The fact that in the 1930s and 1940s the Jews
were willing to accept a Jewish state without the holy places of Jerusalem reveals
that the creation of a state was top priority. A Jewish state without the Old City of
Jerusalem actually matches the original ideas of the secular pioneer Zionist thinkers,
28 H. Eugene Bovis, The Jerusalem Question, 1917-1968 (Stanford, Calif: Hoover Institute
Press/ Stanford University, 1971), p.28.
29
Ibid., p.29.
30 The Times (3 October 1947).
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that is, the location of the state was not as important as the establishment of the state
itself.
Moreover, the Jewish demand to include the West sector of the city in the
Jewish state indicates how Jerusalem could be defined in different ways. This part of
the city has had neither religious nor historical importance for the Jews. Its
importance developed only during the Zionist colonisation movement in Palestine in
the first half of the twentieth century. This proves how the importance of Jerusalem
could be constructed and promoted in the same way as nationalism. While newly
constructed Jerusalem could be defined as a symbol of the Jewish nation, the ancient
sector of the city, where the asserted historical rights were concentrated, was not a
crucial issue. A claim to this sector could provoke a refusal and threaten the major
goal of the Zionists, that is, the establishment of the Jewish state. During the 1948
war and its aftermath more evidence appeared to prove the difference between the
discourse of nationalism and the practical politics of creating a Jewish state.
2.2 The Jewish State and Divided Jerusalem: 1948-1967
The Israeli position during the 1948 war and in the years up to the 1967 war was an
example of how the status of Jerusalem was subjected to power politics and how a
Jewish state could be acceptable without Jerusalem. Israel existed for 19 years
without the historic East sector of Jerusalem and this situation did not cause serious
concern in that country at the time.
The following section is a discussion of Israel's position regarding Jerusalem
during the war of 1948, as well as in the following years at the negotiations under the
supervision of the UN, and the bilateral negotiations with Transjordan. The
discussion then turns to the situation inside Jerusalem and Israeli policy until the
June War of 1967.
2.2.1 The 1948 War
By April 1948, Jewish forces were already occupying Arab areas of Jerusalem which
had been placed under a special regime or corpus separatum, that is, under
international administration, according to UN Resolution 181 (the Partition Plan).
Glubb Pasha, the British head of the Transjordanian "Arab Legion" arranged a secret
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meeting between one of his British officers, Col. Desmond Glodie, and the Jewish
Hagana representative, Shlomo Shamir. Among other questions, Desmond asked
about the Jewish plans for Jerusalem. Shamir's answer was that if the Legion
refrained from attacking the Jewish settlements around Jerusalem and the roads
leading to them were not endangered, he thought there would be no reason for
conflict. However, his answer was given when the Jewish forces were already
controlling areas allocated to the corpus separatum. This meant that the Jewish
forces had no intention of complying with the Partition Plan for the city. In effect, the
answer offered a compromise with King 'Abdullah, and did not ban the Legion from
entering some areas of the city.
The daily developments of the war explain the Zionist plans to capture
Jerusalem, especially the West sector. The Jewish Agency declined a truce in the
city during the days leading up to 15 May, and did not accept the British High
Commissioner's invitation to a meeting to arrange a truce.33 Henry Gurney, the
British Chief Secretary for Jerusalem, wrote the following in his diary for 10 May:
The Jews are still rankling at their not having been told of our meetings with
the Arabs in Jericho. It has wounded their vanity, and has exposed them to
the charge of refusing to agree to obviously reasonable terms for peace in
Jerusalem. At this stage they do not really want a truce at all.34
According to observers, however, "Israel did not invest the same efforts in
the conquest of the Old City as it did in the West." In fact, the idea of invading East
Jerusalem persisted in the minds of the Israeli leaders. For instance, David Ben
Gurion, the first Israeli Prime Minister, in September 1948 suggested a plan to
capture the rest of the city. However, his suggestion was opposed by military leaders
and cabinet members for logistical and political reasons. Another attempt was made
on 19 October, when Jewish forces attacked the strategic village of Bit-Jala, south of
31 For the meeting see Avi Shlaim, Collusion across the Jordan: King Abdullah, the Zionist
movement, and the partition ofPalestine (Oxford : Clarendon, 1988). pp. 182-183.
32 For the war diary, see P.J. Vatikiotis, "The Siege of the Walled City of Jerusalem, 14
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Jerusalem, in preparation for the occupation of Bethlehem and Hebron. This
manoeuvre was to clear the southern road for the occupation of the rest of Jerusalem.
• • • 37
However, local snipers in the village defeated the Jewish forces.
2.2.2 Israel and the UN Proposed Settlements: 1948-1950
On 14 May 1948, the UN named the Swedish Count Folke Bernadotte as mediator in
the task of promoting "a peaceful adjustment of the future situation in Palestine."38
During a truce arranged and observed between 11 June and 9 July, Bernadotte
suggested including Jerusalem in the Arab state of Transjordan.39 After Israel
rejection of this solution the Security Council instructed Bernadotte to continue his
efforts to bring about the demilitarisation of Jerusalem as stated in UN Resolution
181.40
Bernadotte was preparing a new proposal to be submitted to the UN General
Assembly when he was assassinated by the Zionist Stern gang on 17 September
1948.41 His plan was a return to the idea of the special regime under international
administration, as stated in the 181 Resolution. The UN would control the city
according to the Resolution, although with a high level of local autonomy granted to
both the Arab and Jewish communities 42
The Israeli attitude seemed contradictory and changeable at that time. To
understand it would be useful in understanding Israel's real plans for Jerusalem in the
coming years. The current Israeli position could be summed up as follows.
2.2.2.1 INTERNATIONALISATION VERSUS ARAB SOVEREIGNTY
The Zionist leadership declared its acceptance of the international regime (corpus
separatum) in Jerusalem, while preparing to capture the West sector, if not all of the
city. However, developments during the war persuaded the Israeli leadership to
defend the internationalisation, that is, to accept Bernadotte's proposal of June 1948
37
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to include Jerusalem in the Arab state. An official Israeli statement responded to the
proposal as follows
The fact is that after an exhaustive study ... the General Assembly resolved
that Jerusalem be placed under an international regime. ... the Jewish
people, the State of Israel and the Jews of Jerusalem will never acquiesce in
the imposition of Arab domination over Jerusalem.43
The interpretation of this position that as a result of their power on the
ground, the development of the war and their interpretation of the international view,
the Israelis had been trying to gain more than what they had originally been granted
by the 181 Resolution. However, when international powers began to propose
solutions that would take from the Israelis their original allocation, the Israelis
reacted by defending the Resolution.
2.2.2.2 Jerusalem: Facts on the ground.
The Israeli political acceptance of internationalisation was a temporary measure that
could be amended later. In particular, the 181 Resolution stated that a reassessment
was to be carried out ten years after the establishment of the corpus separatum, when
the city's inhabitants could decide if they wished any modification to be made to the
city's status. According to the UN Partition maps, the Jewish population of the city
in 1947 was slightly less than half of the total. Since the establishment of the Jewish
state would open the gates to immigration, this could create a Jewish majority in the
city and thus eventually secure the superiority in strength desired by the Jews.44
Here it is important to show how demographic and geographic definitions
could change and lose some of their political importance. According to many
sources, in the municipal area of Jerusalem enclosed by boundaries fixed under the
British Mandate, the Jews had been the majority since the beginning of the twentieth
century (see Table 2.1).45 However, if the corpus separatum were implemented, the
Jews are not the majority.
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When Israel managed to occupy the Western or larger sector of the city, its
leadership gave the following reasons in defence of its action:
1. The Jewish side had accepted internationalisation because of the special holy
places in Jerusalem, and because of "an overwhelming consensus of Christian
• 9^46
opinion.
2. The Christian world and the UN had done nothing to protect Jerusalem from the
"Arabs" and "Islam", or to implement internationalisation. It was the Jews who
were protecting the city. This view was expressed in a letter sent by the Israeli
Foreign Minister, Moshe Shertok, to Bernadotte on 25 July: "The Christian world
abandoned the Holy City to its fate, and lifted not a finger to its defence".47
3. Following on from the previous two points, Israel asserted that it would continue
ruling the area that it occupied in Jerusalem, treating it as part of the territory
under Israeli control. This position was stated in Shertok's letter:
The Jews alone stood in the breach; they are now in control of practically
the whole of Jerusalem, with the exception of the walled city, and of a firm
land bridge between it and Israel. Henceforth, no constructive examination
of the future of Jerusalem can be undertaken in disregard of these cardinal
facts.




and others % Total
1922 33,971 54.3 28,607 47.7 62,578
1931 51,222 56.6 39.281 43.4 90,503
1944 97,000 61.7 60,080 38.3 157,080
1946 99,320 60.4 65,120 39.6 164,410
Source: Government of Palestine, Survey of Palestine, cited in Michael Brecber, p. 17.
However, discussions within Israel were based on exploiting the situation.
For instance, Leo Kohn, the Israeli Liaison Officer with the UN, sent a memorandum
on 22 July 1948 to the Israeli Foreign Minister, stating that in the light of "the actual
military position", Israel should stop advocating "the international city idea".48
46 Israeli official statement on 5 July 1948 cited in Slonim, "Israeli Policy...", p.583




Israel quickly imposed administrative measures, as shown in Table 2, aimed
at strengthening its position in the city and emphasising that it would not cede the
areas already under its control. As a result of the Israeli victory in West Jerusalem,
the Israeli leadership called for a "functional internationalisation" to be confined to
the Old City and its holy places. The reason given was that the Western sector of the
city did not have the same spiritual characteristics that justified the imposition of an
international regime.49
2.2.3 The Israeli-Jordanian Negotiations and Agreements
By the beginning of June 1948, in addition to the West sector of Jerusalem, Israel
was occupying sites on Mount Scopus such as the Hebrew University and Hadassa
Hospital. These sites comprised an enclave inside East Jerusalem, which had been
captured by Transjordan (see Map 2).
Table 2.2 Israeli administrative measures in Jerusalem:
July 1948 - January 1950
Date Measure
25 July 1948 The Israeli Cabinet decided to extend its authority to Jerusalem (the
occupied West sector) and to impose Israeli law there.
2 August 1948 The Israeli Minister of Defence passed a retroactive decision to make
West Jerusalem subject to Israeli law, and considered it "Israeli-
occupied territory".
20 December 1948 Israeli government institutions were transferred to Jerusalem.
2 February 1949 Military rule in the city was ended and West Jerusalem came under
civilian administration similar to that of the rest of Israel.
14 February 1949 The first Israeli Knesset (Parliament) was opened in Jerusalem.
23 January 1950 The Knesset declared "Jerusalem" Israel's capital.
On 7 July an agreement was signed under UN supervision, in which
arrangements were made to supply this enclave with food, and allow public access to
the sites. In addition, a no-man's land was to be created to separate the two sides.50
49 Abba Eban, An Autobiography (New York: Random House, 1977), p. 141
50 The Agreement text cited in Documents on Jerusalem, p.79.
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This agreement was to establish the status quo in Jerusalem and reflected the mutual
desire to reach a political understanding.
During the remainder of 1948 and 1949, several rounds of secret and open
negotiations took place between the two sides. Israel's goals during the war (until
December) included the prevention of clashes in Jerusalem so as to neutralise the
Arab Legion on this front while Israel carried out operations on the southern
(Egyptian) front. Therefore several agreements were signed under UN supervision to
confirm the cease-fire and the boundaries of the no-man's land.51 These agreements
were combined with secret negotiations and meetings to produce principles of
permanent agreement. Meanwhile, Israel had still not abandoned plans to attempt an
invasion of the rest of Jerusalem, especially during September and October, as has
been explained.
However, another goal for Israel in its negotiations with Transjordan was to
create a united opposition to the internationalisation of the whole of Jerusalem
according to the 181 Resolution. In other words, Israel was working to preserve the
Partition in case the attempt to occupy the whole city was unsuccessful. Therefore, in
August a meeting took place in Paris between Amir 'Abd al-Majld Haidar, the
Transjordanian minister in London, and Eliaho Sasson, the head of the Middle East
Department in the Israeli Foreign Ministry, who was acting in co-ordination with the
Israeli Prime Minister, David Ben Gurion. Sasson made the following three points:
1. He had no confidence in the international mediator, Bernadotte, and called for
direct co-operation to abort the idea of internationalisation.
2. He suggested that King 'Abdullah could keep an (unspecified) part of Jerusalem,
while Israel would keep the modern Western sector with a corridor to Tel Aviv.
The Old City would be administered jointly under international auspices. This
suggestion was Israel's attempt to unite with Jordan to resist the
internationalisation of the whole city, while allowing the internationalisation of
the Old City, which was under Transjordanian control
3. Sasson put forward the demand that Transjordan absorbs refugees.52
51 Moshe Dayan, Story ofMy Life (London: Sphere Books, 1978), p. 139. Shlaim, Collusion,
p.355.
52
see Shlaim, Collusion, p.282.
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These negotiations were not completed because the King was disturbed by a press
leak, and because of Israel's resumption ofmilitary operations.
On 5 December Sasson sent a letter to King 'Abdullah stating Israel's
acceptance of the King's annexation of the West Bank, and urging him not to make a
•• . J. .. cidecision on Jerusalem's future, but to leave it for direct negotiations.
The official armistice negotiations in Rhodes in early 1949 failed to reach an
agreement. On 10 March 1949, Israel occupied Um Rash-Rash (Eilat) on the Red
Sea in the extreme south. Furthermore, in secret negotiations Israel demanded that
Transjordan facilitate Israeli occupation of the Triangular area north of the West
Bank, which was currently under Iraqi control.54 Israel gave hints of its intention to
capture the area and maybe further territory if the matter were not settled
politically.55 Direct secret negotiations took place between the Israeli delegation,
comprising Moshe Dayan and other military officers, and Transjordanian
representatives headed by King 'Abdullah himself. In the early hours of 24 March a
map was agreed, in which the Triangle would be left to Israel after Iraqi
withdrawal.56 This deal opened the door to the official signing of the armistice on 3
April. It is noticeable that Israel required the Jordanians to grant concessions not on
Jerusalem but elsewhere. In contrast, Jerusalem was a means of co-operation with the
Jordanians rather than an issue of conflict, for the two sides agreed to unite to
prevent internationalisation.
Jerusalem occupied a special status in the official armistice agreement from
two aspects.
1. The current structure of the city was a record of the outcome of the war since the
boundaries were set according to the truce lines.
2. The functioning of the city was arranged as follows:
Free movement of traffic on vital roads, including the Bethlehem and
Latrun-Jerusalem roads; resumption of the normal functioning of the cultural
and humanitarian institutions on Mount Scopus and free access thereto; free
access to the Holy Places and cultural institutions and use of the cemetery on
53 Mohamed Heikal , Secret Channels: The Inside Story of Arab-Israeli Negotiations
(London: Harper Collins Publishers, 1996), p.85.
54 Adnan Abu-Odeh, Jordanians, Palestinians & the Hashemite Kingdom in the Middle East
Peace Process, (Washington: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1999), p.47.
55
Kimche, Both Sides, p. 147.
56
Dayan, Story of My Life, p. 49; Bar-Zohar, Ben-Gurion, p. 186.
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the Mount ofOlives; resumption of operation of the Latrun pumping station;
provision of electricity for the Old City; and resumption of operation of the
railroad to Jerusalem.
These arrangements could be regarded as essential for the Jewish holy places
and, in one sense, were an important Israeli achievement. East Jerusalem, containing
the Arab population and the holy places would be under UN supervision, while the
Western sector of the city would be under Israeli control. However, it is important to
note that the Jews could not return to the Jewish Quarter in the Old City, nor could
the Arabs return to their neighbourhood in West Jerusalem. Nevertheless, Israel's
acceptance of this arrangement included access by Jews to the Old City, which was
defined as freedom ofworship.
The first stage of the agreement was implemented in May, when barriers and
fences were built to create the no-man's-land separating the two sides.57
However, the arrangements for the holy places and free passage to Mount
Scopus were not implemented. Although a long series of direct and indirect, secret
and open negotiations took place between the two sides on this matter, there was no
tangible result.58
This stalemate did not prevent the continuing collaboration in opposing
internationalisation. For instance, Israel did not try to put international pressure on
Jordan to implement the agreements because this could renew the discussion on
internationalisation. The collaboration was emphasised in a secret meeting between
King 'Abdullah and the Israeli Foreign Minister Shareet on 5 May when the
negotiations on Jerusalem were confined to Jordan and Israel.59
Secret negotiations commenced on 27 November 1949 in al-Shuna in East
Jordan and continued until the assassination of King 'Abdullah in July 1951. Israel
had been represented by Shiloah and Sasson, and Jordan by Samir al-Rifa'I, the
Minister of the Royal Court, under the direct supervision and frequent visits of King
'Abdullah. From the very beginning of these negotiations, Israel had demanded the
annexation of the Jewish Quarter in the Old City right up to the Wailing Wall in
57
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addition to the area of Latrun, and the creation of a territorial link with Mount
Scopus.60
Jordan insisted that any settlement in Jerusalem should be negotiated after
Israel had made concessions on Negev, where Jordan would control the southern area
so as to gain territorial access to Gaza and to share a frontier with Egypt.61 The
priority of the Israeli Prime Minister, David Ben Gurion, had apparently changed.
During the war he was more enthusiastic than other Israeli leaders to give priority to
Jerusalem. Now he was concerned about immigration, the economy and security.
Therefore, he rejected his aides' advice to agree to Jordan's demand to have a
62corridor through the south ofNegev in exchange for Israel's demands in Jerusalem.
63 • *iHe also rejected military plans to achieve Israel's demands by force. This attitude
shows that Israel's priority was the creation of the Jewish state, whether it contained
the Holy City or not.
On 13 December the UN General Assembly passed a resolution to place
Jerusalem under an international regime. Jordan and Israel reacted by accelerating
their efforts to reach a speedy agreement. A "paper" was drafted which included the
following points:
1. Jerusalem would be partitioned.
2. Israel would have sovereignty over the Jewish Quarter in the Old City up to the
Western Wall, as well as secure access to Mount Scopus.
3. Jordan would be granted territory as far as the Bethlehem-Jerusalem road.
4. Jordan would have sovereignty over a corridor from Hebron to the Gaza coast.64
The agreement made no headway owing to opposition within the two parties.
There were various reasons for the opposition, such as the details of the solution in
Gaza, though Jerusalem was not among them. Resistance to internationalisation










the two sides.65 The negotiations made no progress and came to a complete halt after
the assassination of King 'Abdullah.
In the following years, the military front between the Israeli and Jordanian
armies in Jerusalem remained relatively calm with only a very few exceptions. One
of the exceptions occurred in late June and early July 1954, when Israeli guns and
mortars were fired in the direction of the holy places in the Old City and the Mount
of Olives in the Eastern sector. British officers in the Arab Legion asserted that Israel
had initiated these attacks, though for no clear reason.66
2.2.4 Redefining West Jerusalem as Jerusalem
The proclamation of the State of Israel on 14 May 1948 did not mention Jerusalem.67
This was because any reference to Jerusalem as the capital of Israel would clearly be
a violation of the Partition Resolution, which the Jewish Agency had accepted.
Although Israel used the word Jerusalem when designating it the capital, it implied
West Jerusalem, or, in the early stages, referred to it as "Jewish Jerusalem", which
/: o
suggested that the rest of Jerusalem was not Jewish. Therefore, the official
definition ofWest Jerusalem was Jerusalem.
In addition to the balance of power, there were other reasons why a Jewish
state without East Jerusalem was acceptable at that time. The Zionists agreed to the
1947 Partition Plan because the internationalisation of Jerusalem would satisfy the
Orthodox Jewish groups, who were still questioning the right of establishing a Jewish
state before the coming of the Messiah. Therefore, the internationalisation of Old
Jerusalem was acceptable as a solution to the problem of creating a state that at least
would not include the Holy City.69
However, the acceptance of the war boundaries meant that the Jews would
lose access to the holy places. In the late nineteenth century, Orthodox Jews had
refused to live outside the Old City, insisting that holy Jerusalem included only the
65
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area inside its walls. Therefore, it could be expected that the Old City and the access
to its holy places would become a hot issue of debate inside Israel. Surprisingly, this
was not so.
Moreover, Orthodox Jewish groups were important to the Israeli leadership in
the early stages of establishing the state of Israel. The Israeli leadership sought to
satisfy them to avoid the trouble that they could provoke such as by questioning the
legitimacy of establishing a Jewish state in this era instead of waiting for it to be
granted by "the Hand of God". In addition, the co-operation of these groups was
necessary to attract new immigrants to the state, and to gain international financial
and political support, especially from the activities among the Diaspora.
East Jerusalem did not seem to be an obstacle. Understanding and agreement
were achieved by a formula in which the religious sects were granted rights such as
sectarian autonomy and the application of their religious rules to the lives of their
members. Sects also benefited from state aid to build their social and religious
institutions, and their members enjoyed economic and civilian privileges such as
exemption from military service. In return, the Israeli leadership managed to turn the
religious groups into organisations actively working to attract immigrants, to collect
donations from the Diaspora, and to organise and mobilise the loyalty of the
immigrants.70
Even Orthodox Jews participated, consciously or unconsciously, in the
redefinition of Jerusalem. West Jerusalem became the centre of most, if not all, of
their religious groups for the religious immigrants were concentrated here. Thus
districts such as Mea Shearim and Bukhara came to be known as the districts of
"organised religion in Israel".71
The religious sects came to be numbered among the decision-makers, the
various sects forming political parties based on religion. An examination of the
political blueprints of these groups as well as those of other Israeli parties during the
election campaigns between 1948 and 1967 reveals that the focus was on issues such
69
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as a comparison of the Orthodox Jewish and the secular lifestyles. The Sephardi
political parties concentrated on fighting discrimination against them by the
Ashkenazim in an attempt to gain a better economic and political status within Israeli
society.72 As with the secular parties, East Jerusalem did not form part of their
manifestos. Clearly, the Israelis were satisfied with the state borders.
In other words, the Israeli government and religious leaders, who were
expected to create trouble over East Jerusalem, joined with the rest of the Israeli elite
in redefining West Jerusalem as the Jewish Jerusalem. This attitude supports the
assumption that holy cities and holy territories can be created and used by those in
power to their own political or economic advantage. The construction of a national
symbol was essential in the establishment of a nation-state and the mobilisation of its
people. However, this construction was in fact another redefinition of Jerusalem, in
which claimed historical and religious rights were subordinated to the stability,
security and material requirements of the state.
Israel made great efforts to gain international recognition of West Jerusalem
as its capital and to create the impression that its control of this sector of the city was
irreversible. It achieved the second goal. Gradually the international powers accepted
the new structure and that Israel would not agree to any solution that would end its
control of the West sector. In 1953, the British Ambassador in Tel Aviv sent the
following assessment to the Foreign Office in London:
I doubt whether the Israelis would now accept any formula which did not
provide some recognition of their sovereignty over the new city. They might
have been prepared to overlook this point three years ago in their desire to
reach at least a partial solution to the Jerusalem problem. Since then their
attitude has hardened considerably. Jerusalem is now firmly established as
the capital of Israel and has assumed great symbolic significance.73
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However, there was only little success in gaining official recognition ofWest
Jerusalem as Israel's capital. For instance, only a few countries opened embassies in
Jerusalem. The British Ambassador in Tel Aviv described the Israeli efforts to
encourage foreign governments in this direction as follows: "It is a fairly open secret
that the Israeli Government has offered inducements to make it financially
advantageous for the smaller countries to set up shop in Jerusalem".74 (See Chapter
Five).
In conclusion, between 1948 and 1967 Israel had coexisted with the fact that
East Jerusalem, including the holy sites, was under the control of another power.
While giving priority to the construction and security of the state, Israel also
developed its own Jerusalem, or as Ian Lustick comments:
What is important to note is that this version of Jerusalem, even without the
Old City, could be made politically and emotionally satisfying as a symbolic
evocation of Zionism's response to age-old Jewish yearnings for a return to
"Zion and Jerusalem".75
2.3 Israeli Expansion in Jerusalem: post-1967
Israel won an overwhelming victory in the Six-Day War of June 1967, in which it
occupied the remainder of Palestine that had been under the British Mandate,
including East Jerusalem. It is important to mention that Israel asserts that its
attacking Jerusalem and the West Bank had not been among the war plans, and that
this war was launched only against Egypt, but the Jordanian initiative to attack Israel
76led to the war and the occupation. However later that month, three laws, on
Jerusalem, were passed by the Israeli government:77
1. On 27 June 1967, the Law of Israel's Protection of the Holy Places, which
imposed a punishment on anyone who "desecrated" or "violated" the holy places.
The law could be interpreted as a declaration of Israel's intention to preserve the
safety and status quo of these sites. In practice, however, it meant that Israel
intended to continue occupying at least the area containing them.
74 FCO 17/ 956 E.J.W.
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2. On 28 June 1967, the Municipalities Ordinance Amendment, which authorised
the Israeli Minister of the Interior to "enlarge, by proclamation, the area of a
particular municipality". This law prepared the ground for the third governmental
decision.
3. On 28 June 1967, the Enlargement of the Area of the Municipality of Jerusalem.
This was done by annexing East Jerusalem to the Israeli municipal borders of
West Jerusalem.
There are reasons to interpret Israel's annexation of East Jerusalem in the
1967 War, an action that it did not attempt in the 1948 War. Two examples are the
balance of power and international relations. For instance, in 1967 Israel was
enjoying special American protection embodied in the UN resolutions (see Chapter
Five). Meanwhile, the Soviet Union showed little inclination to take part in the war
and support the Arab regimes. Moreover, in 1948 there was the Israeli fear that
occupying the Old City could result in losing the whole of Jerusalem. Now, such a
loss was inconceivable because the international powers and the Arab regimes were
concerned with eradicating the results of the war. Therefore, the maximum possible
loss was the restoration of the pre-war boundaries.
The decisions made by the Israeli government in June 1967 were aimed at
strengthening the country's position at any future negotiations. They included a
guarantee that the pre-1967 situation of denying Jews access to holy places would
not be repeated, and that the holy places would remain largely under Israeli control.
The decisions also satisfied the Israeli expansionists who were seeking to shift the
78borders for ideological reasons.
Flowever, in 1967 the Israeli government avoided ideological discourse, at
least on the international level. Since the Israeli decisions took the form of
administrative measures, some scholars argue that there were no Israeli laws nor
resolution adopted in 1967 to annex East Jerusalem to Israel. This argument could be
supported by Israeli official statements, such as a letter sent by Abba Eban, the then
Israeli Foreign Minister, to the UN Secretary-General, U Thant, in which he asserted:
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"The term 'annexation' ... is out of place. The measures adopted relate to the
integration of Jerusalem in the administrative and municipal spheres."79
Nevertheless, other scholars assert that the Israeli laws at the time were
concerned with annexation because they were linked to an earlier, self-explanatory
law, namely, the 1948 Area, Jurisdiction and Power Ordinance, which states:
Any law applying to the whole of the state of Israel shall be deemed to apply
to the whole of the area including both the area of the State of Israel and any
part of Palestine which the Minister of Defence has defined by proclamation
as being held by the Defence Army of Israel.80
In this context the Israeli laws and proclamations of 1967 form a declaration
of Israeli sovereignty over the expanded Jerusalem. Nevertheless, it was clear that
international pressure could effect changes in Israel's treatment of the city. This
proves yet again that on certain occasions Israel had to act according to political
realities rather than ideological rhetoric.
However, Israel's denial of the annexations was abandoned once it was inter¬
nationally convenient to do so. For instance, in Eban's autobiography - published in
the mid-1970s - the author was now saying, in contrast to his 1967 statements: "On
June 27 the Israeli Parliament voted in favour of adding Jerusalem to the area of
O 1
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Israeli sovereignty." Although his autobiography contained detailed documentation
of his activities during the war, there was no indication that the Israeli government's
decisions were purely administrative, as he had alleged in 1967.
2.3.1 Israeli Policy in Jerusalem: post-1967
Israel's concern after the war was to render inconceivable the pre-war borders and
structure and to exclude East Jerusalem from any future settlement. The Israeli plans
were clear to observers from the very beginning. For instance, on 2 August 1967 a
confidential letter sent from W. Morris, the head of the Eastern Department in the
British Foreign Office, to R. Beaumont, the British Ambassador in Iraq, described
Israel's aim as follows:
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It has been the Israeli objective since they occupied the West Bank to get it
accepted as widely as possible that, irrespective of the merits of the case, the
fait accompli is irreversible, the fate of Jerusalem is not negotiable, and the
whole subject almost undiscussable. That (a) no one is in a position
physically to remove them from the Old City, and (b) they can and will
resist all other forms of pressure.82
2.3.1.1 Facts on the Ground
Israel worked to strengthen the Jewish presence in the city and weaken that of the
Palestinians, and to absorb East Jerusalem into Israel with a new cultural, social and
political identity. This was to be accomplished by, for example, replacing the Arab
institutions in the city with Israeli, and by increasing the ratio of Jews to Palestinians.
Such a policy was important to create a new image for the city matching the Israeli
ideological and historical discourse about the city's identity, and at the same time
creating a material situation to prevent a return to the pre-1967 situation.
In 1967 the Israeli annexation of East Jerusalem to the Israeli municipality
was accompanied by the extension of the city's eastern boundary to increase the area
of 6.5 square kilometres formerly under Jordanian rule to 70.9 square kilometres.
The whole of Jerusalem, East and West, now covered an area of 108.5 square
kilometres (see Map 3). This and a later extension (in 1993 to 123 square
kilometres)83 were designed to annex the maximum area of land with the minimum
number of Palestinians. Therefore, densely populated towns and villages that had
historically comprised parts of the district of Jerusalem were excluded from these
extensions. Of the 66,000 Palestinians estimated by the Israelis in 1967 to be
residents of Jerusalem, 44,000 were living within the original Jordanian boundaries,
84which covered an area of 6.4 square kilometres.
The ratio of inhabitants within the new boundaries of Jerusalem in 1967 was
74.2 per cent Jews (1,97,000 residents) to 25.8 per cent Palestinians (686,000
residents) (see Appendix 1).
The Israeli aim in the years following the annexation was to increase the
proportion of Jews in Jerusalem to 80-90 per cent.85
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By 1973 it was clear that the plan to increase the proportion of Jews was not
working. So instead, the Israeli government recommended that the current
"demographic balance" between Jews and Palestinians should be maintained. The
recommendation was based on the 1972 ratio of 73.5 per cent Jews to 26.5 per cent
86 • •
Palestinians. Below are listed the main policies implemented to create the new
Israeli-style Jerusalem.
Preferential Treatment
The Israeli policies to increase the ratio of Jews in the city included granting them
privileges that were not available to the Palestinians or even to the Jewish residents
of other cities. In 1980 the Jerusalem Basic Law was passed, according to which
Jews could buy their homes with low-interest or interest-free mortgages, enjoy high-
87
quality services that were heavily subsidised and tax exemptions.
Palestinian Housing
Conversely, Israel imposed restrictions on the granting of planning permission to
Palestinians to build their needed homes. In 1968 Israel began to expropriate
Palestinian-owned land inside the expanded East Jerusalem. Most of the land was
owned by private individuals. Between 1967 and 1995, five major expropriation
orders had been issued, affecting a total area of 23 square kilometres, or over one-
88
third of the area annexed to the city since 1967.
Israel also applied the Absentees' Property Law of 1950 to East Jerusalem.
According to this law, most, if not all, of the Palestinians in East Jerusalem were
considered to be absentees. The legal definition of an absentee was a Palestinian
individual who owned property in Israeli territory, or a national or citizen of an Arab
state that had engaged in war with the state of Israel. As one scholar pointed out, had
the law been applied fully, "all Palestinian inhabitants of East Jerusalem who owned
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property in the city and held Jordanian passports would have been required to cede
OQ
title to their property to the state." However, the law was applied only partly.
To prevent Palestinians from building their homes, another strategy of land
control was implemented under the pretext of zoning lands as Green Areas, where
building was prohibited. Of the land covered by East Jerusalem, 44 per cent was
classified as Green Areas. Practically speaking, the aim of this classification was to
preserve the land for planned settlements. Ramot, Reches Shu'fat and Har Homa are
examples of settlements built on land originally classified as Green Areas.90
Theoretically, the Palestinians had the right to build on a total of 7.4 per cent
of the annexed land in Jerusalem. In practice, however, this was very difficult
because of the other obstacles to acquiring planning permission. For instance, an
application for planning permission costs a Palestinian nearly US$20,000 and takes
up to five years to be granted.91 The result is that 88 per cent of the housing units that
have been built in Jerusalem since 1967 have been allocated to Jews.92 This is in
addition to the policy of justified house demolition such as the removal of an illegal
building.93
Settlements
The building of Jewish settlements in Jerusalem was the main instrument for creating
the new Israeli identity of the city. Construction began in 1968, and by 1995, 64,000
apartments had been completed.94 The settlements in general have been designed as
an obstacle to any surrender of East Jerusalem.
2.3.1.2 The Success of the Israeli Policies
Evaluating the success of the Israeli policies inside Jerusalem could be controversial,
for although there has been success in some areas, there has also been a clear failure
in others. What could be regarded as success from one point of view could also be
regarded as a failure from another. This situation could be described as relative
89
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success or relative failure.
For instance, it could be argued from the statistical point of view that the
Israeli demographic policy failed in Jerusalem because the targeted ratios of
inhabitants were not achieved. Despite all the earlier Israeli policies, the Palestinians
clearly managed to increase their numbers in the city. The growth in the Jewish
population between 1967 and 1998 was 119 per cent, whereas that of the Palestinian
population was 192 per cent.
The situation looks even bleaker when the demographic movement inside
Israeli society itself is borne in mind. It is estimated that a quarter of a million Jews
left Jerusalem between 1980 and 1998. 95 It is particularly indicative when the
sociological aspect of the demographic structure of Jerusalem is examined.
Polarisation already existed in Israeli society, especially between the Orthodox and
secular Jews. The bulk of those who left the city were the young, secular and
financially better-off members of Israeli society. Their exodus threatened to
transform Jerusalem into a community of elderly Haredim (religious adherents).96
This situation could, in turn, change the city from a symbol of national unity into a
centre of internal division.
From another point of view, however, Israeli policies could be interpreted as
successful. For instance, although the ratios of inhabitants in the whole city were not
achieved, it is important to note the Israeli achievement in East Jerusalem. By 1994,
Jewish settlers in this sector outnumbered the Arab population at nearly 190,000 to
180,000.97
Nevertheless, it should be remembered that all these statistics are based on
the extended boundaries of Jerusalem. To accept them as a point of discussion or
negotiation is already an Israeli triumph in itself, not only because of the new
demographic balance in East Jerusalem but also because further alterations to the
maps by the Israelis are likely to be accepted. If new maps were to be accepted as the
basis of statistical analysis and negotiation, all the present statistics and their political
implications would be meaningless. Here one could refer to another geographical
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definition of the city as put forward by the PA after 1994. According to the
Palestinian administrative division, the Governorate of Jerusalem should include
thirty villages, camps and populated Bedouin areas that were excluded from the
Israeli municipal boundaries. This division meant that the Palestinian census of 1999
showed another 113,557 Palestinians living inside the Governorate - who were not
recognised as such by the Israeli government - and thereby increasing the Palestinian
population within the city to 323,766 98
At the same time it was observed that East Jerusalem remained different from
the West sector. There were two cultures, two types of urban design and two levels
of lifestyle, economy and services. In addition to the Palestinian resistance to
annexation this was partly also due to the Israeli method of administration. Teddy
Kollek, the Israeli Mayor of Jerusalem between the 1960s and the early 1990s
observed this difference between the two parts and interpreted it in an interview on
10 October 1990:
For Jewish Jerusalem I did something in the past 25 years. For East
Jerusalem? Nothing! What did I do? Nothing! Sidewalks? No thing. Cultural
Institution? Not one. Yes, we installed a sewerage system for them and
improved the water supply. Do you know why? Do you think it was for their
good, for their welfare? Forget it. There were some cases of cholera there,
and the Jews were afraid that they would catch it, so we installed sewerage
and water system against cholera...."
In other words, the policy discrimination aimed at strengthening the Jewish
presence in the city had misfired. All it had done was to maintain the distinction
between "Jewish Jerusalem" and what the Israelis used to call East (not Arab)
Jerusalem.
2.3.2 The Ideological Discourse
If the important themes of Israeli discourse since the 1970s are examined, it can be
easily stated that the main Israeli slogan for Jerusalem was that it was the non-
negotiable united and eternal capital of Israel. This description was frequently
expressed in stirring words such as "the capital of a sovereign Israel ...a united city
98 See Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, Jerusalem 1999, Statistical Year Book, no. 2
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which will never again be torn apart."100
History and religion have been used not only to assert a special kind of
ideological relationship between the Jewish nation and the West and East sectors of
Jerusalem and therefore to justify annexation and exclusive sovereignty, but also to
justify the application of hostile policies against the Palestinians in the city. Meron
Benvenisti, a former Deputy Mayor of Jerusalem and a well-known politician and
historian, has written several volumes on Jerusalem. He states: "The Israeli
government imposed Israeli law, justice, and administration on Jerusalem,
establishing permanent operating procedures that most Israelis consider non-
negotiable, except on marginal matters."101 Then he tries to explain that this ideology
justifies the policies against the Palestinians: "The Israelis have not sought
legitimisation from the people they annexed .... they demanded compliance, not
109
consent." He continues: "The Israelis needed only self-legitimisation, ... all
Jerusalem belonged to them by historical right."103
Benvenisti then raises the following argument:
Of course, it is possible to argue that a democratic society would never
annex a hostile population against its will. A democratic society will not
persevere in a situation of imposed rule, but will grant the subject population
the right of self- determination.
There are, however, situations - and the situation in Jerusalem is a
clear example - in which a democratic society is motivated and acts in
accordance with imperatives that it considers absolute and of greater
importance than democratic- universal values. For the Israelis, Jerusalem is
fundamental to their identity as a nation and country, and their control of it
symbolises their control of their own destiny and their ability to determine
the future. They see these values as absolute, so any concession is perceived
as a threat to their survival as a nation.... Their superior rights as a
collective, their unilateral approach and advancement of their own interests-
and, therefore, discrimination against the dominated population - are based
on a feeling that their demands regarding Jerusalem exclude all other rights,
national or democratic.104
100 "Statement by Israel's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 21 August 1980", cited in Documents
on Jerusalem, p. 111. See also other similar official statements in various years: pp. 113, 115,
117 & 118, etc.; and see Klein, Contested City, pp.92 & 94.
101 Meron Benvenisti, Intimate Enemies: Jews and Arabs in a Shared Land, (Berkeley ;





This description gives a clear message that Jerusalem is a zero-sum issue, and
Israel's relationship with the city is beyond rational calculations: it is ideological,
emotional, overwhelming and uncontrolled. This view is intended to convince
internal powers, adversaries, and international powers that any Israeli concessions on
this matter are inconceivable.
Israel has been developing this discourse since its occupation of East
Jerusalem in 1967. The aim has been to win international acceptance that the alleged
Jewish significance of the city creates and justifies the Israelis' right of annexation.
This type of discourse was not the same before the 1967 war. There was no
such claim of a right to subjugate other people using ideological-historical and
religious justifications. The new discourse largely reflects the post-1967 balance of
power.
2.3.3 Israel and the Political Settlement: 1967-2000
When the Israeli Cabinet adopted the decision to occupy the whole of Jerusalem,
there was a discussion about the future of the city, especially the Old City. At this
early stage, at least two ministers - H.M. Shapira (Interior) and Aranne (Education) -
said that they would support internationalisation, and no further suggestions were
made.105 This is an indicator that at that early stage annexation was not the only
choice.
In contrast, during the aftermath of victory, mainstream opinion in Israel saw
to it that Jerusalem would not be included in any future withdrawal. Instead, Israeli
officials promoted municipal and religious solutions, although on some occasions
their positions were cloaked with ambiguity.
Among the municipal solutions was one put forward in 1968 by Meron
Benvenisti, the current aide to the then Mayor of Jerusalem. He suggested a dual
administration "with dual sovereignty [which] would be similar to that of the Greater
London Council". The city would be divided into boroughs or sub-municipalities
with an overall, federal or higher municipality which would have defined areas of
responsibility and authority.106
105




In 1976, Ya'acov Hazan, the Mapam Party leader, outlined a similar plan.
Although Jerusalem would continue to be the united capital of Israel, a subsidiary
township would be established and administered by the municipal government.
Meanwhile, the Old City would remain an "inseparable" part of Israel, managed by a
council representing the three religions and their sects. According to the plan, Israel
would guarantee Muslims world-wide the right of pilgrimage to their holy places. In
addition, if the Jewish religious establishments permitted Jews to enter the Temple
Mount, a special section would be set aside for Jewish worship.107
Another plan, which was suggested by Yigal Allon in the same year, was
based on "a religious and not a political solution" because Jerusalem was considered
holy by the three great religions. He said that a "special status could be granted to the
representatives of the various faiths in the places holy to them", and that it might be
possible "to base the municipal structure of the city upon sub-districts that take
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ethnic and religious criteria into account."
On many occasions Israel statements regarding Jerusalem were deliberately
cloaked with ambiguity. This strategy was used to avoid further international
pressure and protest against its policies in the city as well as to counter accusations of
evading a political settlement.
A report by the Foreign office, Near Eastern Department noticed this
ambiguity, for it stated that when Abba Eban was asked at the Royal Institute of
International Affairs on 16 December 1970 "what sort of arrangements Israel might
accept in Jerusalem, he did not give a full answer":
He started by saying that the Israelis regarded the unification of the city as
irreversible. Unity was the normal condition of a city. But the Israelis did
not seek to exercise exclusive control over the Islamic and Christian holy
places, but rather a control with corollary access agreements for all.109
Another example highlights this deliberate ambiguity in a more practical
sense. In 1970, the then Israeli Foreign Minister, Gideon Rafael, sent through a
Romanian official a message to President Jamal 'Abd Al-Nasir of Egypt, asserting
that Israel was prepared to discuss all issues with Egypt without preconditions, and
107 The Archive of the Royal Committee for Jerusalem Affairs, Amman (Arabic trans.).
108 The Allon Plan - Israeli Foreign Minister Yigal Allon on his Plans for Peace, October
1976; cited in Abdul Hadi (ed.), Documents on Palestine, vol. I, p.243.
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would make a new offer once negotiations were under way. He pointed out that
Israel would not annex the occupied territory because this could dilute (by including
the Arab population) the Jewish identity of Israel. Israel would offer solutions to all
the problems, although it did not want to show its hand in advance of negotiations.110
Nasir's response showed resentment of Israel's refusal to make an open and clear-cut
offer. He also emphasised that Egypt's aim was Israel's total withdrawal, including
from Jerusalem, and that no solution leaving Jerusalem as part of a Jewish state
would be acceptable.111 Nasir's response clearly indicates the deliberate ambiguity
displayed by Israel on different issues, especially Jerusalem.
This kind of prevarication still avoided the hard-line attitude in the face of the
resolutions that continued to be issued by the UN against Israel policies, in addition
to criticism by governments world-wide (see Chapter Five). However, the Israeli-
Egyptian negotiations formed the first real analysis of the Israeli position.
2.3.3.1 The Israeli-Egyptian Negotiations: 1977-1980
The Israeli Egyptian negotiations, which were launched after the visit by President
Anwar Al-Sadat of Egypt in November 1977, resulted in the Camp David
Agreement. They are considered to be the first public, official and direct negotiations
that aimed to reach a permanent peaceful settlement between Israel and an Arab
country. They created the opportunity of analysing the Israeli attitude in practice and
in real negotiations.
The Israeli attitude concerning Jerusalem was changeable during the
negotiations. It was different from the normal pattern, in which the parties to the
dispute display a hard-line stance at the beginning, and then gradually become more
flexible as the discussions progress. In contrast, although Israel's initial attitude
showed possible flexibility, by the end of the negotiations this had changed to an
explicit, hard-line undiplomatic position.
A secret meeting was held in Morocco in September 1997 between the Israeli
Foreign Minister, Moshe Dayan, and President Sadat's emissary and Deputy Prime
109 FC017/1365.
110 Heikal, Secret Channels, p. 155.
111 Ibid.
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Minister, Hassan TohamT. The latter demanded that Israel present a constructive
programme that took into account Arab sensitivities regarding Jerusalem. Moshe
Dayan's answer, as reported later, was that regarding
the Settlement on the Golan Heights, the Western Wall, and the Jewish
Quarter, [of the Old City], the Mount of Olives and the [Hebrew] University,
and new population centres [in the southern Gaza Strip and northern
Sinai]...A solution to the problem of the Holy City could be easy and
satisfactory to all parties.112
Menachem Klein comments that Dayan did not insist on the annexation to
Israel of "Arab East Jerusalem" or of the new Jewish neighbourhoods built on the
eastern side of the city, and that "Dayan stood firm on Israel's religious rights in East
Jerusalem, yet he refrained from naming the Temple Mount as a holy site for the
Jews." Another observer said: "Dayan made no distinction between the new Jewish
neighbourhoods in East Jerusalem and the Israeli settlement in the Golan Heights and
in eastern Sinai, even though their status was different under Israeli law."11
The visit to Jerusalem by President al-Sadat of Egypt and his speech in the
Israeli Knesset on 21 November 1977 was interpreted positively by the Israelis as his
recognition of the city's status as the capital of Israel.114 Nevertheless, al-Sadat
clearly stated: "We insist on complete withdrawal from these [Arab] territories
[occupied in 1967], including Arab Jerusalem"115 the Israeli Prime Minister,
Menachem Begin's response was: "Everything must be negotiated and can be
negotiated".116 So Israel did not declare then that Jerusalem was nonnegotiable.
When negotiations began in earnest, Israel displayed a different stance. It
wanted to exclude Jerusalem from the negotiations and refused any change in the
city's situation except a religious solution. As Begin stated before the Israeli Knesset
on 28 December 1977, his plan for the Autonomy of the Occupied Territories
included a provision for the holy places of the three religions in Jerusalem, and that a
112 See Klein, Contested, p. 85.
113 Ibid., pp.85 & 86.
i'4 Benvenisti, City ofStone, p. 40.
n5 Anwar Sadat of Egypt speech to the Israeli Knesset, cited in Documents on Jerusalem,
p.)48'
116 (Clein, Contested, p.87.
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special proposal would be drawn up to include the guarantee of freedom of access to
members of all the faiths to the shrines holy to them.117
Even at this stage Israeli officials were suggesting compromises that would
allow another political power in Jerusalem. Begin's Assistant, Eliahu Ben-Elissar,
revealed later that the Israeli Prime Minister was thinking of a "temporary proposal",
in which one representative from each neighbouring country and from other
countries such as Saudi Arabia, Morocco and Iran, in addition to representatives of
the proposed administrative council for Palestinian autonomy, would form an
organisation to administer the Muslim holy sites. Begin informed President Carter of
the US of his ideas, and when Carter asked if this meant giving the holy sites a status
similar to that of the Vatican, Begin replied, "We will consider all kinds of
possibilities. We have not decided yet."118 If we recall that the Vatican is a sovereign
state, we can say that until then, Begin had not refused a solution that would alter the
Israel's political status in the city.
At the Camp David talks, which began on 6 September 1978 and near the end
of the negotiations, the Egyptian President made several proposals concerning the
city. However, he was faced with an adamant Israeli rejection of any alteration in the
city's status quo or even its mention by name in the text of the agreement. The
Israelis also refused the symbolic gestures that were suggested by the American
President, such as flying Islamic flags over the Islamic holy places.119
On 17 September, the last day of the Summit, the Americans again raised the
question of Jerusalem. In contrast to his initial diplomatic manner, Begin responded
with frustration and recalled his refusal to include Jerusalem in the agreement or to
discuss the issue, and threatened to leave the conference.120
As a result, the Israelis succeeded in imposing their wishes: Jerusalem was
not mentioned in the agreement. Instead, letters were exchanged between the
American, Israeli and Egyptian leaders regarding the city, though these were merely
a repetition of the declared positions of the three parties, (see Chapter Four) The
117 Begin's Autonomy Plan, cited in Abdul Hadi (ed.), Documents on Palestine, vol. 1,
p.247.
11^ Klein, Contested, p.88.
119 Benvenisti, City ofStone, p. 40.
129 See Klein, Contested City, p. 92.
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Israeli letter that was addressed to the US President said: "the Government of Israel
decreed in July 1967 that Jerusalem is one city indivisible, the Capital of the State of
Israel".121
These changes in the Israeli attitude could be explained by overlapping
factors. More importantly, however, was the actual procedure of the negotiations.
The imposition of the Israeli veto on the issue of Jerusalem at the beginning of the
negotiations could have aborted the whole negotiations. The continuation of the
negotiations at Camp David and the postponement of discussions about Jerusalem
were important for two reasons:
1. It became clear that Egypt was going to sign a bilateral agreement, whatever the
Arab position.
2. It would have been difficult for Egypt as well as the US to allow the agreement to
fail at this stage, even over a question such as that of Jerusalem.
Therefore the situation of these two countries was the main reason for the
change in the Israeli attitude.
This is yet another example of how the status of Jerusalem and Israel's
attitude could be used as tools in conventional political calculations and manoeuvres,
capable of showing flexibility as well as obduracy according to the circumstances.
The hard-line Israeli attitude was combined with the acceleration in
settlement building in Jerusalem. Between 1980 and 1985 there were 53,800 new
Jewish settlers in the expanded Jerusalem. This policy was important in pre-empting
the approaching negotiations with Egypt on the future of the occupied territories. It
was now also possible to implement such a policy because American protection of
Israel had been strengthened in the UN after the Camp David Summit. President
Carter had promised Menachem Begin that the issue of Jerusalem would be confined
to negotiations and that the aim would be the minimisation of the international role
(see Chapter Five).
Accordingly, in 1980 Israel passed the Basic Law of Jerusalem, which stated
explicitly: "Jerusalem, complete and united, is the Capital of Israel."122 Therefore,
121 The letter text, cited in Abdul Hadi (ed.). Documents on Palestine, vol. l,p.253.
122 Israel's Basic Law: Jerusalem, Capital of Israel; cited in Documents on Jerusalem, p. 110.
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what Israel could not declare explicitly in 1967 became possible after the Camp
David Accords.
In the 1979 negotiations with Egypt on the interim period of Palestinian self-
rule, Israel adamantly refused to discuss Jerusalem. Nevertheless, at this stage the
Israeli position was not automatically unanimous. The then Israeli Foreign Minister,
Moshe Dayan, did not object initially to the demand to include the Palestinians of the
city in the election of the autonomous authority. However, the Israeli Cabinet
rejected the demand, considering it to be a kind of recognition of Jerusalem as part of
123the occupied territories.
2.3.3.2 After Camp David: 1980-1990
Jerusalem was among the reasons for the collapse of these negotiations before the
assassination of President al-Sadat on 6 October 1981 and the Israeli invasion of
Lebanon in June 1982.
After the evacuation of the PLO from Lebanon, political efforts were
renewed to launch a peace process in the region. In the early 1980s, Israel rejected
several American, Soviet and Arab peace plans. Both the suggested international
conference and the participation of the PLO were the main justifications for the
Israeli rejection of the negotiations.124
The Israeli view of a peace process, as presented by Prime Minister Shimon
Peres on 10 June and 21 October 1985, was based on two requirements. Both of them
concerned the procedure of the negotiations, emphasising the rejection of an
international conference and the PLO,125 while the details of a solution were to be
left to the discussions.
The 1987 Intifada precipitated new American and Arab peace proposals. As
explained in Chapter One, the Israelis realised that East Jerusalem was still far from
being considered part of Israel, and that it remained a political centre for the
Palestinians. However, the years up to the Gulf War in 1991 were consumed in
123 Benvenisti, City ofStone, p.42.
124 See David Horovitz (ed.), Yitzhak Rabin, Soldier ofPeace (London: Peter Halban, 1996),
p.80.
125 Madiha Rashid al-Madfai, Jordan, The United States and the Middle East Peace Process,
1974-1991 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), pp. 186-187.
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discussing the same questions of the procedure of the negotiations and their
attendance by the parties concerned. Israel continued to reject an international peace
conference, demanding instead direct bilateral negotiations. It also rejected any
negotiations with the PLO.126
On 14 May 1989 the Israeli government put forward a proposal for a political
settlement. It reconfirmed the Camp David agreements between Egypt and Israel as a
valid basis for a peace process in the region by direct negotiation, and renewed the
Israeli rejection of a Palestinian state and any discussion with the PLO. Not a single
word was mentioned regarding Jerusalem, as if to emphasise that the city was not
part of the negotiations.127
Pressure from the Intifada and the international community to begin a peace
process persuaded some figures inside Israel to consider the details of a solution.
Different influential groups in Israel discussed a possible solution to the question of
Jerusalem. The leader of the Labour Party, Shimon Peres, declared in 1990 that he
himself and his party acknowledged that an overwhelming majority of Israeli Jews
supported the idea of a "united city" serving as Israel's capital. At the same time he
pointed out that the geographical definition of the city, that is, its boundaries, were
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subject to government decision, and could be changed accordingly. The
significance of this statement was that it referred to the geographical definition of
Jerusalem, and raised the issue that it was the boundaries of the expanded Jerusalem
that were changeable, not those based on religious or historic tradition.
Also in 1990, the members of the Knesset passed a resolution reaffirming the
following statement: "United Jerusalem is under Israeli sovereignty and there will be
no negotiations on its unity and status." Of the 120 members, only 45 voted for the
resolution, whereas 71 either absented themselves from the balloting or abstained,
and 4 voted against it.129 The resolution reflected the fear that the status of the city
was changeable and that there was no consensus on its future. The result of the vote
126 See the communications between Israel and both Egypt and the US on these topics in
Heikal, Secret Channels, pp.384, 385.
127 David Makovisky, Making Peace with the PLO, The Rabin Government's Road to the
Oslo Accord, (Colorado and Oxford: Westview Press 1996), pp. 185-189.
128 Ian Lustick, Unsettled states, disputed lands: Britain and Ireland, France and Algeria,
Israel and the West Bank-Gaza (Ithaca; London: Cornell University Press, 1993), p.382.
129 Ibid.
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revealed that there was a foundation for these fears. Even more revealing was that
serious negotiations on Jerusalem could lead to a major review of the Israeli attitude
towards the city.
2.3.3.3 The Madrid Negotiations and the Oslo Accords
2.3.3.3.1 The Madrid andWashington Negotiations
It was in 1991 during the aftermath of the GulfWar that the US resumed its efforts to
reach a settlement in the Middle East, and it succeeded in creating the Madrid
Conference formula. According to such a formula this conference would be only
ceremonial, while the real negotiations would be later on a bilateral level for the
bilateral issues between Israel and its Arab neighbouring countries and multilateral
for regional issues. Israel, under pressure from the administration of the US President
George Bush, attended the conference and started the negotiations.130
Israel demanded that Jerusalem should not be mentioned in the invitations to
the conference. The US solved this difficulty by not mentioning it in the invitation
sent to Israel, but including a reference to it in the letter sent to the Palestinians.
Israel then imposed the condition that no Palestinian holding an Israeli/Jerusalem
identity card was to be part of the negotiator delegation.131 The meaning of such
condition was that Israel did not recognise the Palestinians of Jerusalem as part of the
negotiations, which could imply that Jerusalem itself was not to be the subject of
discussion.
During the Washington negotiations, Jerusalem emerged quickly as a subject
of dispute, although Israel refused to discuss it. By 1992, and after the Labour victory
in the Israeli election, the ban on participation in the delegation by Arab residents of
Jerusalem was lifted. So Faysal al-Husayni became a directly participating member
of the delegation. This was the result of the Labour view that the Palestinians of
Jerusalem could have a certain role in the negotiations. For instance, the Labour
government accepted that the Palestinian residents of the city could vote in the
elections for Palestinian autonomy but not stand as candidates for election.132
130 Middle East International, 25 October 1991.
131 Ibid.
132 jClein, Contested, p. 134.
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5.3.3.3.2 Oslo Accords
The negotiations did not appear to be serious until the Oslo rounds were announced
in 1993, and they emerged as the real thing. Israel was represented in the early stages
by academics so that the Israeli government could assert that they had acted without
any official mandate if no agreement were reached or if news were leaked to the
media. (See chapter One).
Israel's position during these negotiations, as listed in Appendix 2, developed
in the following way:
1. The Israeli representatives tried to persuade the Palestinians not to mention
Jerusalem in the text of any agreement. In exchange, they offered to construct
thousands of housing units, as well as implement other "confidence-building
measures" including granting permission for the establishment of offices for
foreign diplomats in East Jerusalem.
2. When the Palestinians insisted on dealing with the question of Jerusalem, the
Israeli delegation demanded that the discussion be postponed to the next phase,
which could be during the interim period.
3. The Israelis tried to persuade the Palestinians not to define the problems of the
final status in the text of the interim agreement. In this way, Jerusalem would not
be mentioned explicitly; instead the text would confirm that either side would be
entitled to raise any issue.
4. During the negotiations the Israeli attitude varied towards reference to Jerusalem
in regard to the elections. For instance, in the eighth round on 27 June 1993, the
Israelis demanded that Jerusalem should not be mentioned other than in
connection with the elections. Then in the ninth round, on 6 July, they refused to
mention it even in that context.
The fact that at the beginning of the negotiations the Israeli representatives
offered in exchange for excluding Jerusalem from the agreement to ease certain
demographic and political restrictions affecting the Palestinian residents of Jerusalem
contradicted the Israeli policy of transforming East Jerusalem into a part of the
Jewish city. Clearly, the Israeli negotiators realised that Israel would need to change
its attitude towards the Palestinians. It would have to acknowledge, at least
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implicitly, their presence in Jerusalem as well as their political role and connections
with Palestinian national bodies. At the same time the Israeli negotiators had to bear
in mind the discourse on East Jerusalem which had been developed in Israel since
1967. To move too far from it would have risked a strong reaction from the political
opposition.
The negotiators pointed out that the government could collapse as a result of
an agreement over Jerusalem. Although this statement might have been true, it was a
tactic that was to be expected from the Israelis in negotiations. Since 1967 Israeli
action and ideological discourse concerning the historical rights over the city had
been part of the strategy aimed at excluding Jerusalem from any possible political
settlement. The Palestinian acceptance of dealing with Jerusalem on a different basis
from the rest of the occupied territory meant that the Israeli policy had been at least
partly successful.
Nevertheless, Jerusalem was eventually mentioned in the signed accords, and
the Israeli position throughout the text can be analysed as follows:
1. Israel accepted that Jerusalem was to be a negotiable issue in the final status
negotiations. It abandoned its previous refusal to discuss the matter.
2. Israel accepted: "[The] Palestinians of Jerusalem who live there will have the
right to participate in the election process, according to an agreement between the
two sides." The significance of this acceptance is that the Israeli side had
previously seen such participation as recognition of Jerusalem as part of the
occupied territories.
3. In the letter from Shimon Peres to the Norwegian Foreign Minister, Israel
declared: "[The] Palestinian institutions of East Jerusalem and the interests and
well-being of the Palestinians of East Jerusalem are of great importance and will
be preserved." Although the letter was secret, it was publicised by the Palestinian
President, 'Arafat.133
The letter did not contain any specific pledges, nor imply the ending of the
Israeli closure in the city. Nor did the letter guarantee that Israel would not use the
interim period to implement new policies in Jerusalem. But the letter was sent
secretly to avoid arousing violent opposition in Israel. This fact raises yet more
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doubts about the affirmation of consensus inside Israel on Jerusalem, for it appears
that the Israeli plan for the city could provoke a dispute.
2.3.3.4 Israel-Jordan Agreements
Jerusalem was mentioned not only in Israel's agreements with the PLO but also in
those with Jordan in July 1994 (see Chapter Three). Israel asserted (1) that it
respected Jordan's present special role in the Islamic holy shrines in Jerusalem; and
(2) that it would give the Jordanian historic role in these shrines "high priority" in the
negotiations on the permanent status agreement.
Meron Benvenisti analysed Israel's motives in accepting this agreement as
follows:
The Israelis were delighted to oblige: it helped them to distinguish between
the religion aspect of Jerusalem, on which they are flexible, and the
sovereignty issue, on which they are not. In addition, they knew that by
granting Husayn's wish, they would inflame Palestinian-Jordanian rivalry,
which indeed occurred.134
However, the Israeli position in the agreements signed in 1993 and 1994 with
the PLO and Jordan would be clarified in their application.
2.3.3.5 Implementation of the Oslo Accords
Israeli policy after the Oslo accords was a clear example of how the truce and interim
period could be exploited to implement fresh policies so as to influence the final
stage of the conflict or the settlement. Israel imposed drastic measures affecting
settlers, and the population and administration of the city, and escalated its policies
against the Palestinian residents.
Before Oslo, as part of its demographic policy, the Israeli government used to
withdraw Jerusalem identity cards from Palestinians for several reasons. The average
number of cards withdrawn was 125 annually. Between 1994 and 1998 the average
number rose to 545.2 annually, affecting nearly 2,500 citizens every year.135 This
133 Ibid., p.120.
134 Benvenisti, Intimate, p.229.
l35See Michael Dumper, The Politics of Sacred Space: The Old City of Jerusalem in the
Middle East Conflict (Boulder, Co. & London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002), p. 30; PA
formal web site (in Arabic): www.pna.net.
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meant an increase of 436 per cent in the withdrawal of the Palestinians' right of
residency in Jerusalem.
However, Israeli policies apparently backfired, for Palestinian activities and
countermeasures produced an increase in the city's Palestinian population. This
situation was revealed by the Israeli Attorney-General, Daniel Seidman, who pointed
out: "[The Israeli policy] has clearly backfired, ... the Israeli authorities have
discovered that for the satisfaction of depriving 500 Palestinians of their residency in
•• • • 136East Jerusalem, they are getting 5,000 Palestinians returning to their homes."
Israeli efforts to achieve a marked increase in the Jewish population of
Jerusalem were not successful. Despite the addition of 32,600 Jewish residents to the
city between 1992 and 1998, the Palestinian population increased by 44,600 in the
same period.
Nevertheless, there is the counter-argument that a substantial success was
achieved by the increase in settlers and settlements adjacent to the city. Whereas
there were nearly 110,000 settlers in the Occupied Territories (excluding Jerusalem)
in 1994, there were 195,000 in June 2000. This meant that before the peace accords
of 1993 the number of settlers grew by an average influx of 4,230 per year, whereas
afterwards, it had risen to 12,142 per year, or 287 per cent.137 The importance of this
increase for Jerusalem could be understood in the light of Israel's plans to expand the
city's boundaries. In 1995 Israel put forward a plan ofMetropolitan Jerusalem which
annexed large Israeli settlements around the city. In 1998 the Israeli government
approved the plan for future implementation. If the plan were carried out, it could
add around 250,000 settlers to Jerusalem by the year 2015.138
2.4 The Final Negotiations
2.4.1 Jerusalem: Unanimity and Irreversibility
Scholars have argued, at least until the year 2000, that Jerusalem and the settlements
136 Graham Usher, "Doves over Jerusalem? An Interview with Menachem Klein", Jerusalem
Quarterly File, no. 1 (1998).
137 See the web site of Americans for Peace Now, Fact Sheet: "West Bank & Gaza Strip
Settlement", 30 March 2001; www.peacenow.org. And the PA, "web site:
www.pna.net/Jerusalem.
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were not the subject of dispute among the Israeli political parties with regard to the
final negotiations, and that the two leading political forces, Labour and the Likud, as
well as most of the smaller parties in each block, all shared the same main principles
"they all agreed that Jerusalem and most of the settlements should remain in Israeli
hands".139
However such an argument started to face an apparent challenge by the end
of the 1990s. In 1999 and early 2000, after the election of the Prime Minister, Ehud
Barak, there were discussions with the Palestinians on the application of the
remaining interim agreements, and there were attempts to lay down the principles of
the final status negotiations. This provoked public and political debate, which was
clear evidence that the issue of Jerusalem was subject to changing political
circumstances and could be redefined accordingly. The following observations
challenge the assertion of unanimity inside Israel regarding the irreversible status of
Jerusalem:
1. Realisation of the Palestinian Presence
The aforementioned escalation of the Israeli plans to create a new Jerusalem with a
new identity in preparation for the final status negotiations was combined with
further analysis of the city's demographic and political structure. For instance, the
Jerusalem Institute for Israeli Studies, established in early 1994, published detailed
studies carried out by its think tank. Menachem Klein, one of the Institute's experts,
said that two parallel processes took place during these years, leading to serious
debate within Israel, although in the end they accelerated changes in Israel's
treatment of Jerusalem.
(a) Experts from the Institute and members of the Socio-Economic Co-operation
Foundation Organisation, including academics such as Yair Hirschfeld and
Ron Pundak, were active at the Oslo rounds. Politicians such as Yossi Beilin
explained to the public the political implications of the demographic structure
of Jerusalem, the fact that the Palestinian existence there could not be ignored
and that many policies to minimise it had backfired.
138 For these plan, see George Giacaman & Dag Jorund Lonning (eds.) After Oslo, New
Realities, Old Problems (London & Chicago: Pluto Press, 1998), pp.32-38.
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(b) In contrast, the Likud Party and the right-wing nationalists intensified their
campaign of criticising the Labour Party for allowing the Palestinians to "take
over" East Jerusalem, instead of - according to the right-wing view -
opposing the Palestinian organisations and institutions in the city.
Despite the debate between the two sides, Klein said: "[The] Likud
became an agent of our argument by confirming the Palestinian existence, and
that their presence and their institutions were much bigger than we had
thought."140 The experts argued that the debate plus the outcome of the 1987
Intifada had created a reaction in Israeli public opinion by 1998-1999. However,
Klein argued that changes in Israeli public opinion concerning the city and the
relevance of the municipal boundaries in achieving a political settlement and
preserving Jewish Jerusalem began before any official acknowledgement of the
fact.
2. New Legislation on Jerusalem
In addition to the resolution passed by the Knesset in 1990, further legislation
was proposed in May 2000. While there was a real possibility of negotiations on
Jerusalem, the Likud Party put forward bills on the city and refugees. One bill
stated that at least 61 of the members of the Knesset were required to agree to the
transfer of any part of Jerusalem to a foreign power, and that any amendment to
the city's boundaries would be the responsibility of the Knesset. Although the
Israeli Prime Minister, Ehud Barak, was not present at the ballot, and the
Minister from Meretz, Yossi Sarid, voted against the bill, the Israeli government
supported the passage of its preliminary reading. It would have to go through
further stages before finally becoming law.141 It should be noted, however, that
this bill was passed by a vote of 68 to 21 of the 120 members, and that the
original proposal was that any resolution on transferring parts of Jerusalem
should be valid only if supported by at least 80 votes. Nevertheless, a
compromise was reached and the bill stated the requirement of at least 61






Israeli government needs the support of at least 61 votes for any bill to be passed.
If the opposition had the support of 61 votes, it could bring the government down
at any time. Finally, the attempt to restrict the government with this law casts
further doubt on the existence of unanimity in Israeli public opinion on the
irreversibility of the situation in Jerusalem.
3. Review of the Areas Considered Holy
In May 2000 a political conflict erupted in Israel as a result of the Israeli Labour
government's declaration of its readiness to withdraw from villages adjacent to
Jerusalem as part of the interim stage agreement. The government argued that
these villages were not part of Jerusalem, which raised the question of the city's
geographical definition. The Minister without Portfolio, Haim Ramon, declared
in the Knesset: "Israel today controls more territory in Jerusalem than has ever
before been in its possession, since Solomon's Kingdom." Ramon added,
referring to the villages around Jerusalem: "This is not Jerusalem. ... We
annexed in 1967 everything which we thought was Jerusalem, even a little more
than it."142 Clearly, his words referred not only to the area around Jerusalem, but
also to areas inside the annexed city.
In a similar vein, Shlomo Bin A'ami, the then Minister of Internal
Security, said: "When our grandfathers sought Jerusalem they did not seek Abu
DIs and 'Elzariyya. [the proposed villages]."143 The significance of these
statements was that they opened the way to the reconsideration of the
geographical definition of Jerusalem, and clearly indicated changes in the Labour
Party discourse on Jerusalem.
It should be remembered that in the 1993 polls on Jerusalem, some
questions were included which were phrased differently from those usually put to
the Israelis about the city. The poll asked them whether "they would be willing to
trade Arab neighbourhoods of East Jerusalem outside the Old City" for peace
with the Palestinians. The result was a 35 per cent response in the affirmative.144
141 See Jerusalem Post, (18 May 2000).
142 Haaretz, (2 May 2000).
143 Al-Hayat, (28 April 2000).
144 Lustick, "Yerushalayim",p.l5.
150
Other kinds of questions revealed more evidence on the importance of the
geographical redefinition. In 1999, 28 per cent of the Israelis said that they were
in favour of East Jerusalem becoming the capital of a Palestinian state in order to
achieve peace. Only a minority regarded the Arab neighbourhoods of East
Jerusalem as part of Jewish Jerusalem (Yerushalayim): Wadi al-Juz - 30 per
cent; Sheik Jarrah - 32 per cent; Shu'fat - 42 per cent; Ras al-'Amud -42 per
cent; and Abu-DIs and 'Elzariyya - 22 per cent.145 It is important to notice that
these figures were before the negotiations of Camp David and Taba when a
further change in Israeli public opinion appeared.
These results show that there are two Jerusalems for the Israelis: (1) an
imaginary city constructed from the political discourse and campaigns of
successive Israeli governments; and (2) a real, solid city when the Israelis are
faced with specific practical questions. The difference between the two
Jerusalems is a classic example of the difference between national rhetoric and
the physical reality. The Israelis started to see facts that the previous ideological
rhetoric covered. The tension there could also be seen as causing a genuine loss
of interest by the Israelis in parts of East Jerusalem, and made them face the fact
that another people lived there with their national institutions and existence.
In the months leading up to the Camp David Summit in 2000, Israeli
newspapers published several articles calling for a review of the boundaries of
Jerusalem and asserting that the Old City was the real Jerusalem. One of these
articles, in Haaretz, described a meeting of political figures including Shimon
Peres, Ehud Olmert, Shaul Mofaz, Arial Sharon and Chief Rabbi Lau. They
discussed the poetry of Uri Zvi Greenberg, who represented the Herut Party (the
forerunner of the Likud) as a member of the Israeli Knesset in 1967. They
recalled his speech in that year, in which he stressed that the name of Jerusalem
referred to Jerusalem within the walls, "where the Temple Mount is located".146
In Maarive another article reveals the transformation of the Israeli mood on East
Jerusalem.
145 Ibid.
146 Nadav Shragai, Haaretz, 19 June 2000.
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The Jerusalem of today is a city of extreme conflict, a city of escalating
war,... the time has come to end all the slogans and fanaticism, and to re¬
establish the link between the Israelis, including the secular, with the
charming, beautiful city. If a peace agreement is reached it will elevate the
real Jerusalem and neighbourhoods around it with us.147
These political statements and questions on the real Jerusalem reveal the
importance of the geographical definition of the city in reaching a compromise
on its status and the extent to which it could be manipulated or exploited.
4. Religion and Sovereignty over East Jerusalem
Even if the religious connection between the Jews and Jerusalem is considered
one of the most important justifications for the continuation of the Israeli
occupation of East Jerusalem, there is also the argument that certain influential
religious leaders and groups are less enthusiastic about the annexation and
exclusive sovereignty over the city.
Before discussing the examples of 2000, we need to look at those of
earlier times to explain the root of the problem and to show that there have
always been differing views on Jerusalem among the Israelis.
In 1950 a Jewish group ofNeturei Karta refused the establishment of the
Jewish state for religious reasons. They sent a cablegram to the UN Trusteeship
Council, declaring that "the wishes of the Jewish Orthodox population Neturei
Karta in Jerusalem [were] to live under the international protection of the UN and
not under the sovereignty of the State of Israel."148 Another, more modern,
example is in 1969, when a Sephardi Knesset member, Andre' Chouraqui, asked:
Would it not be in Israel's interests to house in its capital a Palestinian
assembly and a Transjordanian provisional government by guaranteeing
them extra-territorial status if these were the conditions for peace? ... This
city [Jerusalem] has the mission, in the future, of being the federal capital of
a reconciled, pacified, renewed Near East.149
147 Arabic trans, from the Hebrew Maarive (25 July 2000); published in al-Quds al- 'Arabl,
26 July 2000.
148 The cablegram cited in Documents on Jerusalem, pp. 98-99.
149 Maurice M. Ruumani, "The Sephardi Factor in Israel Politics", Middle East Journal, vol.
42, no.3 (Summer, 1988), p.433.
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In the early 1970s a former president of the Council of the Sephardi
Community in Jerusalem, Elie Elicachar, wrote a book To Live with Palestine, in
which he asked "why are we against the establishment of a Palestinian entity that
with our help will be integrated with us into a federation?". As to Jerusalem he
advocated a "condominium" a joint capital with an Arab Palestinian state or with
Jordan.150
In contrast, some Jews with religious views acted, though not
deliberately, to minimise political confrontation with Muslims. For instance,
according to a religious announcement publicised weeks after the 1967 War,
dozens of prominent rabbis warned Jews not to enter the "the entire area of the
Temple Mount", fearing lest they violate the "strict prohibition against
desecrating the purity of the Temple site." The warning included the justification
that owing to the passage of time, "we no longer know the exact location of the
Temple, so that anyone who enters the area of the Temple Mount is liable,
unknowingly, to enter the place of the Temple and the Holy of Holies."151 This
view was clearly in opposition to the wishes of other Zionist movements eager to
build the Temple after the destruction of the mosques.
During the final negotiations of 2000, prominent religious groups did not
seem to express any political interest in Jerusalem nor show any enthusiasm to
engage in the debate over the future of the city. The most prominent of these was
the Shas Party, which was also number three on the Israeli political ladder. It had
been a permanent partner in the Israeli government since the 1980s, whatever the
political agenda of the ruling power. In the 1999 elections the Shas Party won 17
seats compared with 19 for the Likud and 22 for the Labour coalition. The main
concern of the party has been religious issues and the government subsidies for
the party's educational and social institutions. Therefore, when Barak's
government declared its intention to withdraw from the villages around
Jerusalem, other right-wing and religious parties met the Shas Party's spiritual
leader, Ovadia Yusuf, to persuade him to oppose such a step. A group of rabbis,
including the former Chief Rabbi, Avraham Shapira, paid a visit to Yusuf on
150 Ibid.
151 Haaretz, 7 August 2000.
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Friday 12 May 2000. The daily newspaper, Haaretz, published quotations from
the discussion, which is useful in understanding Shas's position regarding
Jerusalem.
The rabbis reminded Yusuf of the close proximity of the neighbourhoods
of Abu-DIs and 'Elzariyya to the Mount of Olives. "How will a future Jerusalem
look if Jews are deterred from going there?" This argument reveals the emphasis
on the security of access to the holy places of Jerusalem. The rabbis did not
attempt to convince Yusuf with religious arguments against the loss of Israeli
control over these areas, but highlighted practical issues instead.
Another issue raised by the rabbis was that Prime Minister Barak's
promise to support the Shas educational network financially would not stand the
test of the High Court of Justice. This connection between a subsidy and the
attitude towards Jerusalem was purely political and revealed the real concern of
the Shas Party. Clearly, its religious nature did not show much concern for the
territories in the West Bank, the expanded Jerusalem or even the villages close to
the Old City. Furthermore, in another meeting with Yusuf, the Mayor, Ehud
Olmert, argued that if a Palestinian police station were to be sited on the "Temple
Mount", Palestinians could open fire on Jewish worshippers in front of the
Western Wall below.153 This argument revealed yet again that the concern of the
biggest religious party was security of access rather than an ideological or
religious view of the sovereignty question.
The point here is that a religious connection with Jerusalem did not
necessarily mean support for the annexation of territory to the city, nor the
rejection of a withdrawal from territories. Issues such as sovereignty had little
religious importance in the minds of these groups.
2.4.2 Negotiating Jerusalem at Camp David 2000
2.4.2.1 The Negotiations Strategy
The Israeli-Palestinian-American Summit at Camp David began on 12 July, (see
Chapter One). The Israeli Prime Minister, Ehud Barak, had been asking for the
152 See Haaretz, 14 May 2000.
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Haaretz, 13 July 2000.
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Summit since the end of May. In the view of his associates as well as observers,
Barak regarded any negotiations conducted by those below the level of leaders as
being unlikely to succeed. If no progress were made quickly, he would face trouble
inside Israel, including the possibility that his ruling coalition would collapse.154
In contrast to his predecessors, Barak was hostile to the interim and phased
agreements negotiated at the Oslo rounds in 1993.155 This could have been the result
of his experience as an army officer during that period. He would have known the
effects of such agreements on security and that they could generate tension at
different levels. It would have been easier to sell a final comprehensive agreement to
his people, thus avoiding opposition campaigns in the aftermath of each phase or
partial agreement.
Now that the final negotiations were to be set in motion, the moment of truth
for Jerusalem had arrived. If the Israelis had no intention of reaching a quick final
agreement, maybe they would at least open the negotiations by declaring that
Jerusalem was not negotiable, or that any negotiations must take into account the fact
that Israeli sovereignty over any part of Jerusalem was irreversible.
That was what actually happened in the early days of the Summit. Barak
asserted that Jerusalem must remain united under Israeli sovereignty, and that the
Palestinians in East Jerusalem would be granted a large measure of autonomy.156
Nevertheless, it was clear even before the arrival of the delegations at Camp David
that the Israeli Prime Minister and his team would bring another kind of jargon to
describe the solution to the problem of Jerusalem.
The Israeli team came with certain ideas. It was not difficult to understand the
recommended strategy from reading the Israeli newspapers. Barak was advised to
consider new implications for the concepts, especially sovereignty, autonomy, and
partition, etc. For instance, experts from the Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies
urged Israeli statesmen to consider a new kind of sovereignty when resolving the
vexing issue of Jerusalem.157
154 Dennis Ross, Interview, Jerusalem Post, 22 June 2001.
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Another aspect of the Israeli strategy was the geographical redefinition of
Jerusalem. The proposal was to expand its boundaries to contain areas adjacent to the
city, and then to hand over parts of these areas to the Palestinians to establish their
capital.158 This proposal had already been discussed in what was known as the
'Abbas-Beilin document of 1995. It consisted of expanding the city boundaries to
include Israeli settlements and Arab villages that were not currently considered part
of the city. Israel would have sovereignty over these settlements in addition to
settlements in Jerusalem, and the Palestinians would establish their capital in villages
such as Abu-DIs, 'Elzariyya, and al-Ram.159
The main point of the recommended strategy was the expectation that the
Palestinian side would accept only a solution that differed from the classic Israeli
position and encompassed sensitive aspects such as sovereignty and a national
capital. In reality, however, the Israeli strategy would not make big concessions, nor
would it end Israeli sovereignty completely. Some Israeli observers criticised the
expected proposal before it had been put forward at the Summit. Meron Benvenisti
wrote in Haaretz on 13 July:
The experts who have sweated over these plans [the concentration on the
concepts and meanings of Jerusalem] must understand that, if they can
persuade the Israeli public that what they are proposing is a compromise,
they will be playing into the hands of extremists, because, when the
Palestinians reject this compromise, everyone can then self-righteously
argue that the Palestinians, as usual, are adopting an extreme position.160
2.4.2.2 The Israeli Offers
Before the Camp David Summit, secret Israeli-Palestinian negotiations took place in
Stockholm between March and May. Ehud Barak banned any official negotiations on
Jerusalem, although he agreed to informal discussions. At the meeting Bin 'Ami
suggested to Ahmad Qray' some ideas that were similar to those which were put
forward later at Camp David.161 According to the reports in the Israeli Press, the plan
was to establish autonomous Palestinian districts in Jerusalem under overall Israeli
158 Jerusalem Post {14 July 2000).
159 For the plan's details see the conclusion.
160 Haaretz, 13 July 2000.
161 Interview, Menachem Klein.
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sovereignty.162 In fact, the word "autonomy" in the Israeli proposal was no more than
another version of the municipal solution. It stated that a large measure ofmunicipal
responsibility would be granted to the Palestinians.
The Israeli proposals at Camp David itself centred on the strategy of
redefining the sovereignty and geographical boundaries of Jerusalem. A variety of
ideas were presented by the Israelis at the Summit and it is not possible to pinpoint a
definite proposal or view. After his initial hesitation and refusal to relinquish Israeli
sovereignty over any part of Jerusalem, the Israeli Prime Minister agreed to offer the
Palestinians "limited sovereignty" in the city.163 It was also known as "functional
sovereignty" and defined as "full sovereignty over certain functions".164
This kind of sovereignty could not be understood without knowing its
practical details. The Israelis put forward many suggestions that were neither
documented nor clearly defined. For example, according to the Jerusalem Post, one
of the Israeli suggestions was that the Palestinians be granted a large part of East
Jerusalem so that 90 per cent of their fellow citizens in the city would be under
"Palestinian civilian control".165 Another proposal was that the Palestinians be
granted full sovereignty over the outlying areas of Jerusalem but not inside the
Jordanian borders of East Jerusalem. In addition, all the buildings on either side of
the road from the West Bank to al-Haram al-Sharlf would be Palestinian, and there
would be a guarantee that the passage of Palestinians and Muslim pilgrims would not
be obstructed by an Israeli road block. At the same time, however, the Israelis
demanded the right to build a synagogue inside al-Haram al-Sharif itself. They also
offered 'Arafat the option of establishing an office near al-Haram al-Sharlf.166 Ehud
Barak accepted that the areas under Palestinian control would be known as al-Quds
(the Arabic name for Jerusalem).167 Another proposal to resolve the problem of the
holy places or al-Haram al-Sharif/Temple Mount was yet again an invented
sovereignty. The area would be divided horizontally, the Palestinians having
162 Haaretz, 18 May 2000.
163 Haaretz, (19 July 2000).
164 Interview, Menachem Klein.
165 Jerusalem Post (19 July 2000).
166 Interview, Menachem Klein.
167 Haaretz (27 July 2000).
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sovereignty on and above the ground, and the Israelis sovereignty beneath the
ground. The idea was based on the Jewish claim that the Jewish temple was
originally on the present site of al-Haram al-Sharif.
The Israeli arguments and explanations can be summed up in the following
points:
1. The notion of functional sovereignty and the Israeli argument in attracting the
Palestinians to this proposal was created by legal experts. Although it might have
been different from the classic example of full territorial sovereignty as practised
in the nineteenth and the first half of the twentieth century, it had been known to
exist. This kind of sovereignty would create a "dramatic change in daily life".
Palestinians would have the Jerusalem municipality that they currently lacked, as
well as a capital in the area of Jerusalem in which villages such as Abu-DIs and
'ETzarriyya were not then part of, although historically they had been part of the
district of Jerusalem. This solution would give the Palestinians authority in
education, sewerage, and civil security, as well as limited powers in housing
development and zoning, etc.168
2. In addressing Israeli public opinion, the argument of the Israeli negotiators would
be that this solution would create a more Jewish Jerusalem. The inhabitants of the
settlements surrounding Jerusalem would be part of the city, and this Jewish
Jerusalem would be recognised officially by the world as Jerusalem. "Al-Quds",
on the other hand, would consist of the Palestinian residents, and therefore the
demographic balance would not be altered, nor would the Jewish identity of the
city be affected.
Moreover, the functional Palestinian sovereignty would be under Israeli
"superior" sovereignty, which would mean that Israel would not cede its control
of the city. At the same time, the very outline of the Israeli offer on the Old City
reveals that Israel would retain full direct control without the Palestinian
functional presence in most of the city. Israel would keep the Jewish quarter,
which had been expanded mostly in the aftermath of the 1967 War and which
formed nearly one-sixth of the city, and the Armenian quarter, which formed a
168 This argument was explained to the researcher by Menachem Klein, who pointed out that
this was not necessarily his personal view.
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second one-sixth. The Western (Wailing) Wall, which was then around 50
metres, would be expanded to include the whole Western Wall of al-Haram
al-Sharif, which is around 450 metres. This was in addition to the Israeli demand
for sovereignty beneath the ground. In other words, according to Michael
Dumper, "Barak may have moved a great deal further on Jerusalem than his
predecessors, but the shift was much less than it first appeared when measured
against the reality on the ground."169
3. There are various unclear and unanswered questions on the Israeli ideas. How
would Israel impose its superior sovereignty over, for instance, the proposed
limits on the Palestinian authority regarding housing development, or the shared
responsibility for al-Haram al-Sharif/Temple Mount?170
4. It seemed as though the Israelis at the Camp David Summit acknowledged the
Palestinian presence in Jerusalem and the need to change their definition of the
city. Evidently, the municipal borders and demographic structure were no longer
relative to Jewish Jerusalem. Furthermore, the taboo against negotiations on
Jerusalem had been broken and compromise on the city was now conceivable.
This was clear at the popular level, for polls conducted at the request of the
Israeli Prime Minister during the Summit showed that 62-65 per cent of Israelis
were in favour of compromise on Jerusalem.171 However, despite this result, the
Israeli negotiators continued to insist on retaining Israel's "superiority". This
meant that they rejected the demand that Israel withdraws from East Jerusalem
and refused to end Israeli sovereignty there.
In other words, the Israeli negotiators acknowledged the Palestinian presence
and its national and political implications, that is, requiring Israel to redefine the
issue of Jerusalem and its rights in the city. However, they refused to accept that the
existence of the Palestinian nation would mean full Palestinian sovereignty and the
termination of any Israeli sovereignty over even the proposed areas to be transferred
to what the negotiators called Palestinian functional sovereignty.
169 Dumper, Sacred Space, p. 164.
170 During the interviews, both Salim al-Za'nun and Menachem Klien pointed out the lack of
details in the Israeli plans.
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2.4.3 Al-Aqsa Intifada and the Washington-Taba Negotiations
In July and August 2000 a debate took place in Israel over whether Jews would be
permitted to pray on Temple Mount.172 The debate was provoked by the fear of the
outcome of the negotiations on the holy places as well as by rivalry between the
different parties, especially since an early election was expected. It was in this
atmosphere that the opposition leader, Arial Sharon, made his famous visit to
al-Haram al-Sharlf, escorted by a bodyguard of thousands of soldiers. The visit
caused the eruption of al-Aqsa Intifada on 28 September 2000.
Arial Sharon justified his visit by saying: "[The State of Israel] cannot afford
that an Israeli citizen will not be able to visit part of his country, not to speak about
the holiest place for Jewish people all around the world."173 However, it seems
difficult to separate the visit from the context of the negotiations and the expected
elections.
Al-Aqsa Intifada was the turning-point in the peace process. Israel's initial
reaction was that no negotiations would be considered until the "violence" was
brought to an end.174 Nevertheless, the continuation of the Intifada and the early
election for the premiership caused the Israeli government to backtrack and engage
in two rounds of negotiations in December and January.
A minister, Yossi Sarid, asserted on 17 December - before the departure of
an Israeli delegation to Washington - that two main issues were to be negotiated:
sovereignty over East Jerusalem, and the Palestinian refugees' right of return.
Another minister, Ben Ami, highlighted the Temple Mount as a core issue.175 An
Israeli official emphasised that Israel had made it clear to the Palestinians that the
refugees' right of return was out of the question, although it would be more flexible
regarding the "Temple Mount". He added: "We are looking for a creative formula
regarding the term "sovereignty"."176 These statements were important, for they
indicated that while Israeli officials thought that a solution to the problem of
172 Haaretz (7 August 2000).
173 The Independent (30 September 2000).
174 Jerusalem Post (2 October 2000); Haaretz (14 November 2000).
175 Haaretz (18 December 2000).
176 Jerusalem Post (18 December 2000).
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Jerusalem was possible, there were more difficult questions to answer on "refugees".
This view was clearly a departure from Israel's zero-sum definition of the future of
Jerusalem.
In Washington the Palestinians demanded clarification and maps in order to
give their decision on Clinton's proposal of Palestinians having sovereignty over the
Arab neighbourhoods and Israel over the Jewish neighbourhoods, (see Chapter One).
The Israelis insisted on hearing the Palestinians' decision before answering. One of
Barak's aides pointed out that if the Palestinian response were positive, "we will
continue talking", and added that Israel was "inclined to accept the proposal if the
Palestinians also [did] so."177 This strategy, while encouraging the Palestinians to
make concessions, did not put the Israelis under any obligation.
In the Taba negotiations in January 2001 Israel's offers on Jerusalem were
little different from those made at Camp David. The negotiators told the Press that
Israel offered the Palestinians "sovereignty" over the Arab neighbourhoods of
Jerusalem. It also suggested a "joint-municipality" to oversee the administration of
everyday matters in an area called the "sacred zone", which comprised the Old City,
the Temple Mount, the Mount of Olives (outside the Old City), the City of David,
Mount Zion, the Ophel, and the archaeological garden outside the walls of the Old
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City. Barak declared in a speech to high school pupils that the Western Wall, the
Mount of Olives, the City of David, and the Old City would be under Israeli
sovereignty.179
The details of Palestinian sovereignty and the nature of the relations between
the two sides in the city were still to be negotiated. Nevertheless, the two sides
discussed and accepted the principle that Israel would annex settlements in Jerusalem
as President Clinton had suggested. However, the Palestinians rejected the Israeli
demand for sovereignty over settlements in the Jerusalem metropolitan area, namely,
Ma'ale Adumim and Givat Ze'ev, as well as the newly established settlements of Har
Homa and Ras al-'Amud. On the other hand, Israel agreed to discuss Palestinian
177 Haaretz (24 December 2000), and (3 January 2001).
178 Jerusalem Post (24 January 2001).
179 Jbid.
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property claims in West Jerusalem.180 The Palestinian demand for land compensation
in exchange for settlements inside Jerusalem was also discussed.181
As described in Chapter One, the two parties could not complete the
negotiations in Taba. Nevertheless, this round of negotiations ended on an
overwhelmingly optimistic note that real progress had been made. "Unfortunately",
further rounds had to be suspended owing to the Israeli election.
The victory of Ariel Sharon in the election at the end of January 2001 and the
formation of a coalition government of the Likud, Labour, Shas and hard-line right-
wing parties created a new situation. The new Prime Minister took a different view
of the peace process. He rejected the large-scale withdrawal by Israel from the West
Bank and had no intention of reaching a quick final agreement as had his
predecessor. The focus shifted to the conditions for ending the clashes between the
Palestinians and the Israelis and the basis on which negotiations would be resumed.
Therefore, no serious new ideas for the comprehensive final solution to the problem
of Jerusalem or other issues was officially discussed.
Conclusion
During the last three decades of the twentieth century there was widespread view that
the Israeli position on Jerusalem was not negotiable. Owing to the religious and
historical significance of the city, the Israelis could not make any concession on their
rule over either West or East Jerusalem. However an examination of the Zionist/
Israeli positions through the twentieth century would cast doubts on this view,
bearing the following main points in mind:
1. Ideological - Religious Observation: A review of the works by the early
thinkers in the Zionist movement shows that their central idea was the call for a
Jewish grouping and the building of their national state or home. The location of
that state was not a crucial question. There was no emphasis that Jerusalem had
to be the location where Jews grouped as a nation. Until the present day, the
180 These details were included in a "non-paper" prepared by the European Union Special
Representative to the Middle East, Ambassador Miguel Moratinos, and his team to describe
the outcome of the negotiations in Taba. Published in the electronic archive of Haaretz. (The
Researcher has a printed copy).
181 Interview, Menachem Klein.
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mainstream Jewish religious groups have not regarded sovereignty over
Jerusalem from a religious perspective. In other words, they have not asserted
that Israel's sovereignty over the whole of Jerusalem, or part of it, is based on
religious principles. Instead their view has been built largely on security, freedom
ofworship and political consideration.
2. Historical Observation: The history of the Zionist movement in Palestine shows
how Jerusalem's religious significance was interpreted and presented to create
certain political implications that would promote Jewish national sentiment and
national awareness, and how Jerusalem's religious status has been connected
with the concept of sovereignty. This has been done in various ways: political
discourse, media and propaganda, production of literature and a particular
narrative of the city and the Jewish history, the construction of intellectual and
national Jewish institutions and monuments in the city, and the construction of
colonies and settlements that alter not only the demographic structure of the city,
but also its architectural identity. However, until 1967 the Israeli and Zionist
leaders were able to accept a Jewish state without the inclusion of Old Jerusalem.
In 1937 and in 1947, those leaders accepted partition plans excluded Jerusalem
from the Jewish state. Moreover, Israel co-existed for nineteen years between
1948 and 1967 with East Jerusalem under Arab rule. West Jerusalem was called
the capital of Israel, and the name "Jerusalem" was used to refer to that sector. It
was a form of geographical redefinition of the city. The balance of power after
the Israeli occupation of East Jerusalem in 1967 enabled Israel's claim of
historical and religious right to sustain its rule in East Jerusalem and to keep it a
"united eternal" sovereign capital of the state of Israel. Accordingly, Israel
worked to develop a particular image of its relationship with Jerusalem and to
promote the idea of Jerusalem, West and East, as unnegotiable depending on
asserting the relevant religious and historical themes. This line has been followed
despite the fact that the claim of exclusive sovereignty was not made before the
1967 war.
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3. The Present Situation: By the end of the 1980s, prompted by the eruption of the
1987 Intifada, the Israelis realised that the image of Jerusalem as a united capital
was not accurate. The Palestinian national presence in East Jerusalem, and the
cultural, economic, social and political distinction between the two parts of
Jerusalem came to the fore. The continuation of the tension in the city, the failure
of creating the targeted alteration in the city's demographic structure meant that
the existence of Palestinian nationals there was undeniable. This has led to
gradual changes in the Israeli view of Jerusalem and the political settlement of
the city. The change became apparent at the Camp David Summit, 2000, where
the image or the taboo of the undebatable and unnegotiable city broke down, and
compromise began to be viewed as necessary. However, it seems that the rhetoric
promoted for more than three decades on irreversible Israeli rule in East
Jerusalem was still strong enough to prevent further changes in the position of the
Israeli government on the relinquishing of sovereignty in East Jerusalem. Thus,
while Israel effectively recognised at the Camp David negotiations the existence
of Palestinian nationals in East Jerusalem and accepted that the Palestinian state
would be able to function in that part of the city, it is still tried to find a formula
to sustain the Israeli "superior" sovereignty in East Jerusalem as well as the holy
places.
However, despite the halt in negotiations owing to al-Aqsa Intifada, it was
difficult to envisage that the Israeli position towards Jerusalem would cease to
evolve. The Israeli definition of the conflict as a zero-sum issue had broken down,





Second Capital or Arab Solidarity
Introduction
Jordan ruled East Jerusalem between 1948 and 1967 and still has an important
administrative and financial role in the city, especially in the holy shrines and al-
waqf affairs. The Jordanian national discourse has constantly emphasised the city's
special religious and historic status and asserted that Jordan under the Hashemite
leadership has borne "Arab and Muslim responsibility" towards the city.
However Jordanian positions on political settlement in Jerusalem, and
towards the definition of relations between the Jordanian state and the city have been
different from one period to another.
This chapter explains how King 'Abdullah I, pre 1948, did not reject
internationalisation of the city, while he refused it in post-1948 years, and how
Jordan now accepts that the PLO is the responsible party for negotiating the city,
while until several years after 1967 it continued to insist that Jerusalem should be
restored to Jordanian sovereignty.
The chapter will show again the role Jerusalem could play and how it could
be used in different ways to generate different kinds of identities. The city has
constituted an essential part in the national state and identity construction in Jordan,
through concentration on the high religious and cultural significance of the city and
the Jordanian regime and army in defending it. On some occasions the city played a
supportive role to Jordan's two banks unity, but on other occasions it formed a base
for another national identity, namely the Palestinian.
The different Jordanian positions on Jerusalem, and Jerusalem's different role
in Jordanian politics, all largely connected with the development of different stages
of the nation-state construction in Jordan, will be tackled in this chapter through four
stages:
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1. From the establishment of the Emirate of Transjordan in the 1920s to the 1948
war.
2. From 1948 to the Jordanian defeat in 1967 and Israel's occupation of the West
Bank.
3. From 1967 to the disengagement decision in 1988.
4. The period of the Madrid peace conference and the agreements with Israel in the
1990s, ending with the negotiations at Camp David and Taba 2000/2001.
3.1 Transjordan and Expansionism: 1921-1948
The appearance of Amir 'Abdullah ibn al-Husayn along with hundreds of tribesmen
in the town ofMa'an (in the south of present-day Jordan) on 21 November 1920 was
a significant event that influenced the discussions in London on the future of the area
east of the River Jordan.
'Abdullah's father, Sharif Husayn, the Amir ofMecca, had been a party in an
alliance with Britain during the First World War, in which London had pledged to
recognise large areas of the eastern Arab countries as an independent Arab kingdom
under Husayn's rule, in exchange for leading the "Great Arab Revolution" against
Turkish rule. However, Britain had other agreements with France, which resulted in
the division of the territories between the two countries, and included a promise to
the Jews to establish a Jewish homeland in Palestine.1
Winston Churchill, the Secretary of State for the Colonies, supported a
policy known as the "Sharifian Policy", which consisted of forming a number of
small states in Arabia, Iraq and natural Syria, all headed by members of the
Hashemite family [Sharif Husayn's family, which is believed to be descended from
the Prophet Muhammad] under full British influence and guidance, these states to be
compensation for not establishing the promised Arab Kingdom.
A few months before the appearance of 'Abdullah I, the Foreign Office in
London had supported the establishment of Zayd, Husayn's youngest son, as a ruler
in this area. However, Herbert Samuel, the first British High Commissioner in




Palestine, influenced by his sympathy for Zionism, wanted to incorporate
Transjordan, or at least its fertile western edge, into Palestine.
'Abdullah declared that he had come to Transjordan to instigate a resistance
movement against France in Syria. However, Churchill decided to benefit from
'Abdullah's visit and he met him in Jerusalem on 24 March. An agreement was
reached, in spite of the rejection of most of 'Abdullah's demands, such as the
establishment of an Arab state comprising Palestine and Transjordan. With regard to
Syria, the agreement stated that Britain should use its good offices with France to
secure the restoration of an Arab administration in Syria with Amir 'Abdullah at its
head.4
In exchange, 'Abdullah was to remain in Transjordan, restrain all hostile
action by the disaffected population, and thus pave the way to reconciliation with the
French. 'Abdullah was to receive financial assistance from the British government to
create and maintain a locally recruited Arab force.5
Such was the background to the establishment of Transjordan, which was
declared an autonomous entity in 1923. 'Abdullah regarded this state as the
beginning of a bigger role and a bigger Arab state, what was known at the time as the
project of Great Syria. Palestine thus became part of 'Abdullah's expansionist
programme. He followed two main paths in his aim to acquire a role in Palestine.
3.1.1 Jerusalem and Transjordanian-Palestinian relations
During the first stage of approaching the Palestinians, 'Abdullah sent in 1924 a
donation from his father, Sharif Husayn, to the campaign launched by the Mufti,
Amln al-Husaynl, to restore the shrines of Jerusalem. This move seemed to be
fruitful, for on 30 July 1924 he received a letter from Amin al-Husaynl thanking him:
The Supreme Muslim Council and al-Haram al-Sharlf Restoration
Committee have received with thanks and overwhelming gratitude your
confidence in us... . May I press Your Highness for another kindness, which
3
Mary Wilson, King Abdullah, Britain and the Making ofJordan (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1990), pp.44,55.
4 See Antonius, Awakening, p.318.
5 Ibid.
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is to accept that all the restoration in al-Haram al-Shanf be under your
presidency.6
The letter included the promise that Amin al-Husaynl would send monthly
statements of accounts detailing with the expenditure, and ended with "May God
*7
preserve you to glorify the Arabs and Islam".
However, relations between Amin al-Husayni and Amir 'Abdullah
deteriorated: rivalry and political disagreement were to continue until the death of the
latter. So 'Abdullah formed an alliance with another leading family in Jerusalem,
namely, Raghib al-Nashashlbl, the Mayor of Jerusalem in the 1920s.8
In short, the restoration of the holy places and contact with the notables of
Jerusalem were doors that 'Abdullah tried to open to enter Palestine. However, he
did not achieve any significant success at the popular level in the pre-1948 period.
3.1.2 Transjordan: British and Jewish Relations
With the escalation of tension in Palestine in the 1930s, Amir 'Abdullah presented
himself to Britain as the saviour who could restore stability, and as the eligible leader
for a halfway solution. In 1934 he wrote to Arthur Wauchope, the High
Commissioner in Jerusalem:
I do not deny that the interests of Great Britain have expanded in Palestine
and in other Arab countries after the war. Would you not agree with me,
considering all this, that the maintenance of the true affection which the
Arabs feel for your noble nation a matter of central importance, worthy of
due attention and care? I have continuously attempted, with all the ability
with which 1 have been endowed, to strengthen these links between the two
nations, being firmly convinced that their consolidation is in the interest of
the Arabs, as it is in the interest of the British. I do not contest that my Arab
people, in Palestine, have committed many political errors. In my opinion,
however, this has been entirely due to the fear that has overcome them with
respect to their threatened existence.9
At that time 'Abdullah was faced with the Palestinian leaders' opposition to giving
him a mandate to speak on their behalf. Wauchope had already written to London
6 Rai'f Najm, al-E'mar al-Hashimi fi al-Quds [The Renovation by the Hashemites in
Jerusalem] (Amman: Dar al-Bayraq li al-Tiba'a wa al-Nashr), 1993, p.73.
7
Ibid., p.74.
8 See also, al-BItar, Mudhakkarat, p.7.
9 Kamal Salibi, The Modern History of Jordan (London & New York: I.B Tauris, 1993),
p.136.
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that 'Abdullah had no "body of opinion" behind him that could make him the
representative of the Palestinians.10
'Abdullah continued his attempts to play an active role in the Palestinian
case, although expressing a different view from that of the Palestinian leaders. So,
whereas in 1937 the Palestinians rejected the Partition Plan of the Royal Commission
(Peel Commission: see Chapter One), 'Abdullah accepted it, for it would incorporate
the areas in Palestine allocated to the Arabs into Transjordan.11
On the other hand, 'Abdullah was proposing a settlement of the Palestinian
question, namely, the creation of a kingdom comprising Transjordan and Palestine.
Jews could settle in either half of the state and enjoy full citizenship and a kind of
autonomy. He put his proposals to the Zionist leaders at several meetings and gave
Jewish investors permission to establish businesses in Transjordan. In 1927 the
Palestine Electric Company bought 6,000 dunams (6 square kilometres) of land in
Transjordan and began selling electricity to consumers in the following year. In 1929
the Palestine Potash Company, also Jewish, won a concession to extract potash from
the Dead Sea.12
When 'Abdullah realised that the Zionist leaders insisted on founding an
independent Jewish state, he acknowledged the partition of Palestine to be a realistic
option. Thus in 1947 he supported UN Resolution 181 to this effect. He also
contacted Zionist leaders and arranged with the British government that the Arab
Legion would control the allocated Arab areas that would be annexed to his
Kingdom.13
When the Arab countries decided to declare war in Palestine in 1948,
'Abdullah complied with this decision. Golda Meir, the then Head of the Political
Department in the Jewish Agency, wrote that when she asked the King at a meeting
in Amman a few days before the outbreak of war why he had changed the deal that





12 For details, see Wilson, KirigAbdullah, pp.104-105.
13 These contacts have been well documented in several scholarly works. See, for instance,
Shlaim, Collusion, Golda Meir, My Life (New York: G.P. Putnam Sons, 1975), p.215;
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of my own destiny and could do what I thought right, but since then I have learned
otherwise, ... I am one of five [Arab countries]."14
There is no indication that 'Abdullah tried to find a particular solution to the
problem of Jerusalem during his communications with the Jews or the British. Inter-
nationalisation at that time was acceptable to him.
When Jewish attacks on Jerusalem continued in May, Palestinian delegations
visited Amman, asking King 'Abdullah to save the city. He answered them positively
and enthusiastically, using expressions such as "I swear that we shall not abandon
[my] father's grave, or the Aqsa Mosque, or the people. No matter how great the
sacrifice, let martyrdom be our fate,"15 and said that he did not want to confine his
army to Jerusalem, but to "smash the snake's head in its den in Tel Aviv."16
Despite Palestinian appeals to enter the city quickly, and although the Arab
Legion had been close to its boundaries (17 kilometres east of the city) since 15 May,
the Legion did not enter Jerusalem until 18 May.17
Hazim Nusayba, the Assistant Manager of Palestinian Arab Broadcasting,
and brother of Anwar Nusayba, Secretary of the National Committee in Jerusalem
which organised the resistance in the city, summarised the situation: The Jews had
launched a comprehensive attack on Jerusalem. The inhabitants of the city, with the
help of the Palestinian police and volunteers, had withstood it for three days until
their ammunition was exhausted and Jerusalem was close to capitulation. So efforts
were concentrated on delaying the Israeli attack until King 'Abdullah could be
persuaded to enter the war.
Nusayba added that the Jordanian entry into Jerusalem on 18 May was a
violation of the Partition according to the map. He recalled the common story about
the controversy between the British head of the Arab Legion, Glubb, who refused to
enter the war in Jerusalem, and the King, who had insisted on this.18 Nusayba said
that the Jews were in a bad state in Jerusalem and ready to lay down their arms. He
was invited, as the Assistant Manager of Broadcasting, to witness the capitulation at
14 Meir, My Life, pp.218-219.
15
Haykal, al-Juyush, p.69.
16 Abu- Gharbya, FiKhidamm, p.263.
17 Ibid., pp.287-288.
18 See also, Abu-Odeh, Jordanian, p.40.
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the Hebrew University. However, an urgent appeal came from Ben-Gurion to the
Jews in the area, asking them to stand firm, because the situation would be saved,
somehow. This was the first truce.19
Arab soldiers in the Legion told the local Palestinian fighters during the war
that they had strict instructions from the Legion's British officers not to attack certain
Jewish sites on Mount Scopus in East Jerusalem and to leave the West sector alone.20
If the Jews had abided by the Partition Plan conditions, it would have been
unthinkable for the Arab Legion to occupy the East sector of the city. The then
American Ambassador in London stated that the Legion had not entered the Jewish
state as defined by the UN: "The attack on parts of Jerusalem was the consequence of
the breaking of the cease-fire by the Jews. We are confident the attack would not
have taken place if the Jews had accepted the truce for Jerusalem."21
The role of the Arab Legion in Jerusalem could have been the most
remarkable Arab success in the war, and, as explained below, this achievement was
vital in facilitating the annexation of the West Bank to Transjordan.
3.2 Jerusalem and the Jordanian State: 1948-1967
In the aftermath of the war Transjordan had to deal with the following issues:
1. The unification of the remaining Palestinian territories west of the River Jordan
with Transjordan.
2. The political settlement with Israel.
3.2.1 Jerusalem in the Construction of the Nation-State
3.2.1.1 The Unification
The achievement of the Arab Legion in Jerusalem was important for the unification
of the East and West Banks and in gaining Palestinian support for this step.
1. One of the direct results of King 'Abdullah's success in defending East Jerusalem
was that the Mufti, Amin al-Husayni, lost much of his influence in Jerusalem,
which had been his power base. Many of his supporters joined King 'Abdullah's
19 Interview, Hazim Nusayba.
20 Abu- Gharbya, FTKhidamm, p. 295.
21
Wilson, KingAbdullah, p. 172.
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camp when the forces of the Arab Legion took control of the Jewish quarter in
the Old City.22
2. The^achievement in Jerusalem was used to justify the failures elsewhere, such as
not defending the northern cities of Lydda and Ramla, or not helping the
Egyptian army in the south of Palestine. The reason given was that if Jordan had
taken part in the battles in those places, the Legion would not have been able to
protect East Jerusalem.23
3. Although there was general official Arab support for the internationalisation of
Jerusalem, the Palestinians backed King 'Abdullah in his rejection of this
proposal. Even Amin al-Husayni who was living in Cairo, shared this view and
instructed his followers to participate in an official Jordanian festival in 1949,
organised as a public rejection of internationalisation.24
3.2.1.2 The Construction of National Identity
In 1950 the unification of the East and West Banks of the River Jordan was declared
officially by the Parliament that had been elected from both sides. The state was
named the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan with Amman as its capital. In the same
year, the government passed a law to abolish the use of the name "Palestine" and to
replace it with "West Bank" to refer to the state's Palestinian territories.
This could be seen as part of the plan to construct a national identity of a
unified Jordan. This was important for two main reasons:
1. A Jordanian identity was an essential aspect of constructing the state itself.
2. If one day Jordan were to achieve a peace treaty with Israel, the citizens of
Jordan, especially the refugees, would already be imbued with a Jordanian
identity and would therefore be willing to accept the state as their permanent
homeland.
The identity that Jordan tried to create seems to have been complex:
22 For examples, see Pamela Ann Smith, Palestine and The Palestinians, pp. 90-91; Abu-
Odeh, Jordanians, p.40.
23 For example of this argument, see Abu-Odeh, Jordanians, p. 42.
24 Abu- Gharbya, FIKhidamm p.3 86.
25
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1. It was necessary to create an identity that would transcend that of Palestine and
Transjordan, in other words, an Arab Islamic identity, which would unite the two
peoples.
2. At the same time, however, this identity should serve the development and
preservation of the Jordanian nation-state, and should not be connected with any
other country. King Husayn explained his interpretation of Arab nationalism:
My own concept of Arab nationalism is different from what I understand
President NasYr's to be. If I interpret his aims properly, he believes that
political unity and Arab nationalism are synonymous. Evidently he also
believes that Arab nationalism can only be identified by a particular brand of
Arab unity. I disagree. This view can only lead, as it has done in the past, to
more disunity. The seeking of popular support for one point of view or one
form of leadership in countries other than one's own has fostered
factionalism to a dangerous degree, splitting countries to the point of
revolution. It is nothing but a new form of imperialism, the domination of
one state by another.26
This view could summarise the Arab identity sought by Jordan: one that
transcended domestic divisions but did not entail a hurried Arab unification or an
unprepared confrontation with Israel.
The construction of a national identity was gradually effected by means such
as political speeches, the media, museums, education, art, etc. Jerusalem was a theme
in the content of the messages conveyed by these means.
1. The Defender of Jerusalem
The focus was on the fact that Jordan was the Arab power capable of defending
Jerusalem and the Palestinians. In 1948 the Arab Legion was the only Arab army
who succeeded in its task. This message was important in creating the acceptance of
the unification and to justify Jordan's role in Palestine.
In this context one can find many political statements and newspaper articles
describing King Husayn as the "defender of the Holy Places".27
2. The National Cultural Treasure
Jerusalem was portrayed as the state treasure. Its Muslim and Christian holy places
enhanced the state's cultural, historic, and political value. This was important,
especially when opponents to the Hashemite regime declared that Jordan was a state
26
Salibi, Modern History, p.200.
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without historical roots. Therefore political speeches concentrated on the theme that
the Muslim and Christian holy places of Jerusalem were part of the civilisation of
humankind.28 This message gave the Jordanians a reason for national pride
3. National Symbols
Jerusalem and its holy places were among the symbols used to create Jordan's
national consciousness. Jerusalem and the Hashemite family, together with other
historical places in Jordan, were presented as the state's national symbols. In her
research "Jordanian Jerusalem: Postage Stamps and Identity Construction", Kimberly
Katz analysed symbols that were used in Jordan to construct the state's national
identity. She surveyed the designs of Jordanian postage stamps and bank notes, and
scanned the media coverage of certain events related to Jerusalem. She found that the
holy places of Jerusalem appeared frequently on Jordanian postage stamps and bank
notes, especially between 1948 and 1967, and were linked to the Hashemite Family
and King Husayn. Regarding a series of stamps issued in 1955 once the renovation
of the Dome of the Rock was under way, she says:
King Husayn's renovations on [sic] the Dome of the Rock were undertaken
almost immediately after his ascension to the throne in 1953. His
renovations of the Dome of the Rock in 1953-1964 continued a link between
the Hashemite Family and the holy places of Jerusalem, cementing this
tradition into the national consciousness.29
However while Jordanian governments tried to incorporate or use Jerusalem
in developing Jordanian nationalism, at the same time they feared that Jerusalem
could be a center of Palestinian identity or center of political powers supporting the
Egyptian and other Arab regimes' political views on Israel and Arab nationalism
which differed from those of Jordan.
Actually there were groups in Jerusalem which, despite their support for the
unification of the East and West Banks, did not agree that such a move necessarily
meant the end of the Palestinian identity. They insisted that Jerusalem be the centre
of Palestine, as well as the centre for confronting Israel. Therefore, the choice of
Amman as the Kingdom's capital seemed to raise the reservations of some powers.
27






The importance of studying such reservations is that they have an important
role in influencing the Jordanian positions regarding the nature of the Jordanian state
with the Palestinian question in general and the question of Jerusalem in particular,
as discussed in later parts of this chapter.
Jerusalem had served as the political centre of Palestine for a long time,
especially during the British Mandate. During the early years of unification, the
feeling grew among Palestinians that Jerusalem was losing its status. In the 1950s the
inhabitants of the West Bank frequently expressed their resentment, accusing the
government in Amman of discrimination against the city by moving its businesses
and institutions to Amman.30 Palestinians demanded that Jerusalem be given a special
political status in the state similar to that which the Israelis had established in West
Jerusalem.
These accusations and demands formed part of the debates in the Jordanian
Parliament. In 1952, following the assassination of King 'Abdullah, and in what
could be described as a call for the general reconsideration of the shape of the
unification, 14 of the 20 West Bank deputies sent a memorandum to the government,
listing several demands. Those concerning Jerusalem included:
1. The preservation of the moral and material status of Jerusalem by establishing in
the city branch offices of the various ministries to solve all the problems of the
inhabitants of the West Bank.
2. The establishment of the Tourist Board in the city.
3. The strengthening of the municipality.31
The memorandum was apparently asking that the status of the West Bank in
the unification be reconsidered, and that Jerusalem be regarded as the centre of the
West Bank. In fact, it was a demand that Palestine identity be recognised, with
Jerusalem as its centre.
On various occasions the deputies of Jerusalem demanded that the city be the
Kingdom's second capital, or its spiritual capital, or at least the centre of Cabinet and
parliamentary sessions. Kamil 'Iriqat put forward this request several times in the
30 Such accusations have been well documented in several sources, such as Friedland &
Hecht, To Rule, pp.30, 247-249; Nairn Sofer, "The Political Status of Jerusalem in the
Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, 1948-1967", Middle Eastern Studies, vol. 12, no.l (January
1976), pp. 79-83; AI-BItar, Mudhakkarat, pp.38-49.
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1950s.32 Dawud al-Husaynl made the same demand.33 In 1956 'Iriqat gave the reason
that the Israelis had made Jerusalem their capital; therefore, "Jerusalem must be a
second capital in order to make the people aware of the city's superior importance
and that the Third [World] War would erupt as a consequence."34
Deputies accused the government of neglecting and discriminating against the
city. During the Budget Debate of 1958, Dawud al-Husaynil said:
The Zionists built the sector that had been seized unlawfully and used force
to establish it as their capital, not Tel Aviv, ... they constructed great
institutions and buildings, wide roads, beautiful gardens, ... For goodness'
sake, though, what did the former governments do for Jerusalem, except
neglect it and more or less seek to weaken it?35
The deputies of Jerusalem frequently requested the implementation of
projects in the city such as the establishment of a "scientific university", the
expansion of the airport near the city, the construction of new schools and the
opening of a branch of the Tourist Board.36 Amman itself was lacking some of these
facilities. However, the residents of the West Bank thought that Jerusalem should
have equal status to that of Amman, for they regarded it as the centre of their lives,
rather than the capital of Jordan.
Meanwhile, the possibility of reopening the settlement file on Jerusalem, that
is, the implementation of the UN internationalisation resolutions, or some other
settlement, provoked fear and insecurity in the city. Activists working there in the
early 1950s said that they were aware of attempts by certain sides to strengthen their
position. One example of this was the efforts of the Catholic Church to purchase land
in the city. Such activities were regarded as a plan to enhance its status should
internationalisation be negotiated, 37 for the Catholic Church was defined by those
activists as a foreign power.
Therefore, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) worked in the city on a
national basis to protect its Palestinian-Arab identity. In a similar vein, the founders
31 Sofer, "The Political Status", p.86.
32 See the Minutes of the Jordanian Deputies Council: 7 November 1954, 24 August 1955,
21 February 1956, 8 January 1957 and 19 January 1960.
33 Minutes of the Jordanian Deputies Council, 13 May 1958.
34 Minutes of the Jordanian Deputies Council, 21 Februaiy 1956.
35 Minutes of the Jordanian Deputies Council, 13 May 1958.




of al-Maqasid Association, which was established in 1956 to construct charitable
hospitals, surgeries, schools, etc., asserted that among their unwritten primary goals
was the protection of city land against "foreign powers". It is significant that
although the leaders of al-Maqasid were secular and leftist, the organisation was
granted Islamic waqfland to establish its institutions.38
Not only was charitable work of a national political nature, but the survival of
profitable companies in the city was also regarded as a national concern. For
instance, the Jerusalem Cigarette Company faced bankruptcy in the early 1960s. This
led national economists to hold a meeting and form a savings plan to bring new
investment into the company. Zaki al-Ghul, a member of the Jerusalem municipality
and a businessman, participated in the rescue. He said that saving the workers'
livelihood was the main motive for such action, but also "we were struggling to keep
Jerusalem alive".39
However, there were persistent demands that Jerusalem be the centre of a
collective Arab effort to liberate Palestine. For instance, in 1955 and in other years
'Iriqat demanded that a special meeting be held there of the Prime Ministers as well
as the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Defence in the Arab world to conduct a
serious inquiry into the Palestinian cause.40 If the Jordanian regime was seeking a
peaceful settlement on the basis of preserving the status quo, Jerusalem had actually
become the symbol of the opposition project of rejecting the status quo. The editorial
of the daily newspaper Filastm [based in Jerusalem] said in 1960: "The status of
Jerusalem must be higher than that of any other city, because it is the origin and
centre of Arab politics regarding Palestine."41
Nevertheless, it should be noted that all the previous demands and complaints
were a request not for separation,* but for a better status within the unification, and a
38 Ibid. Also interview, Zaki al-Ghul, Amman, 23 September 2001. However, in the
constitution of al-Maqasid Charitable Islamic Association in Jerusalem, there is no mention
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*
A remarkable piece of evidence of the support for unification as a principle was the election
ain the mid-1950s of Ya'qub Zayyadin, a Christian physician from al-Karak in East Jordan
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rejection of a political settlement with Israel which recognised the status quo that
resulted from the war, or a political settlement leading to the internationalisation of
Jerusalem.
During the 1950s the Jordanian government did not respond positively to
these criticisms and demands. For instance, in reply to the question of considering
Jerusalem the second capital, the Jordanian Prime Minister said in 1955: "The
constitution states that Amman is the capital, thus unfortunately nothing can be done
concerning such a demand."42 In some cases there appeared to be political
implications in some of the measures imposed. One example was the disbanding of
important institutions connected with the Mufti, Amln al-Husayni, such as the SMC,
and transferring its tasks to the Ministry of "theMwgaf'and the Islamic Shrines" in
Amman.43
Such governmental actions could be interpreted as an expression of fear that
strengthening Jerusalem could lead to the strengthening of a separate Palestinian
national identity. This in turn could jeopardise the unification of Jordan and the
target of a united national identity.
This attitude changed by the end of the 1950s. In 1959 Prime Minister Hazza'
al-Majali declared his intention to ask the Arab League to agree to the holding of an
Arab summit in Jerusalem "between al-Aqsa Mosque and the Sepulchre Church, so
that the decisions of the participants would be inspired by the stolen homeland."44 In
1960 several other Palestinian demands were accepted, including the holding of
Parliamentary and Cabinet sessions in the city.45
In fact the change was a result of demands by Arabs and Palestinians, mostly
from outside Jordan, to create what they called the Palestinian entity (see Chapter
One). The Jordanian response was to revive the political role of Jerusalem as the
Palestinian political centre so as to mobilise a Palestinian rejection of these demands.
The minutes of the parliamentary debate in Jerusalem on 19 January 1960 explain
these changes in government opinion regarding the political role of the city.
and a leading figure in the Communist Party (later its Chairman), as deputy for Jerusalem in
Parliament.
42 Minutes of the Jordanian Deputies Council, 21 February 1956.
43 Friedland & Hecht, To Rule, p. 29.
44 Al- Difa' (22 June 1959).
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Speeches by the Members of Parliament and the government were strongly opposed
to the demand to establish a Palestinian entity. Kamil 'Iriqat launched a lengthy
attack on the AHC, the Arab regimes in general and the Iraqi regime in particular for
demanding this entity. He considered it "a pathetic suggestion, and a conspiracy",
and ended his speech by asking that Jerusalem be the second capital of Jordan.
The Foreign Minister, Musa Nasir, opened his speech with the words: "We
assemble now in Jerusalem, the capital of Palestine, and we should confine our
search today to Palestine's cause in particular," and at the end of the speech he stated
that he had "no use for the demand concerning the Palestinian entity". The Prime
Minister had begun the session with a speech, in which he asserted: "Jerusalem is the
heart of Palestine" and that Jordan had bome its responsibility and would bear it
forever. The aim of the meeting in Jerusalem was to inquire into "one cause, that is,
our first cause", namely Palestine. After speaking at length on the Arab failure to do
anything for Palestine, he concluded that any plan for Palestine must first recognise
the Jordanian entity as the legitimate entity for the unification of the East and West
Banks.46 This reconsideration of Jerusalem's status was clearly the result of facing
the possibility of a Palestinian entity.
Such a change reflected a deeper change in the view of the creation of a
national identity. Jordanian policy by then was no longer aiming for a national
identity to replace the other identities. Instead it was based on a kind of unification
where regional identities could coexist within the nation.
Nevertheless, the demands to establish a Palestinian entity continued to roll
in. As a result of Arab and Palestinian pressure, Jordan accepted the official
establishment of the PLO in Jerusalem in 1964. It was agreed that the city was to be
the headquarters of the PLO and that a Palestinian flag could be flown on the PLO
office building. Ahmad al-Shuqayri, the PLO Chairman, began to initiate action from
Jerusalem. He had disputes with Amman, which rejected some of his demands such
as organising military units and imposing conscription on behalf of the Organi¬
sation.47 This led to political and media campaigns between the two sides, followed
45
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by military action by Fath against Israel and Israeli retaliation against Jordan. As a
result, Jordan felt justified in its decision in January 1967 to close the PLO office in
Jerusalem, and publicly withdraw its recognition of al-Shuqayri as a representative of
the Palestinian entity.48 The Egyptian President, Nasir, effected a conciliation, which
led to the reopening of the PLO office and the return of al-Shuqayri to Jerusalem just
a few days before the outbreak of the June 1967 War.49
3.2.2 Jordan and the Political Settlement of Jerusalem: 1948-1967
As described in Chapter Two, the negotiations between Transjordan and Israel began
during the war and continued until the assassination of King 'Abdullah I in 1951
without reaching an agreement.
'Abdullah had tried to include Arab leaders in the negotiations. On 3 October
1948 he sent a personal message to King Faruq of Egypt, informing him that many
Palestine Arabs wished to bring the war to an end and to reach a settlement, and that
he thought that this should be given consideration. However, he could not take such a
step on his own and therefore wished to consult with his colleagues.50 However, Arab
regimes in general were opposed to the expansion of the Hashemites in the West
Bank on the grounds of rivalry and disputes with 'Abdullah (see Chapter Four).
'Abdullah, who had an understanding with Israel to reject the internationalisation of
Jerusalem, said at the time that he feared that he might encounter "more difficulty
from the Arab states [regarding this issue] than from the foreign states."51
During the negotiations, King 'Abdullah, like the Israelis, showed more
concern about issues outside Jerusalem. 'Abdullah was hoping that showing what he
considered flexibility over Jerusalem would encourage the Israelis to be flexible
elsewhere. At a meeting with Israeli officials in Paris on 9 and 10 November 1948,
'Abd al-Ghanl al-Karml, the King's envoy, told his opposite numbers that the King
hoped that the Israeli side appreciated the arrangements that he had made for free
passage to Mount Scopus through the area held by the Arab Legion. He offered to
48
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continue this arrangement and to provide Israel with a new and better road there.
The King asked in exchange that Israel hand over the areas of Transjordan in Negev
in the south of Palestine to secure a passage to the sea. The King asked also for the
return of refugees from Lydda and Ramla to their homes. No agreement resulted
from that meeting since the war was still continuing and so Israel was not interested
in this offer.52
In twenty meetings of secret negotiations, until the death of King 'Abdullah,
Jordan's main concerns were the outlet to the Mediterranean and the return of the
refugees. Israel, however, did not accept either of these demands and this was the
main obstacle to the progress of the negotiations.
'Abdullah al-Tall, the Jordanian representative at some of these secret
meetings, agreed with Sasson on 13 December that rejection of the UN resolutions
on the internationalisation of the city was a common interest. He asked if Israel
agreed to the partition of Jerusalem, pointing out that this would be the ideal
solution. Sasson did not give a clear answer, saying that the question would be
resolved later in the negotiations.53
Al-Tall himself proposed on 5 January 1949 that, in addition to demanding
the corridor to the sea through the Negev, the Jewish Quarter of the Old City could
be exchanged for Arab neighbourhoods in West Jerusalem such as the Qatamun, the
German Colony, Talpiot, and Kibbutz Ramat.54 Also, in exchange for restoring the
supply of electricity to the Old City, he was willing to grant the Jews free access to
the holy places.55 However, Israel refused these offers.
Jordanian internal opposition to a political settlement recognising Israel
impeded the progress of the negotiations. There was even difficulty in applying the
terms of the armistice agreement of April 1949, which included allowing access to
the holy places. At the special committee established for the application of the
armistice agreements, Jordan was represented by 'Abdullah al-Tall, Hamad
al-Farhan and Ahmad Khalll. The Jordanian delegation, acting under the pressure of
public resentment and Arab hostility, demanded that Israel return neighbourhoods in








West Jerusalem as a condition for further agreements.56 However, the shared
rejection of internationalisation seemed to be holding, which helped in the
continuation of secret contacts and negotiations.
When the negotiations were brought to a halt by the death of the King
'Abdullah, Jordan - with Israel - had apparently managed to gain an implicit
international acceptance of the status quo of the partition of the city.
In short, whereas many observers considered Jerusalem the most difficult
problem of the Arab-Israeli conflict, the Jordanian negotiations with Israel in the
aftermath of the 1948 war created a situation where Jerusalem was the meeting-point
and the subject of agreement, while other issues remained unresolved. This period
also shows that Jerusalem could be redefined geographically by the parties
concerned. Israel defined West Jerusalem as the Jewish Jerusalem and Jordan
defined East Jerusalem as the Arab Jerusalem.
3.3 The Loss of Jerusalem and Redefinition of the Role of
Jordan:1967-1988
In the war of June 1967 Jordan lost the West Bank including East Jerusalem.
Nevertheless, perhaps this event prevented more radical changes within Jordan,
which had been expected if King Husayn had decided not go to the war. 'Adnan
Abu-'Uda expressed it as follows: "The military defeat boosted the King's
credibility."57 The reason for this statement was that although King Husayn and
Jordan had always been the target of attack and accusation by other Arab states,
namely Egypt and Syria, regarding its willingness to negotiate with Israel, and its
relationship with the Western countries and Israel, the Jordanian army had gone into
battle as soon as Israel had launched its attack upon Egypt. Meanwhile, Syria, which
had held an extremely hard-line political position against Israel, did very little in the
first two or three days of the war apart from firing across the border58 This situation
caused 'Abd al-Nasir, in particular, to review his relationship with King Husayn and
the political settlement, is described in detail below.
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3.3.1 Jordan without Jerusalem
The West Bank as a whole comprised one-third of Jordan's population, contained its
richest agricultural land, and contributed 38 per cent of the country's gross domestic
product.59 The loss of Jerusalem had two immediate consequences within Jordan,
economic and political life.
Economically, the 1960s plans to develop Jerusalem so as to satisfy Pales¬
tinian public opinion and increase the income from tourism had produced a boom in
the city's economy. A month after the war, W. Morris, the head of the Eastern
Department in the British Foreign Office, described it as follows:
There has been a heavy investment in new hotels..., and we ourselves have
invested quite heavily in extending the water supply and, earlier, in building
Kalandia Airport. The West Bank without the Old City would be deprived of
its main economic asset. If therefore we decide that we have an interest in a
stable and self-supporting Jordan, we have an interest in seeing that any
arrangement made for Jerusalem takes account of Jordan's economic
interests.60
Jordan without East Jerusalem and Bethlehem could no longer promote itself
as the Holy Land. It has been estimated that 85 per cent of the country's income from
tourism was contributed by East Jerusalem. In 1966 a total of 617,000 tourists had
visited Jordan, compared with 291,000 visiting Israel.61
From the political point of view, the loss of Jerusalem was a severe blow to
the state rhetoric and the regime's long-promoted image as the defender of the holy
places. The responsibility for the loss could be portrayed as a failure by the regime,
giving influential groups both inside and outside the country a reason to question its
legitimacy.
Moreover, the future of the West Bank was in question concerning not only
the occupation, but also the consequences of a potential withdrawal by the Israelis.
There was awareness among political circles that the occupation could lead to "the
revival of interest among Israelis, Jordanian West Bankers, and Saudis in the idea of
a semi-autonomous Palestinian state on the West Bank, possibly with Gaza."62
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In the days following the defeat, the King and the government in Jordan made
every effort to absorb the shock and raise public morale. There was emphasis on the
fact that the army had fought heroically, the media giving the impression that tens of
thousands had been killed in the war. The Prime Minister, Sa'ad Jum'a, stated that
6,094 had been killed, although it appeared later that the true total was 696. The
difference in numbers was attributed to the wartime chaos.63
Emphasis was also placed on the fact that the unification would continue. The
Prime Minister asserted: "The Jordanian entity of the two Banks is sacred (...). The
West Bankers should realise that their souls and future are all tightly and sacredly
bound to this Bank."64 To cement the continuing links between the East and West
Banks, the government adopted the policy of open bridges, and maintained an
institutional presence in the West Bank, where its population could move between
the two sides. Jordanian institutions, such as the waqf, continued to work in the West
Bank. Once again, Jerusalem seemed to be the place where historic questions could
be answered. The Israeli annexation of East Jerusalem at the end of July created an
opportunity to emphasise the Jordanian status in the West Bank in general.
The Israeli Mayor of Jerusalem, Teddy Kollek, failed to enlarge the
Municipal Council with the Arab councillors of East Jerusalem.65 The Amin (Mayor)
of Jerusalem and seven of the twelve members of the Municipal Council (the
remaining five had left for Amman) sent a letter dated 23 July to the Israeli Assistant
Administrative Officer of Jerusalem, Rofael Levy. The letter stated that they refused
to join the Municipal Council of Jerusalem under Israeli law, because this would be
an official recognition of the annexation of "Arab Jerusalem", and they asked that
"things be returned to what they were before 5 June 1967."66
To deal with the Israeli measures in Jerusalem, leading figures in the city
established the Higher Islamic Council (HIC). In particular, this was a reaction to the
Israeli law governing properties owned by absentees. According to this law, waqf
properties, which comprised nearly 25 per cent of the properties in East Jerusalem in
addition to the city's mosques (including al-Aqsa Mosque), were subject to control
63
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by the Israeli government, including the right of sale, leasing, demolition, etc.
Therefore, on 24 July 1967 a meeting was held by a number of Jerusalem's
prominent figures, including waqf officials, lawyers, Shar'ya judges, political
activists and other Jordanian officials. The participants issued a memorandum
addressed to the Israeli Military Governor of the West Bank, rejecting the annexation
and insisting that "Arab Jerusalem" was part of Jordan and that the inhabitants of
Arab Jerusalem rejected the Israeli measures. The memorandum also declared the
establishment of the Council to direct Islamic affairs in the West Bank until the end
of the occupation.67 The result was a wave of support in the form of statements from
municipalities and professional and workers' syndicates in the West Bank.68
In the following weeks the Council seemed to be turning into the political
leader of the occupied territories. With overwhelming popular support, it managed to
dissuade the Israeli Ministry of Religious Affairs from imposing censorship on
al-Aqsa Mosque by asking to see the text of the Friday sermon. The Board refused
and threatened a general boycott of the prayers. Moreover, on 31 January 1968
another victory was achieved with the transfer of Islamic affairs from the Ministry of
Religious Affairs to the Ministry of Defence.69 The result was that Islamic affairs in
Jerusalem were more closely linked to the military occupied territories than to
annexed Jerusalem.
In retrospect, some of the leaders and prominent figures of Jerusalem, by
means of the HIC and with the support of the heads of the municipalities, had the
opportunity to revive a kind of "politics of the notables" in Jerusalem. It was similar
to the role that had been played by the SMC in the 1920s and 1930s, although this
time it was linked to Amman and its leadership was not yet fully developed.
The punitive measures imposed by Israel were responsible for bringing the
progress of the Council to a halt. In September 1967 the Israeli government expelled
the Council Chairman, 'Abd al-Hamid al-Sa'ih, and in May 1969 expelled six other
66 FCO 17/251: Translated copy of the Arab Councillors' letter.
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members.70 More important, though, was the way in which Jordan dealt with the
Board. It was placed under the administration of the Jordanian Ministry ofAwqaf in
Amman, with its tasks confined to the reactivation of the Shar'ya court and awqaf'
affairs. Gradually the members of the Council became Jordanian employees
restricted to certain functions without a political role.71 Although the Council played
a fairly important role in promoting the city's Arab and Muslim identity and in
dealing with the Israeli policies, it did not achieve the political target of maintaining
Amman's power in the West Bank. In other words, the Council was transformed into
a bureaucratic Jordanian body instead of developing into a grassroots organisation.
Meanwhile, the PLO was creating its own grassroots branches as described in
Chapter One.
Thus, while Jordanian flags still appeared in the anti-occupation demon¬
strations and on the martyrs' graves until 1973, it was observed in that year that the
Palestinian flag appeared without its Jordanian companion in symbolic funerals held
in the West Bank for Palestinian leaders assassinated in Beirut by Israeli comman¬
dos.72 Moreover, at the end of that year an opinion poll in the West Bank showed that
44 per cent of its inhabitants wanted an independent Palestinian state, whereas only
19 per cent wanted to return to Jordan.73 This could be attributed to the failure to
begin peace efforts, and to the clashes between the Palestinian armed factions and the
Jordanian Army between 1969-1971. Nevertheless, the lack of grassroots
organisation was the crucial factor. By 1976 Jordan had also lost its control of the
municipalities when PLO supporters won the elections,74 although not in Jerusalem,
where the Palestinians boycotted the elections.
Jordan's role in subsidising education, health and municipal services, awqaf\
etc., was important for the daily life of the Palestinians and for providing them with
the wherewithal for dealing with the Israelis. The "Hashemite renovation" of the holy
places and the maintenance of the shrines and waqf properties continued to be a
70
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special task in Jerusalem, and was usually the subject of intense publicity and media
coverage aimed at sustaining the image of the Hashemites as the guardians and
defenders of Jerusalem, and at mobilising popular support and loyalty.
In the mid-1980s Jordan tried to counter the PLO influence in the territories
by establishing a grassroots influence, and by granting a greater political role to those
Jerusalem deputies in the Jordanian Parliament who returned to Jerusalem, or who
visited it frequently, in an effort to revive the support of Amman.75 In the same way,
in 1986, Amman backed a split in Fath, led by the prominent figure in the
movement, 'Atallah 'Atallah, whose supporters began to act in the occupied
territories. In September of that year, 'Atallah's "personal representative" held an
official press conference in East Jerusalem. These activities were followed by
Jordan's declaration of a 5-billion dinar development plan for the territories.76
Nevertheless, all these plans failed. The discourse of the PLO political resistance
attracted the support of young people, and gradually new figures connected with the
PLO dominated the institutions and political life of Jerusalem. The leaders of the
Intifada of 1987 publicly declared their hostility towards Amman. In March 1988
they called upon the Palestinian deputies who had been "appointed by the King" to
the Jordanian Parliament to resign their seats immediately.77
On reading the messages of the Intifada, the Jordanian government decided
on 28 July to cancel the five-year development plan, and on 30 July the King
dissolved Parliament. The next day, 31 July, he declared his decision to dismantle the
legal and administrative links between the East and West Banks.78 This was the
official end to the unification of Jordan and the West Bank, and to the possibility that
Jordan would negotiate on behalf of the Palestinians. The King's disengagement
speech did not mention Jerusalem at all.79 Amman continued funding and
administering the Shar'ya Court and the awqaf, so the holy places and subsequently
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The exemption of Jerusalem in such a way had different meanings; firstly that
Jordan was aware of the danger of leaving Jerusalem and that it could create a
vacuum to be exploited by Israel, which would not let the PLO fill it. And secondly
such exemption was important to preserve the Jordanian Hashemite regime image as
defenders and guardians of the holy places. However, according to such exemption,
Jordan continued to define its relationship with the cause of Jerusalem differently
from other aspects of the Palestinian cause. In the case of Jerusalem, Jordan
remained a partner and a responsible party in any alteration in the city's status quo.
3.3.2 The Political Settlement
The events of June 1967 seemed to be a possible opportunity for reaching a peace
agreement between Jordan and Israel without fear of Arab rejection, or the reaction
of President Jamal 'Abd al-Nasir. In 1998, King Husayn recalled the Egyptian
President telling him before the [Egyptian] Revolutionary Command Council in
1967:
"My brother, because of us you lost the West Bank, Jerusalem, and Gaza as
well. Go kiss Lyndon Johnson's hand and beg him to return the West Bank
and Jerusalem." I told him: "I will beg to no one; I never have. With God's
help we will work hard to regain our lands." He then promised this: "Let
them [the Israelis] stay in the Sinai and in the Suez Canal and let the Canal
remain closed. I will accept no changes in the status quo until we regain the
occupied lands. We went into a war and we lost it; we have to pay the price.
There is one condition, however—none of us should sign a peace treaty with
Israel alone, and any solution must be part of a comprehensive settlement."80
These were the grounds on which King Husayn aimed to reach a settlement
that would not only restore the occupied territory, but would also be a victory for the
original Jordanian point of view that a settlement should recognise the existence of
Israel, and that the partition of Palestine was a realistic solution.
Jordan made efforts in various directions to achieve a political solution. It
played a pivotal role in persuading the international powers to push for a political
settlement, leading to the UN Security Council Resolution 242.81 In addition, direct
and indirect, secret and open negotiations were taking place at that time. King
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Husayn told British diplomats that the armistice lines "[made] no sense", and would
require revision.82 This was not intended for Jerusalem in particular, rather it was to
give an indication that the armistice borders and the pre-war situation could be
reviewed in terms of a peaceful settlement.
For its part, Israel approached prominent personalities in Jerusalem in an
attempt to deal with them as representatives of the Palestinians. However, they
refused to act independently, instead co-ordinating their moves with Amman. For
instance, in July 1967 information began to leak that Anwar Nusayba was holding
meetings with Israeli "thinkers" at his home.83 Later, it appeared that these meetings
were more than think tanks. Nusayba told the British Ambassador in Amman on 11
March 1968 that he and other prominent figures in the West Bank had been
summoned to Amman by the King and expected to be invited with others, after the
'Eid, to join the government, when there would be a real prospect of negotiations
getting under way and leading to a fair settlement. He told the Ambassador that he
was in contact with Israeli politicians, and the Ambassador reported that Anwar
Nusayba "described an arrangement whereby Israel was sovereign throughout
Jerusalem and Arab flags were permitted to be flown on mosques as 'just not on'."84
Nusayba revealed years later that he had been negotiating a municipal solution based
on the "borough plan", with shared sovereignty in Jerusalem. However, Jordan had
rejected it and insisted on divided sovereignty.85
According to King Husayn, he had at least eight unannounced meetings with
Israeli officials between 1967 and 1974, and another six meetings in the following
two years. The King concluded from his meetings with officials such as Abba Eban,
Yaakov Herzog, Yigal Allon, Moshe Dayan, Chaim Bar-Lev, Golda Meir and
Yitzhak Rabin: "The Israeli attitude was different from what we had expected", and
"we were so far apart". He explained that he was offered "the return of something
like 90-plus per cent of the territory, 98 even, excluding Jerusalem." The King did
not accept these offers, and by the mid-1970s negotiations had come to a halt. The
82 FCO 17/225: "Secret-Nodis", 9 August 1967.
83 FCO 17/251, 12 July 1967: Telegram from the British Consul in Jerusalem, reporting his
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King, as he said later, "could not give an inch of Palestinian territory or an iota of
Palestinians' rights."86
'Adnan Abu-'Uda, who had been an official close to the King since 1970,
said: "The secret communications of King Husayn with the Israelis were important
because he realised Jerusalem was a difficult topic, and he was careful for he was
unable to make peace without Jerusalem." Abu-'Uda explained that Jordan
recognised that Jerusalem's pre-1967 situation was bizarre, in that Jews were denied
access to the city, although he indicated at the same time that the situation was the
same on the other side, where Jordanian [Christians] were denied access to Nazareth
and Tiberias. All this would have changed if there had been a peace settlement.87
These manoeuvres show that although Jordan accepted changes in the pre¬
war situation, it would not accept a settlement without Jerusalem and rejected the
idea of shared sovereignty. The Jordanian official position was that "Arab"
Jerusalem was occupied territory included in UN Resolution 242 regarding the Israeli
withdrawal.88 At the same time Jordan emphasised its intention to guarantee free
access to "Arab Jerusalem" and to the various holy places.
The failure to reach a settlement was not unconnected with the rise of the
PLO and armed resistance. Jordan had to calculate the direction and level of public
opinion, and knew then that the resistance movement could mobilise public support
against a solution based on the pre-1967 situation. It was in this context that King
Husayn proposed a plan on 15 March 1972, which renamed the "Hashemite
Kingdom of Jordan" the "United Arab Kingdom". It would consist of two regions -
Palestine and Jordan - with Jerusalem the capital of Palestine, and Amman the
central capital of the state to be headed by the King. Each region would have a high
level of independence in its internal affairs.89 This offer clearly meant accepting a
state with a new identity that would not be called Hashemite, while the Palestinian
identity would be recognised.
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The Palestinians rejected the plan on the grounds that it was only a partial
solution, whereas they demanded the full liberation of Palestine. In addition, King
Husayn's solution would mean the cancellation of the refugees' right of return.90
Meanwhile, according to 'Adnan Abu-'Uda, "Jerusalem persisted as a theme
in Jordan's official discourse ofmobilisation, and the occupation of Jerusalem led to
highlighting the Arabism of the city in this discourse."91
However, another interpretation of the emphasis on the city's Arabism is
reflected by the political changes in the region, namely, the decision of the Arab
summit in 1974 to recognise the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the
Palestinian people. This resolution helped in bringing the Jordanian negotiations with
Israel to a halt, which, in turn caused a change in Jordan's discourse on Jerusalem. A
Jordanian researcher noticed that:
Jordan in the past called clearly to restore East Jerusalem to Jordanian
sovereignty, dealing with the issue as a Jordanian issue. During this present
stage, however, [after 1973] it has dealt with Jerusalem as an Arab issue,
with a kind of particularity, because of factors related to the Jordanian role
in the city.92
The researcher was referring in particular to the fact that while Jordan was
previously calling to restore Jerusalem to "Jordanian sovereignty", it had begun to
call for restoring it to "Arab sovereignty". The change was a result of the resolution
passed at the Arab summit and an attempt to avoid provoking the PLO. At the same
time, however, it reflected Jordan's refraining from giving explicit recognition to the
PLO as the party responsible.
Then the American administration decided to adopt the step-by-step
negotiations, in which each Arab country would negotiate with Israel bilaterally and
separately. On this basis, the US sponsored the Camp David agreement between
Israel and Egypt in 1978, which was rejected by Jordan. Mahmud Riyad, former
General Secretary of the Arab League, wrote:
Reference in the agreement is made to Jordan and Jordanians fourteen times
as if Jordan was one of the states of the US or an Egyptian province, with
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the assumption that the King of Jordan will hurry to either Washington or
Cairo to do their bidding.93
A statement by the Jordanian government in September 1978 declared that
since Jordan had not been part of the Camp David negotiations, it had no legal nor
moral responsibility for issues in which it had not participated in discussing or
formulating. The statement called for a comprehensive settlement and rejected
separate bilateral agreements. It added that any final settlement should include an
Israeli withdrawal from Gaza and the West Bank, "especially the return of the Arab
sovereignty over Arab Jerusalem". In addition, any final and just settlement had to
give the Palestinian people the right of self-determination.94
After Camp David, Jordan's aim was to find a formula of joint movement
with the PLO, which would lead to a political settlement and would give the
Palestinians the right of representation. This formula was to be a halfway house
between the PLO and Arab regimes calling for complete separation between the
Palestinians and Jordan, and the Jordanian position of the 1950s and 1960s, in which
the government rejected the Palestinian entity and Palestinian identity.
On 11 February 1985 Jordan and the PLO signed an agreement to go to an
international peace conference as a joint delegation. The agreement was designed to
tackle the question of representation, and to find a formula acceptable to the US and
Israel, which would allow the PLO a place at the negotiations. Although the core
issues such as Jerusalem were mentioned, the agreement in general represented the
known positions of the Jordanians and Palestinians. It emphasised the total Israeli
withdrawal from the lands that had been occupied in 1967, including Jerusalem (see
Chapter One).
Having declared the failure of the joint agreement on 19 February 1986 to be
due to PLO hesitation, King Husayn decided to work for peace without the PLO.
Therefore Jordan put forward a five-year development plan and backed an alternative
Palestinian leadership, as described in the previous section.
Abu- 'Uda explained the King's plans:
93 Mahinoud Riad, The Struggle for Peace in the Middle East (London: Quartet Books,
1981), p.323.
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The rationale behind the development plan was to improve the Palestinians'
quality of life, create jobs, and eventually stop or at least slow down
Palestinian emigration to Jordan. The Plan was also designed to create a
local Palestinian leadership free of PLO influence. Such a leadership would,
at the right time, become Jordan's Palestinian partner in negotiating a
peaceful settlement with Israel within an international conference.95
This was a change in the Jordanian position of accepting, albeit reluctantly,
the resolution passed at the Arab summit of 1974, in which the PLO was recognised
as the sole representative of the Palestinians. On 11 April 1987, a secret meeting was
held in London between Shimon Peres and King Husayn, resulting in a document in
which it was understood that an international conference would be held, where the
Palestinians would be part of a Jordanian-Palestinian delegation. The purpose of the
conference was formulated in a general text: "To negotiate an agreement based on
UN resolutions 242 and 338 with the purpose of attaining comprehensive peace in
the region and security for the countries in the area, and granting the Palestinian
people their general legitimate rights."96
Shimon Peres, the current Foreign Minister, was acting without the Israeli
government mandate and so the understanding did not go far. More importantly,
however, the Intifada erupted in December, resulting in the decision of disengage¬
ment between Jordan and the West Bank.
To conclude: in contrast to the period between 1948 and 1967, Jerusalem,
after the war of June 1967 became a significant obstacle to reaching a Jordanian-
Israeli peace agreement. However, it is still possible to say that the PLO role in the
settlement and the constituents of the parties taking part in the negotiations were the
most noticeable questions at the time and the main obstacle to setting a peace process
into motion.
3.4 The Madrid Conference and the Israeli-Jordanian Peace
Agreement
Jordan refused to join the international side against Iraq in the GulfWar of 1990-91.
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This was combined with the increased use of Arab nationalist and Islamist slogans at
both popular and official level. The Muslim Brothers entered the Jordanian Cabinet
and held several portfolios.
In this context Jerusalem returned to the scene not only as part of the
nationalist discourse but also as a rival to Arab regimes, namely Saudi Arabia.
A dispute erupted in the aftermath of the war, largely as a result of wartime tension.
For two weeks in May 1992 Saudi Arabia and Jordan competed publicly for the
responsibility of restoring the Dome of the Rock in Jerusalem. The dispute began
when Egyptian experts visited the site and criticised the standard of its maintenance.
This criticism was considered provocative by Jordan, which had highlighted its role
as guardian of the holy places, having spent 240 million dollars between 1952 and
1991 on the Islamic religious places in Jerusalem. In response to the experts' report,
King Fahd of Saudi Arabia donated 9 million dollars to repair the Dome, and ignored
Jordan's role by sending the donation through UNESCO. In frustration at this move,
a huge media campaign was instigated in Amman.97 The current Jordanian Minister
of Information, Mahmud al-Sharif, criticised any attempt to bypass Jordan's role in
the restoration of the holy places. He warned that by sending the donation through
UNESCO, Saudi Arabia was opening the door to the internationalisation of
Jerusalem, a step that could be exploited by Israel to capture the holy places.98 King
Husayn sold his house in London and donated 8.5 million dollars to repair the Dome.
This action triggered a large solidarity campaign in Jordan in support of the King. It
was led by Jordanian and Palestinian pro-Jordanian figures and took the form of
visits by delegates to the King and the publication of telegrams and advertisements in
the newspapers praising the Hashemites' role in Jerusalem.99 The campaign was an
opportunity to revive the role of Jerusalem in the Hashemite discourse.
The importance of these events was that they occurred while Jordan was
taking part with the PLO in a joint delegation at the negotiations that had begun in
Madrid in October 1991. They indicated that the King, in spite of the disengagement
with the West Bank and his help to the PLO at the negotiations to achieve their
independent entity, was still insisting on his rights and his role in Jerusalem.
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Meanwhile, American attempts in the aftermath of the GulfWar to begin the
peace process and the Israeli rejection of an independent Palestinian delegation
resulted in Jordan and the PLO agreeing to participate in the Madrid peace
conference as a joint delegation. However, Jordan insisted that the delegation should
comprise 28 members, as opposed to 14 in the case of the other delegations. Jordan
also insisted that each delegation should negotiate its issues separately. As the
current Foreign Minister, Kamil Abu-Jabir, explained, it meant that "practically the
Palestinians were acting independently, and this is what we explained to the
Americans."100
In November 1993 the Jordanian delegation reached an understanding with
the Israeli delegation on the agenda for the negotiations. The Jordanian delegation
gave copies of the agenda to the Syrian, Lebanese and Palestinian delegations even
before sending a copy to Amman. Syria was dissatisfied, considering the agenda to
be the beginning of unilateral agreements. Upon the King's instructions, the agenda
was shelved and Israel was told that no further negotiations could take place before
there was parallel progress on other tracks.101
When the Oslo declaration was leaked to the newspapers in late August 1993,
it was a surprise to the Jordanian side. The King and the Jordanian negotiators were
angry that they learnt about the agreement only from the media. The Jordanian
government and negotiators spent the whole night discussing the next step, and
whether they should express their resentment at the behaviour of the Palestinians.
Finally, it was decided to express support for the Palestinian choice, to "avoid
weakening the Palestinians".102
The Jordanian negotiators realised that the Oslo interim agreements had
weakened Jordan's position regarding Israel over issues such as Jerusalem and the
refugees. Nor could Jordan ask for any more immediate changes in the city's
situation, since the Oslo agreement had delayed all further negotiations on the city
until the final status phase.103
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On 14 September, the day after signing the Oslo Accords, Israel and Jordan
signed the "Common Agenda", which designated the issues to be negotiated, namely,
security, water, refugees and displaced people, borders and territories, and bilateral
co-operation within a regional context. There was no mention of Jerusalem.104
The Jordanians informed the Palestinians that Jordan would transfer the
administration of the awqafand the Islamic shrines to the PA in any area from which
Israel withdrew. When King Husayn negotiated with the Israeli Prime Minister,
Yitzhak Rabin, he took care to clarify Jordan's role in the holy places.105 Therefore,
when Israel and Jordan signed the Washington Declaration (a declaration of
principles) on 25 July 1994, it contained the following article: "Israel respects the
present special role of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan in Muslim holy shrines in
Jerusalem. When negotiations on the permanent status takes place, Israel will give
high priority to the Jordanian historic role in these Shrines."106
The Palestinians reacted angrily to this article, and voiced their complaints in
the media and in contacts with Arab leaders on the Jordanian position, considering
Jerusalem a Palestinian affair. The Jordanian counter-argument contained many
dimensions and explanations:
1. The article was in the interests of the Palestinians, because it confirmed a change
in the Israeli position, albeit a very small one. Israel, which had insisted at length
on exclusive sovereignty in the city, had now accepted a degree of Jordanian
participation in sovereignty, which could be the first step to further changes.107
The Jordanian Minister of Information commented as follows on the Palestinian
protest: "We [Jordan] achieved a religious liberation for Jerusalem." Fayiz
al-Tarawna added that the article had placed the "Arab and Islamic custodians"
of al-Aqsa Mosque in the final status negotiations, "and now it is for the
Palestinians to tackle the border issue."108
104 jsrae]j Common Agenda; cited in Abdul Hadi, Documents on Palestine, vol. 1,
p.153.
105 Interview, Fayiz al-Tarawna.
106 Israel-Jordan Washington Declaration; cited in Documents on Jerusalem, p. 122.
107 Interview, Kamil Abu-Jabir.
108 Interviews: Fayiz al-Tarawna.
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2. Jordan explained through different channels to the Palestinians that when the
Palestinians gained sovereignty over Jerusalem, the article would be invalid.109
3. From the Jordanian point of view then, the article could be made to function in
particular ways. For instance, the Palestinians might be forced into reaching an
agreement that excluded or delayed the question of Jerusalem. Or that no
agreement would be reached at all.110
However, on various occasions afterwards, Jordan took care to emphasise
that it had no interest in competing with the PLO in Jerusalem. So when the final
Jordanian-Israeli bilateral peace agreement was signed on 26 October 1994, it
emphasised the article in the Washington Declaration without any additions.111
It could be assumed that the sensitivity between Jordan and the PLO
dissuaded Jordan from making any further attempts to clarify the issue of Jerusalem
in greater detail during the negotiations with Israel. Subsequently, neither Jordan nor
the PLO in their agreements with Israel managed to gain any practical change in the
city for the Arab side during the interim period. In other words, the Arab-Arab
sensitivity eased the task of the Israelis.
Despite the death of King Husayn in February 1999 and the ascent of his son
King 'Abdullah II to the throne, no major changes occurred in the Jordanian position
on Jerusalem. But the new King has shown more interest in concentrating on internal
development and came to the throne at a time when the general trend to play a
smaller role in the Palestinian cause had already crystallised among the Jordanian
officials.
Jordan showed no interest in participating in the negotiations on Jerusalem,
which took place between Israel and the Palestinians at Camp David and Taba in
2000, nor in raising the issue of its role in any future settlement, despite the Israeli
commitment in the peace agreement with Jordan to give "priority" to the Jordanian
role in Jerusalem. Senior Jordanian politicians had expressed their intention to avoid
direct participation in the final negotiations. For instance, in August 1999 the current
Jordanian Prime Minister, 'Abd al-Rauf al-Rawabda, said that Jordan had the right to
109 Interviews: Fayiz al-Tarawna and 'Adnan Abu-'Uda.
110 Intreviews: Fayiz al-Tarawna and Kamil Abu-Jabir.
111 Treaty of Peace between Israel and the Jordan; cited in Abdul Hadi, Documents on
Palestine, vol. 2, pp. 224-230.
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participate in the final negotiations to protect its interests, although "without being
partners in the signing".112
This position reveals Jordan's attitude towards its role in the political
settlement of the Palestinian question. It had developed over years, and become
clearer following the Oslo Accords.
Fayiz al-Tarawna, the current head of the Royal Court, summarised this
attitude. He based his view on what he called the "responsibility theory".* This is a
reference to the trend common in many Palestinian and Arab regimes and influential
groups to place the responsibility on Jordan for the numerous Arab failures in dealing
with the Palestinian question. This trend made Jordanian politicians believe that any
agreement reached with Jordan, or with Jordanian participation in achieving it, would
not be accepted, whatever its content, and would be portrayed by some powers as a
conspiracy. Al-Tarawna expressed his view as follows:
In the final negotiations we shall declare our position in spheres where we
have an interest, such as the refugees and Jerusalem, and we shall co-operate
with, support, and back the Palestinians. However, we shall not be a direct
party to the agreement, nor shall we sign it. The negotiations could lead to
concessions, which, in turn would lead to accusations that Jordan is part of a
conspiracy. We do not want to be part of these concessions, nor do we want
to return to the "responsibility theory".113
This position completed the redefinition of Jordan's political role in the Arab-
Israeli conflict, even where Jerusalem was concerned. Jordan, which had once
regarded its unification with the West Bank as sacred and Jerusalem as the jewel in
the Hashemite crown, had now become an "external" Arab party supporting its
"brothers" in Palestine. Jerusalem as well as the West Bank were no longer national
internal issues for the Jordanian nation-state.
Nevertheless, it is expected that Jordan will continue to carry out its
responsibilities in the city until an agreement is reached."4 If there is no agreement
on Jerusalem, or if the peace process collapses completely, then Jordan could ask to
112 Al-Mustaqbal al-'ArabI, no. 248, October 1999.
*
Af Tarawna used the Arabic word (fV/zr) that I translate as "responsibility".
113 Interview, Fayiz al-Tarawna.
114 For instance, in January 2001 the Jordanian Ministry of the Awqaf declared the
appointment of 160 new teachers in the awqaf schools in Jerusalem (see al-Ra'y, 14 January
2001).
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have the article in the treaty with Israel on Jerusalem put into effect so as to clarify
Israeli recognition of Jordan's responsibilities in the city.
At the same time, bearing these responsibilities in the city will continue to be
a source of national pride, and a useful theme in the discourse on the mobilisation of
support. It would also be evidence that Jordan was contributing its share to the
Palestinian cause, especially in times of escalating tension. An example was al-Aqsa
Intifada, when Jordanian public opinion demanded that more support be given to the
Palestinians to confront the Israelis. The Jordanian newspapers and political
statements at that time offered several examples of how Jerusalem could serve such a
function. For instance, in early 2001 the government-owned newspaper, al-Ra'y,
published a leader quoting an unnamed "senior Jordanian official" who said:
"[Jordan] will not give up the Muslim and Christian Shrines in Jerusalem until the
achievement of (full) Palestinian sovereignty over the city". The article concluded:
The Hashemite relationship with the shrines preceded the unification of the
two Banks in 1950. On 30 August 1924 al-Hajj Amln al-Husaynl, the then
President of the Supreme Muslim Council, asked Amir 'Abdullah bin
al-Husayn that the whole construction of al-Haram al-Quds! be under the
full patronage of Amir 'Abdullah, and since that day the Hashemite
patronage of the shrines has not ceased."5
3.5 Conclusion
This chapter has described the development of the association between Jerusalem
and the Hashemite regime of Jordan, and how this was used in the construction of a
national state. The significance of Jerusalem brought about the achievement of the
Transjordan Arab Legion in defending the city against the Jewish troops, which, in
turn, facilitated the unification of the East and West Banks of Jordan.
Nevertheless, the chapter has also shown that, despite religious and
ideological beliefs and discourse, political factors such as the balance of power and
domestic political agendas have greater power.
The calculation of the balance of power was the reason why King 'Abdullah I
accepted the partition of Palestine in the pre-1948 period as a solution for the conflict
between the Jews and the Palestinian Arabs, and so accepted the internationalisation
115
Al-Ra'y, 13 January 2001 (see the text of the letter mentioned in the first section of this
chapter).
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of Jerusalem. However, developments during the war and the control by the Arab
Legion over East Jerusalem caused the King to reject internationalisation and to
reach an understanding with the other power in Jerusalem - Israel - to partition the
city. Thus it was that Israel gained West Jerusalem and called it Jerusalem, and
Jordan gained East Jerusalem and called it Jerusalem, or Arab Jerusalem.
The role of Jordan in Jerusalem also changed in a similar way, for the state
redefined its relationship with the city several times. In the 1950s it considered
Jerusalem part of the Jordanian state and refused to regard it as a centre of sub-
identity within the state (the Palestinian identity). However, in deference to
Palestinian wishes and Arab pressure, Jordan was gradually forced to change its view
and regard the city as a centre of Palestinian identity, although links continued to be
maintained. Finally, by the late 1990s, Jordan had completely redefined its
relationship with Jerusalem, for it recognised that the Palestinians were the party
responsible for negotiating the city's future.
Jordan has expressed the religious Arab Islamic discourse on Jerusalem since
the 1920s, and the city has become part of the country's Arab Islamic national
identity, which has been constructed over the years. That is why Jordan is expected
to continue bearing its responsibilities there. However, it is no longer because
Jerusalem is part of the Jordanian state or because Jordan is seeking to re-establish its
rule in the West Bank, but on the basis ofArab and Islamic solidarity.
In short, the Arab Islamic discourse and the association between Jordanian
identity and Jerusalem did not prevent the redefinition of Jordan's political positions
towards the political settlement and the state's relationship with Jerusalem according





This chapter discusses the Arab-Muslim dimension of the Jerusalem question,
especially whether the religious and historical significance of Jerusalem makes Arab
and Muslim countries see themselves as directly responsible for the future of the city.
Or, according to the nation-state scheme, do these countries define their role as that
of a group of states supporting another state or nation (Palestine), though not as
partners in the issue?
The argument is that since the Arab and Muslim countries have in general
aimed to establish their own nation-states, rather than a union, they have defined
their role as supporters, not direct players, in the Jerusalem issue. Nevertheless, their
position and the degree of their participation have changed as a result of the
influence of various factors.
Chapter One also analyses how the question of Jerusalem has affected the
construction of nation-state and identity in the Arab and Muslim worlds. The chapter
is divided into two sections:
1. Jerusalem and the Muslim world.
2. Jerusalem and the Arab world.
4.1 Jerusalem and the Muslim World
Unlike the idea of Arab unity, there were no serious attempts in the first half of the
twentieth century to establish Muslim unity, especially at the official level. However,
during the 1920s and 1930s, the Palestinian leadership had managed to gain Muslim
support by publicising the Zionist threat to the holy places of Jerusalem. The
highlighting of Jerusalem as the centre of the conflict in Palestine, as explained in
Chapter One, certainly contributed to making Palestine a subject of public concern in
the Muslim and Arab worlds during the twentieth century.
Muslim interest in the Jerusalem question was reinforced by three major
events: the campaign in the 1920s to restore the holy places, the Muslim General
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Congress in 1931, and the establishment of the Organisation of the Islamic
Conference (OIC) in 1969.
4.1.1 The Holy Places Restoration Campaign (1920s)
After assuming the presidency of the Supreme Muslim Council (SMC), Amin
al-HusaynT began an intensive campaign in 1923 to restore the Islamic holy shrines
in Jerusalem, especially al-Aqsa Mosque and the Dome of the Rock. Thus
delegations visited Hijaz, India, Iraq, Kuwait, Bahrain, Egypt, Turkey and other
countries, explaining the dilapidated and dangerous state of these shrines, and
emphasising the necessity of restoring them to prevent their collapse. The declared
aim of the delegations was to raise funds for restoration, and Amin signed a written
pledge on their behalf and before the Mandatory authority that they would not take
part in political activity of any kind.1
In reality, what happened later was completely the opposite: during their
visits, the delegations took the opportunity to emphasise the Zionist threat to
Palestine. Amin al-Husayni himself explained to his hosts, and to General Allenby,
during a dinner party in Egypt, that he wanted to direct the attention of the Muslim
world to their holy places.
During this period Amin al-Husayni established relations with non-Arab-
Muslim leaders, most importantly the Indian Muslims, such as the well-known
Indian leader Muhammad 'All, whom he met in 1924 during a conference in Hijaz.
Those leaders promised to back the Palestinians in saving the holy places from
Jewish aggression.3
The campaign was vital in persuading Muslim public opinion to take a
religious view of the Palestinian question by means of the situation in the holy city of
Jerusalem. At the same time, the campaign provided an opportunity for the
Palestinian leadership to open channels of communication with prominent Muslim
activists in other countries.
1
Porath, Emergence, p.205, Mattar, The Mufti, p.29.
2 Muhsin, Filastln, pp.59-61.
3 FO 371/16009: The Pan Islamic Movement.
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4.1.2 The General Muslim Congress: 1931
In the shadow of the escalating dispute over the Wailing Wall in 1929 and 1930,
intensive communication took place between Palestinian leaders and Muslim
activists in other countries to initiate united institutional action. Most remarkable was
the co-ordination between Amln al-Husaym and the Muslim Indian activist Shawkat
'All. It was decided that the vehicle of the joint Muslim action would be the
establishment of an Islamic University in Jerusalem. In December 1931, in one of his
reports to the Colonial Office in London on the High Commission in Jerusalem,
Arthur Wauchope discussed the idea of this university. He explained that an
agreement had been reached between Amin al-Husaym and Shawkat 'All in the
previous year when the latter visited Jerusalem to attend the burial of his brother
Muhammad 'AH in the vicinity of al-Haram al-Sharif. The High Commissioner
commented in a letter to the Secretary of State for the Colonies in December 1931:
A Muslim university in Jerusalem would of course attract Muslim students
from all over the Muslim world, and make Palestine an important Muslim
religious and intellectual centre. The idea has also certain political impli¬
cations and in particular the possibility of providing the object and the
means of a world-wide Muslim propaganda which also has its centre in
Jerusalem.4
This was an early recognition of how Jerusalem could
1. define the Palestinian question as a Muslim Arab rather than a Palestinian
national issue; and
2. play a role in reviving the Islamist identity and the pan-Islamic political move¬
ment.
Amln al-Husaym and Shawkat 'All began preparations to hold a congress in
Jerusalem. However, various powers opposed the congress. The official reaction
from the Arab countries was not in its favour, especially after news that it intended to
discuss the matter of the Caliphate. King Farq of Egypt'5 the Hashemite leaders of
Iraq and Transjordan, and the Saudi government, all ofwhom were competing for the
4 FO 371/16009.
5 Muhsin, Filastm, p. 107.
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leadership of the Muslim world, were afraid that the congress would prejudice their
opportunities.6
Amin al-Husaynl visited Cairo and assured King Farq that the congress
would not discuss the matter of the Caliphate. He also met the governing board of al-
Azhar University, which not only opposed the congress, but also mobilised
demonstrations against it. Amin assured the board's members that the proposed
university would be a challenge to the Hebrew University in Jerusalem, not to
al-Azhar. After two weeks of attempting unsuccessfully to convince them to support
the congress, Amin al-Husayni turned to members of the Opposition in Egypt and
.7
Syria and invited them to attend the congress instead.
At the same time the French diplomatic delegation in Cairo contacted the
High Commissioner in Egypt and expressed its anxiety that at the congress the
question of the Islamic University would recede into the background, and that the
proceedings of the congress would be mainly anti-European.
These reactions were signs that Arab as well as European governments pre¬
ferred to minimise Arab involvement in Palestine, out of fear that collaboration on
that issue would provoke popular movements in the Arab countries against the
current regimes as well as European policies. This was an early indicator that nation-
state politics was already directing Arab policies on Palestine in the sense that the
latter was considered an external issue.
As a result of this disapproval, Hajj Amin had to make several concessions
and changes in his plan to hold the congress:
1. He had to depend on Opposition elements to attend the congress instead of
official representatives, which was not what he had expected.
2. He had to pledge to the High Commissioner that the congress would follow a
moderate line on the Jewish question and would not provoke the Jews (see
Chapter One).
6
Elpeleg, The GrandMufti, p.28.
7 FO 371/16009: Arthur Wauchope's letter dated December 1931.
8
FO 371/16009: Secret Telegram no. 1046 dated 26 November 1931 from the High
Commissioner in Cairo.
204
3. No Arab affairs would be discussed, especially Italian policies and the alleged
atrocities in Libya, which was the current hot topic.9
The congress opened in al-Haram al-Sharlf on 7 December 1931 and conti¬
nued for two weeks. Around 145 members attended, of whom 32 were Palestinian,
24 Transjordanian, 31 Syrian, 25 Egyptian, 8 Iraqi, 7 Indian, and 18 Muslims from
other parts of the world. With the exception of Yemen, no country was officially
represented.10
The congress adopted an Organic Law, in which it was stated among other
items: "[the] Congress of all Muslims shall be held in various parts of the world and
shall be called 'the General Muslim Congress'." The Law defined the objectives of
the Congress as being:
to safeguard Muslim interests and to preserve Muslim holy places from any
interference, [and] to establish universities and educational institutions
which will endeavour to create conformity in Muslim culture and to teach
the Arabic Language to Muslim children, provided that the first step to be
taken in this respect shall be the establishment of a university at Jerusalem to
be called the "University of the Masjed Aqsa".11
The conference virtually died at that point. There was no follow-up, nor did
the elected executive committee meet or act, nor was al-Aqsa Mosque University
built. This failure could be attributed to various factors. The British government in
Jerusalem had highlighted the danger of a successful congress of this kind, especially
« • .19..
"on the policy of creating a Jewish National Home in Palestine". British officials
and some of Amin al-Husayni's Palestinian rivals communicated with personalities
and governments that the congress leaders had contacted to collect donations, and
asked them not to donate. Doubts were raised by the officials about the motives of
the congressmen, and this contributed to the failure of the fundraising efforts.13
Another possible reason was that Amin al-Husayni's original target had been to
attract the support of official Arab and Muslim leaders However, the invitation to
Opposition leaders made the congress a grassroots organisation with radical leanings,
which would lead to confrontation with Britain (see Chapter One).
9 FO 371/16009: Minutes of an interview between the High Commissioner and Hajj Amin.
10 FO 371/16009: Police Report to the High Commissioner in Jerusalem.
11 Ibid.
12 FO 371/16009: Report dated 8 February 1932 from Jerusalem to the Secretary of State.
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However, the congress, the restoration campaign and other related activities
clearly produced noticeable effects and indications:
The holy places of Jerusalem were vital in giving the conflict in Palestine a
religious definition, and in raising the awareness of Muslim public opinion on the
issue.
At the official level, Arab rulers were hesitant to become embroiled in the
Palestinian question, especially if this would clash with British policy. Nevertheless,
the development of public opinion made their participation unavoidable. A study
conducted by the British Police in Jerusalem - and sent to the Foreign Office in
London - stated:
The vehemence with which the cause of the Palestine Muslims was then
[after 1928] taken up by the neighbouring countries of Transjordan and
Syria and later on, in a lesser degree, in other Islamic countries, brought
home to the Arab leaders the political strength of religious propaganda and
the unity of Islam.14
From the study it appears that Jerusalem was a factor in the driving-force
towards joint action and unity, despite the requirements of the separate state
construction, which necessitated the concentration on domestic affairs.
1. While united Muslim action was considered important by the Palestinians to help
them face the Jewish National Home policy, Islamist leaders regarded Jerusalem
as a focus for mobilising their programme of unity. Two of these leaders were the
Indian brother activists, Muhammad and Shawkat 'All, whose main goal was
united Muslim action, and who considered the mosques of Jerusalem as a means
of achieving it.
2. The "pan-Islamism" that was being created on the basis of Jerusalem and
Palestine was estimated by the European powers who were ruling the region,
especially Britain and France, as a serious challenge which could abort their
political plans. British officials observed that while nationalist leaders in the Arab
countries had become "absorbed in local affairs", having only "intermittent dis¬
cussions of contemplated plans", and "discussions of arrangements for Arab
confederation", the Indian Muslim activists and the interment of the deceased
13 'Abd al-Hainid al-Sa'ih, Filastm, p.30.
14 FO 371/16009: The Pan-Islamic Movement.
206
Indian leader Muhammad 'All in Palestine (in al-Haram al-Sharif) changed the
trend. A campaign started "of distinctly anti-European, pan-Arab and pan-Islamic
character" with calls for the reinstatement of the Caliphate, and other demands.15
In other words, Jerusalem was triggering a programme which challenged the
scheme of separate nation-states and enhanced a collective identity in opposition
to the national identities of the newly established states.
4.1.3 The Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC)
On 21 August 1969, an Australian member of the Pentacostal sect of the Church of
God set fire to al-Aqsa Mosque.16 As a result the heads of Muslim states convened a
summit in Morocco from 22 to 25 September, at which it was decided to establish
the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC). The Organisation's charter
included aims such as strengthening "Islamic solidarity among member states", and
"cooperation in the political, economic, social, cultural and scientific fields", in
addition to "the struggle of all Muslim people to safeguard their dignity,
independence and national rights".17
The Organisation's headquarters were located temporarily in Jeddah,
although al-Quds al-Shariif (Jerusalem) would be the "permanent seat [after] the
liberation". The aims of the Organisation also included co-ordinated action to
"safeguard the Holy Places" and to "support the struggle of the Palestinian people
• • •• • • • • 18
and assist them in recovering their rights and liberating their occupied territories."
Between 1969 and 2001 nine Islamic Summit Conferences and 28 Confe¬
rences of Foreign Ministers were held and dozens of committees formed to deal with
matters of politics, economics, health, education, science, sport, etc. In addition,
universities, research centres, funds, information agencies and financial institutions
were established, some of which became active and vital such as the Islamic
Development Bank, which supports numerous enterprises and participates in expand¬
ing the banking sector in the Muslim world.
15 Ibid.
16 Guardian (25 August 1969).
17 OIC web site: www.oic-un.org
18 Ibid.
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The establishment of all these institutions - in 56 states - could be seen as a
result of the arson attack on al-Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem in 1969. Nevertheless, the
question remains: what role does the OIC play in the issue of Jerusalem?
On the one hand, the Islamic summits have tackled this problem. A number
of them have been named after events or places related to the city, such as the Third
Summit in Mecca in 1981: "Session on Palestine and al-Quds al-Sharif'; the Sixth
Summit in Dakar in 1991: "Session on al-Quds al-Sharif Concord and Unity", and
the Ninth Summit in Doha in 2000: "Session on Peace and Development: al-Aqsa
Intifada".19 On the other hand, however, it could be asserted that no efficient or
practical role has been played by the OIC regarding Jerusalem. This assertion could
be supported by an analysis of the Organisation's attitudes and actions regarding the
various aspects of the conflict over Jerusalem.
4.1.3.1 The Solution in Jerusalem
The summits and meetings of the OIC have rejected the Israeli policies on Jerusalem
and called for the solution to the problem by the Israeli withdrawal to the boundaries
of June 1967, asserting at the same time the right of free access to the holy places for
the three religions after the liberation. The second conference in 1974 declared:
"Muslims alone could be [the] honest guardians of [Jerusalem], because they believe
90
in the religions of the three prophets".
In the early years of the Organisation there was the assertion that Israel was
occupying "parts of three Islamic states" and that the OIC supported "the brother
• • *21Arab-Muslim states in restoring their occupied territories". After 1974, when the
PLO was recognised officially as the representative of the Palestinians, there was a
change in the terminology of the OIC, which now began to declare "Arab
99
sovereignty", "Muslim and human rights" and "religious freedom," and to stress
19 "OIC Summits" (Arabic), PNC Archive, Amman; OIC web site.
20 "Second OIC Conference", PNC Archive, Amman.
21 "Resolutions of the Fourth Conference of Foreign Ministers" (Arabic), Benghazi, 24-26
March 1973, PNC Archive, Amman.
22 "Resolutions of the Sixth Conference of Foreign Ministers" (Arabic), Jeddah, 12-15 July
1975, PNC Archive, Amman.
208
• 9t
that the solution was to return Jerusalem "to its previous Arab and Muslim status".
However, asserting "Arab sovereignty" was not an expression of united identity but a
symptom of disunity and dispute. Using such an expression instead of referring to
states' rights could indicate the tension between the PLO and Jordan, because of the
Palestinian insistence on being the sole representative of the Palestinians and on
building an independent entity in Palestine. Thus omitting any reference to a state's
sovereignty over Jerusalem avoided provoking the PLO, while a reference to Arab
and Muslim sovereignty avoided provoking Jordan.
It was a similar situation when the OIC decided to establish a permanent
committee for Jerusalem in 1975. Although the Jordanians would have liked to be in
charge of it, the OIC members decided to appoint Morocco instead to avoid problems
between the Palestinians and Jordanians. One Jordanian official said:
When the Jerusalem Committee was established, we thought it would be
better if we were in charge. We were there in Jerusalem, and we were
responsible for financing the waqf, but the Arabs wanted things to be other¬
wise, and the Palestinians wanted to distance Jordan from Jerusalem. So
choosing Morocco or any other country except Jordan was in their interests.
Actually, the issue was not Jerusalem.. .24
However, the development of the idea of the Palestinian state caused the OIC
to declare that Jerusalem would be its capital. The Third OIC Summit in Mecca in
1981 produced the statement that the OIC had "the commitment to liberate Arab
Jerusalem to be the capital of the Palestinian state".25
Nevertheless, the OIC documents continued to hold the almost unchangeable
position that Israel must withdraw from East Jerusalem and the rest of the territory
occupied in 1967 as part of the solution to the problem between Arabs and Muslims
and Israel.
4.1.3.2 The Methods and Tools of the Solution
The OIC view of the method and tools to deal with the issue of Jerusalem has been
changeable. At the First Summit a debate was held on the mechanism of dealing with
23 "Resolutions of the Ninth Conference of Foreign Ministers Conference" (Arabic), Dakar,
24-28 April 1978, PNC Archive, Amman.
24
Interview, 'Adnan Abu 'Uda. (The member states of the committee are Bangladesh,
Egypt, Ghana, Indonesia, Iraq, Iran, Jordan, Lebanon, Malaysia, Mauritania, Niger,
Palestine, Saudi Arabia, Senegal and Syria.)
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the Israeli occupation. There were those who wanted to call for struggle, and those
who preferred political means. The controversy was resolved by calling on the
international powers to secure a speedy Israeli withdrawal from Arab lands occupied
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in the June 1967 War. At the same time, however, the determination to liberate
Jerusalem by struggle or jihad was expressed, which was repeated in subsequent
sessions. For instance, the Fourth Conference for Foreign Ministers in 1973 asked
the member states "to open offices in the Muslim countries for volunteers to
participate in jihad to liberate the holy lands". 7 In addition, the Third Summit in
1981 declared: "Jihad has its clear Islamic concept that could not be misunderstood"
and that practical measures would be adopted along these lines "according to
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consultations with the Muslim states".
However, the 1991 Summit in Dakar, called the "Session of al-Quds
al-Sharlf: Concord and Unity", rejected a call from Chairman 'Arafat to promote
jihad as a method of liberation. It stated instead: "we solemnly pledge to unite our
efforts in defence of all Islamic causes, and in the first place the cause of al-Quds
— 90
al-Shariif, the foremost cause of Islam". This change was a result of both 'Arafat's
position in opposing the current war against Iraq, and the United States' preparations
to hold an international peace conference.
Here again the situation reflected how controversies on issues unconnected
with Jerusalem influenced the policies of the Muslim states towards that city. The
refusal to reaffirm jihad as a means of solving the problem of Jerusalem aimed at
punishing Chairman 'Arafat, and this was a manifestation of how Muslim states
dealt with Jerusalem as a problem of Palestinian national identity, not as their own
issue.
The subsequent OIC Summit in 1994 "appreciated" the peace accords and
"supported" the current peace process. It called for similar progress on both the
25 "Third OIC Summit", Mecca, 1981, PNC Archive, Amman.
26 Guardian (26 September 1969).
27 "Resolutions of the Fourth Conference of Foreign Ministers", 1973, PNC Archive,
Amman.
28 "Third OIC Summit", Mecca, 1981, PNC Archive, Amman.
29 "Sixth Islamic Summit", Dakar, 9-11 December 1991; OIC web site www.oic-un.org
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Syrian and Lebanese tracks, and demanded an independent Palestinian state com-
T A
prising all the occupied territories, with al-Quds al-Sharif as its capital.
In 1997, in the shadow of tension in the occupied territories, the Teheran
Summit used the word "liberation" again, and declared the Muslim states' "resolve
and determination to regain the Holy City of al-Quds and noble sanctuary of Masjid
al-Aqsa".31
The final communique of the Ninth OIC Summit held in Doha in November
2000, two months after the eruption of the al-Aqsa Intifada, contained long and
detailed resolutions to the Palestine and Jerusalem question. It "hailed" the "heroic"
uprising in defence "of al-Quds al-Sharlf and all sacred shrines", supported the
PLO's demand for an international supervision and monitoring committee to
"prevent colonial settlement in al-Quds and the Occupied Arab territories", and
demanded that member states having relations with Israel sever them. However,
there was no return to the declaration of jihad or similar methods.
In fact, the debate on jihad and liberation was only a rhetorical expression
without any practical results. The OIC did not succeed in implementing even modest
practical action regarding Jerusalem. For instance, the OIC continually failed to raise
funds for the Palestinians in general, and for Jerusalem in particular. In 1970 it was
decided to establish a Palestine Fund to collect donations from states and peoples.
No progress was achieved, and so a Jerusalem Committee was established in 1975.
The Committee, however, did not manage to play a tangible political role. In 1976 it
was decided to establish a Jerusalem Fund, into which Muslim states were invited to
pay voluntary donations. However, only minimal contributions were made. In 1978,
despite the small amount of money that had been donated, it was decided that the
Fund would consist of 100 million dollars. Yet by 1980, many states had still not
even fixed the amount that they were going to pay. So, the annual Conference of
Foreign Ministers decided to activate the collection of donations by establishing a
30 "Seventh Islamic Summit", Casablanca, 13-15 December 1994; OIC web site: www.oic-
un.org
31 OIC web site: www.oic-un.org
32 "Resolutions of the Third Conference of Foreign Ministers" (Arabic), Jeddah, 26-28
December 1970, PNC Archive, Amman.
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waqfwith the same targeted capital of 100 million dollars.33 In 1995 the Jerusalem
Committee created the Bait-Mai al-Quds al-Sharif (Jerusalem Fund Agency) with the
same targeted capital. It took five years to hold the first meeting of the Agency's
Board of Directors consisting of the finance ministers of the member states. At this
first meeting - in Morocco in February 2000 - the Director of the Agency, the
Palestinian Ambassador to Morocco, Wajih al-Qasim, revealed that the Agency's
plans for housing, education, health, restoration, etc. needed 100 million dollars to
implement them, whereas the Committee had received only 2 million.34
This inefficiency was attributed to various factors: (1) The OIC is only a co¬
ordinator and therefore lacks authority. (2) The member states give priority to their
national policies, and are guided by other frameworks such as the Arab League. (3)
Continual disputes between these states affect their ability to implement joint
policies. (4) The OIC has apparently had the function of showing rhetorical support
and acting as a containment institution to satisfy domestic Arab and Muslim public
opinions, as explained below.
4.1.3.3 Definition of the Parties to the Conflict
The establishment of the OIC following the fire in al-Aqsa Mosque, and the
formation of a range of committees on Jerusalem indicate the Islamic significance of
Jerusalem to the Muslim world. However, the actions of the OIC reveal an attitude in
dealing with it as though it were a crisis instead of constructing a strategy for solving
the long-term problem. The OIC's strategy has been directed at domestic public
opinion in the Muslim nation-states rather than at the issue itself. The governmental
polices reflect the care taken by these states not to define themselves as bearing
direct responsibility for the parties to the conflict, but as states supporting other states
(Jordan, followed by the Palestinians).
Among the evidence for this definition is the rhetorical nature of the OIC
discourse, which declares positions without implementing or complying with them.
For instance, Turkey is a major military ally of Israel, while according to the former
Indonesian President 'Abd al-Rahman 'Abd al-Wahid, Israel has hundreds of
33 "Resolutions of the Annual Conferences of Foreign Ministers (1970—1981)", PNC
Archive, Amman.
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millions of dollars invested in Indonesia, which is the largest Muslim country in the
world.35
Other evidence shows that some Arab/Muslim leaders insist that the
Palestinians alone have the right to negotiate and decide the fate of the city, and so
they refuse to take part in this process. A practical example of this attitude was the
eighteenth session of the Jerusalem Committee on 30 August 2000. The session was
held after the American-Israeli-Palestinian summit at Camp David, where great
pressure had been put upon Chairman 'Arafat to reach a compromise on the
Jerusalem problem. When Chairman 'Arafat's attempts to hold an Arab or Muslim
summit failed, the Jerusalem Committee was seen as a possible alternative and so it
was invited to a special meeting in Morocco (see Chapter One). The US government
contacted the participating states to persuade them not to adopt any action, and
• • • •
advised them to leave the issue to the Israelis and Palestinians alone. The Israeli
newspaper, the Jerusalem Post, reported:
Prime Minister Ehud Barak said he hopes the intensive behind-the-scenes
diplomatic activity of the last few weeks would prevent the conference from
passing resolutions tying Arafat's hands on the Jerusalem issue, thus pre¬
cluding any possible agreement.37
Attitudes of this kind indicate that while the Palestinian leadership has, over
several decades, defended an "independent Palestinian decision" against any inter¬
vention or control, it does not claim the same exclusive right over independent
decisions regarding Jerusalem. 'Arafat wanted Arab and Muslim support against
American-Israeli pressure. He wanted an Arab or Muslim body to define Jerusalem
as an Arab-Muslim-Christian issue that could not be decided at the Palestinian-
Israeli level.38
However, it is clear that the result of American pressure, in addition to Arab
and Muslim hesitation to bear any responsibility, was that the Committee asserted its
previous position on Jerusalem and would "support the stand of the State of Palestine
firmly adhering to its sovereignty over al-Quds al-Sharlf'. The Committee's decision
34 See al-Quds al- 'Arabi{\A February 2000).
35
al-Khalij (5 December 1999).
36
al-Ra'y (27 August 2000).
37 Jerusalem Post (28 August 2000).
38
al-Hayat (27 August 2000).
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seemed to be in line with the American-Israeli demand. Israeli Radio broadcast a
statement attributed to an unnamed senior Israeli official, welcoming the Commit¬
tee's decision because it "did not make the decision instead of 'Arafat and gave the
Palestinian Chairman complete freedom to reach an agreement."39
The Palestinians wanted greater Arab and Muslim participation in the
Jerusalem issue, whereas the United States and Israel wanted to confine it to the
Palestinian-Israeli level, which is what the Committee actually decided.
In short, the Muslim world has realised that Jerusalem is the core of the
Palestine issue, and that there are special ties between Muslims and its cause.
Nevertheless, at least on the official level, the Muslim world has dealt with Jerusalem
according to the rules of nation-state policies. The Muslim countries do not define
Jerusalem as a direct nation-state concern, but as a Muslim issue that may need a
special kind of solidarity. However, it is not possible to discuss the Muslim world's
policies regarding Jerusalem in complete isolation from those of the Arab world,
especially at the popular level. This is explained in greater detail in the following
section.
4.2 Jerusalem and the Arab World
Factors that dictate the actions of the Arab world regarding Jerusalem are different
from those in the Muslim world. Firstly, the Arab nationalist movement was already
active when the conflict in Jerusalem escalated in the 1920s. Secondly, in addition to
the religious and historical role of Jerusalem in mobilising Muslim and Arab public
opinion, Palestine was also crucial for the Arab world's search for geographical and
cultural unity as a link between the Arab countries of Africa and Asia. Thirdly,
Palestine has been part of the expansionist ambitions of several Arab regimes and
leaders.
By the mid-1930s, the confrontations in Palestine and the communication
between Palestinian leaders and activists and those in other Arab countries had
become a daily religious and nationalist issue around the Arab world. Arab leaders,
either because of public opinion in their countries or because of the regimes' regional
policies, were compelled to show concern for the Palestinian cause.
39
al-Quds al- 'Arabi(reporting from Israeli Radio, 30 August 2000).
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The situation was also recognised in London, where a British Cabinet
Committee was formed in 1938, holding its first meeting in October of that year.
From the very beginning, its members accepted the Arab dimension of the conflict.
During the discussion of the proposed Jewish-Arab conference, the new Colonial
Secretary, Malcolm MacDonal, said that the participation of neighbouring Arab
countries was necessary since a settlement "would never be reached" if Palestine was
treated in isolation. This view was supported by the Prime Minister, Neville
Chamberlain, who added: "[Palestine] has now become a pan-Arab question and the
Arab 'princes' would be more likely to form a united front if they were omitted from
the conference than if they were invited to attend it."40 Clearly, Britain now recog¬
nised that Palestine was no longer the issue of the Palestinians alone. However, the
British politicians decided to take advantage of this fact by directing the Arab
regimes to support those solutions which matched British interests, instead of
supporting the Palestinian resistance.
During the Second World War there was serious consideration of an idea to
resolve the Jewish-Palestinian question inside an Arab framework. The idea, which
was suggested by various parties, including Arab leaders, and supported by
prominent Zionist leaders such as Chaim Weizmann and David Ben Gurion, was to
establish a Jewish state as a unit in a larger Arab federal state.41
In August 1943, a British Cabinet Committee studied a proposal to establish a
federal state comprising Palestine, Transjordan, Syria and Southern Lebanon as the
state of Great Syria, which would also include a Jewish state and an international
state consisting of the Jerusalem area and Bethlehem. However, following an evalu¬
ation of the scheme, the Committee abandoned the idea, in particular because the
Arab parties would not accept the continuation of foreign rule in the state, France
would not support such a scheme, and there was the strong likelihood of rivalry for
the leadership of the state.42
These ideas had been the basis of the historians' argument that the formation
of the Arab League in March 1945 was a British invention aimed at containing the
40 Ahmed Mahmoud H. Gomaa, The Foundation of the League ofArab States (London &
New York: Longman Group, 1977), p.7.
41
Ibid., pp.11, 134.
42 For details, see ibid., pp. 142-150.
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radical attitudes in the Arab states, which had been mobilised by the issue of
Palestine.43 However, further studies since the end of the 1970s, when the British
documents of the 1940s became available, have proved that this assumption was not
accurate. Public opinion in the Arab world, the need to organise relations between
the Arab states, in addition to the Palestinian issue, encouraged Arab leaders, namely
Mustafa al-Nahas, the Egyptian Prime Minister, to form the Arab League.44
It cannot be said that the Palestinian issue was the direct reason for
establishing the League, which was different from the OIC, as has been explained.
This can be seen from the League's Pact, which did not include any particular
reference to Palestine, but only an annex regarding the choice of Palestinian
representatives for the League's meetings, owing to Palestine not being an indepen¬
dent state nor having an officially recognised representative.45 Indeed, Palestinian
political parties and leaders criticised the Pact because it did not adopt a clear
position on the Palestinian issue.46
However, the Arab League was a prominent influence in shaping the Arab
region. It was a framework for organising relations between the Arab states, rejecting
the idea of establishing them as separate political units. This was important in terms
of how these states would deal with a range of issues, including Palestine and
Jerusalem. In a framework of this kind, Palestine would be viewed as the land of one
of the Arab nations who sought the establishment of its own nation-state, and this
shifted issues such as Jerusalem from the domestic sphere to that of external policy.
The Arab League did assume responsibility for the Palestinian question, not
only in choosing the Palestinian representative in the League but also in having the
authority to respond to international proposals and resolutions, especially through the
43
See, for instance, Jamil Matar & 'All al-DIn Hilal, Al-Nizam al-Iqlimial- 'Arab!: Dirasafi
al-Alaqat al-Siyasiya al-Arabiyya [The Arab Regional Order: A Study of Arab Political
Relations] 6th edn (Beirut: The Arab Unity Studies Center, 1999), p. 175.
44 See examples of these studies in Gomaa, The Foundation, pp. 142-150 & 190; Yunan
Lablb Rizq, MawqifBaritaniya, pp.181-196; Marwan al-Buhayri, Baritaniya wa al-Jam'a
al-Arabiyya: al- Sanawat al- Ta 'sLsyya [Britain and the Arab League: The Foundation
Years]; al-Mustaqbal al- ArabI, vol. 8, no.76 (Junel985) pp.11-14.
45 "The Arab League Pact", Annex on Palestine, in Gomaa, The Foundation, p.301.
46
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League's delegations to the United Nations 47 This could be attributed to the fact that
the Palestinians had no recognised leadership at the time, and that the Arab regimes
were in dispute with Amin al-Husayni, who was regarded by many Palestinians as
their leader. The dispute was due to Amin's support for the Axis powers in the
Second World War and his role in mobilising opposition and rebellion in some of the
Arab countries (see Chapter One).
The League held a number of meetings including summits between 1945 and
1948, at which a special committee was established to deal with the Palestinian
problem. A new Palestinian leadership was formed by establishing a Higher Arab
Executive Committee in Palestine with financial bodies to deal with the problem.48
However, confusion and internal controversies were characteristic of Arab policies
on the Palestinian issue. The decision to enter the war was taken only after long hesi¬
tation, and until the end of 1947 there was no sign that any Arab country had any
intention of becoming involved. The primary position in the Arab League was to
support the Palestinians and to facilitate the entry of volunteers into Palestine. The
factors affecting the decision of Arab states to enter the war included public opinion,
the competition among regimes and the fear that King 'Abdullah I would succeed in
establishing rule over the territories allocated to the Arabs in the Partition Plan.49
The hasty decision to enter the war reflected the lack of Arab political or
military strategy to deal with the Palestinian issue. The Israeli occupation of West
Jerusalem and the Jordanian annexation of the West Bank and East Jerusalem created
two dimensions of the issue of Jerusalem: Arab-Israeli, and Arab-Jordanian.
The remainder of this section is devoted to the discussion of two topics: the
general Arab view of the solution of the Jerusalem issue, and the Arab response to
the Israeli policies for the city.
47
See, for instance, the participation by the League General Secretary in the debate on the
Partition Plan in 1947, The Times (7 & 10 October 1947).
48
al-Buhayrl, Biritanya wa al-Jam 'a, p. 15.
49 For the decision-making in late April 1948 regarding the war, see Haykal, al-Jnyush,
pp.49-50, 72-76 & 83-86.
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4.2.1 The Arab View of the Political Solution to the Jerusalem Question
4.2.1.1 From 1948 to 1967
In the aftermath of the 1948 War the Arabs were divided into two camps with regard
to Jerusalem. Jordan's position, which was supported also by the Palestinian leaders
and personalities, was to reject the internationalisation of the city (see Chapter
Three). Jordan was trying to reach an understanding with Israeli to partition
Jerusalem, whereas the Palestinians were looking for full liberation, so both parties
opposed internationalisation. The rest of the Arab countries were demanding inter¬
nationalisation according to UN Resolution 181, and rejecting the claims by Israel
and Jordan to sovereignty over the West and East sectors of Jerusalem respectively.
This position had several implications and interpretations.
1. The situation was largely a symptom of Jordanian-Arab rivalry and the enmity
between King 'Abdullah I and other Arab leaders. The Arab countries refused to
recognise the union of the East and West Banks or any expansion of the King's
territory. Al-Azhar in Egypt denounced the resolutions of the unification con¬
ference held in Jericho on 1 December 1948 and declared anyone who supported
them a non-believer.5 In this context, Arab leaders would oppose any special
terms of the King's rule over the holy places of Jerusalem.
One of the commonly held interpretations of the Arab stance at that time was
that it was a kind of "jealousy" of King 'Abdullah's achievement in the city. A
British official commented: "The Arabs are jealous of Jordan's occupation of part
of Jerusalem."51 Jordanian officials said also that the Arab position had resulted
"from ignorance of the position on the ground" and that the Israeli border
extended to the city. Therefore, internationalisation "would merely have the
result of admitting the Israelis into a strategically vital area."52 These comments
reveal how inter-Arab rivalry and disputes could influence the Arab position
towards Jerusalem and prove that it was not only an Arab-Israeli conflict.
2. Arab support for the UN resolution advocating internationalisation was part of a
general policy calling for the implementation of all UN resolutions concerning
30
Abu-Odeh, Jordanians, p.45.
51 F0371/104775: P.S. Fallato Harold (Foreign Office), 24 December 1953.
52 FO371/104775: Report from the British Embassy in Amman, 3 September 1953.
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Palestine, which meant that Israel had to withdraw from those areas of the
territories under its control.53
3. The acceptance by the Arabs of internationalisation as a solution in Jerusalem
clearly implied their acceptance of Israel's existence. Therefore the Arab
countries did not see the conflict with Israel as a zero-sum issue (that of the
state's existence), but as one of territory.
In subsequent years Arab regimes continued their attempts to raise the issue
of internationalisation at the UN General Assembly. However, by 1952/1953 it was
clear that the necessary two-thirds majority to reaffirm the UN decisions on
internationalisation did not exist. There were new international trends for a more
limited internationalisation or international protection, which prevented the Arab
countries from raising the problem of Jerusalem at the United Nations.54
The changes in the Arab world in the 1950s and the coups d'etat that brought
new regimes into being raised the banners of revolutionary Arabism and Socialism,
resulting in fewer demands for a political settlement of the city and consequently
internationalisation. Nevertheless, East Jerusalem remained a major bone of
contention between the Jordanian and other Arab regimes. Arab countries continued
making frequent attempts, especially during periods of tension with Jordan, to assert
their denial of Jordanian sovereignty in the city as an expression of their refusal to
recognise the union of the West Bank and Jordan.
A noteworthy example was the dispute between Jordan and Egypt in 1959—
1960, when Egypt decided to open a consulate in East Jerusalem although the consul
had not been officially installed.55 The controversy was Egypt's refusal to submit
credentials through the Jordanian Foreign Ministry, submitting them instead to the
city's governor as did Western consulates. This tactic indicated that Egypt did not
recognise East Jerusalem as part of Jordan but only Jordan's de facto power, a
position that Jordan could not accept.56
53 F0371/104775: P.S. Falla to Harold.
54 FO 371/194775: Letter from P.M. Crosthwaite [UK representative to the UN], to James
Bowker [Assistant Under-Secretary of State, Foreign Office], 4 September 1953.




The inter-Arab controversies over the Palestinian question continued over the
years. In January 1964 an Arab summit, later known as the First Arab Summit, was
convened after President Nasir's call to "forget all our differences for the sake of
Palestine." The PLO was officially established by a decision at that Summit.
Another three Arab summits were held before the outbreak of the Arab-Israeli war in
1967, when Israel occupied the rest of Jerusalem.
Jerusalem was not given any particular attention at these summits, although
the establishment of the PLO was a significant step. Perhaps the intention of that
decision was to weaken Jordan's hold on the West Bank and its role as the
representative of the Palestinians. However, this move clearly showed that the Arab
states viewed the solution to the Palestinian problem to be within the framework of
the nation-state scheme. The participation of Arab states in the Palestinian question
would be minimal, the main responsibility being on the shoulders of the Palestinians.
Thus Arab states could devote their efforts to their own internal construction. In
other words, this was a step towards emphasising the definition of the Palestine
question as an external question.
4.2.1.2 The Aftermath of the 1967 War
The Israeli occupation of East Jerusalem in 1967 provoked substantial changes in the
Arab position towards the Jerusalem question. The dispute with Jordan over the city
was set aside, though disputes over other issues continued. The Arab position was
that Jerusalem had the same status as the other territories occupied in the 1967 war,
and therefore Israel should withdraw from the city.
There was concern that if no quick solution were to be reached, Israel would
alter the character of the city. For instance, at the Arab Summit in Khartoum between
29 August and 1 September 1967, the Chairman of the PLO, al-Shuqayrl, stressed
that no concessions be made on the Gaza Strip, the West Bank and al-Himma, and he
asserted the need "to place particular emphasis on the Arab character of Jerusalem".
57
Foreign and Commonwealth Office (Research Paper), "The Arab League and Arab
Summit Conferences", London, October 1986 (Archives, National Library of Scotland,
Edinburgh).
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President Nasir, who was also attending the Summit, supported the idea that priority
should be given to regaining the "West Bank and Jerusalem".5
The efforts to reach a settlement continued to be made by Egypt and Jordan
and by international mediators (see Chapter Three). When the Arab Summit in
Khartoum passed the decision of its three famous noes - "no peace, no recognition,
no negotiation" - with Israel, President Nasir asked King Husayn not to comply with
the Summit's resolutions, but instead to use political means with the United States.
He told the King: "I am afraid that with time the Israelis would find an opportunity to
fill the West Bank with settlements and change the character of Jerusalem".59
From the Sixth Arab Summit in November 1973 in Algeria, and in the
aftermath of the October War, there was a marked change in the Arab position. The
Summit imposed two conditions for peace: (1) that Israel withdraws from all the
"Occupied Arab Territories and Jerusalem in the first place"; and (2) that the
Palestinian people retain its national rights.60 These conditions were repeated at
every subsequent Arab summit.
At the Arab Summits held in Fez in 1982 and Algiers in 1988, two detailed
proposals were adopted which included the following three major points:
1. The withdrawal of Israel from all Arab territories occupied in 1967 including
Arab East Jerusalem.
2. The guarantee of the freedom of worship and practice of religious rites for all
religions at the holy places.
3. The establishment of an independent Palestinian state with Jerusalem as its
capital.61
These principles became the general Arab position towards Jerusalem.
58 al-Hut, 'Ishrun, p. 146.
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4.2.1.3 The Egyptian-Israeli Accords
In addition to the positions described above, and the conditions of the Palestinian and
Jordanian treaties with Israel, there was the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty of March
1979.
At the initial secret meetings held in preparation for President Sadat's visit to
Jerusalem, Hassan Tohami the Egyptian emissary, in a discussion with Moshe Dayan
in Morocco in September 1977, explained how crucial it was for the Arabs to have a
f\9
constructive programme on Jerusalem. At the negotiations the Egyptian President
demanded that Israel withdraw to the 1949 armistice lines, Arab sovereignty be
established in East Jerusalem and that a joint Israeli-Palestinian municipal council be
formed of equal numbers of members from each side. The two sides were to commit
themselves to freedom ofworship and free access to the holy places.63
In response to American wishes, President Sadat agreed to set the Jerusalem
issue aside at the Camp David Summit negotiations in September 1978 until other
issues had been resolved.64 Thus an agreement was reached at the Egyptian-Israeli
level though not in relation to Jerusalem. To resolve this dilemma and to enable the
signing of an agreement, the three sides - American, Israeli and Egyptian - exchange
letters explaining their views on Jerusalem. The letter from Egypt affirmed the
following:
Arab Jerusalem is an integral part of the West Bank.
Arab Jerusalem should be under Arab sovereignty.
The inhabitants of Arab Jerusalem are entitled to exercise their legitimate
national rights, being part of the Palestinian people in the West Bank.
Relevant Security Council resolutions,..., must be applied with regard to
Jerusalem. All the measures taken by Israel to alter the status of the city are null
and void, and should be rescinded.
All peoples must have free access to the city and enjoy freedom of worship.







Essential functions in the city should be shared and controlled by a joint muni¬
cipal council composed of an equal number ofArab and Israeli members.65
The letter did no more than declare a position, for it had no practical meaning
in terms of the peace treaty, nor did it bring about any change in the situation of the
city under the Occupation.
Egypt's signature to a bilateral agreement with Israel was a current example
of nation-state politics. The state gave priority to its own national interests, and to
achieve them, it was ready to start negotiations alone. However, as the subject of
negotiations, Jerusalem was either an Arab-Muslim or a Palestinian issue, though
certainly not exclusively that of the Egyptian nation. So when the Egyptian
government found that the question of Jerusalem could prevent the signing of the
treaty, it agreed to set this obstacle aside while signing the treaty to repossess its own
occupied territories.
The Egyptian treaty had far-reaching consequences in Arab politics.
However, the political position towards Jerusalem in particular did not change, in the
sense that the Arabs continued to demand the Israeli withdrawal from East
Jerusalem. Moreover, the Camp David negotiations clearly indicated that Jerusalem
would be a very complex issue in any future negotiations.
4.2.2 The Arab Response to Israeli Policies in Jerusalem
Arab policies failed to compel Israel to withdraw from East Jerusalem, and to
prevent the Israeli government from implementing its policies of imposing a new fait
accompli on the city. There was no Arab strategy to resolve the problem of Jerusalem
by military means, nor was there any effective policy to encourage international
pressure to be put on Israel to withdraw from or to halt its annexation of the city.
Internal disputes in the Arab world were apparent on various occasions,
which clearly weakened Arab performance. One example was the reaction to the
torching of al-Aqsa mosque in August 1969. Throughout the Arab world there was
the feeling that there must be a response of some kind. Two ideas were suggested.
The first was a call from King Husayn for an Arab summit: "On this black day, I
64
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urge you all to cooperate effectively to save Jerusalem from occupation." The second
idea was the call by King Faysal of Saudi Arabia to organise an Islamic summit.66
Two days later, King Faysal, in a cabled reply to King Husayn, said that he
supported the idea of an Islamic meeting to discuss the Israeli occupation of the
Islamic holy places, while ignoring the call for an Arab summit.67
the demand for an Islamic conference seemed to be a Saudi attack on the
Arab League, which was controlled by President Nasir, and which, according to his
adversaries, had become a tool for Egyptian foreign policy. An Islamic summit,
s o
however, could be a rival organisation beyond his control.
To avoid a crisis over the issue, President Nasir supported the convening of
both Arab and Islamic summits, and suggested to King Faysal that they be held near
the holy places in Saudi Arabia.69 The result was that the first Islamic summit was
convened in Morocco in September. It was not attended by Syria, which had severed
its diplomatic ties with Morocco owing to other disputes. India, with 60 million
Muslims, was not invited because of an administrative mistake by the organising
committee.70
In late December an Arab summit was held also in Morocco. It did not give
much attention to the issue of Jerusalem or the torching of al-Aqsa Mosque. It ended
in failure with disputes erupting over the share that each state should pay to aid
Egypt and Jordan in confronting Israel. The sessions were not completed, nor were
any final statements or resolutions made.71
These methods of dealing with Jerusalem indicate how its religious and
historic status could be exploited by some nation-states to achieve gains that might
not be in the interests of the city itself. Clearly, the significance of Jerusalem did not
help in creating an effective Arab policy that would transcend inter-Arab rivalry.
Indeed, on many occasions the OIC provided a face-saving substitute for the failure
to organise collective Arab action. The large number of members in the OIC meant
66 Guardian (22 August 1969).
67 Guardian (25 August 1969).
68 Ibid.
69 Guardian (27 August 1969).
70 Guardian (22 September 1969).
71 See The Times (22 & 23 December 1969).
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that its meetings could not deal with disputes between the Arabs themselves, unlike
the Arab League. In other words, the OIC was a refuge where Arab countries were
able to show general rhetorical solidarity when they had no ability to act in a tangible
manner either jointly or independently.
Another example of how disputes weakened the power of Arab action
concerning Jerusalem was in August 1980, when Israel passed its Basic Law, which
considered Jerusalem its united capital. At that time, an Arab summit had already
been scheduled for November in Amman. The PLO, Algeria, Syria, Lebanon, Libya
79 i ...
and Yemen boycotted the Summit. Egypt was also absent owing to its earlier
suspension from the Arab League as a result of its treaty with Israel. Certainly, such
widespread boycotting weakened the resolutions of the Summit, which affirmed that
"liberating" Arab Jerusalem was a national duty. It asked the world to take an
unambiguous stance against the Israeli measures in the city, and threatened to sever
Arab state relations with any state that recognised Jerusalem as an Israeli capital or
transferred its embassy there.73
In addition to the disputes described above, Arab action regarding Jerusalem
was certainly hesitant and confused. In mid-August, at the time of the passing of the
Israeli Basic Law, the then Saudi Crown Prince, Fahd, issued a strong statement on
this latest Israeli action: "One must wonder what has been the benefit ofmoderation
if this is the way the West understands 'just peace'." He added: "Is not the Arab and
Muslim call for a prolonged and persistent Jihad the only reply to this Zionist
religious and racist haughtiness?"74 The statement appeared to be a demand for some
kind of confrontation.
The call was supported by various Arab countries and organisations,
including the PLO, Yemen, Bahrain, Kuwait, Mauritania, and the General Secretary
of the Arab League.75 However, the Arab disputes and the lack of joint institutions
made it unlikely that a response to this call would materialise. In reply to a letter
from the then President of the Jerusalem Committee of the OIC, King Hassan II of
72
al-Mustaqbal al- 'ArabJ, no.24 (February 1981).
73 See "Final Communique of the Arab Summit in Amman, 1980", in Yi/suf Khri (ed.),
al-Masharl', p.230.
74 The Times (15 August 1980).
15
al-Mustaqbal al-Arabi, no.21 (November 1980).
225
Morocco, President Sadat said he did not believe any Arab or Muslim collective
work to be possible until the inter-Arab and inter-Muslim conflicts were brought to
an end.76
However, as evidence of his retraction, Prince Fahd himself said to the Press
at the beginning of November that his invitation to Jihad was not an encouragement
to take up guns or swords or to move to Palestine, but an exhortation to the Muslims
77
to realise what was facing them, and a call for Arab and Muslim unity.
However, the Arab and Muslim worlds were not completely passive
concerning Jerusalem. To avoid damage to their interests in the Arab states, the
international powers did not recognise Israel sovereignty over any part of Jerusalem
(see Chapter Five). The Arab reaction apparently achieved a positive result regarding
the relocation of embassies to the city. Following the passing of the Israeli Basic Law
in 1980, the Arab governments threatened a boycott of any country that moved its
70
embassy to Jerusalem. The Netherlands, the only European country with an
embassy in that city, moved it to Tel Aviv, fearing lest its interests with Arab states
be adversely affected.7
Meanwhile, Arab donations were reaching Jerusalem, though they were nei¬
ther sufficient nor allocated for any clear purpose. It was not possible to speak of
regular institutional Arab funding for Jerusalem. Moreover, disputes erupted fre¬
quently between countries claiming the right of supervising or carrying out
restoration work in the holy places (see Chapter Three).
Another example of their ineffectiveness was the refusal by the Arab states to
hold a new summit after that convened in Cairo in 1996, despite many calls to do so.
It was especially necessary to challenge the actions of the Israeli Prime Minister
Netanyahu in Jerusalem's holy places, and the acceleration in the construction of
settlements in the city. The refusal was repeated even in response to the Palestinian
Chairman's request following the collapse of the Camp David 2000 Summit over the
issue of Jerusalem. The pretext for this refusal was the fear lest the dispute escalate
owing to Iraq, and tension be provoked if the Iraqi case were to be discussed.
76 Ibid.
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However, as a result of the unprecedented escalating protest in most, if not
all, of the Arab and Muslim countries after the eruption of al-Aqsa Intifada in
September 2000, the Arab leaders, in less than one month, were compelled to
convene a summit in Cairo on 21 and 22 November. During the meeting they
welcomed the Intifada and commended the response "of the Arab masses to the
Intifada of the doughty Arab Palestinian People". The Summit asserted that Israel
was responsible for the Intifada, because of its violation of al-Haram al-Sharif and
the holy places, and because of the continuation of the occupation. The Summit
decided to establish two funds: al-Aqsa Fund, with a sum of 800 million dollars to
"preserve the Arab-Muslim identity of Jerusalem", and the Jerusalem Intifada Fund
OA
of 200 million dollars, established to support the "Palestinian martyrs' families".
The PA later faced a critical financial crisis because the money that had been
promised had not been paid. In March 2001, another summit was held in Amman, in
accordance with a resolution adopted at the Cairo Summit that the Arab League
should meet annually. The mechanism of paying the money to Palestinians was the
subject of a dispute at the Amman Summit, and that in itself was used to justify the
withholding of the sums promised. Consequently, the Summit agreed to loan the
Palestinian Authority 60 million dollars, together with another 180 million in
o J
instalments over six months. This arrangement meant that the sums which had been
earmarked for Jerusalem, would now be diverted to covering the current expenditure
of the PA.
The official Arab position at these summits was again the expression of
solidarity with the Palestinian people, though not that of a united strategy. The
Palestinians were still considered the responsible party in the conflict, with the
support of Arab states. It was noticeable, however, that Arab public opinion on the
Jerusalem question was intensifying and pressuring Arab regimes for greater partici¬
pation.
It is possible to see a steady rise in the level of Arab and Muslim public
concern about the issue of Jerusalem since the late 1970s. This rise can be attributed
to various reasons, among which are the expanding implementation of Israeli policies
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81 "Final Communique of the Arab Summit in Amman, 2001", al-Hayat (29 March 2001).
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in the city and the growth in the power and influence of Islamist groups and the
popular support for them. In addition, there has been an increase in organised effort
to highlight the Arab and Islamic importance of Jerusalem, especially by Palestinian
official and popular bodies. So exhibitions, seminars, conferences, fundraising
activities, etc. for Jerusalem have become regular events in the Arab and Muslim
worlds. The activities that were organised in the Muslim world in the early 1990s, as
explained in Chapter One, were an example of how Jerusalem could unite public
opinion at times of fragmentation such as the period following the GulfWar.
It is difficult to make accurate documented observations of Arab and Muslim
public reaction on the issue of Jerusalem, and maybe a separate detailed study would
be necessary for this purpose. Nevertheless, the strength of public reaction is clearly
visible.
For instance, the anniversary of the torching of al-Aqsa Mosque, and that of
the liberation of Jerusalem by Salah al-DIn from the Crusaders on 2 October 1187,
initiated the organisation of dozens of activities by Arab and Muslim peoples.
According to official Palestinian sources, Salah al-DIn's victory was the basis of
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around 250 festivals, seminars, exhibitions, talks, etc. in 2001. Although some were
single events, others became part of the national institution. For instance, in the
1980s, some Palestinian activists in Kuwait began to celebrate Salah al-DIn's victory
and this was continued in Amman under the name "The Committee of Jerusalem
Day" throughout the 1990s up to the present day. The Committee's record has
included the annual publication of books on Jerusalem, seminars, exhibitions, and the
construction of an information centre to house documents on the city's history.
Among the Committee's successes is the lobbying in 1999 of the Association of
Arab Universities to declare that Arab universities should teach a special course on
Jerusalem and to organise a "Jerusalem Day" on 2 October every year.
82 The researcher was informed of this figure by Ibrahim Muhana, the Palestinian
Information attache in the Palestinian Embassy in Amman, in an interview on 2 October
2001.
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Centre, Amman.
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The eruption of the Al-Aqsa Intifada revealed the importance of Jerusalem in
Arab and Muslim public opinion. To declare solidarity with the Palestinians' position
in al-Aqsa Intifada, thousands of demonstrations, conferences, fund-raising cam¬
paigns and other expressions of solidarity were organised throughout the Muslim
world and among Muslim and Arab communities internationally. In a random sample
of two days in the first week of the Intifada, I calculated that demonstrations and
other forms of protest took place in twenty-one countries in support of the
Palestinians.84
Some Arab Gulf states saw the first demonstrations in their history during the
last few decades of the twentieth century. In Kuwait, where there had been an
unfriendly attitude towards the Palestinians since the Gulf War in 1991, and where
there were friendly feelings towards the United States, demonstrators shouted "Death
to America" and burned the American flag.85 In Jordan the government counted 276
demonstrations and rallies up to 6 October 1986 The atmosphere that followed
al-Aqsa Intifada made the Arab countries accept the participation of Iraq at the Arab
• • 87 •
Summit for the first time since its invasion of Kuwait. Under these circumstances,
the United States declared a temporary closure of its embassies in thirteen Arab
88
states five days after the eruption of the Intifada.
4.3 Conclusion
Jerusalem has been important in accelerating the establishment of collective
Muslim and Arab institutions as in the founding of the OIC in 1969. Events in the
city have also hastened the restoration of solidarity to these institutions, such as the
convening of the Arab Summit in Cairo in 2000.
Jerusalem has played an essential role in uniting Arab and Muslim public
opinion. Examples are the campaigns of the 1920s and 1930s in support of the Arabs
and Muslims in Palestine, the solidarity campaigns of the early 1990s, and the erup¬
tion of al-Aqsa Intifada in the city in September 2000.
84 al-Ra 'y and al-Hayat (1 & 7 October 2000).
85
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86 al-Ra 'y (7 October 2000).
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However, the following points should be borne in mind:
1. Effectiveness and Rhetoric: Official concern with the problems of Jerusalem
remains at the level of rhetoric. The inadequacy of Arab and Muslim government
organisations that deal with this area underlines the assumption that they are
designed to absorb and contain angry public opinion.
2. Arab-Muslim Identity and the Politics of the Nation-state: As a means of
uniting Arab and Muslim public opinion, Jerusalem forces governments to come
together and declare an agreed position through their collective institutions. This
in itself emphasises the Arab and Muslim identities of the pre-nation-state era. It
promotes the ideology of those powers which demand states based on Arab or
Muslim unity and identity. However, the official Arab and Muslim structures and
institutions are designed to express nation-state politics, that is, to declare a kind
of solidarity with issues such as Jerusalem, while preserving their individual
entities and giving priority to domestic construction and interests. The result is
that the actual support which Jerusalem receives from the Arab and Muslim
countries is much less than is due to its status as proclaimed in Arab and Muslim
rhetoric.
3. The Arab-Muslim Role in the Political Settlement: The situation also prompts
the question of the roles that the Muslim and Arab states could play in the
settlement of Jerusalem.
The continuing tension in Palestine, especially al-Aqsa Intifada, and the
emphasis on the central importance of Jerusalem to the Palestinians heightens the
concern of Arab and Muslim public opinion regarding this issue. The situation
stimulates support for identities that are broader than those of the nation-state and
forces the political regimes in the Arab and Muslim worlds to devote greater
attention to the Palestinian issue. Yet this is in opposition to the clear preference
shown by some of these regimes to concentrate on the construction of their nation-
states and individual identities. The conflict between regimes and powers supporting
the agenda of giving priority to domestic requirements and those which demand
greater participation in Arab and Muslim issues such as Jerusalem could provoke
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tension to the level where the stability of these states is threatened. This means that
Jerusalem could also - indirectly - play a role against the nation-state scheme in the
Arab and Muslim worlds. Another consequence is that greater efforts would need to
be made to find an acceptable political solution to the problem of Jerusalem, and a
fragile situation would make the granting of concessions more difficult.
However, Jerusalem's expanding role in Middle Eastern politics could be
transformed into a positive force in reaching a political settlement. It could stimulate
international efforts to solve the Palestinian question in general and that of Jerusalem
in particular. It could produce changes in the Israeli view of Jerusalem, which would
recognise that there are other peoples with rights and ties to the city, and that a
peaceful life in Israel requires compromise on the issue. The participation of Arab
and Muslim states or organisations in finding a solution by creating a direct
international presence throughout the city could reduce Israeli fears about security
and the sensitivity of the question of sovereignty in the city, as well as satisfying
Arabs and Muslims regarding their holy places.
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Chapter Five
Jerusalem in the International Sphere
Introduction
Jerusalem has been seen by many observers as the focal point of repeated conflict.
The city has been contested for centuries between the followers of various Christian
doctrines, Christians and Jews, and Christians and Muslims. According to these
observers, the present conflict between Jews/Zionism and Palestinian/Christian and
Muslim Arabs/Muslims, is only the latest episode in the never-ending conflict.
This chapter discusses how the issue of Jerusalem has been defined and
treated by some international powers and actors during the current conflict.
Two important points should be noted here. Firstly, until the early twentieth
century, the European colonial powers had taken a particular interest in Jerusalem,
considering the city's holy places and Christians to be among their direct interests,
which justified European intervention and presence in the region. However, this is no
longer true - at least since 1948.
Secondly, since the 1930s the international powers had clearly desired that
Jerusalem should not become an issue for the Arab or Muslim world, but should
remain in the arena of the conflicting parties inside Mandate Palestine. In other
words, it should be restricted to a national issue between the Palestinians (or
Jordanians after 1948) and the Jews/Israelis. This requirement was one of the conse¬
quences of the British-French understanding after the First World War, according to
which the region was divided into separate units. These units, which later formed the
states of the region under what was known as the nation-state scheme, were supposed
to develop individual interests instead of defining themselves as parties to issues
such as Palestine or Jerusalem. Collective action by the new units could result in the
reconstruction of a regional Arab/Muslim identity, which would oppose the interests
of the international powers and threaten the present regional order that depended on
separate nation-states.
These points will be explained in greater detail below. The first section
discusses the position of Europe, especially Britain, and the second section, that of
the United States. The third section examines the position of the Christian churches
of Jerusalem, which have mostly had close administrative and religious connections
with the churches of Europe and the United States. It is argued that the churches of
Jerusalem are increasingly expressing views that coincide more with those of the
Palestinians and other Arabs than with those of their protectors.
The last section analyses the general principles and views of the United
Nations in dealing with Jerusalem, and the reasons for its ineffectiveness in dealing
with the problem.
5.1 Great Britain and Europe
5.1.1 Historical Background
The Ottamans had captured Jerusalem in 1516. Between the sixteenth and nineteenth
centuries, during the Ottaman era, European countries continued to claim the right to
protect the holy places in Jerusalem and Christians in the Middle East. Following the
decline in their economy and military power, the Ottomans gradually granted con¬
cessions to the European countries, allowing them to play an increasing role in the
affairs of Jerusalem's holy places and those of the Christians in the empire. In 1604
and 1673, France signed agreements with the Ottomans, known as the
"Capitulations", which gave the Franciscans the right to supervise the holy places.1
Russia had made similar agreements, under which it was granted the guardianship of
the Orthodox interests.
In the mid-nineteenth century, under European pressure, the Ottomans
issued regulations to classify and register the various sects around the empire. A
special section covered the relationship between the rival Christian churches in
Jerusalem. These regulations were included in international treaties, such as the Paris
Peace Convention in 1856 and the Congress of Berlin in 1878, and became known
later as the Status Quo. In fact, these treaties were the result of the Crimean War
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Church. However, thanks to Russian support, the Greek Orthodox Church won
primacy in the holy places according to Ottoman regulations.3
Religious claims and agreements constituted another aspect of the rival
political ambitions of the European countries in the Middle East. This became more
apparent in the late nineteenth century, when their governments intensified their
efforts to colonise areas of the region. The holy places of Jerusalem were one of the
reasons given by these states to justify their political interference. The importance of
Palestine lay in its geographical position, for it formed a link between the Arab
countries ofNorth Africa and Asia.4 Therefore, the control of Palestine was essential
for the control of the Middle East.
According to British and French newspapers and documents published in
the nineteenth century, public and official opinion was concerned with Palestine for
two main reasons:
1. The holy places were significant as part of the Catholic-Protestant rivalry.
2. The geographical position of Palestine was of particular importance to the plans
of the two countries in the Middle East.5
The relationships with the Christian communities in the region were among
the tools used by the colonial powers to create local alliances and justify their
presence there. However, Britain faced the problem of an insignificant number of
Protestants in Palestine compared with the number of Catholics, a matter which
weakened British claims to the Holy Land. This led to ideas being proposed in
Britain in which the Jews played a central role. Lutheran missions sponsored by
England in the nineteenth century, and later by the United States, concentrated on the
conversion of Jews, which was viewed by Anglicans as a means of returning Jesus to
the Holy Land.6 The plan did not succeed, since Jews did not convert. So British
experts proposed an alternative, which was to create a Jewish colony in Palestine
3
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4 Uri Ra'anan, The Frontiers of a Nation: A Re-examination of the Forces which Created
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under the sponsorship of Britain.7 Other experts such as Harry Johnston, in 1912,
proposed internationalising Palestine. Johnston advocated internationalising "Judea"
in the context of partitioning the Middle East between the rival European powers.
France was first to make a concession in January 1915. It renounced its
claim to the right to rule the holy places in Jerusalem and accepted their
internationalisation in exchange for controlling the northern part of Palestine, which
was of commercial and military importance. Russia refused this solution, declaring
that Orthodox interests covered the whole of Palestine.9 However, when France and
Britain drew nearer to an agreement to partition the Arab East between them, Russia
communicated with France, offering to accept its rule over the whole of Palestine in
exchange for territorial concessions to Russia in Armenia. In the event, no agreement
was reached upon the offer.10
Britain had the opportunity to occupy Jerusalem in 1917 after the Sykes-
Picot Agreement with France in 1916. The need to have the right to keep Palestine
under British control prompted the idea of a Jewish settlement. Britain's under¬
standing with the Zionist leaders reveals how closely religion and politics are
intertwined. Jewish Zionism, Christian Zionism (Anglicanism) and colonial interests
were merged to produce the Jewish national home in Palestine.
5.1.2 The British Rule and Mandate (1917-1948)
British policy towards Jerusalem during the Mandate can be assessed from two main
aspects: (1) the political role of Jerusalem in implementing the British Mandate
policies in Palestine; and (2) the British view of a political settlement in the city.
5.1.2.1 The Mandatory Policies Inside Jerusalem
British policies in Jerusalem during this period reveal the awareness that the city
could be a source of trouble for the Mandate, although it could also be helpful in
applying the authority of the Mandate if handled properly. Therefore, the government









Chapters One and Two have already discussed a large part of the British policies in
Jerusalem during the Mandate. Jerusalem was important in the British plan to
establish separate mandatory units in the region, each with a sense of separate
national identity. It served as the capital and centre of a separate Palestine. Its
religious and administrative leaders were the right sort of members of the elite, who
were acceptable to the people while maintaining an understanding with the Mandate.
Thus, in the 1920s, when the Jerusalem notables were taking care of Muslim
religious affairs, they played an active political role in channelling the popular
movement away from radical and opposition trends.
British policies were carefully framed so as not to turn the holy places of
Jerusalem into a source of tension, either with the Mandate or between the different
communities in Palestine. So, although the text of the Mandate gave Britain full
responsibility for the holy places in Palestine and the right to control their
administration, it also preserved the Ottoman Status Quo. No Christian sect was
given new privileges not accorded to the others, nor were the followers of any
religion given privileges at the expense of the others. Both Christians and Muslims,
in particular, enjoyed full autonomy in their affairs and had the opportunity to extend
their properties and expand their religious institutions in Jerusalem.
Nevertheless, although Jews could, in general, maximise their presence in
the city, maintaining the Ottoman Status Quo resulted in the government preventing
them from strengthening their position in locations that were the subject of dispute
with the Muslims. For instance, the government responded positively on several
occasions to Muslim complaints regarding Jewish attempts to change the Status Quo
of the Western Wall of al-Haram al-Sharif by installing instruments or changing the
character of the place, such as in 1922, 1923, 1925, 1926 and 1928."
By the early 1930s, however, as a result of the growth of the Zionist project,
it seemed that maintaining an understanding with the Palestinian leaders of Jerusalem
was no longer possible. The city had become the subject of confrontation between
Arabs and Jews, especially after the dispute over the Western Wall. The city had also
become an issue of Arab and Muslim public opinion. British as well as French and
other European diplomats saw that the active support for the Palestinians in the
" Special Report, "The Rights of Muslims and Jews", pp.402-403.
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Muslim world was the beginning of an "anti-European" movement against the
• • 19
European presence and interests in the region. By the mid-1930s, the formula of the
politics of notables had collapsed, and Jerusalem, based on its traditional leadership,
could no longer be a factor of stability.
5.1.2.2 The Political Settlement and Jerusalem
In 1937 and 1947, during the Mandate, two of the most important political solutions
were proposed for Jerusalem. On both occasions, partition plans for Palestine were
suggested and Jerusalem was omitted from the areas under consideration.
5.1.2.2.1 The 1937 Plan
After the Palestinian rebellion of 1936, a British Royal Commission, headed by Earl
Peel, recommended partitioning Palestine between Jews and Arabs. The plan com¬
prised the establishment of a permanent British mandatory zone including Jerusalem
and Bethlehem, as well as a narrow corridor by way of Nazareth and Lake Tiberius
1 ^ •
to allow access to the sea. In this context the report of the Commission stated that
the mandated area would be excluded from the Balfour Declaration. This
recommendation was justified in the report by the need for free access to the holy
places for "all the world".14 Nevertheless, in his address to the League ofNations, the
British delegate, Anthony Eden, did not hide Britain's particular concern for the
Christian holy places:
His Majesty's Government... concluded, from the terms of Article 28 of the
existing Mandate, that it was the intention and wish of the League that the
holy places, including the Christian holy places, should remain permanently
under League supervision and control.15
International developments and escalating tension between the Allies and
Axis Powers led to the suspension of the Partition Plan to avoid losing Arab support
in the expected Second World War.
12 FO 371/16009, Letter from the British High Commissioner in Cairo to the Foreign Office
on 26 November 1931, on his discussions with French delegation. And letter from P.
Cunlifee-Lister to the Colonial Office on 8 February 1932.
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5.1.2.2.2 The 1947 Plan
A second partition plan was proposed by the UN Special Committee on Palestine
(UNISCOP) in 1947. Britain, now in a different situation from that of 1937, was
seeking to withdraw from Palestine as soon as possible, where, in addition to the
economic and political difficulties that it suffered after the Second World War, its
troops had been under continual attack from Zionist groups in Palestine. The British
delegation in the UN declared on 26 September that if the UN recommended a policy
unacceptable to Jews and Arabs, Britain would not be able to implement it, and that
if no settlement were reached, Britain planned an early withdrawal.16
The consequences of the British plan of evacuation were clear and discussed
many times at different levels. For instance, in Jerusalem the High Commissioner
warned through the Press that the people of Palestine should realise the possible
consequences of Britain's departure should the Jewish and Arab leaders not make a
last effort to come together, and that this might lead to economic chaos and blood-
1 7 • •
shed. The British government refused international, American and Soviet appeals
1 o
to continue the Mandate for some time longer, and British troops began their
withdrawal on 16 November,19 even before the UN vote on the Partition Plan.
In a debate in the British parliament, Sir W. Smithers spoke about the result
of British policy on Jerusalem in particular. He said that there would be chaos and
anarchy, and that the final struggle between good and evil would be fought in the
cockpit at Jerusalem, and he asked the Foreign Secretary to work towards creating an
20international enclave in Jerusalem.
Britain's position towards Resolution 181 and internationalisation or any
other solution for Jerusalem was summed up later by a British official as follows:
The basic attitude of the British Government has consistently been that no
solution of the Jerusalem problem can be adopted unless accepted by both
Jews and Arabs. Because of this the UK Delegate abstained in the vote on
General Assembly Resolution No. 181 (II) of 29 Nov 1947 which called for
the establishment of a "Corpus Separatum" under a special international
16 The Times (11 October 1947).
17 The Times (9 October 1947).
18 The Times (14 November 1947).
19 The Times (17 November 1947).
20 The Times (13 December 1947).
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regime to be administrated by the Trusteeship Council on behalf of the
UN.21
In short, Britain's plans to enter and establish a presence in Palestine
included religious justifications and pretexts. In addition, the religious sectarian map
of Palestine was studied and used by British politicians, and an alliance with Jewish
Zionism was seen as an effective means to control the state. Since political goals and
general interests in the Middle East were crucial to British policy, religious conside¬
rations in the Mandatory policy were assessed according to their political meaning.
Indeed, the decision to leave Palestine in 1947 did not show much concern for the
religious considerations of the city.
5.1.3 Israeli-Jordanian Rule (1948-1967)
After the 1948 War, Britain, like the rest of the international community, refused to
recognise Israeli and Jordanian sovereignty over Jerusalem and adhered to UN
Resolution 181, which called for the internationalisation of the city. In reality,
however, Britain especially, and other European countries to a lesser degree, sup¬
ported a new kind of internationalisation.
British policy, as observed from the correspondence between the various
diplomatic delegations and departments, as well as the minutes of meetings of British
diplomats with American, European and other diplomats, showed opposition to
internationalisation as laid down in the Resolution. What the United Nations had in
mind was known as "territorial internationalisation", whereas Britain supported
"functional internationalisation", which, according to a Foreign Office official, was a
solution "under which Israel and Jordan would continue the administration of their
sections, while the control and supervision of the Holy Places would be in the hands
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of a UN commissioner."
This policy could be attributed to the British consideration for its
relationship with the various parties concerned, and for what were described as
practical considerations. In 1967, a draft paper prepared by the Foreign Office on
21 FCO 19/115: Letter from P. Yarnold to Tripp, 3 June 1969.
22 FO 371/104775: P.S. Falla, Comment on Brazilian proposal to start process to resolve the
question of Jerusalem, 1953.
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how to deal with the situation after the Israeli occupation of East Jerusalem,
summarised the British position between 1948 and 1967 as follows:
The position, in short, has been that the general opinion in the UN favoured
and maybe still favours "territorial" internationalisation. But H.M.G, both
because of its interests in the Arab countries (Jordan in particular) and
because internationalisation was not practical politics since the city was
23divided between Israel and Jordan...
Other European countries also held overt and covert positions; declaring
their support of internationalisation according to the UN Resolution, whereas in
reality supporting another solution, that of partitioning Jerusalem but keeping an
international presence or administration in the holy places. France, for example,
declared its support for the Vatican's demand for the implementation of the UN
Resolution. However, French diplomats, such as the French Consul-General in
Jerusalem, told their British counterparts and others: "the French Government would
now support anything which is practical and which does not openly conflict with the
Vatican stand." They might also accept a formula of an "international regime...to
supervise access to the holy places and the preservation of the rights of the religious
communities".24
5.1.4 The Israeli Annexation: Post-1967
The general view of the European states on Jerusalem in the post-1967 years was that
the city was not of direct interest to them. They no longer considered themselves to
be closely associated with the parties to the conflict, unlike their assertions in the
early years of the twentieth century.
A typical example of this view is the following statement from the above-
mentioned Foreign Office draft paper of 1967:
There is no direct British interest... which need put us out in front. The
Protestant churches can look after themselves. (...). Our indirect interest in
the Arab world is merely that we should not stand too conspicuously for too
isolated an opposition to Arab views.25
23 FCO 17/648: British Position Past and Present "Draft on our attitude to the Jerusalem
Problem", 13 July 1967.
24 Ibid.
25 FCO 17/648: Draft Paper. (From the Foreign Office records for the years following 1967,
it appeared that what was called a "Draft Paper" was a reference to the British diplomats in
handling the Jerusalem issue. There was no final version.)
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The reactions of other parties, and how a certain position could influence
European interests in the Middle East became the yardstick of European policy in
dealing with the Jerusalem question. However, in practical terms the European
position on Jerusalem can be understood by examining the following points:
5.1.4.1 Israel Politics of Religion
The main issue to be tackled by Europe regarding Jerusalem was the Israeli emphasis
on the religious rights of the Jews to justify the occupation. W. Morris, the head of
the Eastern Department in the Foreign Office, was fully aware of Israel's attempt to
redefine the identity of Jerusalem. He commented as follows on the Israeli policies
and actions in this regard:
The Israeli case does not bear close examination. Until 5 June, they were
putting forward no claims to the Old City, except on the question of access
to the Wailing Wall. Since then they have been attacked from the Old City
by the Jordanians; this gives them a claim to security against future attack,
but not to annexation of a wholly Arab city against the wishes of its
inhabitants, on the basis of their military success in occupying it.26
There were yet other examples of Europe's doubts about Israel's
exploitation of religious claims. The Venice Declaration of the European Community
in June 1980 asserted "the special importance of the role played by the question of
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Jerusalem for all the parties concerned".
This doubtful view justified the European countries' rejection of Israel's
occupation and annexation policies in East Jerusalem. Their rejection was confirmed
by their voting in favour ofUN resolutions "calling on Israel to desist from measures
9x
altering the status of the city".
The emphasis on the religious rights of different parties explains why
European countries supported the international administration of the holy places of
Jerusalem. However, as time passed, Europe placed less emphasis on this policy.
The Venice Declaration stated: "any agreement on the city's status should guarantee
freedom of access for everyone to the holy places". This statement did not demand
an international role. Any agreement negotiated by the parties seemed acceptable to
Europe. The acceptance of negotiations as a means of reaching a solution was
26 FCO 17/251: W. Morris to R. Beaumont, 2 August 1967.
27 "Venice Declaration on the Middle East", Documents on Jerusalem, p.219.
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emphasised several times, for example, during the Camp David negotiations in
2000.29
5.1.4.2 The Legal Status of Israel in Jerusalem
The frequent declarations of European countries condemning Israel's occupation of
East Jerusalem and its annexation policies should be seen in combination with action
taken towards recognising Israel's presence in West Jerusalem. As long as the action
did not provoke the Arabs, the European states were prepared to take it.
After the 1967 occupation, Europe considered that the Arab countries
"tactically" accepted that West Jerusalem was "Israeli territory". Accordingly, Euro¬
pean countries began to be less reserved about declaring their official appearance in
West Jerusalem. For instance, in late 1967, the German and British embassies held,
for the first time, reception parties in West Jerusalem, believing that the Arab
countries would not protest against these events as long as they did not take place in
East Jerusalem.30
At the same time, the European countries continued to refuse to move their
embassies to Jerusalem, or to recognise officially the West sector of the city as part
of Israel. In August 1980, after Israel had issued its Basic Law, which defined the
whole of Jerusalem as the Israeli capital, the Netherlands had to move its embassy
from West Jerusalem to Tel Aviv. The Dutch government issued a strong statement
deploring Arab pressure on it to take this step (it was the only European embassy in
Jerusalem). The statement said: "ultimatums in relations between friendly states are
unacceptable." Then the statement declared that the Dutch government would move
its embassy to Tel Aviv and emphasised that this action was in response to the
decision by the UN Security Council on 20 August, asking countries with diplomatic
missions in Jerusalem to withdraw them.3'
28FCO 17/648: 1968.
29 See the interview with the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, al-Hayat (23
March 2000).
30 FCO 17/251: Letter from the British Embassy in Tel Aviv to the Eastern Department, 16
November 1967.
31 "Statement by the Netherlands Government, 26 August 1980", in Documents on
Jerusalem, p.219.
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On some occasions, European governments seemed concerned to appear to
be playing a role that would satisfy the Arab states, though not necessarily with the
firm intention of reaching a solution. For instance, after the 1967 occupation, British
officials had a particular wish for Jordan to regain sovereignty over the Old City, or
at least have a "special position" there, were any settlerhent to be reached.
Apparently, this indicated British recognition of Jerusalem's political and economic
importance to Jordan. At the same time, however, it is interesting to read the
following recommendation by a British official:
If in the end negotiations between Israel and Jordan fail for any reason ... it
is necessary that both we and the government of Israel be in a position to
show that every reasonable effort towards an agreement has been made, and
made in good time and good faith.32
This is an example of how far more importance was attached to the impact
on relations with the parties to the conflict over Jerusalem than to the problem of the
city itself.
In short, European interests in the Christian religious aspect of Jerusalem
was the main justification for the intervention and colonisation of Palestine during
the Ottoman era. Since the Second World War, however, attention was turned to the
question of Jerusalem's impact on the settlement in the Middle East and on Europe's
relations with the parties to the conflict. Europe no longer declared that Jerusalem's
religious significance was of paramount importance. Therefore, Europe was likely to
agree to any solution acceptable to those parties directly involved in the conflict.
5.2 The United States of America
5.2.1 The Pre-1967 Era
In 1919, President Woodrow Wilson of the United States appointed the King-Crane
Commission, comprising two American scholars, whose purpose was to study the
situation in Palestine by touring the country, meeting its inhabitants and finally
reporting back to the Peace Conference in Paris.33 This Commission was to be the
earliest official American concern with the issue of Palestine.
32 FCO 17/251: A report entitled "Secret - Nodis".
33
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Jerusalem played a crucial role in shaping the Commission's recommen¬
dation, which favoured the Arabs and found the Islamic view of the holy places
justified Muslim custodianship of these places, and also justified not establishing a
Jewish state. According to the report, Palestine was:
"the Holy Land" for Jews, Christians, and Muslims alike. Millions of
Christians and Muslims all over the world are quite as much concerned as
the Jews with conditions in Palestine, especially with those conditions which
touch upon religious feeling and rights. (...) With the best possible inten¬
tions, it may be doubted whether the Jews could possibly seem to either
Christians or Moslems proper guardians of the holy places, or custodians of
the Holy Land as a whole. The reason is this: the places which are most
sacred to Christians - those having to do with Jesus - and which also are
sacred to Muslims, are not sacred to Jews, but abhorrent to them. It is simply
impossible, under those circumstances, for Muslims and Christians to feel
satisfied to have these places in Jewish hands... There are still other places
about which Muslims must have the same feeling. In fact, from this point of
view, the Muslims, just because the sacred places of all three religions are
sacred to them, have made very naturally much more satisfactory custodians
of the holy places than the Jews could be.34
Britain and France did not react positively to the idea of sending a commis¬
sion of this kind and refused to participate in it. The text of the report was suppressed
and was not published until 1947. The circumstances influencing this action re¬
mained ambiguous.35 Nevertheless, the report clearly showed that public opinion in
the United States had not yet veered in support of Zionism, nor had the Anglican or
Christian Zionists in the American churches begun supporting Israel.
The role of the United States in Palestine was highlighted after the Second
World War. At that time American policy dealt with the issue of Jerusalem with two
main considerations in mind. At the international level, the United States was careful
not to let its position regarding the Palestine issue harm its interests with the Arab oil
countries. In addition, the withdrawal of Britain from the region created a vacuum
that the United States had to fill, not only because it was the new world leader, but
also because its rival, the Soviet Union, could exploit the situation. At the same time,
however, the decision to increase the role of the United States in the region required
34 "The King-Crane Commission Report", in Walter Laqueur, The Israel-Arab Reader, p.30.
35
Wagner, Dying, p. 110.
careful thought, especially since it could provoke a confrontation with the Soviet
Union.36
At the domestic level, there was an increase in the power of the Zionist
lobby in American politics. There was also a rise in Christian Zionism, which
believed in the necessity of establishing a Jewish state in order to prepare for the
t 7
return of Jesus.
These factors were largely the reason why the United States was concerned
not with the details of the solution to the Jerusalem question, but with its conse¬
quences on international politics. This explains the United States' apparent hesitation
to express its position at the United Nations during the debate on Palestine in 1947.
On 10 October 1947, both the American and Soviet delegations to the Palestine
Committee kept silent, each waiting for the other to begin, so the Indian head of the
TO
Committee proposed to close the proceedings if no one wanted to speak.
On 11 October, American sources revealed that the United States would
support a plan adopted by the majority of the Assembly, although it warned against
implementation, declaring that the Palestine problem should be kept "out of the arena
TQ
of the great powers' conflict" The American delegation was aware of the special
requirements for the implementation of the UN internationalisation plan in
Jerusalem. On 13 October it stressed that the Partition Plan implied that the United
Nations would assume responsibility as the administrative authority of the city of
Jerusalem under international trusteeship.40
The United States tried to deal with the implementation problem by asking
Britain to carry out the task;41 however, Britain refused. Nevertheless, on 29
November the American Administration played an active role in influencing the
members of the General Assembly to adopt the resolution in favour of partition,
36
For the factors affecting American policy in the Middle East, see Steven L Spiegle, The
Other Arab-Israeli Conflict: MakingAmerican Middle East Policy, from Truman to Reagan
(Chicago & London: University ofChicago Press, 1985), pp. 3-10.
37
For the Jews' role in American politics in the 1940s, see Zvi Ganin, Truman, American
Jewry and Israel:, 1945-1948 (New York, London: Holmes & Meier Publishers, 1979), pp.
xiv-xvi, 144-145.
38 The Times (10 October 1947).
39 The Times (11 October 1947).
40 Ibid.
41 The Times (1 November 1947).
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although the problem of implementation remained unresolved.42 Moreover, it could
be said that the failure to create a suitable international role to implement UN
Resolution 181 led to the 1948 Arab-Israeli war.
Between 1948 and 1967 the United States continued to show little interest in
finding a solution for Jerusalem. Its policy in the Middle East was influenced more
by the escalation of the Cold War and the confrontation with the Communist bloc.
Therefore, American policy regarding Jerusalem at that time avoided provoking
either the Zionist lobby or the Arab states, which was generally achieved by adhering
to the UN resolution favouring internationalisation. This support by the United States
was expressed on various occasions during the 1950s and 1960s. For instance, in
1952 it condemned Israel's decision to transfer its Foreign Office to Jerusalem. It
also rejected Jordan's intention in 1960 to consider Jerusalem a second capital,
declaring its adherence to the international regime and the United Nations' special
role in the city.43
5.2.2 The Post-1967 Period
In the aftermath of the June 1967 War, the American Administration increased its
political support for Israel. The United States wanted the Israeli withdrawal from the
occupied territories to be part of a comprehensive political settlement that would
guarantee Israel's existence and security. For months the United States prevented the
adoption of a resolution by the UN calling for Israel's withdrawal from the occupied
territories.44 Israeli security rather than the question of Jerusalem was the main
American concern. Therefore, the Israeli decision to annex the East sector of the city
was not taken with American approval. On 16 June, around ten days before the
Israeli annexation, the American Secretary of State spoke in strong terms to the
Israeli Ambassador in Washington about the "unwisdom" of annexing the Old City
of Jerusalem.45 It was only after Israel's decision to go ahead with the annexation
that the United States Administration abandoned its attempt to reach an immediate
comprehensive solution between the Arabs and Israel. As a result, Soviet-American
42 See Ganin, Truman, pp. 147-151.
43 See the US Statement on the two occasions, in Documents on Jerusalem, pp. 173 & 174.
44 Spiegel, The OtherArab-Israeli, pp. 154-155.
45 FCO 17/251: Report by W. Morris, 17 June 1967.
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collaboration led to the passing of UN Resolution 242, which called for Israeli
withdrawal "from territories occupied in the recent conflict".46 Washington also
issued a statement saying that it did not "accept or recognise these measures as
altering the status of Jerusalem".47
The failure in 1967 to reach a quick settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict
led the United States to consider the long-term aspect of the problem. Over the
following years, the US administration continued its efforts to reach a settlement in
the region. Calculations on the Cold War and relations with the Arab world as well
as the influence of the Zionist lobby inside the United States remained the main
considerations in formulating a political settlement. However, the international
aspect of the American position gradually became less crucial. The Soviet Union's
abstention from intervening in the June 1967 War and the decline in Arab-Soviet ties
after the ascendance of Anwar al-Sadat to power in Egypt gave the United States
greater opportunity to increase its support for Israel.
Against this background, the American position towards the question of
Jerusalem from 1967 until the present day can be understood by examining the
following points.
5.2.2.1 The Status of Israel in Jerusalem
From 1967 the United States was more inclined to recognise Israel's presence in
West Jerusalem. It is noticeable that in some cases the declaration of rejecting Israeli
measures regarding East Jerusalem implied a recognition ofWest Jerusalem as a part
of Israel. For instance, on 1 July 1969 the American representative to the United
Nations issued a statement at the UN Security Council regarding Israeli policies in
. 48 . •what he termed "occupied portions of the city". Despite the statement's rejection of
Israel's policies, its reference to East Jerusalem as "occupied portions" implied a
recognition that West Jerusalem was unoccupied.
Calls to move the American embassy to Jerusalem increased. In February
1972, President Gerald Ford declared his support in recognising Jerusalem as the
46 For the American dismay with the annexation and its influence on Resolution 242, see
Spiegel, The Other Arab- Israeli, p. 155.
47 "Statement by Arthur Goldberg, US Ambassador to the UN, 9 May 1968", Documents on
Jerusalem, p. 175.
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"historic and lawful capital of Israel" by moving the American embassy there.49
Political calculations prevented the implementation of this view. In 1984, a bill was
proposed for the relocation. Ronald Reagan's Administration opposed it and pre¬
vented its adoption on the grounds that it would "convey a message that the US
accepted the position of one party to the issue", that the issue of Jerusalem "must be
resolved through negotiations," and that it "would seriously undermine [the United
States'] ability to play an effective role in the Middle East peace process."50
After signing the Oslo Accords, Congressmen reopened the question of the
American Embassy. In May 1995, 41 senators and 31 representatives signed a bill to
relocate the Embassy in Jerusalem. President Clinton's Administration responded
that the legislation would jeopardise the peace process and the American role as
mediator.51 Despite this response and the American patronage of the agreement that
made Jerusalem part of the final status negotiations, the bill was passed in the Senate
by 95 to 5 votes and in the House of Representatives by 374 to 37 votes in October.
The bill now gave the President the right to delay the relocation for reasons of
"national security." It implied, however, that Jerusalem had "been the capital of the
state of Israel" since 1950, and that between 1948 and 1967 Israeli citizens of all
faiths, as well as Jewish citizens of all states, had been denied access to the holy
places in the area controlled by Jordan. However, under Israeli administration since
1967, "persons of all religious faiths have been guaranteed full access to holy sites
within the city". The bill concluded that US policy should be based on "Jerusalem
remaining an undivided city", the aim that "Jerusalem should be recognised as the
capital of the state of Israel", and that "the US Embassy in Israel should be estab-
lished in Jerusalem no later than May 31, 1999." To date, however, the American
Administration has still not taken the decision to relocate its embassy.
48 "Statement by Charles W. Yost, US representative to the UN", ibid., pp. 175-176.
49
Spiegle, The OtherArab-Israeli, p.232.
50 "Statement by Lawrence Eaglburger, Under-Secretary for political Affairs, Department of
State, 23 February 1984", in Documents on Jerusalem, pp. 180-181.
51 "Senate of the US, 104th Congress, 1st Session S.770, 'Jerusalem Embassy Relocation
Implementation Act'", in Documents on Jerusalem, p. 196.
52 Documents on Jerusalem, p.203.
53 Ibid., pp.201-203.
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Although the United States has refused to accept Israeli action in East
Jerusalem,54 it has also refused to take any practical steps to prevent it. It has even
discouraged verbal condemnation by the United Nations. For example, in a comment
by the American State Department on 29 June 1967 concerning the Israeli annexa¬
tion (the application of law and administration within the expanded boundaries of
Jerusalem), there was no mention of Israel by name, although there was criticism of
other states in the region:
The hasty administrative action taken today cannot be regarded as deter¬
mining the future of the holy places or the status of Jerusalem in relation to
them. The US has never recognised such unilateral actions by any of the
states in the area as governing the international status of Jerusalem.55
The United States was giving Israel increasing protection at the United
Nations by vetoing resolutions against Israeli action in Jerusalem. This behaviour
became much more apparent after the signing of the Camp David agreement in 1978.
The American Administration promised the Israeli government at the time that
Jerusalem was the subject of negotiations that should not be held in an international
framework. A famous story marked the beginning of the implementation of this
policy, the events of which took place during February 1980. Jordan and Morocco
had proposed a resolution against the construction of settlements in the occupied
territories. Hazim Nusayba, Jordan's current representative at the United Nations,
said that the American representatives engaged in long negotiations with him, and
asked him to change certain words in the proposal, such as substituting "deplore" for
"condemn". Finally, after lengthy discussions in which the American delegation was
in contact with the White House through the Secretary of State, Cyrus Vance, the
representatives imposed the condition that if the United States were to vote in favour
of the proposal, a particular paragraph on Jerusalem had to be removed. Nusayba
agreed and the delegation was accordingly instructed to vote in favour. The
American decision provoked enormous Israeli frustration and a campaign against
President Carter. The reason, as Nusayba explained, was that the remaining text of
54 See various American resolutions and statements, Documents on Jerusalem, pp. 175-178,
183, 186.
55 Ibid., p. 174.
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the resolution referred to the "deplored policies" as those implemented in the
"occupied territories including Jerusalem".56
The American Administration declared that it had not intended to vote
affirmatively and that a communication fault with the American delegation was
responsible. President Carter, whose failure in the next election was attributed to this
incident, was against including Jerusalem in the resolution because of his promise to
the Israeli Prime Minister, Menachem Begin. The "communication fault", as
President Carter's aides asserted, was the result of a misunderstanding. When the
delegation told Cyrus Vance that the paragraph on Jerusalem would be removed, he
assumed that all the other references to Jerusalem would be removed as well.
However, the delegation saw this paragraph as the reason for the President's reser¬
vations, while the content of the resolution had already been accepted (in the past) by
American officials.57
After this incident the United States showed greater opposition to discussing
Jerusalem at the United Nations and this attitude was strengthened after the signing
of the Oslo Accords in 1993. In 1994, after the American abstention from the vote by
the UN Security Council to condemn the killing of dozens of Palestinians by Israeli
settler in the Massacre of Hebron, the American delegate to the Council, Madeleine
Albright, declared:
Under the Declaration of Principles, [Jerusalem] is an issue which Israel and
the PLO have agreed will be dealt with in the final status negotiations. My
government does not believe that it is helpful to the negotiations to include
the kind of reference that is made to Jerusalem in this resolution.58
It can be concluded, therefore, that although the American Administration
still does not recognise Jerusalem as the capital of Israel, there is increased pressure
from Congressmen and other politicians to step over that threshold. The American
role as a mediator in a political settlement in the region, and the possible reaction
from the Arab and Muslim world to such a decision are largely the reasons why the
American Administration has not taken that step.
56
Interview, Hazim Nusayba.
57 For the details, see Spiegle, The OtherArab-Israeli, p.378.
58
"Albright's Statement", in Documents on Jerusalem, p.l 86.
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5.2.2.2 The American View of the Political Solution
The United States did not recognise Israel's occupation or annexation of East
Jerusalem. It described East Jerusalem as occupied territory and tried to convince the
Israelis not to annex this part of the city. Nevertheless, American ideas of a peaceful
settlement in Jerusalem favoured Israeli gains in the city compared with the pre-1967
situation.
Among the early American proposals for a solution was a paper compiled
by the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs in the State Department around September
1967. Although the paper was not published, it was discussed with certain parties
such as the British. The compilers of the paper thought their ideas "the most likely
eventually to prove acceptable". The proposal was detailed and comprehensive.59
Under the title "Geographic Limits" the paper proposed partial
internationalisation. An international sector was to be established in the former
Jordanian-controlled Jerusalem, including the Old City and adjacent areas, while the
various areas between the armistice lines were to become part of Israeli Jerusalem.
The proposal suggested that the United Nations administer this area and control
functions such as movement in and out of the internationalised sector in co¬
ordination with Israel and Jordan to guarantee free access to the holy places. The
United Nations would also be responsible for the protection of the holy places in the
internationalised sector, while their maintenance and operation were to be left to the
religious representatives in Jerusalem. The paper also discussed "civil
administration", though not in detail, and stated that a city council was to be elected
and local courts established. The paper detailed economic and financial
arrangements: taxation and revenue would be shared between Jordan and Israel; the
currencies of both states would be legal tender; and branches of the banks of both
states would be opened.
Although the paper was not officially published, perhaps because the peace
process had not yet reached a suitably advanced stage, it was important in revealing
the current American view and the fact that there was some practical thinking about
the issue of Jerusalem during that period.
59 FCO 17/251: 21 September 1967.
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When there were no negotiations in progress, the United States, from time to
time, suggested principles for a solution to the problem of Jerusalem. On 25
September 1971, the current American Ambassador to the United Nations, George
Bush, listed the following four:
1. Jerusalem should be a unified city.
2. There should be open access .. .for persons of all faiths and nationalities.
3. Administrative arrangements for the unified city should take into account the
interests of all its inhabitants and of the Christian, Jewish, and Muslim com¬
munities.
4. There should be roles for Israel and Jordan in the civic, economic and religious
life of the city.60
George Bush's view did not differ greatly from the ideas suggested in the
paper compiled by the Near Eastern Affairs Department, except that it did not define
the geographical boundaries of the "unified" city. However, since the American
position was that "the instrument and process of negotiations"61 would determine the
future of Jerusalem, no practical action was taken to implement this view.
It is important to note that these ideas did not match the frequent
declarations by the United States that its Administration had not accepted Israel's
unilateral action in Jerusalem and its description of East Jerusalem as occupied
territory. However, American policy in the mid-1970s was that unilateral agreements
could be an ideal mechanism for negotiations. This policy resulted in the Camp
David agreement between Egypt and Israel.
The real revival of plans for a comprehensive peace agreement in the region
came in the wake of the Gulf War in 1991. The war against Iraq and the continuing
collapse of the Communist bloc led to a comprehensive political review by the
United States of the shaping of a new world order. This required the reorganisation
of the affairs of various economic and political regions around the world, including
the Middle East. This had to be done by building new regional institutions in a way
that would guarantee American interests and prevent the repetition of an attempt -
such as that of Iraq - to create a regional order opposing American interests in the
60 The text of the statement in Documents on Jerusalem, p. 177.
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Gulf. The American-based order would be one in which both of the United States'
non-Arab allies in the region, namely Israel and Turkey, could participate. The Pales¬
tinian question therefore emerged as a source of tension that could prevent the
creation of a structure which included Israel.
After intensive efforts, the United States managed to persuade the various
parties to attend the Madrid Peace Conference (see Chapters One and Two).
Although the interim agreement - known as the Oslo Accords - was welcomed by
the United States, its main concern had been to reach an agreement rather than the
details of the agreement itself
The final status negotiations that took place at Camp David in July 2000
were a moment of truth for American policy. The question of Jerusalem was more
critical now than at any other time. A comprehensive agreement made it impossible
to delay finding a solution for Jerusalem - as had happened before - and at the same
time tension inside the city was growing. When the Summit collapsed and the
problem of Jerusalem emerged as the main reason, President Clinton's
Administration decided to play a more active role in dealing with the situation. Until
that time the United States had been playing the role of facilitator without taking a
direct part in the negotiations, leaving most of the issues for the two parties to
negotiate. Now, however, it decided to propose a specific solution. So, in late
December 2000, President Clinton put forward a proposal for peace. He described
the problem of Jerusalem as "perhaps the most emotional and sensitive of all", and
fV.?
made "four propositions" to solve it:
1. Jerusalem should be an open and undivided city, with assured freedom of access
and worship for all. It should encompass the internationally recognised capitals of
two states, Israel and Palestine.
2. What is Arab should be Palestinian, for why should Israel want to govern in
perpetuity the lives of hundreds of thousands of Palestinians?
3. What is Jewish should be Israeli. That would give rise to a Jewish Jerusalem,
larger and more vibrant than any in history.
61 "Statement by William Scranton, US representative to the UN, 1976", in Documents on
Jerusalem, p. 178.
62 Haaretz (9 January 2001).
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4. What is holy to both requires special care to meet the needs of all. No peace
agreement will last if not premised on mutual respect for the religious beliefs and
holy shrines of Jews, Muslims and Christians.
As explained in previous chapters, the proposal was not accepted by either
the Palestinians or the Israelis, for further negotiations were needed to reach an
agreement. A new American Administration and Israeli Prime Minister came to
power in early 2001, the conflict escalated, and negotiations came to a halt.
In general, it could be concluded that the United States has had two main
considerations in mind when dealing with the Jerusalem question. Firstly, it viewed
the issue of the city according to its impact on the overall situation in the Middle
East. Therefore, American policies have shown a certain amount of care not to
provoke the Arab and Muslim countries and public opinion, for example, by not
recognising the city as Israel's capital. Secondly, the special relationship between
Israel and the United States made the American Administration view the pre-1967
partition of Jerusalem as an unacceptable solution, and recognise an Israeli presence
in East Jerusalem in any forthcoming settlement. Yet the United States was giving
Israel increasing protection by preventing any international action against the Israeli
annexation policies in the city.
5.3 The Vatican and Churches in Jerusalem
The major Christian churches in Jerusalem were, until recent years, administered by
European clerics. The Vatican and Western states had been claiming the right to
protect the laity of these churches, and had provided support for them in various
ways such as missionary services. As a result, the churches and their laity had been
viewed by many as representatives of their international protectors. In other words,
they were portrayed as expressing foreign attitudes. However, before discussing this
assertion, it is important to look at the Christian presence in Jerusalem.
254
5.3.1 The Christian Presence in Jerusalem
In 1922, Christians in Jerusalem numbered around 14,700, forming 23 per cent of the
total population. This increased to 31,300 in 1946, though now forming only 19 per
cent.63 The change in the percentage was largely due to Jewish migration to the city.
However, the 1948 War was a severe blow to the Christians' existence in
Jerusalem. It was estimated that at least 40 per cent of the city's Christians fled or
were forced out of West Jerusalem until none remained there. It was also estimated
that 25 per cent of the land lost in West Jerusalem was owned by churches or
Christian institutions and 13 per cent of the residential properties lost were those of
Christian individuals and families.64
In 1961 the number of Christians in East Jerusalem was 11,000. According
to 1998 statistics, there was no increase in this number in the whole of Jerusalem.
The 11,000 Christians of 1998 in Jerusalem, mostly in the Old City,65 accounted for
less than 2 per cent of the city's population.
The sharp decline in the Christian presence was largely due to the
occupation and the difficult economic situation in Jerusalem (unemployment among
Christians in the city in the late 1980s was 35 per cent66), to the marked increase in
Jewish migration to the city and the natural growth in the population of Palestinian
Muslims.
Historically, the Greek Orthodox Church had accounted for the majority of
Christians in Palestine and Jerusalem, followed by Roman Catholics67 and the
Armenian Orthodox Church. However, there have been changes in the proportions.
The followers of the Greek Orthodox Church declined from 4,000 in 1967 to 3,500
in 1998, the Armenian Orthodox from 2000 to 1,500, while the Roman Catholics
remained around 3,900. Other small Christian groups in the city have shown slight
increases or decreases, although the Orthodox presence has been declining notice¬
ably, with a slight increase in the numbers of Catholics and Protestants.68
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Dumper, Sacred Space, pp.111-112.
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Wagner, Dying, pp. 151, 209.
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66 Filastin al-Thawra (22 July 1990).
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Until the 1980s, most of these churches were controlled by non-Arabs and
non-Palestinians. The Greek Orthodox Patriarchate, theoretically independent of any
other Patriarchate in the world, has in reality been controlled by Greek bishops for
hundreds of years. During the nineteenth century it enjoyed Russian support, which
was replaced with Greek support after the independence of Greece and the
Communist Revolution in Russia.69 The Catholic churches, namely the Roman
Catholic, had links with the central universal Catholic leadership of the Vatican, and
in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries had received support and protection
from France, Italy and other Catholic countries. The third major Christian group in
Jerusalem, the Armenian Orthodox Church, is completely non-Arab and expresses
pride in its Armenian national culture and heritage.70
The Christian presence in Jerusalem has been analysed in various ways,
including the political aspect. Some Israeli views tried to negate the Palestinian
national identity of Christians in Palestine, or to deny that the Christians of Jerusalem
are indigenous. Teddy Kollek, the former Mayor of Jerusalem, said
Christianity... sprang up and developed far from the scene of Jesus' last
ministry, notably in Antioch and other parts of the Middle East and the
eastern Mediterranean, where his disciples recounted his teachings, his
parables, the stories of his miracles in his lifetime and his resurrection and
ascension. Jerusalem itself...remained comparatively untouched by the
views expounded by the latest victims of Rome.71
This view attempts to minimise the significance of Jerusalem as the cradle
of Christianity. However, another Israeli argument says that the establishment of the
Jewish state is in the interests of the Christians since it protects their holy places from
Muslims (See Chapter Two). There are also those who assert that in 1967 the
Christians of Jerusalem welcomed the capture of the city by the Israelis.72
Assumptions and questions are raised in connection with assertions of the
role played by the Christians of Jerusalem, churches and laity in the conflict over
Jerusalem. Among these assumptions, there are those which suggest that Christians
69 On the history of the Orthodox Patriarchate in Jerusalem, see P.J. Vatikiotis, "The Greek
Orthodox Patriarchate of Jerusalem between Hellenism and Arabism", Middle Eastern
Studies, vol.30, no.4 (October 1994).
70 On the Armenian Church, see Daphne Tsimhoni, "The Armenians and the Syrians: Ethno-
religious Communities in Jerusalem", Middle Eastern Studies, vol. 20, no.3 (July 1984).
71 Cited in Wagner, Dying, p.21.
72 Ibid., p.159.
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in Jerusalem might accept Israel's presence, and would be influenced by the position
of the states and churches to which they are attached.
v Historical examination disproves such assumptions. This can be shown by
examining the Christian view of the question of national identity and the political
solution in Jerusalem.
5.3.2 Christians and National Identity
A distinction must be made between the position of the Churches of Jerusalem and
that of the Christians of Jerusalem and Arab Christians in general.
It could be argued that the sense of Arab and Palestinian national identity
was growing among Palestinian Christians, especially in Jerusalem, even before the
appearance of Zionism. This was certainly true of the members of the Orthodox
Church, who comprised the overwhelming majority of the Christians of Palestine and
Jerusalem. During the late nineteenth century, the laity of the Greek Orthodox
Church was struggling on two fronts against two foreign powers: Turkish political
rule and Greek control over its Churches in Jerusalem. This situation has led to
waves of protest by Arab Orthodox Christians since that time, demanding that the
Church be Arabised. In 1908 they asked that local secular members be elected along
with the clerics to administer the affairs of the Patriarchate, especially property and
financial resources. The Greek clerks vigorously rejected the request, asserting that
the Patriarchate endowments "are not national but belong to all the Orthodox in the
world".73 The dispute became a national issue between the Orthodox Arab Chris¬
tians, who styled themselves "nationals" (Watuniyyun) or "the Palestinian Orthodox
People", and who called the other side the "Greek element".74 Subsequently in late
1908 and early 1909, demonstrations were held in protest against the Greek
Patriarchal policies in various cities in Palestine. It is noteworthy that Muslims
73 Shehada & Niqula Khun & Ra'uf Abu-Jabir, Khulasat Tarikh Kanisat U'rshahm al-
U'rthodhuksiyya, Idafa ila Nubtha 'an Tarikh al-Qadiyya al- U'rthodhuksiyya [A
Summarised History of the Orthodox Church of Jerusalem in Addition to a Brief History of
the Orthodox Issue in Palestine and Jordan between 1925 and 1992] (Jerusalem: Matba'at




participated in these demonstrations,75 clearly indicating that the development of
national identity transcended religious divisions.
The appearance of the Zionist movement exacerbated the dispute between
the two sides, especially after news of the sale of properties owned by the
Patriarchate to Zionist organisations. For instance, in 1914 some intellectual
members of the Orthodox Church of Jerusalem, such as Khalil Sakakini and George
Antunyus, led a wave of protests, asking to have the Greek language used in the
• ...
Church replaced with Arabic, and to have the sale of properties to Zionists halted.
Christians in Palestine in general took part in the struggle against the
Zionists by joining with Muslim Palestinians in forming the Muslim-Christian
Associations that led to the Palestinian national movement in the early 1920s (see
Chapter One).
The situation in the other Churches was different. There were no demands
for Arabisation, maybe because on the one hand, there was no sense of exploitation
among local Christians, namely the Catholics, and, on other hand, the Vatican, as the
new protector of Catholics in the early 1929s, was not enthusiastic about Zionism
and was even wary of British rule. So a dispute over Zionism was not expected
between the local laity and the universal spiritual leadership.
In the aftermath of the 1948 War, the assertion that the Christians of
Palestine held a different position from that of the Palestinian Muslims was almost
baseless. Not only did the Christians of Palestine in general, and of West Jerusalem
in particular, suffer as refugees with the rest of the Palestinians, but also the new
middle-class, educated, secular or leftist Christian figures established resistance
movements, and some of them took their place among the symbols of the Palestinian
national struggle. For instance, one of the leading figures was George Habash, a
"Greek" Orthodox Christian, who was a co-founder of the Arab Nationalist
Movement in Beirut in the 1950s, which promoted Arab unity and liberation. He and
other Palestinian Christians participated in establishing a Palestinian successor to the
Arab Nationalist Movement in the 1960s: the Popular Front for the Liberation of





leadership and a Palestinian spokesman in the early 1970s until his assassination by
the Israelis.77 There are many other examples of Christian figures who have played a
prominent role in the struggle to liberate Palestine. It must be pointed out that these
leading figures were secular and leftist, and that they were not acting on a religious
basis. Nevertheless, the importance of their participation is that any attempt to assert
that the Christians of Palestine hold a position different from that of Palestinian
Muslims can be easily challenged.
The establishment of Israel increased the overlap between the two fronts on
which the Arab members of the Orthodox Church had to fight, especially because of
the sale of land in West Jerusalem and Israel by the Patriarchate to Zionist organi¬
sations.
During the 1950s, many attempts were made by Arab Orthodox Christians
to spur the Jordanian government into passing a new law to organise the affairs of the
Orthodox Patriarchate and its relations with its members. This action indicated that
Arab Orthodox Christians in Palestine and Jordan felt closer to their Arab govern¬
ments than to their Greek clerics. Between 1956 and 1958, the Arab Renaissance
Orthodox Association* contacted the current leftist Arabist government in Jordan
(headed by the leader of the National Socialist Party, Sulayman al-NabulsI), demand¬
ing legislation to end the exclusive Greek control of the Patriarchate. They wanted
"secular" members to participate in a "mixed council" to administer the Patriarchate,
and the regulations to be changed so that Arabs could be elected as clerics to lead the
Church. A bill was drafted in 1957 and sent to the Deputy Council, which approved
it and sent it to the Upper House. However, the government was dismissed before the
70
end of the legislative procedure. A new bill was hastily drafted and agreed in
Parliament after governmental pressure and amid objections from Members of
Parliament, who said that they had not even read it. The new bill was passed in the
Upper House without any discussion, some of the members pointing out that they
had not even seen it.79 The name of the Patriarchate remained the "Greek Orthodox
Patriarchate", although the first bill had called it the "Orthodox Patriarchate". So the
77 Ibid., pp. 198-199.
Established in Transjordan in 1923.
78
Interview, Ra'uf Abu-Jabir, Amman, 19 September 2001.
79 The Minutes of the Jordanian Upper House, 22 May 1958.
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new law ensured that power remained in the hands of the Patriarch.80 The behind-the-
scenes influence that led to changing the bill in this hasty manner is not known,
although Greek pressure is one of the possible reasons. However, the new law
allowed the inclusion of Arabs in the Patriarchate, yet to the present day the Greek
o 1
heads of the Patriarchate have refused to appoint Arab members.
The occupation of East Jerusalem in 1967 maximised the importance of the
role that Churches in Jerusalem could play, because of their acceptance of the
Israelis, who became the ruling power, or the controversy over the sale and leasing of
property by the Churches to the Israelis. By the late 1960s and early 1970s, the
number of land sales, particularly in the district of Jerusalem, by the Greek Orthodox
Patriarch, had rocketed. Ra'uf Abu-Jabir, the head of the Orthodox Society in
Amman, allowed the researcher access to a file containing documents of numerous
contracts for the sale and leasing of properties from the late 1960s up to the late
1990s. The file included documents and information about contracts to sell, lease,
and exchange properties with Israel, either inside Israel itself or in West and East
Jerusalem. Among these properties was land where parts of settlements such as
Ma'ale Adumim, Har Homa and Gilo were built, as well as land adjacent to the Old
City.82
However, during the 1970s, the Armenian Patriarchate was also selling land
and property to the Israeli government, including a tract along the western side of the
oi
city wall of Jerusalem, while other plots were lost by confiscation.
Some of these deals were justified by Israeli pressure. This meant that Israel
used its authority in issuing visas and residence permits for foreign bishops, as well
as the granting of planning permission and similar issues to force the Churches into
accepting these contracts. Various statements issued by the Greek Orthodox Patriar¬
chate deny some of the contracts, such as the sale of land, although it admits to
80 The texts of the first bill cited in Khurl & Abu Jabir, Khulasat, pp.447-468; and Law No.




Copies of some of these documents and reports were given to the researcher by Ra'uf
Abu-Jabir. Details of other land sales and long-term leases are found in journalist reports
such as Al-Nahar (3 September 1997), and al-Hayat (\ September 2000),
83
Dumper, The Politics ofJerusalem., p. 189.
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leasing land for long periods, some of these leases lasting fifty or a hundred years or
C 84tor ever.
The nationalist struggle against the occupation during the late 1980s in the
West Bank and Gaza seemed to be entering a new stage with the Churches drawing
closer to the Palestinian national movement. The Intifada of 1987 was significant in
that Christians participated on some occasions in a way unlike that in other places in
the West Bank and Gaza. For instance, the Christian town of Bayt Sahur, between
Jerusalem and Bethlehem, was unique in its practice of civil disobedience, especially
the refusal to pay taxes to the Israelis. This action prompted the Israelis to launch
vigorous campaigns of arrest, siege and confiscation of property. All these events
oc
were covered by the international media. The Intifada led the Christian Churches in
Jerusalem to adopt a new style of discourse in the form of joint public statements. It
seemed as if the Intifada had created Palestinian national unity, in which the
Churches had to play their part.
Since the end of the 1980s, the Churches have expressed political views in
their joint statements, such as calling on the United Nations "to give urgent attention
to the plight of the Palestinian people, and to work for a speedy and just resolution of
the Palestinian problem,"86 as well as "international protection to preserve our
07
universal Christian heritage". A historic step was taken in 1988 by appointing to
the Roman Catholic Patriarchiate an Arab Patriarch, Michel Sabbah, who, together
« . . . ... 88
with his Palestinian aides, expressed criticism of the Israeli policies.
In reaction to the anti-occupation struggle, Israeli measures in targeting
Church properties were intensified by the increase in the numbers of religious right-
wing settlers on the Jerusalem Municipality Council and in Israeli politics. In April
1990, a confrontation took place when a group of settlers broke into St John's
84 For instance, the Arabic statement "Explanation by the Greek Orthodox Church in
Jerusalem" in 1998 and other statements given to the Israeli courts in defence of the
Patriarchate in civil cases initiated by Arab Orthodox Christians (Orthodox Society Archive,
Amman).
85 See Dumper, Sacred Space, p.l 17.
86 "Statement by the Head of the Christian Communities in Jerusalem, 27 April 1989",
Documents on Jerusalem, p.22.
87 "Statement by the Head of the Churches in the Holy Land, Jerusalem, 14 January 1992",
Documents on Jerusalem, pp.24-25.
88
Interviews, 'Afif Safiya & Ra'uf Abu-Jabir; also Wagner, Dying, pp.71, 161 & 252.
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Hospice, owned by the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate, in the heart of the Christian
quarter in the Old City, and claimed it for Jewish residence. The Patriarch, Diodorus,
despite-his past co-operation with Israeli officials was, among others, physically
assaulted during the attempt to restore control over the building.
The Churches in Jerusalem issued a joint statement under the heading
"Christian Churches and Communities in Jerusalem". It contained three measures of
protest: closing the holy places in Jerusalem, Nazareth and Bethlehem, and elsewhere
in the Holy Land for one day; tolling the funeral bell in the churches; and declaring a
special day of prayer on behalf of the Christian Community of Jerusalem and inviting
Christians throughout the world to take part.89
This action prompted a campaign of protest inside and outside Israel against
its policy towards the Christian areas. President Chaim Herzog refuted these accusa¬
tions and asserted in letters to the United Nations and the American President that the
campaign was part of a revival of Christian "classical hostility" against Jews, and
was exploiting a "property deal".90
The importance of these events was that they increased the gulf between the
Arab Christians and the Israelis, enhanced the nationalist trend in the Churches, and
established joint Christian action.
The increasing tension between the Churches of Jerusalem and the Israeli
government and settlers over the status and properties of the former was exacerbated
by the escalation of another dispute, that is, the status and role of other non-
indigenous Churches in Jerusalem. These Churches were known as Zionist Chris¬
tianity or American Fundamental Christianity. The dispute between Jerusalem's old
Churches and American Protestantism had begun in the nineteenth century, when
American archaeological/biblical missions carried out research in the city. They
concluded that the crucifixion and resurrection of Jesus had taken place not at the site
of the Holy Sepulchre but somewhere outside the Old City. At the same time, they
89
Documents on Jerusalem, pp.23-24.
90 Filastln al-Thawra (27 May 1990).
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supported the establishment of a Jewish state, or Israel, which would "bring back"
the Jews to the land of Israel, considering it to be a duty laid down in the Bible.91
According to this research, a group asserting that it represented Christians
"everywhere" declared itself - in response to the international condemnation of Israel
for its Basic Law on Jerusalem in 1980 - to be the "International Christian Embassy
Jerusalem". The group asserted that its membership comprised 1,400 Christian from
Q9 •
forty countries. The mutual support and co-operation between these groups and
Churches and the Israeli government have provoked the established Churches in
Jerusalem and added another dimension to the tension between the two sides. For
instance, in 1988, the established Churches in the city issued a statement that this
embassy neither represented nor replaced the Christian community in Jerusalem or
the majority of the Faithful throughout the world. The statement also rejected the
political interpretation of the Holy Scriptures by this Church and pointed out: "We do
not expect people coming from abroad, unaware of our problems, to act on our
behalf."93
Meanwhile, the confrontation inside Jerusalem continued. In 1992 another
joint statement by the heads of the Churches in Jerusalem was issued to express
concern about the situation in the occupied territories. In this statement the issue of
the holy places and Church properties was viewed in a wider framework. The
Churches condemned the Israeli demographic policies to change Jerusalem's "unique
character and status", and condemned settler activities not only against certain
Christian properties and personalities but also throughout the whole of the city.94 In
1996, during the escalating tension in the occupied territories, the Christian Churches
expressed a more nationalist position. In joint and individual statements they
91 For the origins of the American Protestant views and projects regarding Jerusalem and
Israel, see Edward Fox, Palestine Twilight: The Murder of Dr Albert Glock and the
Archaeology of the Holy Land (London: HarperCollins, 2001), pp.51-63.
92 See the web site of International Christian Embassy Jerusalem: www.icei.org.il. However,
it must be emphasised that some sources do not accept some of these Churches in Jerusalem,
which support Israel, as Protestant Churches. See, Jane Betty Bailey & Alison Hilliard,
Living Stones Pilgrimage (London: Cassell, 1999), p. 42.
93 "Statement by the Christian Churches on the 'Christian Embassy' in Jerusalem, 15 April
1988", in Documents on Jerusalem, p.21. Also, in June 2002, 'Attaalla Hanna, spokesperson
for the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate, commented: "There are in the United States groups that
claim Christianity under different names. They are actually Zionist businesses, whose aim is
to serve the Zionist project by defrauding, penetrating and destroying the Christian religion."
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protested against Israeli action against Islamic holy places, namely, the excavation of
the tunnel under al-Aqsa Mosque. The joint statement described the Israeli policies
as "injustice" and declared that the excavation "touched the religious nerve of our
Muslim brothers and sisters". The statement also protested against the Israeli
closures and other issues, such as education, health, work, worship, freedom of
movement, policies, etc.95
The movement to express closer solidarity with the Palestinian national
position against the Israeli occupation were combined with further attempts by Arab
Orthodox Christians to change the situation of their own Patriarchate. Although the
Patriarchate had to join with other Churches in expressing support for the
Palestinians, the disputes over the sale of land and Greek domination continued. In
July 1987, a few months before the Intifada, a large demonstration took place in front
of the Patriarchate in Jerusalem to protest against the land sales.96 In 1992 various
actions along these lines were taken in Israel, the occupied territories and Amman.
Simultaneous action in these three arenas highlighted the question of identity. It was
as if the action transcended the identities and borders that resulted from the
establishment of Israel, where Palestine and East Jordan had consisted of one
Patriarchate since the Ottoman era. In other words, Arab Orthodox Christians were
not restricted to the invented borders of the nation-state scheme in the region, but
were acting within an earlier, broader structure.
In October 1992, a conference entitled "A Church for Our Palestine" was
organised in Jerusalem by the Arab Orthodox community from both Israel and the
occupied territories to discuss the Patriarchate policies.97 An organiser said to the
Press on this occasion: "We see land being sold to the Israelis and the Greek bishops
being driven around in luxury cars to their beautiful villas, and yet there is never any
money when a church roof needs fixing."98 This statement clearly linked the
4
Ibid.; Documents on Palestine, p.24.
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Ibid., Documents on Jerusalem, pp33-34; see also, "Jerusalem First" - a Message by the
Latin Catholic Patriarch of Jerusalem, 29 September 1996., ibid., pp.34-35; "Urgent Appeal
for Assistance and Action to the Bishops of the World", issued by the Commission for
Justice and Peace of the Roman Catholic Patriarchate of Jerusalem, 10 October 1996 (ibid.,
p.35).
96 The Bulletin ofthe Orthodox Association, Amman, no.21 (July 1998).
97 Filastln al-Thawra, (22 November 1992).
98 The Times (3 October 1992).
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traditional accusations of financial corruption and the issue of relations with Israel.
The conference established the Arab Initiative Committee, which brought together
the Arab Orthodox community in Palestine.
Two months later, the conference of Amman was attended by around three
hundred representatives from Israel, the occupied territories and Jordan. The PLO
was represented by high-ranking officials. 'Abbas Zaki, head of the Higher
Committee of the Intifada in the PLO and member of the Fath Central Committee,
attended on behalf of the PLO Chairman, Yasir 'Arafat. 'Abd al-Hamid al-Sa'ih,
Speaker of the PNC and a prominent scholar of Islam also attended." The attendance
strongly implied a union of the Arab Orthodox struggle against Greek control with
the general Palestinian national cause.
From the Conference resolutions and documents, it can be seen that Israel
and the occupied territories were described in one word, that is, "Palestine", not
"Israel". The most important resolution was establishing the Central Orthodox
Council of 44 members, with Ra'uf Abu-Jabir from East Jordan as its President,
The council declared itself to be a body representing Palestine and Jordan's 200,000
Orthodox Church members.100 A representative body that operates in Israel, the
occupied territories and Jordan may be the only united organisation of its kind. The
Islamic movement, for instance, does not operate jointly in the three places.
In the following years, the Central Council made every effort in Amman to
change the situation of the Patriarchate. It asked the Jordanian government and the
King to intervene and make the Patriarch in Jerusalem appoint a mixed council of
secular Jordanian members and clerical members according to the 1958 law.101
Inside Israel and the occupied territories the Orthodox Central Council went
to the Israeli courts several times in an attempt to prevent contracts for the sale and
leasing of land, declaring that the Patriarch should not have the right to deal with
99 Interview, Ra'ufAbu-Jabir.
100 Ibid., and documents on the conference (Orthodox Society Archive, Amman).
101 Letter from the Orthodox Society to King Husayn in 1997, and other correspondence
with the Jordanian Prime Minister on various occasions between 1993 and 1998 (Orthodox
Society Archive, Amman).
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endowments of "national" importance which were not the "exclusive property of
anybody".102
In late 2000, the death of the Patriarch Diodorus reopened the case ofGreek
domination of the Church, and linked it more strongly than at any time before with
the Arab-Palestinian national cause, by concentrating on the sale of properties to
Israel. The two parties, the Greek and the Arab, tried to use similar methods,
especially the recruitment of governmental support: the Arabs looked to Jordan and
Palestine, and the Greeks to Israel and Greece.
According to Jordanian law, bishops participating in the election of the
Patriarch, as candidates or voters, must have Jordanian nationality. At the beginning
101
of 2001, the Jordanian government refused to grant nationality to 76 Greek monks,
in response to the demands ofArab Orthodox Christians.
However, the Jordanian government later granted 21 Greek monks
Jordanian nationality so that they could participate in the election. In what appeared
to be a compromise, and after intensive efforts from the Orthodox Society in
Amman, 'Attaalla Hanna, an Arab Israeli Orthodox Christian, was also granted
Jordanian nationality to enable him to participate in the election and stand as a
candidate for the post of Patriarch in the future.104
Although approval to hold the elections had been granted by the Jordanian
government and the Palestinian Authority, it was refused by the Israeli government.
Since the Patriarchate's responsibility included the Churches and institutions in all
three states, permission had to be granted by all three authorities before any elections
could be held. Israel insisted that some figures in the Patriarchate, who did not
observe the Israeli demands, could not stand as candidates. This inflamed the dispute
within the Orthodox bodies, and gave the election a stronger nationalist nature. Some
sources inside the Orthodox community declared that if Israel continued its inter¬
vention, an election could be held without its consent.105
102 Statement from the Executive Committee/The Orthodox Conference in Israel., 28
November 1993 (Orthodox Society Archives, Amman).
103
al-Hayat (28 April 2001).
104
Interview, Ra'uf Abu-Jabir; Haaretz (3 July 2001).
105 Haaretz (3 July 2001).
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The Arabist party in the Orthodox Patriarchate focused on the sale of land in
facing its rivals. 'Attaalla Hanna issued the following statement:
We reject anyone who has relations with Israel to be the Patriarch of
Jerusalem, and anyone who conspired with the Israeli occupation authorities
or who acted to assimilate with the occupiers and sell Church land to
them, because such an act is high treason against the Church and its
humanitarian values.106
After long debates Bishop Irianus, who was the Palestinian choice, won the
election. However, it is interesting to see how the Israeli question interacted with the
Arabisation of the Patriarchate in this campaign. Ra'uf Abu-Jabir said: "We stopped
asking for the Arabisation of the Church. Now we are asking for our participation in
reaching the right decisions on what is the nationality of the Patriarch." He justified
his view as follows: "Israel welcomes conflict in the Orthodox Church; it would
welcome an Arab declaration that we do not recognise the [1958] law",107 because
this would offer them the opportunity to impose new laws and to confiscate land, etc.
By using this language, the Arab Orthodox Christians gave priority to the
general national cause of Palestine and Jerusalem over their own specific aim of
Arabising the Orthodox Church, although this was also a national cause in their view.
However, the problem of Jerusalem was a double front for the Arab Orthodox
Christians in their struggle against the Israeli occupation and Greek domination.
The role of 'Attaallah Hanna, as former election candidate, spokesperson
for the Patriarchate, and champion of Palestinian nationalism, as well as a probable
change in the new Patriarch policy toward the sale of land, could bring the Greek
Orthodox Patriarchate into the Palestinian and Arab nationalist camp.
It can be said that while the Palestinian Christians have always been part of
the Palestinian and Arab nationalist movement, the Christian Churches in Jerusalem
have made every effort to associate themselves with it. The external influence on
these Churches has been declining, whereas that of the Palestinian laity has been
gradually increasing. The Churches of Jerusalem are thereby influencing inter¬
national Churches and Christian bodies into giving more support to the Palestinian
cause.
106 al-Hayat (7 July 2001).
107 Interview, Ra'uf Abu-Jabir.
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5.3.3 The Churches and the Political Solution
There are two main political opinions held by Christian Churches regarding the
solution to the conflict in Jerusalem: firstly, that of the Vatican, the leader of the
Catholic Church worldwide, and at the same time an independent sovereign state;
and secondly, that of the local Churches in Jerusalem.
As a state, the Vatican has been expected to, and has had the power to hold
opinions on issues when the other Churches have been unable or have not been
required to express their position. For instance, the Vatican participated in the
League ofNations debate over the establishment of the British Mandate in the 1920s,
and had to decide whether to recognise Israel in 1948.
The Vatican officially welcomed the British capture of Jerusalem in 1917
• 108
because a Christian power had achieved victory for "Christian Civilisation". In
reality, however, there was a strong fear that the British victory could create an
opportunity for Protestantism to control Jerusalem. This fear was expressed infor¬
mally by Cardinal Pietro Gasparri, the Vatican Secretary of State, who said that he
preferred Muslim rule to that of Protestants or Zionists.109
However, several factors persuaded the Vatican to support the Mandate.
Firstly, that there was rivalry with France over who would represent the Catholic
Church in Jerusalem. The British authorities assured the Vatican that they would no
longer consider France the protector of Catholics in Palestine.110 Both the Vatican
and the Catholic Church in Jerusalem protested against Zionist colonisation activities
on several occasions, and criticised the methods of modernisation, which could
damage the character of the Holy Land.111 Cardinal Gasparri was reported to have
said in 1919: "We are very worried about Palestine. Zionism is threatening to invade
every place, to take everything, actually to buy Palestine."112 The Pope himself on
108 Minerbi, The Vatican, pp.18, 20.
109 Ibid, p.21.
110 Ibid, pp.42, 43.
111 Ibid, pp.43,44.
112 Ibid, p. 127.
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several occasions deplored Jewish activities to transform the holy places into
"pleasure spots".113
In 1948, the Vatican insisted that Jerusalem should be internationalised. It
refused to recognise Israel and continued to do so until 1993. However, meetings
with Israel had taken place after 1967. In 1969 the Pope met the Israeli Foreign
Minister, and in 1972 the Prime Minister.114
Besides the Arab states, the Vatican was the main power to support the
internationalisation of Jerusalem in the aftermath of the 1948 War, according to the
borders of the Partition Plan or the corpus separatum decided by UN Resolution
181.115 The Vatican's view meant that Catholic states in Europe and Latin America
could not support any other resolution. Even in Jerusalem itself the Latin Patriarch,
Gori, expressed his support for other resolutions in closed meetings during the early
1950s. He told the French Consul-General in Jerusalem that he would favour a UN
resolution which, while paying "lip-service" to the principle of internationalisation at
some future date, would establish a system of "international supervision" for the time
being.116
The Vatican changed its position gradually, although it was not expressed
clearly since no serious peace process began before 1967. On various occasions after
that date the Vatican took care to participate in any political negotiations over
Jerusalem. In 1973, at the international conference in Geneva, which was attended by
Israel and its neighbours after the October War, the Vatican issued a statement
asking the conference not to adopt resolutions that might affect the future of
Jerusalem.117
In 1979, after the failure of the Egyptian-Israeli negotiations at Camp
David, the Vatican put forward a solution to the problem of Jerusalem. It stated that a
solution should be part of the settlement of the whole Middle East crisis. However
the question of sovereignty was to be resolved, Jerusalem must have special status
113 Ibid., p.149.
114 Eban, Autobiography, pp.298, 604.
115 FO 371/104775: Letter from H. Beely, British Embassy, Washington, DC, to Paul Falla,
Eastern Department, Foreign Office, 14 October 1953.
116 FO 371/104775: Letter from A.R. Walmsley, British Consulate-General, Jerusalem to
q H- Baker, Eastern Department, Foreign Office, 6 August 1953.
U7 Jdeikal, Secret Channels, p.227.
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including international guarantees for the freedom of worship and access to the holy
places. All three religious communities should enjoy equal rights, including adequate
opportunities for economic progress, education, employment, etc. The Vatican also
• • 118
asked to be enabled "to make its voice heard" when negotiations took place.
It was clear that the Vatican no longer insisted on the type of internationali-
sation described in UN Resolution 181 and that it could accept solutions based on a
different international role. At the same time, however, the Vatican considered itself
part of the solution and demanded to have a role in determining the future of the city.
The peace process that began in Madrid in 1991 opened the case of the
Christian position on Jerusalem. The Vatican, which had not been invited to the
negotiations, and which for years had been under pressure from Israel and countries
such as the Netherlands and Germany to recognise Israel, opened negotiations with
Israel itself shortly after the Madrid Peace Conference. At the same time it informed
the PLO that it could now receive a Palestinian diplomatic mission.119
190
In December 1993 the Vatican signed a Fundamental Agreement with
Israel. The Agreement's preamble emphasised the "process of reconciliation and
growth in mutual understanding and friendship between Catholics and Jews". It
established diplomatic relations and Israel recognised the right of the "Catholic
Church to carry out its religious, moral, educational and charitable functions".
Nevertheless, the agreement did not include a specific view of the political future of
Jerusalem, or the role of the Vatican in the negotiations. On the contrary, it stated:
The Holy See, while maintaining in every case the right to exercise its moral
and spiritual teaching office, deems it opportune to recall that owing to its
own character, it is solemnly committed to remaining a stranger to all
merely temporal conflicts, which principle applies to disputed territories and
unsettled borders.
The text restricted the rights of the Vatican, in particular the right to express
an opinion at future negotiations.
The Agreement did not please various parties, such as the PLO, which was
late in appointing a delegation, for no reason other than bureaucracy, and which
118 "Statement by the Permanent Observer of the Holy See to the UN, 3 December 1979", in
Documents on Jerusalem, pp. 19-20.
119 Interview, 'Afif Safiya.
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wanted the Vatican to wait until a final agreement was reached between the
Palestinians and the Israelis. The Palestinians were wary because the annexe to the
Agreement contained a list of Catholic institutions in East Jerusalem. The Vatican
explained that it did not mean its recognition of Israel in East Jerusalem, but merely
its awareness of the fact that Israel currently had de facto control there.121
In October 1994 official relations were established between the PLO and the
Vatican and on 15 February the two parties signed the 2000 Basic Agreement.
Unlike the Fundamental Agreement with Israel, the Basic Agreement emphasised the
uniqueness of the Jerusalem issue, and called for a solution based on international
resolutions. It rejected any decisions or unilateral actions "altering the specific
character and status of Jerusalem", and called for a particular statute for Jerusalem,
internationally guaranteed.122
The Israelis criticised the Basic Agreement, pointing out that it contradicted
the Fundamental Agreement which had been signed with them, because the Vatican,
according to the Israeli government, had agreed not to intervene in the negotia¬
tions.123 The Vatican later asserted its demand to take part in the negotiations on
Jerusalem, and during the Camp David 2000 Summit it declared that it must be heard
in determining the future of the city.124
The peace process seemed to provoke even the Churches in Jerusalem itself
to express a joint opinion on the future of Jerusalem. On 14 November 1994 they
125
issued a statement entitled: "The Significance of Jerusalem for Christians". It was
a discussion of the political process and the future of Jerusalem. It criticised both the
Israeli insistence on exclusive sovereignty over the whole of Jerusalem, and the
120 "Vatican-Israel Fundamental Agreement, 30 December 1993", Documents on Jerusalem,
pp. 25-27.
121 Interview, 'AfifSafiya.
122 "PLO-Holy See Fundamental Agreement", in Journal ofPalestine Studies, vol. 29, no.3
(Spring 2000).
123 al-Hayat (17 March 2000).
124Interview, 'Afif Safiya.
125 Statement by the Patriarchs and Heads of the Christian Communities in Jerusalem: "The
Significance of Jerusalem for Christians", 14 November 1994 (Archive of the Royal Com¬
mittee for Jerusalem Affairs, Amman). (The signatories were the Greek Orthodox Patriarch
of Jerusalem, Latin Patriarch, Armenian Patriarch, Custos of the Holy Land, Coptic
Archbishop, Syrian Archbishop, Ethiopian Archbishop, Anglican Bishop, Greek-Catholic
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Palestinian demand for exclusive sovereignty over East Jerusalem. The statement
said that "Jerusalem should be open to all, shared by all" and "the capital of human¬
kind". It highlighted, firstly, the significance of Jerusalem "in the heart of Chris¬
tianity everywhere", and secondly, the continuity of the Christian community's
presence in the city for almost two thousand years. Building on these two elements,
the Churches claimed the "legitimate demands of Christians for Jerusalem". These
rights included free access to the holy places, and the Churches' rights of "property
ownership, custody and worship". The statement demanded that "the Status Quo of
the Holy Places according to historical firmans and other documents...should
continue to be recognised and respected". At the same time the social, cultural,
political and national rights of the "local Christian communities" were emphasised.
Therefore, the signatories demanded a "special status for Jerusalem", and a
role in its creation:
In order to satisfy the national aspirations of all its inhabitants, and in order
that Jews, Christians and Muslims can be "at home" in Jerusalem and at
peace with one another, representatives from the three monotheistic
religions, in addition to local political powers, ought to be associated in the
elaboration and application of such a special statute.
Furthermore, the representatives of the Churches opposed a solution based
on a municipality or partition, demanding instead an international role in the city:
Because of the universal significance of Jerusalem, the international com¬
munity ought to be engaged in the stability and permanence of this statute.
Jerusalem is too precious to be dependent solely on municipal or national
political authorities, whoever they may be. Experience shows that an inter¬
national guarantee is necessary.
The statement clearly adopted a position very different from that in the
Israeli-Vatican agreement that had been signed a year earlier, especially by
demanding a role for the Christian Churches in determining the city's future and by
declaring support for an international authority in the city.
The political position of the local Churches seems to be continually evol¬
ving, especially in response to the escalation of tension in Jerusalem after the Oslo
Accords. The Churches issued the following statement after the 1996 Tunnel Up¬
rising: "If Israel maintains an exclusive sovereignty over the city, and continues its
Patriarchal Vicar, Lutheran Bishop, Maronite Patriarchal Vicar and the Syrian Patriarchal
Vicar.)
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'Judaization', Jerusalem will never be a city of peace." The statement declared
support for shared sovereignty and did not mention the international arrangements,
while its conclusion seemed to adopt a Palestinian point of view:
"Jerusalem first" is now a priority. It is the heart of the conflict and the key
to peace. When the closure of Jerusalem is lifted and the two parties share
sovereignty over it, Jerusalem will become the city of peace. If Israel main¬
tains an exclusive sovereignty over the city, and continues its "Judaization",
Jerusalem will never feel secure and Palestinians will never submit to it. We
therefore insist on an open Jerusalem, the capital of two states.126
During the negotiations at Camp David in 2000, the leading Churches in
Jerusalem - the Greek Orthodox, the Roman Catholic and the Armenian Orthodox -
sent a message to the Summit, demanding a role in the discussions and that their
representatives be allowed to attend Camp David and any future meetings. The three
Churches also refused to divide the Christian neighbourhoods inside the Old City.
This refusal was in response to the Israeli Prime Minister's suggestion to give control
• 127
to the Palestinians of the Muslim and Christian quarters but not the Armenian, and
indicated that if any kind of partition were to take place, they would prefer it to be
under Palestinian control. Hanan 'Ashrawi pointed out that the representatives of the
Churched had made their views clear to the Palestinian officials.128 Yasir 'Arafat
benefited from the Churches' position. He included their representatives at the
meeting of the Jerusalem Committee of the OIC, which was held in Morocco in
August. At the meeting the Greek Orthodox Patriarch, Diodorus I, declared
"Jerusalem must not continue under the Israeli occupation, and it must be the capital
of the Palestinian state."129
We can conclude the discussion of the Christian aspect in Jerusalem with
two observations. Firstly, the Christian presence in Jerusalem is threatened by the
decline in its population in the city. This will change the identity of the city and
lessen the interest of international Christian public opinion in events these. Secondly,
the Churches of Jerusalem are gradually being nationalised as the foreign influence
over them is steadily decreasing. The result is that the position of these Churches is
approaching that of the Palestinians.
126 Documents on Jerusalem, pp.33-34.
127
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al-Quds al- 'Aran (25 July 2000).
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5.4 The United Nations
Between 1947 and 1995 the United Nations adopted 141 resolutions on Jerusalem.130
Further resolutions were added over the following years until 2001, which is the
closing point of this study. Such a large number would raise doubts about the
importance and efficiency of the international organisations in dealing with an issue
like that of Jerusalem. However, before resolving these doubts, it is necessary to give
an overview of the most important international resolutions on Jerusalem.
5.4.1 The UN Resolutions on Jerusalem
A useful starting-point for discussion is an examination of the international
resolutions on Jerusalem since 1922, when the League ofNations included in the text
of the British Mandate an article entitled "The Holy Places Commission". It was
decided that a commission be established with the Mandate "to study, define and
determine the rights and claims in connection with the Holy Places and the rights and
claims relating to the different religious communities in Palestine."131 The method of
nominating the commission was disputed between Britain and the Vatican, and yet
the League was supposed to approve the commission before it could begin function¬
ing. The Vatican had fears that the commission could be formed in a way that would
change the Status Quo of the holy places in favour of the Protestants or the Greek
Orthodox Church. The continuation of the dispute prevented the establishment of the
commission,132 with the result that there was no review of the affairs and rights of the
holy places. This was an early example of a situation where positions on Jerusalem
were adopted but not implemented.
The UN resolutions applicable to Jerusalem can be classified according to
their topic.
129 al-Quds al- 'Arabl(29 August 2000).
130 These Resolutions are documented in Mahmud 'Awad, Jerusalem in the UN Resolutions
1947-1995 (Amman: Royal Committee for Jerusalem Affairs, 1995).
131 Article 14, "The Mandate of Palestine", cited in Jacob Stoyanovsky, The Mandate for
Palestine: A Contribution to the Theory and Practice of International Mandates (London:
Longmans, Green, 1928), pp.355-362.
132 Bovis, Jerusalem Question, p. 17.
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5.4.1.1 INTERNATIONALISATION
According to the UN General Assembly Resolution 181, adopted on 29 November
1947 and known as the Partition Plan,133 "[t]he City of Jerusalem shall be established
as a corpus separatum under a special international regime and shall be administered
by the UN." Arabs and Jews residing in the city were to be entitled to vote in the
Arab and Jewish states respectively. The Trusteeship Council of the United Nations
was required to prepare, no later than 1 October 1948, "a detailed Statute of the
City".
This solution was proposed for the following reasons: (1) It was difficult to
persuade one of the antagonists to hand over control of the city to the other side; and
(2) it guaranteed freedom of worship and secured international Christian public
opinion.
The municipal boundaries of the city were enlarged to include surrounding
villages and towns. According to the UNISCOP statistics, the population inside these
boundaries comprised 100,000 Jews compared with 105,000 Arabs and others. In the
district of Jerusalem, Jews comprised 38 per cent of the population compared with 62
per cent of Arabs and others. In the same area, Arabs and others owned 84 per cent
of the land and the Jews 2 per cent.134
The Resolution included arrangements together with obligations on the two
states to guarantee free access to the holy places. In addition, rules were implemented
regarding the administration of these places, tax exemption and maintenance
requirements.
The failure of the implementation of this Resolution was mainly a
consequence of the lack of international will to provide the necessary authority and
resources, as has been explained in the first and second sections of this chapter.
Moreover, one of the major problems of the Resolution was that while the
corpus separatum regime was not scheduled to begin until 1 October 1948, the
British evacuation was supposed to be completed by 1 August. In the event, the
133 UN General Assembly Resolution 181 (Partition Plan), 29 November 1947, Abdul Hadi,
Documents on Palestine, vol. I, pp. 172-184.
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evacuation was completed earlier - in May - and the Resolution itself left a possible
two-month vacuum that the conflicting parties on the ground could exploit to control
the city.
Nevertheless, irrespective of its present legal and political validity, Resolu¬
tion 181 introduced the most comprehensive view of a solution in Palestine. It stated
two major principles: the partition of Palestine, and the internationalisation of
Jerusalem.
5.4.1.2 The Israeli Annexation of East Jerusalem
Since 1967, the UN organisations have issued dozens of resolutions in response to
Israeli policies inside Jerusalem. On 4 July 1967 the UN General Assembly adopted
a resolution against the "measures taken by Israel to change the status of the city",
considering them "invalid" and asking Israel to "desist" forthwith from taking any
action that would alter the state of Jerusalem.135 On 14 July the General Assembly
issued another resolution condemning Israel's failure to implement the previous
resolution.136
Neither of the resolutions explicitly mentioned Israel's "annexation". The
reason could have been that the annexation was implemented as administrative
measures. However, on 12 September the UN General Secretary, U Thant, reported
to the General Assembly as follows:
In the numerous conversations which the Personal Representative had with
Israeli leaders, including the Prime Minister and the Minister of Foreign
Affairs, it was made clear beyond any doubt that Israel was taking every step
to place under its sovereignty those parts of the city which were not con¬
trolled by Israel before June 1967.137
Resolutions concerning Jerusalem continued to be issued by the United
Nations though without implementation, except in rare cases where, it could be
argued, they were respected by some of the parties. As an example, when Israel
134 See Special Report introduced to the General Assembly by a special committee formed to
study the minority plan in the UNISCOP, Abdul Hadi, Documents on Palestine, vol. 1,
pp.164 & 165.
135 General Assembly Resolution 2253 (ES-V), cited in 'Awad, Jerusalem in the United
Nations, p.38.
136 General Assembly Resolution 2254 (ES-V), ibid., p.39.
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passed its Basic Law on Jerusalem in 1980, the UN Security Council and General
Assembly reaffirmed their positions. The Council described the declaration of the
Law as "null and void",138 and on 20 August 1980 adopted a resolution calling upon
"those states that have established diplomatic missions in Jerusalem to withdraw
such missions from the Holy City".139 Several embassies of the Latin American
countries and the Netherlands withdrew from the city in protest against the Israeli
resolution. Nevertheless, various observers raised doubts that these states acted upon
the UN Resolution itself, suggesting that Arab pressure was the real reason for their
withdrawal. It is important to remember, however, that the states concerned had no
direct interests in the Middle East, and that their embassies were already in a bizarre
situation since most countries, including the international powers, had their embas¬
sies in Tel Aviv.
5.4.1.3 The UN View of a Solution in Jerusalem
UN Resolution 181 was apparently replaced with Resolution 242 of 1967 as the basis
of a solution to the issue of Palestine and the Middle East..
Resolution 242 stated that the settlement in the Middle East was based on
Israeli withdrawal from the territories occupied in June 1967. Although the Resolu¬
tion did not refer to Jerusalem by name, various other resolutions passed by the
Security Council and the General Assembly emphasised that Jerusalem was included
in the description of "territories occupied by force". Some of the resolutions were
based on the Israeli withdrawal "from Palestinian territory occupied in 1967, includ¬
ing Jerusalem, and from other occupied territories" as the principle for "the
achievement of a comprehensive peace".140
The United States provided protection for Israel at the Security Council by
the right of veto, and the American administrations insisted that negotiations were
137 The Report of the UN Secretary-General Concerning the Situation in Jerusalem (UN Doc.
A/6793), Documents on Jerusalem, p.284.
138 Security Council Resolution 478 (1980), 'Awad, Jerusalem in the United Nations,
pp.551-552.
139 UN Security Council Resolution 478, ibid., pp.551-552).
140 See, for instance, General Assembly Resolution 45/68, 6 December 1990, in 'Awad,
Jerusalem in the United Nations, pp.331-332; also Security Council Resolution 681, 20
December 1990, pp.562-563; and various other resolutions.
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the means of resolving this question, though they rejected any role for the United
Nations. This situation led the General Assembly to express views different from
those of the United States, though without the ability to translate them into practical
solutions.
For example, the General Assembly expressed indirect reservations about
the Egyptian-Israeli peace accords. In its resolution on 10 December 1981 the
Assembly stated the following:
[The General Assembly] decides that all actions, measures and negotiations
to implement or execute such accords and agreements, or any part thereof,
are null and void in so far as they purport to determine the future of the
Palestinian people and of the Palestinian territories occupied by Israel since
1967, including Jerusalem.141
The United Nations welcomed the Madrid Peace Conference of 1991,
though at the same time it revealed a different view of the principles for solution.
The General Assembly issued the following resolution on 11 December 1991:
[The General Assembly] considers that the convening of an International
Peace Conference on the Middle East, under the auspices of the UN, with
the participation of all parties to the conflict, including the PLO, on an equal
footing, and the five permanent members of the Security Council, based on
Council Resolution 242 (1967) of 22 November 1967 and 338 (1973) of 22
October 1973 and the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people...142
The principles of a comprehensive peace were to include "the withdrawal of
Israel from the Palestinian territory occupied since 1967, including Jerusalem, and
from other occupied Arab territories". The resolution also referred to Resolution 181
as a basis for the recognition of secure boundaries for all states in the region.
Palestine's refugee problem was to be tackled on the basis of Resolution 194, the
Israeli settlements in the territories occupied since 1967 were to be dismantled, and
freedom of access to holy and religious places was to be guaranteed. At the same
time it "expressed desire and endeavours to place the Palestinian territory under the
supervision of the UN for a transitional period, as part of the peace process."
The Resolution required another peace conference and illustrated the
solution, not leaving it open to negotiation. It recognised all the territories occupied
141 UN General Assembly Resolution 36/120, 10 December 1981, 'Awad, Jerusalem in the
UnitedNations, pp.95-99.
142 General Assembly Resolution 46/75, 11 December 1991. 'Awad, Jerusalem in the United
Nations, pp.41 ON 11.
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since 1967, including Jerusalem, as Palestinian. It is important to mention that this
resolution was adopted by 104 votes in favour, 2 against, 43 abstentions and 15
absentees.
Nevertheless, the situation seemed devoid of practical meaning.
Negotiations in Washington and Oslo continued and the United Nations found itself
in a position only to support the peace process under actual exclusive American
supervision.
5.4.2 UN Ineffectiveness in Solving the Jerusalem Question
There are several noticeable characteristics in the UN treatment of the Jerusalem
question, which also illustrate its inability to participate effectively in finding the
answer.
5.4.2.1 A Means of Crisis Management
The dates of the UN resolutions on Jerusalem indicate that there are long periods in
which Jerusalem disappeared from the UN debate, a fact that reflects the lack of
international effort to resolve the issue during that time. It also supports the assump¬
tion that international organisations move mostly to contain and manage crises rather
than solve problems. An example is the period between 1951 and June 1967; during
which only one resolution was issued - in 1958 - whereas the number soared after
the 1967 War.
The main reason is that between 1948 and 1967 there was implicit mutual
acceptance of the situation between the two countries that controlled Jerusalem;
Jordan and Israel, and there was no real tension over the city. So it appears that the
United Nations, like other regional and international organisations in dealing with
Jerusalem and Palestine questions, acts only to contain tension rather than solve
problems. A similar attitude is shown by the Arab countries' actions inside the
United Nations. Arab delegations' insistence on issuing certain resolutions, and
entering long compromises on formulating acceptable text to avoid an American
veto, have been received by Arab public opinion as "just a face-saving attempt,
which resulted in the Arab failure in deterring Israel from Judaising Jerusalem."143
Resolutions of this kind are used to calm the situation and contain crisis.
143 Shu'un Filastmiyya, no.5 (November 1971), p.215.
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5.4.2.2 The Declared and Actual Positions
As explained in the previous sections of this chapter, in cases where particular
governments declared their support for some of the UN resolutions, they did not
actually mean what they declared. Support of the internationalisation of Jerusalem
according to Resolution 181 has always been an alternative for the failure to reach
another solution, and in order to preserve relations between international powers and
some of the parties to the conflict. For example, between 1948 and 1967, the
partition of the city with some kind of international role in the holy places was a
solution supported by many international parties. Political circumstances, however,
were not suitable for declaring such a position, so preserving the de facto position
was the ideal solution in the view of these governments.
5.4.2.3 The Parties' Rejection of the Resolutions
Another reason for the ineffectiveness of the United Nations in dealing with the
question of Jerusalem is the Arab-Palestinian and Israeli rejection of some of the
resolutions. Israel has usually insisted on its rights in Jerusalem, and has considered
it a domestic affair, whereas the Palestinians, especially in the early 1970s, rejected
those resolutions which they found ineffective or not sufficiently forceful.144 On
other occasions, the Palestinians and Arabs accepted American demands to make
Jerusalem the subject of further negotiations, instead of implementing resolutions
already issued by the United Nations, thereby lessening their effectiveness.145
Israel's rejection was crucial since the country was protected by
international governments who refused to enforce the implementation of these
resolutions, unlike other cases where UN resolutions were implemented by force. US
protection was crucial, and US insistence that Jerusalem was a question of
negotiations rather than international resolution, considerably weakened the role of
the United Nations.
Despite all these factors and the resulting ineffectiveness, the resolutions of
both the League of Nations and the United Nations are still judged by many powers
144 Ibid.
145 See the criticism of the Palestinian acceptance of the Madrid negotiations on bases
different from those of the international resolutions: Bakir, Mu 'tamar al-Salam, pp. 19, 37.
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to be a valid basis for a solution in Jerusalem, and the United Nations is considered
an organisation capable of playing a role in the operation if it were allowed to do so.
Conclusion
In the study of any international conflict it is always necessary to analyse
international opinion and its influence. The United Nations and the leading powers,
in addition to those governments which could be concerned with the conflict for one
reason or another, usually have an influence that needs to be taken into account so as
to understand the situation. The question of Jerusalem is rather different since several
international powers have declared a special interest in the conflict, pointing out that
they should participate in the determination of the city's future. However, the
number of these aspiring participants is smaller now than that of a century ago.
Examination of the issue of Jerusalem in the international sphere reveals
that the religious claims or interests in the city which had been used to justify some
of the colonial campaigns in the Middle East in the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries no longer exist. This is largely because colonialism in its traditional style of
a physical presence in the region has also ceased to exist.
The regional order of the nation-state scheme, started by the establishment
of separate mandates in the hands of the colonial powers in the 1920s, was based on
the boundaries, sovereignty and national interests of the established states, not on
religious or wider universal and regional common interests. Conversely, an emphasis
on Christian special interests in the region, through Jerusalem, would provoke Arab
and Muslim reaction, and even raise questions about the existence of the Jewish state
and Western support for it.
In the context of the nation-state scheme as the regional order that
succeeded colonialism in the Middle East, we can understand why Europe no longer
expressed a particular interest in Jerusalem. There were also other factors, such as the
decline of the religious role in European society and politics. That could be why the
United States insists on keeping the question of Jerusalem as the subject of mutual
negotiations between the parties to the conflict. Simply giving the United Nations the
responsibility of resolving issues such as Jerusalem could revive or enhance public
opinion in various countries, especially those of the Arab and Muslim world, which
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insist on regarding Jerusalem as an Arab-Muslim issue. This would play into the
hands of pan-Arab and pan-Islamic groups which oppose the present regional order
of separation under the nation-state scheme. There is also the possibility of invoking
Christian public opinion, though perhaps to a lesser degree, in asking for a special
role in determining the future of Jerusalem. That would not be in the interests of
Israel, the regional ally playing an important part in guaranteeing American interests
in the Middle East, maintaining a strong lobby in American political life and
enjoying public support at the United Nations. Therefore, a religious definition of the
issue of Jerusalem, and a wider inclusion of all those who could be concerned in it,
are not in American or European interests in the Middle East, and run counter to the
present regional order of nation-states.
In recent decades the Vatican has shown more flexibility in its position on
Jerusalem and less determination in playing a role in settling the future of the city.
The evidence is that the Vatican has abandoned its insistence on the broad territorial
internationalisation of Jerusalem, and signed an agreement with Israel which has
more or less dismissed its demand to take part in the negotiations over the com¬
promise on Jerusalem. The participation of the Churches of Jerusalem, in an external
or international position, has gradually become less realistic. They are clearly under¬
going a steady nationalisation and so there is a diminishing interest among the inter¬
national Christian institutions, including the Vatican, in playing a political role in
determining the future of Jerusalem.
Since the UN reflects the balance of the international powers, it is under¬
standably subject to ineffectiveness and limitations when dealing with problems such
as that of Jerusalem.
However, there are other factors that are apparently working against the
international trend to restrict the issue of Jerusalem to a conflict between the Israelis
and the Palestinians. Firstly, there is in the Arab world a continuing struggle in the
form of political currents which reject the redefinition of identity in the region. The
participants still declare a commitment to a broader Arab or Muslim identity, and
view Jerusalem from a religious-national perspective. Secondly, the Israeli claims in
Jerusalem are also based on a religious nationalism that provokes counter-claims.
Thirdly, the Christian significance of Jerusalem still enables certain powers, such as
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the Vatican and some of the Churches, to express a special interest in the city.
Fourthly, some of the parties to the conflict, such as the Palestinians, see an
advantage in widening the range of interested parties in Jerusalem. Recently,
Palestinian clerics and Churches of Jerusalem have been participating in the
Palestinian leadership and nationalist movement, asserting the Arab, Muslim and
Christian aspects of the issue of Jerusalem, which refutes the Israeli claim of
exclusive sovereignty over the city.
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Conclusion
During the very early stages of preparing this thesis I visited the Royal Committee
for Jerusalem Affairs in Amman. The aim of the visit was to obtain a volume
published by the Committee, documenting the UN resolutions on Jerusalem.
However, when I explained my thesis proposal to the researchers there, they were
generous enough to offer me files of dozens of proposals dealing with the question of
Jerusalem. They included copies of original proposals, translations of proposals
written in Hebrew, and cuttings from newspapers and journals, etc.
A scrutiny of all these proposals gave rise to two questions: (1) why did the
proposals fail? and (2) what could be added to them?
An examination of the history of the conflict shows that there are several
reasons for this failure. After identifying these reasons, it is possible to outline some
of the steps required to deal with the question of Jerusalem.
Among the most important reasons for the complexity of the Jerusalem
question is the tendency of the international powers and the parties to the conflict to
avoid facing the problem by using delaying tactics as a means of dealing with other
issues in the wider conflict between Israel and the other parties.
At the international level, as shown in Chapter Five, there is an impression or
belief that the United States and the European countries have no "direct interests" in
the question of Jerusalem. Deferring its solution to a later stage and dealing with
other, easier issues have formed the favoured method for these countries. The
delaying tactics had started during the Mandate era, when the Vatican and the United
Kingdom could not reach agreement over the formation of a special committee to
review claims and settle controversies regarding the holy places in the city. Although
the two parties agreed on the principle of forming the committee and stated this in
the Mandate text, the committee's structure was deferred to future discussions. As a
result, the committee has never been formed and confrontations over issues that this
committee was supposed to tackle have continued and intensified. The same thing
happened in 1947, when the international powers did not shoulder their responsi¬
bilities in implementing the internationalisation of the city as stated in UN
Resolution 181, and so the city was abandoned to the armed conflict between the
Arabs and Jews. Even when there have been peace accords between Israel and the
Arab countries such as Egypt in the late 1970s, and the Palestinians and Jordanians in
the 1990s, Jerusalem has been set aside for future negotiations. These tactics were
adopted in the hope that agreements on other issues would make it easier in the
future to resolve complex issues such as Jerusalem. Unfortunately, the opposite has
happened. The parties to the conflict, especially the Israelis post-1967, found that
they could avoid giving really urgent consideration to the political settlement of the
city. The situation that led Israel to adhere to a particular rhetoric addressed domestic
public opinion and was designed to avoid making any compromise on Jerusalem in a
future settlement, and so was created the concept of Jerusalem as a non-negotiable
issue.
Gradually the international community, as well as observers and academics,
acknowledged a situation in which neither the Israelis nor the Palestinians were
willing to compromise on their demands for the city. It meant that these parties
accepted that religion and historical rights could justify certain political positions. In
other words, it was not until 1967 that religion and history were exploited to justify
or assert that "all Jerusalem" must be the Israeli or the Palestinian capital.
Furthermore, there had been no clear connection between religion and the claim of
an "exclusive" sovereignty. All these possibilities began to be considered by
different parties in their reactions to the question of Jerusalem.
Until the early 1990s Arab proposals insisted on returning to the pre-1967
borders, whereas Israeli proposals refused any territorial change, concentrating
instead on municipal and religious solutions. Meanwhile, the international powers
made no serious efforts nor proposals.
In the early 1990s a new regional order in the Middle East was being
designed to guarantee American and Western interests in the region by accepting
Israel - the Western ally in the region - as part of the structure. The Palestinian
question had to be solved to enable the construction of the new order, which could be
seriously hampered by the territorial tension. This produced fresh attempts to deal
with the Jerusalem question in a different and more satisfactory way and so new
proposals with different terms began to be put forward. However, since the 1993
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Palestinian-Israeli interim agreements deferred Jerusalem to the final status
negotiations, there was no serious reconsideration of this question until the mid-
1990s.
The 1990s proposals show a different trend from those previously suggested.
First of all, the need for agreement motivated some voices to reject the zero-sum
definition and to look for a half-way house. It is noteworthy that intellectuals and
academics played a major role in this round. However, those proposals did not even
try to question the premises of the definitions of the conflict, especially those based
on religious and political pretexts justifying certain political positions. Instead, the
aim was to invent solutions to satisfy the various parties.
The following two examples are of particular importance. 'Adnan Abu-'Uda
published his own personal proposal, which was not the official Jordanian view, in
1992 in the Foreign Affairs journal. It received wide publicity. The starting-point
was the recognition that "Arabs (Muslims and Christians) and Jews are equally
bound to Jerusalem with the same intensity for the same reasons: religious
attachment, historical attachment and political attachment."1 The formula that would
give a political interpretation of this recognition was what Abu-'Uda called
"conceptual" treatment by using the name of the city. He suggested three names for
the city: "al-Quds" (Arabic), "Yerushalayim" (Hebrew), and "Jerusalem" (as used by
the rest of the world).
The Plan divided Jerusalem into three areas: firstly, the walled city: "the true
and holy Jerusalem [which] would belong to no single nation or religion". It would
belong to the "whole world", and therefore no state would have political sovereignty
over it. This part would be named "Jerusalem" and no flag would be raised there and
it would be open to all Muslims, Christians and Jews, governed by representatives of
the three religious authorities, each responsible for administering its holy places and
participating on an equal footing in administering "Jerusalem".
The second area, to be called "al-Quds", would include the east, north-east and
south-east of the walled city. It would be the Arab quarter and the Palestinian flag
would be flown there. Jewish settlements would be dealt with according to the
1 Adnan Abu Odeli, "Two Capitals in an Undivided Jerusalem", Foreign Affairs (Spring
1992), pp.183-188.
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solution reached for other settlements in the occupied territories. The third area,
"Yerushalayim", would include the west, north-west and south-west of the walled
city, where the Israeli flag would be raised.
Before commenting on this proposal, another proposal - what is known as the
Beilin-Abu Mazin understanding - will be examined. According to Israeli sources,
this understanding was reached on 31 October 1995 after secret negotiations between
Israeli and Palestinian teams, which largely consisted of academics. The Israeli side
consisted of the two academic members of the secret negotiations in Oslo, Ron
Pundik and Yair Hirschfeld, under the direction of Yossi Beilin, and the Palestinian
side of two UK-based Palestinian academics, Ahmad Khalidi and Husayn Agha,
under the direction of Mahmud 'Abbas (Abu Mazin).2 According to the Palestinian
side, namely Mahmud 'Abbas himself, "this document does not exist"; it was only
an academic discussion completed on that occasion, and he himself had no role in it.3
However, the ideas behind the "understanding" still deserve to be examined,
especially since they seem to be similar to those presented by the American Adminis¬
tration and President Clinton at the Camp David Summit in December 20004 (see
Chapter Five).
The "understanding" uses the idea of three names for the city, al-Quds (the
East sector), Yerushalayim (the West sector), and the City of Jerusalem, which
would be the whole city including the two parts. Al-Quds would be the Palestinian
capital, and Yerushalayim the Israeli capital. The city would remain "open and
undivided" with "free access for people of all faiths and nationalities". The municipal
system and boundaries would be reformed, and new areas annexed to the City of
Jerusalem: the Arab villages of Abu-DTs, 'Elzariyya, al-Ram, al-Zu'aim, together
with the Jewish settlements of Ma'ale Adumim, Givat Ze'ev, Givon and other areas.
The neighbourhoods inhabited by Palestinians would be defined as "Palestinian
boroughs" and those inhabited by Israelis would be "Israeli boroughs". The exact




Al-Hayat (10 September 2000).
4 The text of the plan in: Jewish Virtual Library:www.us-israel.org
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was stated that the number of boroughs allocated to each side would reflect the
present demographic balance of 2:1 in favour of Jewish interests. A joint higher
municipal council would be formed by representatives of the boroughs and those
representatives would elect the city mayor. However, the paper did not state the
number of representatives from each party who were to sit on the municipal council.
Clearly, if it reflected the 2:1 demographic balance, there would be a Jewish majority
and therefore a Jewish mayor. It was also specified that a joint parity committee was
to be elected for the Old City (where the Arabs have a clear majority).
Two sub-municipalities would be formed: one Palestinian and the other
Israeli, each elected by its respective boroughs. In all matters relating to the areas
under Palestinian sovereignty, the joint municipal council would seek the consent of
the government of Palestine, and the same arrangement would be applied to the areas
under Israeli sovereignty. The sovereignty beyond these boroughs and within the
municipal boundaries was to be left to further negotiations.
The solution for the Old City remained unclear. The paper stated that it would
be granted a "special status" and that the Israeli and Palestinian sub-municipalities
would each be responsible for its citizens in that area. In cases of dispute, the joint
parity committee would have the final decision. The issue of sovereignty over the
Old City remained ambiguous. It was declared that the State of Palestine should be
granted extraterritorial sovereignty over al-Haram al-Sharlf. While the Palestinian
sub-municipality would manage the Church of the Holy Sepulchre, the joint parity
committee should still "examine the possibility of assigning [to it] extra-territorial
status". This implied that Israel would have sovereignty over the Old City.
The importance of these two proposals, and the reason why they are
discussed in this conclusion, is that they contained a different attitude from those
proposed previously. Firstly, they clearly regarded the type of conflict as non-zero-
sum. Secondly, each of the parties to the conflict fully recognised the existence of
"the other". Instead of trying to annihilate it, it was ready to coexist peacefully. As
for the cause of the conflict, that is, "Jerusalem", Abu-'Uda's proposal distinguished
between what was called "true Jerusalem", and what could be called "untrue
Jerusalem". This idea was also implicit in the second proposal. There was the holy
Jerusalem with its religious significance, that is, the walled city, which included the
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holy places, and there was also the modern construction of al-Quds and
Yerushalayim.
The negotiations at Camp David in 2000 and Taba 2001 seemed to follow
more or less the same line of breaking the taboo of the non-negotiable city. Neverthe¬
less, they failed: at least the Camp David Summit failed and the negotiations at Taba
were brought to a halt (see Chapters One and Two).
The reason why the negotiations did not succeed was that further reconsidera¬
tion of the existing definitions was required. The fact that academics and intellectuals
played an essential role during the 1990s in shaping these ideas was important, since
they could distinguish between constructed "taboos", "myths" and definitions, which
served certain political agendas, and realities. They recognised the existence of the
two parties to the conflict, and that to deny the presence of one of them was useless.
They were also aware of the distinction between religious significance and its politi¬
cal interpretations, which were used to achieve certain political functions. However,
it seemed that further action was still necessary.
The tension following the collapse of the Camp David Summit, Ariel
Sharon's visit to al-Haram al-Sharif, and the confrontations that triggered the al-Aqsa
Intifada could give the impression that the peace process had come to an end and that
the progress achieved no longer existed.
However, some of the taboos had already been broken and would not be
reconstructed, such as that Jerusalem was non-negotiable. A return to the
negotiations has been strongly demanded by many international and regional powers
and factors. Moreover, a better understanding of the conflict will always be required,
whether there is a political process or not. Therefore, further study of the question of
Jerusalem is still needed.
Much action is yet to be taken and progress made if an agreement is to be
reached through negotiations. Academics and intellectuals are those best qualified to
carry out this task. It is not enough to recognise realities and reject claims and taboos
that some powers and politicians try to construct: they need to be confronted and
alternative visions promoted.
Although it could asserted that this aspect has been tackled, further efforts are
necessary. The idea of giving the city three names - Jerusalem, al-Quds and
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Yerushalayim - was suggested so as to grant each party its own imagined Jerusalem.
This was to satisfy the images projected and promoted by nationalist rhetoric. To
achieve further success, it is important to confront the rhetoric by reconsidering it
instead of inventing solutions to satisfy it. Instead of finding a solution to comply
with the present slogans of insisting that the city's religious status and history qualify
each party to claim exclusive sovereignty, or that religion means that the city must be
the capital of each state, the ideas behind the slogans should be questioned. Instead
of accepting that each party must gain what it claims now, and what each justifies by
reference to religious and historical claims and interpretations, it is important to ask
these parties to reconsider their claims. This is not a call to challenge religious
beliefs, but to question many political positions promoted in the name of religion,
and to confront newly constructed positions and invented premises, which are
presented as historical and holy principles.
As a practical example, Chapter Two shows how it could be argued that
Orthodox Judaism has no religious nor ideological position on the sovereignty issue
in general. The question of who should rule Jerusalem in the present era depends on
considerations of security and politics, not ideology and religion. Moreover, the
assertion of the centrality of Jerusalem in Zionist thought could be examined. Indeed,
several Jewish and Israeli scholars in recent years have been questioning the status of
the city in this school of thought. Although he does not deny that "Jerusalem has
been central to the thought and symbolism of Judaism",5 Bernard Wasserstein states
quite clearly in his book (published in 2001) that "religious devotion did not carry
with it, until very recently, a demand for [what he describes as] restoring
sovereignty."6 He notes also: "early Zionist thinkers generally avoided attributing
special importance to Jerusalem".7 Therefore, what I mean here is challenging not
religion and beliefs, but what has been lately projected in the name of religion, and
so restore to the conflict its territorial/political identity.
In the other camp, the Palestinians, Arabs and Muslims need to remember the
following comments by a prominent Muslim scholar, Yusif al-Qaradawi:
5
Wasserstein, Divided, p.3.




Some pious people think that the battle is to support belief, in the sense that
we fight Jews because they are Jews and do not believe in Muhammad's
message, ...and this view is completely wrong....the battle started because
of the occupation of the Islamic land.8
It cannot be said that religion does not affect the Muslim view of Jerusalem.
Nevertheless, there is a great difference between fighting Jews because they are
Jews, as some powers try to define the cause, and fighting them over a piece of
territory. Another point needs to be mentioned at the Palestinian level; that is, the
emphasis on Jerusalem as the capital of the Palestinian state. This demand is now
largely accepted by international governments and even the Israelis, although the
boundaries of the capital are still disputed. From a historical point of view, however,
Jerusalem had never been the capital of a Palestinian or Muslim state before the
British Mandate, even as an administrative centre. It did not achieve that status until
the nineteenth century and it was applicable only to the southern area of the present
Palestine. 'Adnan Abu-'Uda, in challenging the Israeli attempt to capitalise on this
fact at the United Nations, gave a religious historical interpretation. He indicated that
none of the holy cities in Islam had ever been the political centre or capital: neither
Mecca, nor Medina, nor Jerusalem. Nevertheless, this did not reduce the religious
importance of the city.9 It also means that religious importance does not always have
to be reflected as political status.
The history of coexistence, including modern examples such as the mixed
Jewish-Arab municipality in Jerusalem pre-1948 and the 1948-1967 partition, must
be invoked to show the extent to which the present position has been exploited as an
instrument of propaganda. Yet, new cultural and intellectual contexts that question
the very bases of the definitions have been promoted need to be developed.
Academics could contribute by finding the appropriate contexts and confronting
public opinion with the necessity of reconsidering many of the slogans and claims
presented by certain elites and treated as if they were immutable holy principles.
However, it should be borne in mind that these views and recommendations
imply that the peace process will be resumed under the same conditions of the
8 Yusif al-QaradawI, al-Quds fl al-wa'i al-Islami [Jerusalm in the Islamic Awareness],




present regional order, which was originally based on the nation-state scheme
implemented in the Middle East. It is also important to remember that the region is
not immune from challenges and instability. The Jerusalem question could be
affected by the situation in other Arab and Muslim countries, just as the Arab and




Population of Jerusalem by groups
"According to Israeli statistics"
1967-1998





1967 266.3 197.7 68.6 74.2 25.8
1970 291.7 215.5 76.2 73.9 26.1
1972 313.8 230.3 83.5 73.4 26.6
1974 252.8 252.8 93.2 73.1 26.9
1976 366.3 266.0 100.3 72.6 27.4
1977 376.0 272.3 103.7 72.4 27.6
1978 386.6 279.4 107.2 72.3 27.7
1979 398.2 287.4 110.8 72.2 27.8
1980 407.1 292.3 114.8 71.8 28.2
1981 415.0 297.6 117.4 71.7 28.3
1982 424.4 304.2 120.2 71.7 28.3
1983 428.7 306.3 122.4 71.4 28.6
1984 447.8 321.1 126.5 71.7 28.2
1985 457.7 327.7 130.0 71.6 28.4
1986 468.9 336.1 132.8 71.7 28.3
1987 482.6 346.1 136.5 71.7 28.3
1988 493.5 353.9 139.6 71.7 28.3
1989 504.1 361.5 142.6 71.7 28.3
1990 524.5 378.2 146.3 72.1 27.9
1991 544.2 392.8 151.3 72.2 27.8
1992 556.5 401.0 155.5 72.1 27.9
1993 567.2 406.4 160.8 71.7 28.3
1994 578.8 411.9 166.9 71.2 28.8
1995 602.7 420.9 181.8 69.8 30.2
1996 613.6 426.2 184.6 69.5 30.1
1997 622.1 429.1 189.5 69.0 30.5
1998 633.7 433.6 200.1 68.4 31.6
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